

**THE EVOLUTION OF CIGARETTE
ADVERTISING**

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THE EVOLUTION OF CIGARETTE ADVERTISING

An Abstract
Presented to
the Graduate Council of
Austin Peay State University

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts

by
William Paul Martin

August 1980

In the years that followed, cigarette advertisements in printed materials would continue to be of importance, and, with advancements in technology, corporate leaders would turn their attention to new advertising mediums with which they could promote their brands. Therefore, radio and television began to play an integral part in the growth of the cigarette industry. With new outlets to make use of, tobacco executives began to prepare larger advertising budgets in hopes of increasing sales.

Eventually an attack on cigarette advertisements was begun and it would lead to a full-fledged antismoking campaign. As a result, cigarette advertisements were banned from radio and television and would return once again to the old outlets. So, cigarettes would be advertised heavily in newspapers and magazines; companies would change in their corporate structures; smokers would continue to light up and profits would continue to rise.

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
To the Graduate Council:

I am submitting herewith a Thesis written by William Paul Martin entitled "The Evolution of Cigarette Advertising." I recommend that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts, with a major in History.


Major Professor

We have read this thesis and recommend its acceptance:


Second Committee Member


Third Committee Member

Accepted for the
Graduate Council:


Dean of the Graduate School

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CHAPTER I

THE CREATION OF CONSUMER DEMAND

The cigarette is as much a part of America as are "baseball, hot dogs, apple pie and Chevrolet." To a great extent, this is due to the promotion of cigarettes through the mass media. Tobacco executives realized this from the beginning and, therefore, never feared the development of huge advertising budgets.

A crude form of the modern cigarette was born when Spanish explorers arrived in Yucatan in 1518. An old chief welcomed them by sharing a Mexican delicacy--the "reed cigarette." The reed was filled with native tobaccos and herbs. When the Spaniards returned home, they replaced the reed with a paper wrapper.

In 1832, an Egyptian army under Ibrahim laid seige to Acre, a stronghold held by Suleiman Bey and his Turks. An Egyptian soldier began to roll gun powder in hand paper spills and the cannonade attack was speeded up to a great extent. In appreciation, Ibrahim sent the gun crew a gift of tobacco. The soldiers filled the one pipe they had and passed it among themselves. Then a turkish cannon ball lobbed in and shattered the "community" pipe. The Egyptians were disconsolate until the same gunner began to

roll the tobacco in some of his paper spills, and passed them out to his fellow artillerymen.¹

The cigarette industry began when English soldiers captured a train of Russian officers in the Crimea in 1854. The officers carried with them an adequate supply of Russian-made cigarettes, cigarettes rolled with Turkish tobacco. The British soldiers kept the cigarettes when they traded the officers. Returning home, they brought with them a demand for the Russian-made cigarettes. Small London tobacconists, among them Philip Morris, Esquire, hand-rolled the Turkish cigarettes to order. Inevitably, the fad soon spread to New York.

In America, the Russian cigarette was a specialty item. Brand names were most descriptive. Those aimed at high society were called Opera Puffs, Bon Ton, Fragrant Vanity Fair, Turkish Orientals, and Three Kings. Other cigarettes were aimed at anybody who had a dime, and bore such names as Old Rip, Old Judge, and Canvas Back.²

In 1874, a tobacco firm was born which was destined to make some stir in the world--"W. Duke and Sons."³ In 1878, a formal partnership of Washington Duke, his three sons, and

¹Hannah Campbell, Why Did They Name It...? (New York: Fleet Press Corporation, 1964), p. 98.

²Ibid., p. 99.

³John W. Jenkins, James B. Duke (New York: George H. Doran Co., 1927), (Spartanburg: The Reprint Co., 1971), p. 54.

George W. Watts of Baltimore was formed, and two years later Washington Duke sold his interest to Richard H. Wright, a successful tobacco manufacturer. James Duke succeeded to effective control of the business, which at this time was worth about \$70,000.⁴

The chief rival of the Dukes was Blackwell and Company, manufacturers of the famous Bull Durham brand of smoking tobacco, which enjoyed wide popularity. The Duke brands were unable to make satisfactory progress against this competition. James B. Duke had the good sense to acknowledge this fact.⁵ "My company is up against a stone wall. It cannot compete with the Bull. Something has to be done and that quick. As for me, I am going into the cigarette business."⁶

When Duke entered this field, only a few firms in America, mainly in New York and Virginia, were making cigarettes on a large scale. Foremen and expert workers had to be drawn from them because local workers were not familiar with cigarette manufacture.⁷ As superintendent of the cigarette

⁴Richard B. Tennant, The American Cigarette Industry (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950), p. 22.

⁵Ibid.

⁶Joseph C. Robert, The Story of Tobacco in America (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1967), p. 140.

⁷Jenkins, op. cit., p. 66.

department, Duke employed one of the pioneer cigarette rollers in the United States, J.M. Siegel, a Russian Jew, who had learned the craft in the government factories of Kovno.⁸

Sensing that the future belonged to those who could most effectively employ labor-saving devices, Duke acquired on a royalty basis the Bonsack cigarette machine.⁹ The first fully satisfactory cigarette rolling machine was patented by James A. Bonsack in 1881, and was subsequently improved. In this machine, an endless belt underlay both paper and filler and passed through the mechanism with both. Bonsack's distinctive contributions were improvements in the tobacco feeding mechanism, the cigarette forming tube, and the cutting knife. His machine weighed a ton, absorbed one-half horsepower, and required an operator and two feeders. It could produce 200-220 cigarettes per minute. The Bonsack Machine Company customarily rented its machines, complete with operator, on a royalty basis, charging thirty cents or thirty-three cents per thousand, depending upon whether a printing device was used. A guarantee of \$200 per month was required. Even with these royalties, the Bonsack machine reduced the cost of rolling cigarettes by more than half. The labor costs alone of this operation were cut to two cents per thousand. With these savings, it was inevitable machine methods should replace hand manufacture on all but the most expensive brands.

⁸Robert, op. cit., p. 141.

⁹Ibid., p. 142.

Thus, by the middle 1880's, the cost of producing cigarettes was sharply reduced, both by the use of domestic leaf and by the development of machine manufacture. Further savings were secured in 1883, when the tax on small cigarettes was reduced to fifty cents per thousand. The large decline in total cost from all causes could have its effect either in reduced prices to the consumer, in heavier selling expense, or in larger profits for the manufacturers themselves. Ultimately, all three results occurred; each encouraged the further growth of the industry.

The principal effect of the change in technology, however, was upon market structure. Machinery increased the optimum scale of enterprise, and this encouraged the concentration of output. Moreover, the sudden introduction of the new methods caused temporary instability in competitive relationships, which favored the courageous innovator. The ultimate consequence was a complete revision of the structure of the industry and the establishment of extreme concentration of output and power.¹⁰

Duke had obtained an important advantage. For a brief period he was the sole user of machinery; later, he had the best machine available on better terms than anyone else could obtain. Duke had a royalty advantage which permitted price concessions or increased selling expenditures.

¹⁰Tennant, op. cit., pp. 18-19.

The Bonsack machine contract was not the sole explanation of Duke's success. In other hands it would not have been enough. In addition to his royalty advantage, Duke possessed commercial genius and a driving capacity to sell tobacco products.¹¹

During this period cigarettes were poorly packed. Some were sold in boxes, which were expensive. For the most part, they were put up in flimsy paper packs, easily crushed. A proper package was needed, attractive in appearance, protecting cigarettes from breakage or crushing, and so devised they could be extracted readily by the smoker. There being nothing in existence meeting these requirements, Duke himself invented it. The result was the familiar sliding box, which later came into general use. It was composed of two pieces of pasteboard, one pasted together, constituting the cover, the other folded, forming the inner portion, the sliding box. Millions of them were used annually, and bore, on the inside slip, Duke's name and signature.

Machines were designed which would, at a single blow, stamp out the pasteboard shapes. Therefore, Duke installed his own printing and box-making machinery; all the operations of cutting, printing, and completing the package were performed automatically in his plant. Use of the machines had reduced the cost of manufacture from eighty cents to thirty

¹¹Ibid., p. 21.

cents a thousand. Turning out better made, better packed cigarettes at less cost than other manufacturers, Duke could produce them in unlimited quantities. The one thing necessary was to sell them.¹²

Duke decided upon a daring sales campaign that would cover Europe and the Orient, as well as America. R.H. Wright was sent on a nineteen-month trip around the world. He successfully opened foreign markets to Duke cigarettes. Edward F. Small and other salesmen toured the principal domestic markets, visiting jobbers and retailers, both to sell goods and to observe consumer preferences.¹³

In connection with the sales drive, Duke carried on an extensive advertising campaign that familiarized the public with his brands and made his largest competitors "sit up and take notice." But advertising alone was not depended upon to market his products. He backed it up by salesmanship extending from the factory door clear through to the consumer.

Duke cigarettes suddenly became the cheapest in the market. Orders poured in from every part of the country. The large surplus of cigarettes, which had been created by the use of the Bonsack machine during the first year of operation, could now be utilized. Competitors were distanced. With low manufacturing costs, better packing,

¹²Jenkins, op. cit., pp. 68-69.

¹³Tennant, op. cit., pp. 22-23.

large advertising and lower prices, Duke was in the strongest possible position.¹⁴

Realizing that the cigarette was, first of all, an urban smoke, James B. Duke in 1884 established a branch in New York City.¹⁵ He got the feel of the budding market by canvassing retailers himself, arranging for billboards and newspaper advertisements, and swelling New York's production totals by setting up a factory in a loft on Rivington Street. In addition to his original cigarette brand, Duke of Durham, Duke manufactured Cyclone, Cameo, Cross Cut, and Duke's Best, the last four introduced in cigarette form when he invaded New York.¹⁶

Duke became one of the country's largest advertisers, setting the pace for big business in other lines as well as his own. In the use of large space in newspapers, magazines, theater programs, on billboards and everywhere advertisements catch the public eye, he was a pioneer, backing his faith with his money.¹⁷ In 1884 Duke bought 380,000 chairs, painted on the back of each an advertisement of one of his brands of cigarettes, and placed a chair in every cigar store in the country.¹⁸

¹⁴Jenkins, op. cit. pp. 69-71.

¹⁵John K. Winkler, Tobacco Tycoon: The Story of James Buchanan Duke (New York: Random House, 1942), p. 60.

¹⁶Robert K. Heimann, Tobacco and Americans (New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1960), p. 212.

¹⁷Jenkins, op. cit., p. 77.

¹⁸New York Times, October 11, 1925, p. 25, col. 2.

Duke demonstrated that national advertising on a large scale not only could be made to pay, but was one of the best investments for any firm that had something to sell which the public wanted. He created what experts now call "consumer demand." Smokers walked into stores by thousands, calling for his brands by name. Familiar with them, they would take nothing else.¹⁹

The arts of promotion, which Duke polished in New York, were designed, not to increase the use of tobacco as such (history had already demonstrated that would take care of itself), but to funnel as much of it as possible into cigarettes, and into his particular brands. Having begun as a "commercial traveler" at the age of eight, Duke was well equipped to train the drummers who blanketed his market. The tools of their trade were of New York origin: "photo-arto-types" or picture cards, sometimes called "Russell cards" after their principal subject, actress Lillian Russell, although cards picturing baseball players, boxers, and other notables helped fill the "cigarette sandwich." Coupons redeemable for "mantlepiece clocks" and the like were widely used. Duke's Cross Cut Polo Team advertised the cigarette and smoking tobacco of that name as it rolled across the country to meet all corners (it played on roller skates, not on horses). Where the local situation permitted, attractive

¹⁹Jenkins. loc. cit.

women salesmen were employed, in itself an attention-getting device. His object was to learn how the leading manufacturers played the game, and then beat them at it. In 1889, he poured \$800,000 into promotion, a staggering sum for a small business.²⁰

Smokers welcomed the advent of factory-made cigarettes, and with the perfecting of the Bonsack machine, the cigarette era arrived. In 1885, one billion cigarettes were produced, though not until 1921 did cigarettes surpass all other forms of tobacco consumption.²¹

R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Company was founded in 1875 by Richard Joshua Reynolds. During the early years of the business, chewing tobaccos were the only products made. But nationwide recognition came with the introduction of Prince Albert smoking tobacco in 1907. A few years later, Reynolds entered the cigarette field and introduced the world's first blended cigarette. Oriental names were popular with tobacco fanciers of that era. Reynolds decided the camel evoked an image of the exotic orient and suited the Turkish tobaccos the new cigarette would contain.

In Richmond, the litographers prepared two labels, "Kamel" and "Camel," with the latter winning out. A great deal of attention was paid to the wording, especially to the

²⁰Heimann, *op. cit.*, p. 213.

²¹Campbell, *loc. cit.*

famous inscription advising purchasers: "Don't look for premiums or coupons, as the cost of the tobaccos blended in Camel Cigarettes prohibits the use of them." The label's background of temples, minarets, an oasis, and pyramids was much like it is today; the camel in the foreground was a pathetic, one-humped beast with short, pointed ears, two-pronged hoofs and a drooping neck.

Camel's impact was astounding. At that time, cigarettes held only sectional appeal--Fatima in the East, Picayune in New Orleans, and so forth. But Reynolds, through an innovative advertising and sales campaign, managed to create a national taste.

The name, Camel, coincided with the annual visit of Barnum and Bailey's circus to Winston-Salem, which featured an Arabian dromedary called "Old Joe." Mr. Reynolds sent R. C. Haberken to take pictures of "Old Joe" from which drawings would be made. On October 21, 1913, a gigantic advertising campaign launched Camel cigarettes. N. W. Ayer handled the campaign and was paid \$250,000 for its efforts. The campaign took the form of four "teaser advertisements," each bearing the illustration of "Old Joe" as he appears on the package, but each having a different copy. The first appeared a few days before the introduction of Camels, bearing the single word "Camels"; the second announced, "The Camels are coming!"; the third predicted, "Tomorrow there will be more Camels in this town than in all Asia and Africa

combined"; the following day, when the cigarettes went on sale, the final advertisement proclaimed: "Camel cigarettes are here." In 1914, The Saturday Evening Post printed its first cigarette advertisement, a two-page Camel spread.

In that year, the company sold 425 million cigarettes. By 1921, the figure had risen to more than 18 billion, and one-half the cigarettes smoked in the United States were Camels. During World War I, doughboys in France asked for more Camels. General Pershing himself sent the appeal on to Winston-Salem.

With Camels booming, salesmen were busier than ever. The public wanted the new taste; they liked the ten cent price, too, as most rivals were fifteen cents.²²

In 1921, the company developed one of the best-known slogans in cigarette advertising: "I'd Walk a Mile For a Camel." It originated with an unidentified man who asked a sign painter, at work on a Camel billboard, for a smoke. He was given a Camel. "Thanks," said the stranger, as he lighted the cigarette and inhaled. "I'd walk a mile for a Camel."²³

Another version of this slogan reported that a foursome of golfers were fresh out of cigarettes. They sent for a new supply. While they waited, one of them said to Martin Reddington, who handled Reynolds' outdoor advertisements, "I'd

²²Jerome Beatty Jr., Our 100th Anniversary, 1875-1975 (Winston-Salem: R. J. Reynolds Industries, Inc., 1975), pp. 2-10.

²³Campbell, op. cit., p. 102.

walk a mile for a Camel." He worked it into a poster, using a New Haven fireman as a model. Soon, the famous slogan appeared on billboards and in newspapers and magazines.²⁴

P. Lorillard, the oldest tobacco company in existence today, was founded in 1760 by Pierre Lorillard. Snuff was the speciality of the Lorillard Company; from the revenues earned on this product, the company would be able to branch out into other tobacco products.²⁵

Cigarette smokers in the United States began by rolling their own, and Lorillard provided them with inexpensive, fine cut tobaccos such as Ante, Caboose, Golden Floss, and Comet. Although the best rollers could manage in a high wind, the average smoker welcomed the advent of factory-made cigarettes. The original filling of straight domestic tobacco, bright flue-cured, came to be blended with the Turkish variety. Lorillard brands went oriental in fact and in name: Egyptian Deities, Helmar, Murad, Mogul, and Turkish Trophies. Gods of the Nile, harem beauties, and potentates appeared on boxes. The short, convenient cigarette was welcomed, not only for its smoking pleasure, but for its social value. Shy people lit one up in embarrassing moments, and Lorillard took note with its memorable advertising series: "Be Nonchalant--Light a Murad."²⁶

²⁴Beatty, op. cit., p. 11.

²⁵Campbell, op. cit., p. 105.

²⁶P. Lorillard Co., Lorillard and Tobacco (New York: P. Lorillard Co., 1960), pp. 28-29.

Cigarette sales brought the age of premiums to maturity. It started when salesmen presented dealers with lighters and clocks along with displays. It boomed when tobacco companies offered customers, in exchange for brand coupons, a vast variety of presents, ranging from shoelaces, garters, and silk stockings to lamps and hand-cranked washing machines.

Seldom have premiums caused such furor as they did during the sales campaign devised by Lorillard to advertise its hundredth anniversary in 1860. In honor of the occasion, the company brought out its Century brand, a fine cut tobacco well suited for hand-made cigarettes. Into a random package of each day's output of Century was slipped \$100 in currency. Fortunate purchasers who hit the jackpot, and others who kept trying, deluged smokers of the family with Century, until the authorities criticized the practice as too close to a lottery.²⁷

Also costly, but highly effective in the promotion of cigarettes, were the trade cards placed in each pack. Engraved or printed, paper or cloth, they were a riot of color, and covered every subject under the sun. Joseph C. Robert wrote that "a man bought not so much a box of cigarettes as a Yale pennant, a miniature oriental rug, a silk flag, a map of Portugal, or a picture of Lillian Russell." Lorillard cards featured actresses and queens, athletes and

²⁷ Ibid., p. 29.

Indian chiefs, banners and mottos, fruits and flowers, birds and beasts. The cards stirred the collecting mania, and were briskly traded or pasted in albums.²⁸

"It pays to advertise the product so that everybody will know it's available," runs a cardinal principle in P. Lorillards Company's basic formula for success. On the New York sidewalks and in the woods of Westchester, from fashionable Tuxedo Park to the ancient ruins of Yucatan, four generations of Lorillards lived up to that principle by keeping their name before the public. Ways and means varied from stamping tin tags to printing a national magazine, and from winning the English Derby to slapping a large mosquito.

Peter and George Lorillard were strong and imaginative believers in the art of advertising. Like other merchants, they made use of bill posters, a classic technique of the time. Their advertisements in the New York Daily Advertiser were directed not only to the city customer but to country storekeepers who came to town to buy merchandise.

In 1913, the company began to publish a national magazine. Its very name, Lorillards Magazine, was an advertisement. But its content was in the great tradition, featuring Booth Tarkington's immortal Penrod, and stories by O. Henry, Ring Lardner, and Irvin S. Cobb. Illustrators were also first-rate: Rose O'Neil, Gordon Grant, Fred Oppen,

²⁸Ibid., pp. 29-30.

comic strip artist and cartoonist. Dr. Frank Crane wrote, "No man comes rolling home and beats his wife under the influence of tobacco." The magazine also ran full color advertisements of Lorillard brands. These continued the tradition of Lorillard "firsts," because the company had led off in the use of four-color lithographs for brands and advertising.²⁹

A colorful figure headed the family and firm in Pierre Lorillard IV. While he was duck hunting in a marsh, a large mosquito landed on Mr. Lorillard's neck. The hunter slapped hastily, but missed, and the insect buzzed triumphantly away, its sting delivered. Ruefully rubbing the spot, the victim exclaimed, "What a sensation!" Then and there a new brand name was born--Sensation--and on each of its boxes of cigarettes was pictured a zooming mosquito. When later on it was removed from labels, many customers complained; the mascot was ordered back.³⁰

There are more ways of selling wares than direct advertising. Irish Sir Thomas Lipton helped sell his brands of tea by sailing international yacht races. Pierre Lorillard IV won horse races and, incidentally, kept his tobaccos in the running.

²⁹Ibid., pp. 41-42.

³⁰Ibid., pp. 42-45.

Lorillard's fleet brown gelding, Parole, named for one of his brands, won fifty-nine races with purses amounting to \$83,000. In 1877, Parole, with the odds against him, was matched with the Kentucky thoroughbred, Ten Broeck, and Tom Ochiltree in the Pimlico Sweepstakes. Parole came from behind to win by four lengths.

Another racer, Iroquois, carried Pierre Lorillard's colors, cherry and black, to victory in the English Derby of 1881. Iroquois was the first American horse to win the classic; the news touched off a widespread celebration in the United States.³¹

When Turkish cigarettes became popular, the American Tobacco Company, which had been founded by James B. Duke in 1890, introduced Pall Mall as a straight Turkish cigarette in a deep purple slide and shell box at a price of twenty-five cents a box. Pall Mall was named for a London street noted for its fashionable address and exclusive clubs. The Pall Mall motto, "In hoc signo vinces" ("By this sign we are victorious"), was used to enhance the image of the cigarette.³²

Cigarette sales climbed, and in 1910 the total for the nation was 8,600,000,000. The American Tobacco Company

³¹Ibid., pp. 46-47.

³²Campbell, op. cit., p. 110.

produced eighty-two per cent of these cigarettes. In 1911, American Tobacco was declared a monopoly by the government. Duke's combine was dissolved.³³ As a result, the majority of today's major tobacco companies emerged, including the "Big Four"--American Tobacco, Liggett and Myers, Lorillard, and R. J. Reynolds.³⁴

In 1916, American Tobacco introduced Lucky Strike, a blended cigarette, which gained popularity through 1925, the year James B. Duke died. Duke's successor as president, Percival S. Hill, died two months later; he was succeeded by his son, George Washington Hill, who would become the virtuoso of tobacco advertising.

Upset by the fact Lucky Strike ranked third in national sales, Hill's first move as president was to concentrate all the company's selling and advertising energy on this brand. The result was a series of imaginative campaigns that moved Lucky Strike into first place in eleven of the next eighteen years. Hill originated such famous slogans as "Reach for a Lucky," and "With Men Who Know Tobacco Best, It's Luckies Two to One."³⁵

In 1912, Liggett and Myers introduced the Chesterfield brand of cigarettes. This brand name was given to

³³New York Times, May 30, 1911, p. 1, col. 1.

³⁴Campbell, loc. cit.

³⁵Ibid., p. 111.

Liggett and Myers when the Tobacco Trust was dissolved. Chesterfields were named after Lord Chesterfield, fourth Earl of Stanhope. He had achieved world fame, as his name became synonymous with "the gracious way of life." Chesterfield was an excellent choice in brand names. When cigarettes became the favorite form of tobacco in 1921, Chesterfield was one of three brands to "set the fashion and the standard of excellence all over the world."³⁶

Women of the early 1900's were criticized, and even arrested, for smoking cigarettes. All the same, more women began to smoke in the privacy of their own homes; high society ladies affected the habit as evidence of their cosmopolitan sophistication. Oriental women in costume were pictured on the packages of two popular cigarette brands, but they did not threaten the sacredness of American womanhood.³⁷

In 1926, Chesterfield introduced a poster advertisement that helped to revolutionize cigarette advertising. A man and woman were shown seated on a moonlit river bank. The man was lighting a cigarette, and the girl coaxed: "Blow some my way." A storm of protest arose against the advertisement, but other companies followed Chesterfield's lead. It meant that women who wanted to smoke could do so

³⁶ Ibid., pp. 113-114.

³⁷ Ibid., p. 113.

openly, thus destroying a predominant social taboo. It also opened a new market that could double the sale of cigarettes.³⁸

By the middle of the 1920's the cigarette had been firmly entrenched as the favorite form of tobacco consumption in the United States. The consumer's demand for cigarettes had been met by the various tobacco companies. This had been accomplished in part through the use of extensive advertising. Therefore, in order to increase the growth of the public's demand for cigarettes, innovative forms of advertising would be needed, and this in turn would bring about the use of new advertising mediums.

³⁸ Ibid.

CHAPTER II

NEW ADVERTISING MEDIUMS

By the late 1920's, the major tobacco companies had become very competitive and large-scale advertising became essential in order to get the upper hand on the competition. As a result, new advertising schemes, themes, and mediums were introduced. In planning new cigarette advertisements, agencies began to use airplanes, contests, public opinion polls, movies, radio, war, and, eventually, television.

P. Lorillard entered the blended cigarette field in 1926, when it introduced Old Gold. At this time, blended cigarette brands were already deeply entrenched in consumer markets. Brand habits and loyalties had been established by great masses of people. Hence, when Lorillard moved into this tremendously competitive market, its planning and execution had to be both original and bold. As a matter of fact, many of the now accepted advertising and merchandising techniques were thought of, and demonstrated, during this introductory period of launching Old Golds.

Large-scale consumer testing started when Lorillard approached the public to determine the cigarette blend that should eventually become Old Gold. New blends were created and rolled in plain cigarette paper. Then the company bought up large amounts of competitors' cigarettes and rerolled these

cigarettes also in unmarked paper. The various cigarettes were identified by a secret key symbol on each. They were enclosed in unmarked packages. Then the cigarettes were passed out to thousands of smokers throughout the country. Pick your favorite, please, Lorillard asked, for taste, flavor, aroma, and report it by symbol.

The returns that were tabulated leaned heavily in favor of one of Lorillard's new blends. There was no question that this new blend was the samplers' preference. The blend was christened Old Gold after the Old Southern belt of Virginia where the rich golden tobacco was grown. The new cigarette was aggressively introduced in New England, as a test market.¹

A series of advertising innovations served to broaden the range of Lorillard's sales program. The company developed sky advertising in 1927, when it chartered an airplane equipped with a loudspeaker, piano, announcer, and a singer--known as "The Voice from the Sky"--to promote Old Golds. In its print advertising, Old Gold used the first comic strip in advertising, and contracted with such public favorites as the John Held flappers, Petty girls and Ripley's "Believe It or Not."²

Another advertising campaign conducted by the Company concerned itself with the Old Gold "Blindfold Test." In the

¹p. Lorillard Co., op. cit., pp. 30-31.

²Ibid., pp. 47-48.

test, Old Gold and three other brands were bound by a numbered outer wrapper which concealed their names. Guests at hotels and restaurants were asked to try them, make note of the one they liked best, then remove the wrapper. This "prove it yourself" method seemed to click with the public. It paved the way for the cigarette's expansion across the country.³

In its radio advertising, Lorillard worked hard, not only to promote Old Golds, but to popularize such entertainers as Paul Whiteman, the Dorsey Brothers, Ferde Grofe, Bing Crosby, Frank Sinatra, and Fred Waring and his Pennsylvanians. Lorillard's sponsorship of Whiteman was the occasion for another "first," a coast-to-coast radio network program in 1928. Lorillard was also the first to use a Broadway theater for a radio program, when it sponsored a show in 1932 designed and produced by the great George M. Cohan.⁴

Each of the advertising strategies employed by Lorillard helped give Old Gold the necessary momentum that, by the early 1930's, made it one of the country's leading cigarette brands, and each of the strategies shared in common one particular advertising phrase--"not a cough in a carload." Thus, through the expediency of advertising, Old Gold was able to establish itself as one of the favorites among blended cigarettes.

³Ibid., p. 31.

⁴Ibid., p. 48.

By 1929, the American Tobacco Company had promoted Lucky Strike to such an extent that it had surpassed some of the more popular brands of blended cigarettes. George Washington Hill, American's president, had used several advertising campaigns to accomplish this for Lucky Strike. He had no intention of watching the cigarette backslide. Therefore, in his advertising strategy, Hill also made use of the radio, which had just graduated from the crystal-set-and-earphones stage. Hill was the mastermind behind the Lucky Strike "Hit Parade" program which lasted twenty-five years, and the famous chant of the tobacco auctioneer, L. S. "Speed" Riggs, who always ended with the classic, "Sold, American."⁵

Philip Morris, the oldest name in the cigarette industry, was acquired by American stockholders in 1919. The company had grown tremendously, and advertising had played an important role in that growth. Melton Biow and Kenneth Goode, two advertising men, in 1933, asked a bellhop at the New Yorker Hotel to page Philip Morris. The bellhop was John Roventini, a twenty-two year old dwarf. "Johnny" looked at the card handed him on which were printed the words, "Call for Philip Morris." Johnny walked through the crowded lobby, singing out in the clear voice that was soon to become famous-- "Call for Philip Mar-a-iss! Call for Philip Mar-a-iss!"⁶

⁵Campbell, op. cit., p. 111.

⁶Philip Morris, Inc., Philip Morris History (New York: Philip Morris, Inc., 1978), p. 2.

Johnny's voice and unique inflections caught the attention of everyone in the lobby. Biow and Goode were delighted. The slogan was good and Johnny was perfect. John Roventini became Johnny "Philip Morris", and his "Call for Philip Morris" rang out everywhere.⁷ Johnny was introduced on radio (NBC) for the first time on April 17, 1933. This initial appearance marked the beginning of Johnny's promotional career for Philip Morris. He would work as a spokesman for the company until his retirement on October 14, 1974.⁸

A battle was taking place in the field of cigarette advertising. Realizing that Camel was no longer unique, it had been passed already by Lucky Strike and Chesterfield, and that new thinking was needed, R. J. Reynolds decided to change advertising agencies. After a brief period with Erwin Wasey and Company, Reynolds, in 1932, signed up with William C. Esty and his new firm.⁹

For most of the 1930's Reynolds each year put an amount equal to more than half of its net earnings into magazines, newspapers, billboards, gratis goods, point-of-purchase advertising, and the new medium--radio. Most of the money was spent on advertising Camel. In 1934, advertising costs for the company totaled nearly eighty-one percent of net earnings.¹⁰

⁷Campbell, op. cit., p. 115.

⁸Philip Morris, Inc., op. cit., pp. 3-12.

⁹Beatty, op. cit., p. 14.

¹⁰Ibid.

Reynolds was the first company with a particular packaging improvement when it wrapped Camels in moisture-proof cellophane. To attract attention, the company sponsored a nationwide \$50,000 contest, with half of the money reserved for first prize for the best answers to the question: "What significant change has recently been made in the wrapping of the Camel package and what are its advantages to the smoker?"

There were close to one million entries. A Boston milkman, a Brooklyn housewife, and a Duluth real estate dealer won the top three prizes and were brought to Winston-Salem for an elaborate awards banquet which featured two radio stars, Morton Downey and Tony Wons.¹¹

"It's Fun To Be Fooled...It's More Fun To Know" was the theme of yet another very successful advertising series established by Reynolds. Each advertisement featured a magician's trick and an explanation of how it was done. The series became so popular that the company mailed out one million copies of "The Magician's Handy Book of Cigarette Tricks." Magicians still complain about the revelations in those advertisements.¹²

Other interesting advertising themes followed. Some of them focused on well-known athletes of the day, such as Bill Tilden and Carl Hubbell. "Try Ten Camels" with a money-back guarantee was another; the highlight of outdoor advertising

¹¹ Ibid., pp. 14-15.

¹² Ibid., p. 15.

for Camel was a huge 3,000-square-foot electric sign overlooking Times Square from Forty-fourth Street.¹³

R. J. Reynolds also considered radio advertising essential and invested heavily in the new medium. The first radio programs sponsored by Camel cigarettes were the Camel Pleasure Hour and the All-Star Radio Revue, which began in 1930. They were followed by the Camel Caravan, featuring Walter O'Keefe and Robert Benchley as masters of ceremonies, Annette Hanshaw, Ted Husing, and Glenn Gray's Casa Loma Orchestra. Later radio sponsorships included Eddie Cantor, Benny Goodman, and Vaughn Monroe.¹⁴

The cigarette war ended in 1935 when, thanks to what one Reynolds executive called the "whizz and whozzle" of its advertising programs, Camel regained leadership over its rivals.¹⁵

During the 1930's, cigarette advertisements showed comfortable people at ease, in better than average surroundings, talking and laughing, with a cigarette in their mouths or between their fingers. One such advertisement for Camel stated: "For Digestion's Sake--Smoke Camels," with testimonials from society women. But at this time many Americans had little food to digest, and had little in common with the New York Smart Set. These advertisements indicated

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 16.

¹⁵ Ibid.

that the major tobacco firms were out of touch with reality.¹⁶

The movies of this period attempted to portray this reality, and the images created on the screen benefited the cigarette manufacturers. With Warner Brothers leading the way, several companies released films of social conscience in which the criminal or member of the low class smoked cigarettes. Such actors as James Cagney, Paul Muni, Humphrey Bogart, and George Raft starred in these roles. With the quasi-revolutionary atmosphere of the time, they were looked upon as heroes. After several protests against such films were made, and the studios had time to react, the same actors were cast as Federal agents or policemen; the cigarettes remained. Working women, often their consorts or wives, played by Ann Dvorak, Ann Sheridan, Bette Davis, and others, also smoked cigarettes. It seemed as though most heroes and heroines were addicted to them. As a result, the most important and effective entertainment medium of the 1930's proved to be a useful tool in the promotion of cigarettes.¹⁷

In 1933, musical comedies and light romances were quite popular; if James Cagney smoked a Lucky, what did Fred Astaire remove from his silver case? Certainly not the same kind of smoke. The Philip Morris Company, which had

¹⁶ Robert Sobel, They Satisfy (Garden City: Anchor Press/Doubleday, 1978), p. 112.

¹⁷ Ibid.

introduced Philip Morris English Blend to compete with the standard American brands, hoped to attract the Fred Astaire-Cary Grant-Adolphe Menjou-William Powell set, and not the commoners.¹⁸

According to the records of cigarette sales during the years of World War I, soldiers smoked more than did civilians. There seemed no reason to think it would be different in a new war. Tobacco company executives knew the statistics by heart: Cigarette production went from eighteen billion in 1914 to twenty-six billion in 1916, the last full year of peace before President Wilson's war declaration. By 1918, consumption was over forty-seven billion.

Would this experience be duplicated in another war? If so, the 180 billion cigarettes manufactured in 1939 could serve as a new springboard. By the end of World War II, the industry could be turning out 400 billion smokes. This was the kind of talk heard in company board rooms during the summer of 1940.¹⁹

Just as General Pershing had called upon Americans for tobacco in 1918, so Douglas MacArthur told the employees of Wright Aeronautical, who had raised \$10,000 for the war effort, to use the money to purchase smokes for his troops. "The entire amount should be used to buy American cigarettes which, of all personal comforts, are the most difficult to

¹⁸Ibid., p. 119.

¹⁹Ibid., p. 127.

obtain here." The soldiers and sailors did get their smokes. Cigarette sales went from 218 billion in 1941 to 257 billion in 1942; the military's share almost doubled, rising to twenty-two billion from twelve billion in the same period.²⁰

The major tobacco companies wanted this market for several reasons. They hoped to increase sales and profits while the war was on. They also wanted to create brand loyalty. It had worked in World War I, and there seemed no reason to think the sons of the doughboys would behave any differently than their fathers.²¹

Cigarette manufacturers adopted strategies that incorporated military advertising themes. "Keep 'em Smoking," read one Chesterfield blast, "Our Fighting Men Rate the Best!" Reynolds retaliated with "Camels are the Favorite! In the Army...In the Navy...In the Marine Corps...In the Coast Guard!"²²

The American Tobacco Company got into the act when its president, G. W. Hill, in 1942, unleashed another very successful advertising campaign. It consisted of seven words: "Lucky Strike Green Has Gone to War." During this campaign, the Lucky Strike package underwent drastic changes. The gold panels on the package became war casualties because the ink base was copper powder, and copper was in short supply. Then chromium, which was needed for the dark green label, became unavailable. The result was the present white package.

²⁰ Heimann, op. cit., p. 242.

²¹ Sobel, op. cit., p. 131.

²² Ibid., p. 132.

"Lucky Strike Green Has Gone to War" broke in the fall of 1942, simultaneously with the American invasion of North Africa. Six weeks later, sales were up thirty-eight per cent.

The last campaign that Hill waged consisted of only five words: "Lucky Strike Means Fine Tobacco." This phrase became so well known that in 1944 it was shortened to initials only: "L. S. M. F. T." Hill had these letters stamped on the bottom of the Lucky Strike package, and they still appear on the package just as he wrote them.²³

By the end of World War II, the cigarette had become an integral part of the American life style. The blossoming economy worked in favor of a strong industry; so did a major alteration in the way cigarettes were purchased--by the carton. The rise of carton sales was important, indicating not only a commitment to individual brands, but a rising standard of living.²⁴

This change in distribution worked in favor of the habit, but it created a major problem. The manufacturers had no new markets to conquer, and so could not anticipate a repeat of the growth they had enjoyed after World War I.

In 1947, the small market for such erotica as mentholated, low-nicotine, and filtered cigarettes appeared neither interesting nor capable of expansion. The industry expected little from these sources.

²³Campbell, op. cit., p. 111

²⁴Sobel, op. cit., p. 148.

In contrast, the king-size smokes did offer possibilities for change, growth, and perhaps would enhance profits as well. Because of the success of American's Pall Mall and Herbert Tareyton, the major firms felt obliged to act. Just as they had reinvented the cigarette before World War I by creating the standards, now they would try to do the same by stressing the kings.

Liggett and Myers led the way. It introduced a larger version of Fatima and with little advertising, sales of the cigarette doubled by 1949. Lorillard, with a new package and the commitment of some advertising money, introduced Embassy, and R. J. Reynolds brought forth its first king, Cavalier.

In June of 1952, Liggett and Myers broke the news of a carefully guarded trade secret. The company announced that Chesterfield would be available in two sizes, standard and king; each would have its own price. On the retail level, this worked out to twenty-one cents for the standard, and only a penny or two more for the kings.

The kings were an instant success. As a result of an intensive advertising and distribution campaign, stressing the new smoke combined the familiarity of the old standard with the novelty of the larger size, there were some eight and one-half billion Chesterfield kings sold in a period of six months. The success of the Chesterfield kings prompted strategy meetings of the major tobacco companies, and contained important messages for the cigarette industry.

The first lesson was the major tobacco companies had misunderstood the nature of the market for king-size smokes. The second message was that diversity, not conformity and uniformity, would be the rule within the cigarette industry. A third message was the consumer wanted a smoother smoke.

A king-size cigarette filtered its own smoke. This fact would prove to be quite significant. If a king-size cigarette acted as a natural filter, and this increased sales, why not introduce an artificial filter? Then maybe sales would continue to increase.²⁵

The P. Lorillard Company led the way to the "filter landslide" when, in March of 1952, it introduced a new cigarette brand, Kent, with its now famous Micronite Filter. Kents immediately attracted tremendous consumer interest. As a result of extensive advertising, Lorillard executive watched the cigarette grow in popularity.²⁶

Now came the reaction. As Americans became more conscious of filter cigarettes, other companies would follow the path Lorillard had confidently marked with its Kent cigarette, and introduce their brands of filter smokes. Here again, advertising would be of extreme importance, especially the use of a new medium--television.²⁷

²⁵ Ibid., pp. 149-160.

²⁶ P. Lorillard Co., op. cit., pp. 34-36.

²⁷ Ibid., p. 36.

R. J. Reynolds had been using television for a few years in promoting its products, and when new advertising strategies demanded more emphasis on this medium, Reynolds did not hesitate to appropriate sufficient funds in its advertising budget. The first of Reynolds' products to make an appearance on television was Camel, when commercials were seen during the broadcasts of sports events from Madison Square Garden. In the late 1940's, as national networks were formed, Camel cigarettes sponsored the Camel News Caravan. This featured John Cameron Swayze on one of the first national TV news programs. As this new advertising medium came into its own, Reynolds commercials, one of which featured Cavalier on the "I've Got a Secret" show, reached a nationwide audience with an unprecedented impact on tobacco sales.²⁸

Winston filter-tip cigarettes, which had been introduced by Reynolds in 1954, were marketed on the basis of satisfaction. The sales of this cigarette rose from seven and one-half billion in 1954 to thirty-one billion in 1956.²⁹ This was brought about by a very energetic campaign on television and in newspapers, featuring the slogan, "Winston Tastes Good, Like a Cigarette Should." Grammarians attacked Winston's offensive phrase immediately. Articles pertaining to the use of like as a conjunction appeared in various

²⁸Beatty, op. cit., p. 21.

²⁹Ibid.

publications.³⁰ The case was argued as well on radio and television. Probably the most famous incident occurred when the jingle was discussed pro and con for twenty minutes on a television panel show. John Mason Brown, the noted author and critic, ended the discussion by stating that the jingle gave him "physical pain." With that he pulled out a package of Winstons, lit one right on camera, and added, "But I think the cigarette is great." The company withstood these attacks. It continued to use the slogan and watched Winston rise to the very top of industry sales.³¹

After a long period of top-secret preparation, R. J. Reynolds in 1956 shocked the industry with Salem, the first filter-tipped menthol cigarette. Here too, advertising was important. The television viewer saw a commercial keyed to the theme of light, refreshing, springtime smoking. And the green of the package was carefully chosen to suggest the green buds of the outdoors.

The sales of Salem proved phenomenal. Four billion were sold in the first twelve months. Salem eventually dominated not only the menthol field but also became one of the world's top-selling brands.³²

Marlboro, introduced nationally by Philip Morris in 1955, featured a flip-top box and a cork-tipped "selectrate" filter. Response was so enthusiastic that the supply did not

³¹Beatty, loc. cit.

³²Ibid.

catch up with the demand until April of that year.³³ Marlboro's slogan "Filter, Flavor, Pack, or Box," preceded by "You Get a Lot to Like in Marlboro,"³⁴ was heard on television. Marlboro became the first national sponsor of the National Football League telecasts in 1956.³⁵ Later Marlboro advertisements promised to "Deliver the Goods on Flavor." Brown and Williamson's Viceroy followed suit. Its advertisement in 1954 stressed "20,000 filter traps" and talked about aroma and taste. These trends continued into 1956, when sales went up again to 424 billion.³⁶

The P. Lorillard Company had been sponsoring many different radio and television programs. In 1944-45 Lorillard was sponsoring Jackie Gleason on the radio. A few years later it was presenting a visible Jackie Gleason to television audiences.³⁷

The invitation which came with the development of television to bring graphic sales messages into millions of homes prompted Lorillard's advertising architects to seek a new, dramatic manner to identify Old Gold cigarettes. The famous Old Gold Dancing Pack--one of early television's most

³³ Philip Morris, Inc., op. cit., p. 4.

³⁴ Sobel, op. cit., p. 177.

³⁵ Philip Morris, Inc., op. cit., p. 5.

³⁶ Sobel, loc. cit.

³⁷ P. Lorillard Co., op. cit., p. 48.

interesting trademarks--appeared. With new developments, the Dancing Pack got one and then two partners as Old Gold King Size and Filter King demanded to be represented as well. The Dancing Pack created such a hold on people's imaginations that even now, long after it made its final appearance, Lorillard continues to receive many requests from persons who want to know how to design the costume, and the Dancing Pack--in homemade giant Old Gold Packs--continues to make many appearances at various parties and costume balls throughout the country.³⁸

As the viewing public indicated its desires in the entertainment medium, Lorillard sponsored the various and changing types of programs designed to gain entry into television homes. It sponsored newscasts, exciting quiz shows, westerns, detective thrillers, baseball telecasts and different variety shows.³⁹

During the 1950's, tobacco companies invested heavily in television advertising. The promises of those commercials comprised so much of what was seen that the required dress for an evening of viewing was a smoke jacket!

In one commercial, a voice on television promised "Something wonderful happens when you change to Philip Morris." In another, a Chesterfield announcer told the viewing audience Chesterfields could now be purchased in

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Ibid.

king size. A Camel commercial made use of the beautiful Ruth Hussey and her director. In the dialogue, Miss Hussey testified she tried the thirty-day Camel test and liked the cigarette. A Pall Mall commercial claimed this cigarette filtered the smoke. Another commercial asked "Got a Cough? Smoke Kool!"⁴⁰

From the middle of the 1920's through the middle of the 1950's, cigarette sales had shown a steady annual increase, and this had been accomplished in part by the extensive use of new advertising mediums. Now, as company executives prepared new strategies to further cigarette sales, they would learn of an imposing threat to their product--the anti-cigarette campaign. This threat would have to be dealt with quickly.

⁴⁰ Goodman Ace, "Smoke Gets In Your Ears," Saturday Review, February 28, 1953, p. 41.

CHAPTER III
AN ATTACK IS MOUNTED

The opposition to the personal enjoyment of tobacco began soon after Sir Walter Raleigh brought the first cargo of leaf to England in the sixteenth century. As early as 1604, antitobacco pamphlets such as "A Counterblaste to Tobacco," written by King James I of England, were circulated. Today, with tobacco well into its fifth century of use, the controversy continues.¹

Cigarettes, in the early days, fought not only one another, but reformers as well. Henry Ford was well known for his attacks on cigarettes. He felt that almost all criminals smoked. He would not hire anyone who smoked cigarettes. Thomas Edison, John Wanamaker, and Connie Mack allied themselves with Ford against cigarettes. These men were the forerunners of those who would eventually establish an all out campaign against cigarettes.²

Since the beginning of the cigarette industry in America, there had been sporadic reports dealing with the allegedly dangerous effects of cigarette smoking. No one had paid much attention to these reports. But in December, 1953,

¹The Tobacco Institute, On Smoking (Washington, D.C.: The Tobacco Institute, 1978), p. 5.

²Campbell, op. cit., p. 113.

the situation would change. In that month's issue of Reader's Digest was a hard-hitting article, "Cancer by the Carton." Other publications followed the lead of Reader's Digest and carried articles attacking cigarette smoking.³

The modern antismoking crusade hit the industry hard. In 1953, cigarette sales declined, dropping to 423 billion from 1952's record of 435 billion. Medical reports began piling up; all seemed to corroborate the claims of a cancer-cigarette connection.⁴ Several "prospective" studies--studies in which a certain population group is first defined, its smoking habits established and followed up over several years and the causes of death established for each member--indicated people who died of lung cancer were precisely those who had smoked heavily for a long time.⁵

Although the major disease originally linked to cigarettes was lung cancer, other diseases were quickly associated with smoking. New investigations disclosed relationships between emphysema, coronary disease and heavy smoking. The overwhelming conclusion for all of these investigations was: "Cigarette smoking is positively associated

³Sobel, op. cit., p. 168.

⁴Ibid., p. 169.

⁵H. J. Eysenck, Smoking, Health and Personality (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1965), pp. 38-39.

with lung cancer and that the greater the amount of cigarettes smoked, the greater is the probability of dying from almost all causes."⁶

Cigarette consumption declined sharply, to 401 billion, in 1954. The manufacturers realized they were facing a crisis. They held emergency meetings to develop strategy. On January 4, 1954, the major firms announced the formation of the Tobacco Industry Research Committee.⁷

The manufacturers decided to continue the artificial filters previously introduced by the P. Lorillard Company. For as the medical barrage against the cigarette mounted, methods of removing harmful substances became more important than ever. By using artificial filters, more of what doctors considered harmful could be removed.⁸

The antismoking groups had persisted in their campaign. They persuaded the Federal Trade Commission, on September 15, 1955, to promulgate Cigarette Advertising Guides, forbidding health claims, direct or indirect. But feeling sure of itself, the industry began to downplay the health issue. By 1956, cigarette sales began to climb again; the anticigarette forces were clearly on the defensive.⁹

⁶ Edgar F. Borgatta and Robert R. Evans, *Smoking, Health, and Behavior* (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1968), pp. 36-38.

⁷ Sobel, *op. cit.*, p. 170.

⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 159-160.

⁹ The Tobacco Institute, Federal Trade Commission and Cigarettes (Washington, D.C.: The Tobacco Institute, 1976), p. 1.

The tobacco industry tried to let the matter of health, especially the question of the cigarette-cancer link, rest. It was impossible to prove a negative, industry executive stated; since critics had failed to show the link, there was none.¹⁰

Many individuals and governmental agencies continued their attempts to control smoking during this period. Chief among the agencies concerned with smoking had been the United States Public Health Service. The limited antismoking activity which had been generated by governmental agencies had primarily been centered in one or another section of the Public Health Service. Each Surgeon General since the late 1950's had spoken out vigorously on the issue.¹¹ In 1957, Surgeon General Burney said statistics indicated excessive cigarette smoking was one of the causative factors in lung cancer.¹² The hard-liners demanded a total end to cigarette manufacturing. Centrists would concentrate upon health warnings on packages and the curbing of advertising. The moderate reformers might settle for effective filters. During the

¹⁰Sobel, op. cit., pp. 177-178.

¹¹Bernard Mausner and Ellen S. Platt, Smoking: A Behavioral Analysis (New York: Pergamon Press, 1971), p. 2.

¹²The Tobacco Institute, Chronology of Intervention in the Smoking and Health Controversy (Washington, D.C.: The Tobacco Institute, 1977), p. 1.

next few years, the tobacco companies would attempt to please the moderates, weaken the centrists, and isolate the hard-liners.¹³

In the early 1960's, the industry had succeeded in repulsing the initial anticigarette assault. Some critics, who had condemned smoking in the 1950's, fell back to a new position, arguing that many environmental factors, especially air pollution, caused cancer, and that cigarette smoking added to the cancer-inducing environment and should be eliminated on that basis.

This was not to say the anticigarette movement was declining. Rather, the initial shock had passed. Doubtless, some individuals stopped smoking entirely, and others switched to cigars and pipes, but more began to smoke the relatively new filter and king cigarettes. The statistics told the story. In 1953, when cigarette sales declined due to the Reader's Digest articles and similar attacks, sales were 2,702 per capita; by 1961, this had increased to 2,830.

At this time, Maurine Neuberger emerged as a leading anticigarette representative in Washington. Until 1960, she had been known as the reform-minded wife of Senator Richard Neuberger, a former New York Times reporter and author who had gone from the Oregon legislature to the Senate in 1955. Richard Neuberger had been a heavy cigarette smoker. In

¹³Sobel, op. cit., p. 181.

March 1960, at the age of forty-eight, he died of lung cancer. His wife won the election to fill his seat and arrived in the Senate that November. Almost immediately, she became involved in the issue of banning cigarette advertising.

The problem of cigarettes was not a pleasant issue for the opponents of smoking nor those who defended the habit. The principal reason both sides were nervous about the subject was: if cigarette smoking did cause cancer, then the practice should be ended, and no American should be allowed to purchase or use cigarettes. Tobacco might have been classified as a drug; it did contain nicotine and other substances that were labeled as such. Should it be proven a harmful drug, it could have been banned.

The problem of scientific proof also plagued the affair. What if the case against tobacco could not be proven in the laboratory? Then cigarettes would continue to be sold, and the modern antismoking crusade would end. Scientific proof that smoking resulted in lung cancer was needed. But none existed in 1960. So a different approach had to be taken. Failing in the crusade for a total ban, the anticigarette forces turned to the matter of advertising, which was regulated by the Federal Trade Commission and the Federal Communications Commission.¹⁴

The anticigarette groups worked hard. As a result, the Federal Trade Commission, in January 1960, asked each

¹⁴Ibid., pp. 187-188.

cigarette manufacturer to execute this statement:

The undersigned states on behalf of (Company) its intention to omit from cigarette advertising references, direct or implied, to health benefits to be derived from the use of cigarettes produced by it. It is understood this statement includes references to tar and nicotine.

An accompanying letter said noncompliance "by a current user of health claims will result in referral of the matter to other Bureaus of the Commission looking forward to mandatory procedures..."¹⁵

The American Cancer Society, the American Public Health Association, the American Heart Association, and The National Tuberculosis Association, continued the fight. As a result of the pressure exerted by these and other groups, the Surgeon General, Luther Terry, announced in June, 1962, the formation of the Advisory Committee on Smoking and Health.

In January 1964, the Committee released its report entitled Smoking and Health. Its message, which could be interpreted in many ways depending on the viewpoint taken, revealed that cigarette smoking was causally related to lung cancer in males and that it was one of the most important causes of chronic bronchitis in the United States. The report also stated smoking may contribute to other diseases and was "a health hazard of sufficient importance. . .to warrant remedial action." Needless to say, this pleased the antismoking forces and upset the cigarette executives.¹⁶

¹⁵The Tobacco Institute, Federal Trade..., loc. cit.

¹⁶The Tobacco Institute, Chronology..., loc. cit.

While the antismoking forces basked in apparent victory, the cigarette manufacturers continued to scrutinize the Committee's report. By dissecting the report, they hoped to prove smoking did not cause cancer and other diseases. They said the report of the Advisory Committee to the Surgeon General failed to establish a cause-and-effect relationship between cigarette smoking and cancer and other diseases. The report was essentially a "study of numbers"-- a selective review of population studies which compared disease rates among smokers, ex-smokers and non-smokers. The report showed a statistical association between cigarette smoking and lung cancer. However, the report stated, "Statistical methods cannot establish proof of a casual relationship in an association. The casual significance of an association is a matter of judgment which goes beyond any statement of statistical probability." They also pointed out many questions left unanswered by the report. Why, for example, did non-smokers fall victim to heart disease, lung cancer and other diseases frequently associated with smokers? If, as some antismoking groups claimed, cigarette smoking was the major cause of lung cancer, why was it that the vast majority of the "heavy" smokers never developed the disease? Why had not independent scientific research been able to identify any one or combination of the thousands of components as found in cigarette smoke as the cause of any particular disease? Why in more than forty years of research

had not anyone been able to reproduce the type of lung cancer associated with smoking -- through tobacco smoke inhalation -- in laboratory animals?¹⁷ By the dissection of the report, and by posing these many questions, the cigarette manufacturers were attempting to regain any ground lost to the antismoking forces. The struggle would continue. No end was in sight.

Leaders of the cigarette industry understood the situation and hoped to alleviate any penalties decided upon. The antismoking groups, recognizing this, attempted to obtain a ruling from the Federal Trade Commission on advertising. By doing so, they could bypass the legislative process entirely.

At this time, the Federal Trade Commission had no legal power to rule on advertising. The tobacco industry pressed for hearings before "the proper congressional committee."¹⁸ While the struggle over rights and powers intensified, the Federal Trade Commission proposed a severe health warning on cigarette packages and in all cigarette advertising.¹⁹ The Commission also hinted further regulations were being considered, among which were some relating to television. In January 1965, the tobacco industry, anticipating such changes, announced the formation of a

¹⁷The Tobacco Institute, On Smoking...op. cit., p. 2.

¹⁸Sobel., op. cit., pp. 193-194.

¹⁹The Tobacco Institute, Chronology...op. cit., p. 2.

self-imposed cigarette advertising code. The companies agreed not to promote cigarettes to young people and to avoid implying smoking had health benefits or was essential to social prominence.²⁰

Congressional hearings took place before the Federal Trade Commission. This pleased the cigarette manufacturers. If the Federal Trade Commission did not handle the case, the tobacco executives feared the antismoking groups would go to the Federal Communications Commission, which had the power to ban cigarette commercials from radio and television.

The congressional hearings were not medical forums. What really mattered was what would be done to resolve the contest between the industry and its lobbyists on one side, and the anticigarette force and its allies on the other. Votes and political pressures counted in this struggle, not laboratory evidence and statistical charts.²¹

The Congressional hearings began in March and were completed in July of 1965. The Cigarette Labeling Act was enacted, in order, as the Act stated, "the public may be adequately informed that cigarette smoking may be hazardous to health," and commerce may be protected against "confusing" regulations. Its principle provisions were:

²⁰ Philip Morris, Inc., op. cit., p. 8.

²¹ Sobel, op. cit., pp. 195-197.

1. Cigarette packages must bear a health caution label.
2. Federal and state agencies were not to make other labeling or advertising requirements in connection with smoking and health at least until July 1, 1969.
3. The Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Health, Education and Welfare were to keep Congress informed on the issue through annual reports.²²

Beginning on January 1, 1966, all cigarette packages were required to carry a label stating: "Caution: cigarette smoking may be hazardous to your health."²³ That was all. Given the problems that it faced in 1964, and the fears of what might be done as a result of the Surgeon General's report, this must be considered a major victory for the industry.

This did not mean the end of the contest. Despite the strong position still held by the tobacco industry, the required caution label represented some gain for the anti-smoking forces. They were making plans for another assault at the next session of Congress. They would use the courts as well, and try to work through the Federal Communications Commission.²⁴

The tobacco companies realized the health issue would not vanish or even fade. At the same time, smokers demonstrated an unwillingness to give up cigarettes.²⁵ In 1964,

²²The Tobacco Institute, Chronology..., loc. cit.

²³Philip Morris, Inc., loc. cit.

²⁴Sobel, op. cit., p. 198.

²⁵Ibid., p. 201.

six major cigarette companies invested almost \$190,000,000 in sponsoring their brands on television. So many millions would not have been spent had not the retail sales of cigarettes justified their television advertising cost. A host of smokers were still "lighting up" in the belief they were "getting a good thing going," despite the Surgeon General's report.²⁶ The drive to combine health and smoking-pleasure and safety continued. There would be further growth in the filter, king, and menthol markets. Thus, the new product mania of the early 1960's would continue for at least the rest of the decade.²⁷

In 1966, 100 millimeter cigarettes were introduced. By 1967, they had won an unexpected share of the eight billion dollar American cigarette market. Pall Mall and Benson and Hedges were the first two brands to turn to the super king-size cigarette. Others quickly followed suit. Much of the gain made by these cigarettes came at the expense of the eighty-five millimeter filters.

Reading the smoke signals, the tobacco companies began to switch advertising money toward the long size as quickly as possible. So many new brands had appeared, manufacturers were forced into gimmicks. Benson and Hedges used commercials that lampooned longer length. Pall Mall responded with a "seven-minute" cigarette campaign.

²⁶ Robert L. Shayon, "Where There's Smoke," Saturday Review, September 25, 1965, p. 51.

²⁷ Sobel, loc. cit.

Introducing its Century Great Lengths, Lorillard advertising referred to the cigarette as the "whatchamacallit," and Liggett and Myers went competitors one better when it introduced Chesterfield 101s. Chesterfield 101s were actually one millimeter longer than the other cigarettes. They appeared in a plum-colored package with a large "101" on the front. To accentuate the difference, and to create the image, Liggett and Myers promoted the "silly millimeter longer" feature of the cigarette. Their advertisement stated: "A silly millimeter longer than the 100's. It isn't much. But wait 'til you taste it. It's one better."²⁸

A family approach to cigarette production, in which a particular brand was mutated, was begun in the latter half of the 1960's. Winston, the nation's leading smoke in 1969, came in four models--king filters in soft pack, 100 millimeters, menthol 100s, and eight-five millimeters in boxes. Pall Mall, in second place, had three different forms. Marlboro, the nation's number three smoke, was advertised in five different forms--king boxes, king softs, 100 millimeter boxes, 100s soft, and Marlboro Greens.

The family approach to cigarette production was a sign of either industry maturity or decay, depending on whether the analyst was optimistic or pessimistic regarding the future of smoking in America. As might have been expected,

²⁸"Silly Milly," Time, October 20, 1967, pp. 96-97.

the industry tended to take the former position, while the anticigarette groups adopted the latter.²⁹

Gradually, the companies began to ease themselves out of total dependence upon tobacco in general and cigarettes in particular. They turned to products that offered more promise in sales and profits. Diversification seemed both sensible and possible, given the business atmosphere of the 1960's.³⁰

Philip Morris led the way. In 1957, it acquired Milprint and Nicolet Paper Company, and, the following year, Polymer Industries. In 1960, Philip Morris obtained control of American Safety Razor and, in 1963, Burma-Vita and Clark Brothers Chewing Gum. In 1969, it made its most important acquisition when it obtained majority control of Miller Brewing Company.³¹

In 1956, R. J. Reynolds amended its corporate charter to permit investment in non-tobacco enterprises. In 1963, it turned to convenience foods and beverages. Reynolds began with the purchase of Hawaiian Punch fruit drink. Two years later the company added Vermont Maid syrup, Brer Rabbit molasses, My-T-Fine puddings, College Inn products and Davis baking powder. Then Reynolds took on Chun King; in 1967, it acquired Patio Mexican Foods. In a bold step away from

²⁹Sobel, *op. cit.*, pp. 204-205.

³⁰*Ibid.* p. 206.

³¹Philip Morris, Inc., *op. cit.*, pp. 5-10.

consumer products and packaged goods, Reynolds, in 1969, purchased Sea-Land Service Incorporated, the world's largest containerized freight operation.³²

The American Tobacco Company did not, at first, seek merger candidates. It seemed intent upon making itself the leader in cigarettes. Eventually, facing corporate disaster, American converted.

American agreed to buy Andrew Jergens, the hand-lotion and cosmetics manufacturer. It also bought James Beam Distilling Company, Duffy-Mott Foods, and Swingline, a maker of stapling machines. To signal this new independence from cigarettes, the company changed its name to American Brands, Incorporated.³³

Liggett and Myers followed American into the liquor field in 1966. They purchased control of Paddington (the importer of J and B Scotch) and Star Industries, a liquor distributor. Earlier they had taken control of Allen Products, the canner of Alpo dog food. Later, Liggett and Myers changed their name to Liggett Group.³⁴

The anticigarette groups might have destroyed the tobacco companies of the 1960's, just as the prohibitionists

³²Beatty, op. cit., pp. 26-28.

³³"What Happens When the Marlboro Man Leaves," Time, November 23, 1970, p. 96.

³⁴Ibid.

of 1919 smashed the distilleries and breweries of that period. But they hardly could do the same to Reynolds Industries, American Brands, Liggett Group, and Philip Morris. Corporate executives spoke about interesting possibilities in merchandising, and the growth cycles for pet foods, alcohol, and other consumer goods. Yet, the anticigarette movement continued.³⁵

John F. Banzhaf III, a graduate of Columbia Law School, became the leader of the next stage of the fight against smoking.³⁶ On December 1, 1966, he wrote to WCBS-New York, demanding equal time for antismoking advocates to respond to its cigarette commercials. The request was denied. He wrote again, on December 20, reasserting previous requests, and asking that he personally be afforded time to rebut cigarette commercials. Again, the station denied the request. The station hoped that Banzhaf would forget the matter, and that no one else would take up the fight.³⁷

Banzhaf did not let the matter rest. On January 5, 1967, he filed a fairness doctrine complaint with the Federal Communications Commission against WCBS-TV. On June 2, 1967,

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ James E. Roper, "The Man Behind the Ban on Cigarette Commercials," Reader's Digest, March, 1971, p. 213.

³⁷ The Tobacco Institute, Federal Communications Commission and Cigarettes (Washington, D.C.: The Tobacco Institute, 1974), p. 1.

the Federal Communications Commission notified the station that it would uphold Banzhaf's complaint. It ordered free air time for anticigarette announcements. Needless to say, the tobacco and broadcasting industries were upset. Their lawyers petitioned the Federal Communications Commission to reconsider its decision. Banzhaf, without any help, had to answer the petitions himself. The Federal Communications Commission reaffirmed its decision. The industry's lawyers, as well as Banzhaf, appealed to the federal court; a "legal blizzard," over the matter, would ensue.³⁸

Shortly thereafter, Banzhaf quit his job for full-time work in the anticigarette movement. On February 29, 1968, he called a news conference in New York to announce that he and Dr. Donald T. Frederickson had formed Action on Smoking and Health (ASH). Its major goal was the complete elimination of televised cigarette advertisements.³⁹ Other groups, including Fresh Air for Nonsmokers (FANS), Group Against Smokers Pollution (GASP), and Society to Humiliate, Aggravate, Mortify and Embarass Smokers (SHAME), joined forces with Banzhaf in this struggle.⁴⁰ Motivated to a certain extent by Robert F. Kennedy's address to the World Conference on Smoking and Health (1967), which was a stirring call to

³⁸Roper, op. cit., pp. 213-214.

³⁹The Tobacco Institute, Federal Communications..., op. cit., p. 4.

⁴⁰The Tobacco Institute, On Smoking, op. cit. p. 4.

social action, the antismoking groups hoisted their battle standards and prepared for war. They seemed quite capable of winning the fight.

The tobacco companies appeared to recognize this. Clearly the 1967 decision would be the first of several, which would finally result in an end of televised advertisements. They would fight ASH, FANS, GASP, and SHAME to the end. They would not go down without a struggle; perhaps some kind of compromise would be reached. For example, if the government would promise to end certain forms of "harassment," then the tobacco companies might volunteer to stop using television. The industry was hoping for a compromise; it feared the impact of antismoking advertisements. Industry leaders realized that if there were no cigarette advertisements, the equal time provision would not apply, automatically ending anti-smoking messages on television. Therefore, the companies began to court an influential group of legislators with considerable seniority, which, of course, was committed to the support of the tobacco industry because of its importance to the economies of their states.⁴¹

Some kind of ban on television and radio cigarette commercials loomed as a distinct possibility. Tobacco companies and advertising men would fight. But they faced tougher going in Congress than in the past. The tobacco and broadcasting industries pressed for a reprieve from regulations at Congressional hearings slated to begin April 15,

⁴¹Sobel, *op. cit.*, pp. 212-213.

1969. But the likely outcome was some kind of compromise that either ruled out cigarette blurbs during certain viewing hours or called for a gradual phasing out of tobacco advertising over several years.

Even a modified ban would have represented a major victory for the antismoking forces and a serious setback for both the tobacco companies and the broadcasting industry. As in past fights over cigarettes, the tobacco industry was dead set against any encroachment on its freedom. The broadcasters, however, appeared resigned to strictures on cigarette advertising; they probably would have been willing to accept a partial or gradual prohibition. A slow fade-out would have given them time to replace the \$225 million in cigarette advertising accounting for eight and one-half per cent of income on television and six per cent on radio.

Unless a compromise was reached beforehand, the Federal Communications Commission would swing into action on June 30, the end of a four-year moratorium on new cigarette regulations. The tobacco industry had won this concession (the moratorium) from Congress in 1965, when legislation was pushed through putting the first health warning on cigarette packages.

Other government agencies were itching for action. The Federal Trade Commission, for instance, wanted to stiffen the language of the health warning on cigarette packages, and possibly extend it to cigarette advertisements in newspapers, magazines, and on billboards.

Obviously the antismoking forces had gained strength. In the Senate, Frank E. Moss (D-Utah) was ready to filibuster against any pro-cigarette bill that reached the floor. Moss was also chairman of the consumer subcommittee that would have had first crack at such legislation. A Mormon who does not smoke or drink, Moss said, with a chuckle, "We may have some very long hearings."

In the House, the situation was different: of the twenty-five members of the Commerce Committee, eleven represented tobacco states. They would probably lend the Tobacco Institute a much friendlier ear. The association, the industry's main lobby, was headed by former Senator Earle C. Clements of Kentucky.

The broadcasting industry had many friends in Congress. Legislators did not want to offend local stations, on which they were so dependent for publicity. The broadcasters, too, did not welcome the idea of any product being ruled off the air. Said a spokesman for the National Association of Broadcasters: "If they can ban cigarette advertising, they can do the same thing for anything else on which there is a health controversy."

The broadcasters would undoubtedly go to court if the Federal Communications Commission ban was imposed, but they had small chance of winning if the case went that far. The circuit court of the District of Columbia had already upheld the Commission's right to require equal time for antismoking

commercials. These public service messages by the American Cancer Society and the American Heart Association cut a wide swath in cigarette consumption. The tobacco companies would not be sorry to see the messages silenced, even if they were forced to drop their own commercials.

A complete ban was not considered likely to be adopted in 1969. But chances were good for a ban on television advertising of cigarettes during hours when youths were most likely to be watching television, or a step-by-step ban spaced out over three or four years.⁴²

The United States Public Health Service prepared devastating advertisements condemning cigarettes.⁴³ Some of them, featuring actors Tony Randall and Tony Curtis, urged the public to throw away their cigarettes and wear a button that read, "I quit." One was a takeoff on the Marlboro man. It featured a tough cowboy who smoked in a saloon. He was unable to draw his gun on a clean-cut non-smoker because he was overcome by a coughing fit. The slogan: "Cigarettes-- They're Killers."

The most effective advertisement featured William Talman, who had played Hamilton Burger in the Perry Mason television series. Talman told the audience, "I have lung cancer. Take some advice about smoking and losing from someone who

⁴² "Clearing Smoke From the Airwaves," Business Week, April 15, 1969, pp. 38-39.

⁴³ Roper, op. cit., p. 216.

has been doing both for years. If you haven't smoked, don't start. If you do smoke -- quit. Don't be a loser." The fact that Talman was dead by the time the commercial reached the air made the appeal much more effective.⁴⁴

On July 22, 1969, Philip Morris chairman, Joseph Cullman III, spoke for the nine American cigarette manufacturers. He told the Senate Consumer Subcommittee that the industry was ready to end all advertising on television and radio by the end of the year, in return for immunity from legal actions. All the industry wanted was the assurance it would not be prosecuted for ending its advertising campaign. The offer was rejected.⁴⁵

By late 1969, then, the fight over televised advertisements was between the media and the reformers. The tobacco companies were on the sidelines in this struggle. They knew no matter what happened, they would do well.

The end for televised advertising of cigarettes came rather suddenly in 1970 by Congressional action. Congress provided cigarette advertisements would be banned from radio and television, effective midnight, January 1, 1971. Also, the message on the side of cigarette packages would be altered, with the final version being "Warning -- The Surgeon General Has Determined That Cigarette Smoking is Dangerous to

⁴⁴Sobel, op. cit., p. 213.

⁴⁵"The Dike Breaks," Time, August, 1969, p. 68.

Your Health." President Nixon signed this measure into law on April 1, 1970. The legislation was called a major turning point in the history of the cigarette habit. Perhaps now it would loosen its grip upon the American public.⁴⁶

The tobacco company executives began to prepare the last year of televised commercials, the switchback to the old media, and the introduction of new brands. During their waning moments on television, cigarette makers heavily promoted these new brands.

Reynolds brought out Vantage, American Brands introduced Maryland 100s, and Philip Morris marketed winter-green-flavored New Leaf. Brown and Williamson marketed Laredo, which was a two dollar kit including tobacco, paper, filters and a roll-your-own machine.⁴⁷

The antismoking groups looked forward to the television ban, thinking it would reduce the sale of cigarettes. Time would tell. The companies would survive; so would the cigarette. Banzhaf and others may have threatened the cigarette, but their efforts actually had helped American, Reynolds and Philip Morris, because they had been forced into a program of diversification. Thus, the companies were well prepared to enter the post-television age by 1971.⁴⁸

⁴⁶Sobel, op. cit., p. 216.

⁴⁷"What Happens...", loc. cit.

⁴⁸Sobel, op. cit., p. 218.

CHAPTER IV
THE POST-TELEVISION AGE

The advent of the television ban on January 2, 1971, was a fine symbol for the anticigarette forces. They rejoiced in their victory. But, in the end, the industry proved more successful than its opponents in adjusting to the post-television advertising age. Tobacco executives began to adopt new advertising strategies in order to promote their products. Soon cigarette sales were climbing.

The antismoking forces were not able to obtain free space in newspapers and magazines. For a while, some journals refused to run the more blatant forms of cigarette advertisements; others would not print them without the inclusion of clear health-hazard notices. The companies protested these actions as violations of their alleged First Amendment rights, and of the Congressional television ban. Meanwhile, the companies began to spend large amounts for advertising schemes in magazines, newspapers, on billboards, and in other forms of the media.¹

Billboard cigarette advertising, which grew from \$8.9 million in 1969 to \$16.2 million in 1970, was expected to reach \$30 million in 1971. Newspaper cigarette advertising was projected at \$40 million to \$50 million that year,

¹Sobel, *op. cit.*, pp. 219-224.

compared with \$20 million in 1970. The other big gainer was magazines. During the first quarter, according to the Publishers Information Bureau, some ninety measured magazines ran 4,005 pages of cigarette advertisements worth \$26.9 million. That represented a 162 per cent increase in pages and a 144 per cent jump in dollars. (The smaller dollar increase resulted from having bought more pages in lower-priced magazines).²

At the same time, the industry moved deeper into special giveaways and promotions. And these promotional excursions by cigarette companies took many forms. Brown and Williamson, for instance, allowed customers to send in a panel from a carton of Kools, along with a check for eighty-eight dollars, and they would receive a Sea Snark sailboat. Philip Morris offered \$50,000 in prizes to buyers of its Multi-filter brand who correctly picked the winning post position in the Kentucky Derby.³ They also offered a \$4.50 dictionary to its Parliament smokers, and distributed 7.3 million copies of a free cookbook ("Chuckwagon Cooking from Marlboro Country") in Life magazine.⁴ P. Lorillard sponsored

²"Cigarette Makers Do Great Without TV," Business Week, May 29, 1971, p. 56.

³"Selling Cigarettes Without TV," Industry Week, August 2, 1971, p. 22.

⁴"Cigarette Makers...", loc. cit.

contests for Kent buyers with a week in London as the prize. American Brands provided a water filter for five dollars and two Tareyton wrappers.⁵

The industry's biggest single promotion was sporting events. "That's where the smokers are," said Philip Morris' vice-president, James C. Bowling. And Daniel Provost, a spokesman for Liggett and Myers, added, "it sure generates great publicity." Philip Morris sponsored everything from automobile and ski racing to women's tennis championships. Liggett and Myers focused mainly on automobile racing. In 1971, they sponsored the "L&M Continental 5000 Championship," a series of eight races at some of the country's best tracks and in its top marketing areas. Liggett and Myers even hired Jackie Stewart, the 1969 world champion racing driver, and invested more than \$125,000 to enter an L&M car in the Canadian-- American Challenge Cup championships.⁶

R. J. Reynolds sponsored stock car races and bowling tournaments. It worked a brand name into an event's title-- as, for example, "The Winston-Salem Bowling Classic," held appropriately, in Winston-Salem.

That created somewhat of a problem for the network that televised the event nationally. Wanting to maintain the objective of the television cigarette advertisement ban, the network commentators tried hard to avoid mentioning the name

⁵"Selling Cigarettes...", loc. cit.

⁶"Cigarette Makers...", loc. cit.

of the city in which the tournament was being held. They feared such mention would "advertise" Reynolds, Winston and Salem brands. Because of this, media people now refer to the tournament as the "blip blip open."⁷

Reynolds participated in thirty-six different stock-car races in 1971, and spent more than \$2 million on their advertising, promotion, and winners' purses. To promote their biggest race of that year--the first annual, \$160,000 "Winston 500" in Talladega, Alabama--Reynolds put up hundreds of billboards in Tennessee, Georgia, and South Carolina, bought full-page color advertisements in Road and Track and other racing magazines ("Great racing from the makers of that great-tasting cigarette. . .Winston"), and covered the area around Talladega with posters, flags, banners, and bumper stickers. Reynolds also saw to it local cigarette-vending machines were filled only with Reynolds cigarettes.

The payoff came with a paid attendance of some 40,000 racing fans. In one year Reynolds doubled attendance at the race. Thanks in part to a blizzard of press releases, and free Winston lighters and cartons of cigarettes, Reynolds also garnered its share of newspaper coverage.⁸

Enough time had now passed for industry executives to reacquaint themselves with the older forms of advertising.

7 "Selling Cigarettes....," loc. cit.

8 "Cigarette Makers....," loc. cit.

They realized the loss of television and radio commercials would not reduce the sale of cigarettes drastically; with this in mind, they began the search for the ultimate cigarette for the 1970's. The result would be the low-tar and nicotine cigarette. Here again, advertising would be a key to industry leadership.

Carlton, a low-tar and nicotine cigarette, had been introduced by American Tobacco in 1964. Carlton was the nation's twenty-sixth best seller in 1969, and was headed upward. It also sparked interest on the part of the other companies, R. J. Reynolds in particular.

Reynolds had developed a method for "expanding" the leaf so less of it was used for each cigarette. This meant each puff would contain less tar and nicotine and more air and water vapor. When joined to porous cigarette paper and improved filters, one had a mild smoke which the anticigarette groups might consider safer than those already on the market.

Reynolds introduced three low-tar and nicotine cigarettes--Now, Doral, and Vantage. These were grouped together with Carlton and some other brands -- True and Lark, among them--as "high filtration," or "hi-fi" brands. Within the industry, this meant a tar content of fifteen milligrams or less. For a while, the hi-fis were distinguished from the "medium-fis," which had from fifteen to twenty milligrams, while the "low-fis" had more than twenty milligrams

of tar. The low-fis also were called "full flavor" cigarettes, and were advertised as such.⁹

In the early 1970's, it was clear the smoking population was divided into two camps. One insisted on the old kind of flavor; the other accepted milder flavor to have low-tar and nicotine contents. All of the major companies had entries in both categories, but it was evident that emphasis was behind the hi-fis. The industry discovered many smokers would keep their daily doses of tar and nicotine at a fairly constant level. The smoker of Marlboro (which had eighteen milligrams of tar) might switch to a hi-fi with half as much. Then he would increase his consumption from one to two packages per day. In this way, company profits would increase.¹⁰

Buying patterns indicated smokers were concerned with the tar and nicotine content of a cigarette more than ever; as a result, advertising themes reflected this concern. Therefore, the advertisements for the hi-fis, the low-tar and nicotine cigarettes, stressed not only taste, but health as well.

Early advertisements by the Leber Katz agency pushed the theme that Vantage, a Reynolds product with eleven milligrams of tar, had flavor out of proportion to tar. But the

⁹Sobel, op. cit., pp. 229-230.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 230.

brand did not really escalate until the agency switched to candid advertising with long "body copy" addressed to concerned smokers. "Smoking -- What are you going to do about it?" began a magazine advertisement. "If 'tar" and nicotine has become a concern to you. . . consider changing to a cigarette like Vantage."¹¹

Philip Morris was stirred by Vantage's success to prepare an ambush with Merit. It came out with all guns blazing. Chairman Joseph F. Cullman III took the podium at a press conference and spoke of a "scientific breakthrough" that made possible unprecedented taste for Merit's nine milligrams of tar. A battery of advertisements proclaimed that in large-scale tests of 3,000 consumers, "audited" by an independent firm of marketing counselors, Merit was found to taste as good as other brands with up to sixty per cent more tar.¹²

Vantage's rise had been slowed by the new competition from Merit and the other hi-fis, such as Kent Golden Lights, whose advertisement proclaimed, "Taste it, You won't believe the numbers!" But Reynolds chose not to change its advertising message. It had no immediate plans to emphasize the use of flavor additives, for example, or to reveal consumer

¹¹Edmund Faltermayer, "Reynolds Gets a Bang Out of the Cigarette Brand Explosion," Fortune, October, 1976, p. 143.

¹²Ibid.

surveys of its own, which showed that Vantage won out over other low-tar brands. Instead, Vantage advertising kept hammering on the health-concern theme that angered top officials at Philip Morris, which considered it "anti-cigarette."¹³

The success of Vantage, Merit, and Kent Golden Lights, set off the industry's great new game of one-downmanship on tar numbers. Within months, Vantage, at eleven milligrams, Merit with nine milligrams, and Kent Golden Lights at eight milligrams, had taken back seats to a version of American Brands' Pall Mall with seven milligrams, not far above Lorillard's True, whose tar was newly cut to five milligrams. Reynolds had meanwhile brought out Now at two milligrams, only to be matched when American Brands halved the tar in its Carltons. American subsequently introduced two versions of Carlton with a mere one milligram of tar.¹⁴

The hi-fis had more than eighteen per cent of the market by 1977 and sales were rising so quickly that it was evident this category would be the leader by 1981 at the very latest. Over 145 billion hi-fis were sold that year, against 105 billion in 1976. They commanded half the advertising budgets, around \$365 million. One out of every three brands or offshoots of them were in this group. They included some

¹³Ibid.

¹⁴Ibid., pp. 138-139.

early entries such as Vantage, Kent, and Carlton, and many old brand names revamped for this market, including Marlboro, Winston, L&M, Tareyton, and Pall Mall. Another group, including Merit and Now, was the fastest growing, and industry executives felt it was from this group the sales leaders for the 1980's would come.¹⁵

Apparently, tobacco companies will continue to spend huge amounts to push new brands onto the market, and maintain large budgets for old brands as well. Habit, tradition, inertia, and uncertainty, have had as much to do with advertising decisions as anything else. The companies have showed no evidence of wanting to alter the pattern. Why should they? Sales are up, and so are profits, even after the most successful antismoking crusade in history. That is all that matters.¹⁶

¹⁵Sobel, op. cit., pp. 233-234.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 225.

CHAPTER V
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The concept of the modern cigarette had been introduced during the Crimean War. Later, James B. Duke capitalized on this idea when he realized that he could not compete against the "Bull" and he turned to the production of cigarettes. He knew it would be difficult to overtake the more popular forms of tobacco usage which had been engrained in the American consumer; he was ready and willing to try. Far ahead of his time, Duke began an extensive advertising campaign to promote his new product. From that point on, advertising would play an essential role in the growth of the American cigarette industry.

By 1921, the cigarette had become more popular than any other form of tobacco used by Americans. This had been brought about in part by the continuance of heavy advertising expenditures. Industry officials had now taken over the lead. They planned to keep the cigarette in first place.

With the advent of radio and television, advertising agencies developed new themes they hoped would attract the smoker. Catchy jingles were heard. Elaborate commercials were seen by the listening and viewing audience. These jingles and commercials cost millions, but industry executives were not worried. They realized they would receive a substantial return on their investment.

Advertisements had helped make the cigarette an integral part of the American life-style, when the industry was assaulted by the antismoking campaign of the 1950's-1960's. Strategies in both camps during this conflict focused on advertisements. The antismoking forces won the battle. Cigarette advertisements were banished from radio and television. But the industry may have won the war. It had been given enough time during the antismoking campaign to prepare new advertising strategies which would be forthcoming in the media-- newspapers, magazines, and billboards. In this way, the industry was still able to keep its product before the public.

It has been ten years since cigarette commercials were banned from radio and television. The industry is still growing. Today's smokers demonstrate a preference for the high-filtration cigarettes developed by the industry; this preference has been established to a great extent through advertising.

As long as the cigarette industry exists, advertising will be a key to that existence.

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