Interviewer: Today we are interviewing Professor Dewey Browder, Lieutenant Colonel Dewey Browder. And we are continuing on the chronology of the 1970’s and the 1980’s. Professor Browder left Vietnam in the summer of 1971. And where was your next destination?

Browder: I went to school at Fort Benjamin Harrison in Indianapolis.

Interviewer: And this was the school you were telling us about where there were actually two schools and you and Helga tried to

Browder: Actually yes.

Interviewer: Right

Browder: I was scheduled to go to the Adjutant Generals Corps advanced course. And when I got there I found out that there was an opening in the Defense Information Officer’s School. And it was getting ready to start and it was going to finish just in time for me to go into the other school. And so I applied for a seat in it and was selected, that was the DINFOS School. And there you learn how to produce newspapers, conduct press conferences, and that sort of thing as a public affairs officer. And they moved the start date for my advanced course up one week after I had enrolled in the other one, and so I finished out that information school and my wife attended the first week’s classes for me then I moved into the regular classroom again.

Interviewer: What was your rank, were you a captain at this time?

Browder: I was a captain right.

Interviewer: Yes and you had received, is it fair to call it a field promotion?

Browder: A direct commission is the correct term yeah, a direct appointment.

Interviewer: And this was in Vietnam?

Browder: It was during Vietnam but I was on Okinawa at the time.

Interviewer: Okay alright. And you had already completed your bachelor’s degree at Mississippi State, is that correct?

Browder: Yes in Business Statistics and Data Processing.

Interviewer: And that really led to the personnel work and the sort of tracking?

Browder: Well when I was commissioned, I went to Okinawa as an NCO I was a Staff Sergeant. And I went as a computer programmer. I was assigned to the 6th Data Processing Unit and then my commission came through. I was appointed and I was converted to a systems analyst which was actually better considering my degree. And so I was then a systems analyst for a couple of years. Then before I went to Vietnam I went to Personnel Management School at Fort Benjamin Harrison.

Interviewer: Okay

Browder: And after Vietnam I came back and went to the advanced course for the branch the Adjutant General’s Corps. Which includes personnel management, personnel administration the whole works.
Interviewer: You must be pretty familiar with Indianapolis by now.

Browder: Yes

Interviewer: When did they close Benjamin Harris?

Browder: You know it was long after I left there. I don’t know probably sometime in the 80’s.

Interviewer: Yeah I knew someone who was stationed there in the 80’s and he told me it was closed not long after that.

Browder: Well they had the finance center there also. And the finance center may still be operating out at Fort Benjamin Harrison. I’m not sure I’ve been retired for so many years you kind of lose track of some of that.

Interviewer: So after you received the defense information training is that when you went to Germany? Is that when they sent you to Germany?

Browder: Well I finished my information school then I went in to the Adjutant Generals Corps course. And I went to school there until the late spring, early summer of 1971 or 1972. And then I moved to Germany.

Interviewer: Okay and where were you stationed in Germany?

Browder: I was stationed in Zweibruecken. Its right close to the French boarder and you work in French and English and German it’s kind of a multilingual city.

Interviewer: Was there any particular reason you were sent to Zweibruecken or was this the luck of the draw?

Browder: It was luck of the draw. There were two of us from my class that went to Zweibruecken. Larry Daly a good friend of mine and I went over first and they were looking for an adjutant. And I really wanted to be an adjutant rather than another computer guy. So I got there in a hurry and I got the admin job and became the troop commander and adjutant. And Larry came along later and Larry had become a programmer and systems analyst.

Interviewer: How many men were under you at this point?

Browder: Well I was troop commander which is kind of an administrative position for maybe 20 or 30. We had more civilians than we had military, it was a research and development organization. We had more civilians than we had military. And so I was the admin officer and the troop commander and then later they changed the term from admin officer to adjutant.

Interviewer: And you spent quite a few years in Zweibruecken didn’t you?

Browder: I did, I spent four years there. They were very good years. They were very productive years and we had a lot happen. We did a lot other than the military work.

Interviewer: Now you had met Helga earlier on.

Browder: Oh yes, yeah.
Interviewer: And so this wasn’t your first trip to Germany or your first station in Germany for that matter was it?

Browder: That’s right.

Interviewer: What were your language skills at this point?

Browder: I was pretty good in German both reading and speaking and writing. The spoken was easier for me than. And I could read and work in German, I didn’t do too much writing. Whenever I had to write documents in German I had Helga check them for me.

Interviewer: Yeah writing

Browder: It’s nice to have a built in rhetoric and dictionary guide.

Interviewer: Yeah, that’s actually writing is my downfall.

Browder: But while we were there Helga was the President of the International Wives Club which was French and German and American. Because we still had French located in Zweibruecken also. And the Canadians had been there earlier and when they moved out the American Air Force came in behind them at the airbase. And so we still had some fragments of the Canadian influence there.

Interviewer: So Zweibruecken was part of the original French zone wasn’t it then?

Browder: It was, the Americans are the ones who concurred it in 1945 in early 1945. There is a famous picture of them that appeared in the New York Times of American soldiers going through the bombed out city. It was really, it was about 75 percent destroyed. And then the Americans went on through then the French came in behind and occupied it. And then when de Gaulle asked for the NATO troops to leave France in the 60’s, they picked up the computer systems command from France and moved it to Zweibruecken in Germany. And the Americans were already in the former French zone because of airbases that they established. We also had a big training area called Baumholder.

Interviewer: Which is where the 101st goes?

Browder: I don’t know if the 101st goes to Baumholder do they?

Interviewer: They do I believe don’t they? Or was it closed?

Interviewer 2: It wasn’t when I was there, it was still open. But I went there for training and to drop things off so.

Browder: It’s a big big training area. And they sometimes refer to Rheinland Pfalz as the world’s largest aircraft carrier because we had so many airbases there. And I was located not far from one of those Ramstein.

Interviewer: One time when I was in Germany I used the term Kaiserslautern and someone said, “Oh you mean K-Town.”

Interviewer 2: Yeah that was exactly what we called it.

Browder: And Kaiserslautern was about 30 or 40 kilometers from Zweibruecken. And so we went there on occasion. They had a huge post exchange and then Ramstein was located there with their base
exchange and Landstuhl the big general army hospital was located there also. So it was convenient to be located so close to all of those service kinds of things.

Interviewer: What was the nature of the relationship between American forces and the locals, the Germans?

Browder: It was really good, we really got along well with the locals. And as a matter of fact that’s one of the reason why they voted for Helga to be the President of the German, American, French, International Women’s Club. And we had another organization that was pretty well known called Little NATO. And we had two levels of Little NATO. We had the officers Little NATO and the senior officers Little NATO. The senior officers Little NATO was made up of general officers and mayors. And Little NATO was made up of officers, usually captains and below, warrant officers. I was the President of Little NATO. And so there for a while she was the President of the International Wives Club and I was President of Little NATO. And we did things like visit the Bundestag and Ministry of Defense. And we went to Baumholder and fired each other’s weapons and we did things of an international nature that was social.

Interviewer: When I was there I went to give a talk at one point in Idar-oberstein.

Browder: I’ve been there many times.

Interviewer: And that’s not very far away.

Browder: Yeah

Interviewer: And they had a German American Friendship Club I forget what they called it exactly, that was the substance. And it was very popular and the relationship was very warm and you know you got the sense that the Germans you know tolerated some of the nuisances of extra traffic and tanks running into farmers’ fields and so on and so forth. But they positively liked the American influence and you know people got along well, that was my impression.

Browder: The German American relations were absolutely excellent in the area of Zweibruecken. We didn’t have tanks and big heavy vehicles and artillery pieces and so forth. We had computers and you know there was the airbase there where the American air force was located on the other side of the city. But we had really good relations with the local civilians and the force-to-force relations the French, the Americans we got along very well. We had a big training joint exercise when I was President of Little NATO where we all went to Baumholder we fired each other’s weapons just for the fun of it. And Germany being Germany after we were done we had a keg of beer and so of course the shooting was all over with. But we all had our share of beer and then I had rented a bus to haul us back and forth so we all piled on the bus and during the course of the day a little wild pig had approached one of the, had approached the firing line and they ran him off. And so I ran him off and he went into a big Quonset hut which is actually like a combat theatre where you can fire weapons and you are all in doors and they’re sub caliber. But this little wild pig ran into this huge building and the bus driver told me said, “I would like to have that pig.” And I said, “What are you going to do with him?” He said, “I am going to fatten him up and eat him.” So we chased that pig and he caught that pig and he locked the pig in the bathroom of the bus. And the pig went crazy inside that bathroom and then everybody had beer and everybody needed to go to the bathroom and nobody could get into the bathroom because we had this little wild pig in the bathroom. We all had a good laugh. The bus driver was willing to stop by every bush
on the way back to Zweibruecken. But he took that pig home with him and it was a joint American, German, French operation and it turned out to be a lot of fun.

Interviewer: What would a typical day have been like for you when you were in Zweibruecken?

Browder: Well I normally went to work at about 7 or 7:30 in the morning and I had a desk and I had lots of papers to shuffle. And we had assignments you know replacements to request and we sent people back and we usually had meetings. We provided the software support for USAMMAE which was the United States Army’s Material Management Agency in Europe. So the depots and all, and it’s a huge logistics operation. And so we provided the software support. We didn’t have the computers, they were next door to us and USAMMAE operated their own computers but we did all of the analysis and the computer programming and so it was a highly technical operation.

Interviewer: Did it depend on civilian employees?

Browder: It did. The civilian employees were very very important. And the enlisted people we had, most of our programmers were officers. But we did have probably ten or fifteen enlisted guys but most of those guys I mean they really had high GT scores and some of them had degrees and some of them had been drafted. I went there you know right at the end of the draft period.

Interviewer: Right 72, 73.

Browder: Yeah so it was we were very dependent on them. But we had a lot of Germans that worked for us also, computer programmers and systems analysts. Our division chiefs and branch chiefs were all Americans. We had a lot of, that brings up another issue though about German and American relations. Let’s go back for just a couple minutes and think about when German sovereignty was regained in 1955. In 1955 when Germany became the Federal Republic of Germany in the west and they had the German Democratic Republic in the east, President Eisenhower signed an executive order that divided the authority in the Federal Republic of Germany right down the middle between the ambassador and the Commander in Chief of the United States Army in Europe. And we’ll talk about him later because that’s the guy that I wound up working for the Commander in Chief. But the consular duties, the political duties, the business things all were handled by the embassy with the consulate sprinkled all over. But the Commander in Chief of the United States Army in Europe was in charge of all the defense. And along with that came a lot of German employees. For the first several years of the American presence in Germany after sovereignty we were one of the major employers in Germany. And so when I was with computer systems command we had a works council that was kind of like a union and I worked directly with them. That would fit into my day-to-day business meeting with the works council talking about workplace management and breaks and salaries.

Interviewer: Was this a Beirat did they call it a Beirat?

Browder: It was a Beirat yeah. So we had a lot of German employees. Now that had gone down considerably and I’ve got a list if you’re ever interested. I worked out the number of American employees and German employees and civilians from 1945 until 2000.

Interviewer: I remember you wrote an article related to this about the influence of American employment and Americans spending money on the economy and so on and so forth.
Browder: Right and we spent more money during, up until about 1960, we put more money into the German economy through the employment of Germans and through American spending than we did through the Marshall Plan. And I worked all of those out and the Journal of European Economic History published that article. So the American presence was very beneficial. We had our extracurricular activities you know our clubs and things of this nature but we also put a lot of money into the local economy.

Interviewer: At one point there were as many as, am I correct, 300,000 American service personnel in Germany? Is that right?

Browder: That’s pretty close. Now USAREUR at the height of the Cold War the USAREUR, the Army we had manning documents we called it TO & E and TDA and we had in USAREUR proper 199,000 soldiers in Germany say for instance in 1985 and 1986, 1987. But then we also had family members and we had American civilian employees school teachers and so forth. These people were all there and it was all regulated by what’s called the Status of Forces Agreement, a SOFA agreement. And that was a document that was periodically renegotiated between the Americans and the Germans that specified who has legal authority here and there, what kind of tax exemptions, it’s very complicated. But I’ll use the year 1987 because that number is really fresh in my mind. I just recently talked to a group about the INF treaty signed in 1987 between Gorbachev and Reagan. But we had over 500,000 American in Germany in 1987 that were subject to the SOFA and then we still had an additional 30 or 40 thousand German employees who worked for the Americans.

Interviewer: That’s a very large number.

Browder: Very large number. So we had to remind the ambassador from time to time about that split in authority and once in a while it did come up. I was always happy to point out that there were a half a million Americans in Germany that were there as a consequence of USAREUR. There were other military units in Germany sometimes the signal command and the computer systems command. The few people that were in the unit that I was within Zweibruecken we didn’t count as a part of the USAREUR figure because we were there in support of USAREUR. Our headquarters was in Fort Belvoir Virginia. It was very very complicated.

Interviewer: And a very sophisticated operation.

Browder: Very sophisticated yeah.

Interviewer: Arguably the most sophisticated outside of the United States at this point.

Browder: I think that’s easy to say yeah.

Interviewer: I mean certainly there were a significant number in Italy and Britain.

Browder: The ones in Italy belonged to USAREUR too.

Interviewer: Okay

Browder: We had USAREUR units in Turkey and in Greece. But there were other American, now USAREUR is not air force, air force is USAFE United States Air Force Units. But when I counted the Americans in Germany I was counting the air force people also. But it’s a big big operation.
Interviewer: When I was in Germany in the 1980’s there you could always see GIs in or out of uniform traveling on trains and trying to negotiate arrangements with the conductors. And the conductors would sometimes have to explain them no, no, no this compartment has been reserved by somebody else, you can’t sit here. And depending on how good their English was the conductor, it got complicated sometimes.

Browder: Speaking of trains. Starting in 1955 the Commander in Chief United States Army Europe had control over a number of trains in Germany. We ran a regular troop train from Bremerhaven down through Frankfurt and Stuttgart and I think it went as far south as Munich and went back and forth every day. And troops were brought into Germany by sea and they got off in Bremerhaven they got on that train then they were sent down and then they were picked up by their units along that route. But we also had, and this was a part of a bone of contention with the Ambassador from time to time, is the CINC also had his private train that had his office on it. And whenever we had big field exercises and so forth, the CINC lived in that train and we put the train out wherever we needed to go. And we could also run that train anywhere we wanted to in Germany. And we had a train that went to Berlin that left out of Frankfurt everyday back and forth just like we had the one running from Bremerhaven down south and back. And so the Ambassador liked the idea of maybe having that train for his own use from time to time.

Interviewer: Of course

Browder: But it was the CINC’s train and he willingly loaned it to the Ambassador from time to time. And I kept a copy of that executive order on my desk because I was the one that interfaced with the embassy on a day-to-day basis, remind them of what the provisions of that executive order was. The train belonged to my boss. We are talking 1980’s again not Zweibruecken. But those trains existed in the 1970’s.

Interviewer: Parts of Bremerhaven after the Americans left turned into a kind of ghost town because there was such a quantity of volume of stuff. Because above a certain rank you could bring in your household goods and all of the household goods came in through Bremerhaven. Then they’d reach Bremerhaven and then go on elsewhere. You could bring your car over and that would go through Bremerhaven too. And then of course once that stopped folks in Bremerhaven didn’t really have very much to do. When was the last time you were in Bremerhaven?

Browder: The last time I was in Bremerhaven was probably about 76.

Interviewer: Oh wow, you should go back.

Browder: No I was there again in 82 when I shipped a car over.

Interviewer: You should go back now because what they did to sort of compensate the loss of some of these facilities they built a really nice immigrant museum there I mean a really nice immigrant museum. There are two immigrant museums in Germany one of them in Hamburg and the other one is in Bremerhaven. And the one in Bremerhaven is actually the premier museum and it is really something else. It is really very impressive. You go through this museum and they everyone gets a ticket and it’s the story of a real German who decided to follow his fate by going to America. And then you follow you know what this person did, the steps that they took to leave and what became of them when they came
to this country. It’s a remarkable, it’s a really nice museum. So if you ever have a chance to go to Bremerhaven don’t forget there is a wonderful museum there.

Browder: Bremerhaven doesn’t have the best weather in Germany.

Interviewer: No it doesn’t.

Browder: It’s cold and rainy and so much of the

Interviewer: Where did you go after Zweibruecken?

Browder: After Zweibruecken I went to Baton Rouge Louisiana for ROTC duty at LSU.

Interviewer: So we’re talking mid 70’s by now.

Browder: Seventy-six

Interviewer: Seventy-six, seventy-seven

Browder: Yeah I went in 76.

Interviewer: This is the sort of thaw in relations in terms of the Cold War. You know Gerald Ford was talking about how you know we’re getting along, coexistence. Did you sense any of that when you were there?

Browder: About getting along with the Soviets you mean?

Interviewer: Right, exactly. A relaxation of tensions I guess is really what I’m getting at.

Browder: Well yes, I mean we had television and you know the daily newspapers and we had radio and we talked to the people. I mean the immediate area around Zweibruecken was so cordial that there was no immediate impact on us there but you could see what was going on in the big picture.

Interviewer: Did you go to Berlin during these years?

Browder: I did I went to Berlin and I took my children there and of course Helga my wife. We went there and we went on the troop train because that was the way you got to Berlin. Either you flew or you went by the troop train. You couldn’t drive just any old route because those things were closed off to the Americans. So we went we spent a few days probably I don’t know four or five days in Berlin. And we took a tour where we went over into East Berlin and it was an education for our children.

Interviewer: Did you cross at Check Point Charlie?

Browder: We crossed at Check Point Charlie. As a matter of fact, that was the place where Americans had to cross back and forth was at Check Point Charlie in and out of East and West Berlin. Now there’s another place call the Glienicke Bridge which is also known as the Bridge of Spies. And I used that later when I was in a political advisors job we used that bridge in and out. But that was because we had an operation over in Potsdam and it was easier for people who did things diplomatically and politically that were recognized to use that bridge as opposed to Check Point Charlie. But when I went on private business and I wanted to go over to East Berlin, then I went through Check Point Charlie and I had to wear my uniform.
Interviewer: Later on you could use the Friedelstrasse train station because I did that a number of times.

Browder: Well you weren’t military.

Interviewer: No, no, no that’s right I was a civilian.

Browder: See I had restrictions on me. We didn’t recognize the East German regime.

Interviewer: That’s right.

Browder: We dealt only with the Russians with the Soviets. So if somebody wanted to stop me, I had to wear my uniform when I went into East Berlin. But if they wanted to stop me they had to have a Soviet officer do it. And so and there are some peculiarities there when we start talking about the political advisor’s job where that comes in to play later on in the 80’s for me.

Interviewer: So how long were you in Baton Rouge?

Browder: I was there for four years.

Interviewer: So from roughly 76 to 80?

Browder: That’s right.

Interviewer: And was it an active chapter? Did you find volunteers who were eager to sign up?

Browder: Are you talking about for ROTC?

Interviewer: Yes

Browder: Yes when I went there we had an air force component and we had an army component. Together we only had about 90 cadets, but the draft had ended and the shadow of Vietnam was still over American society. And we had a real problem, we were still required to commission so many officers per year but we only had a handful to draw from. So the second year that I was there we had a staff meeting and somehow we hit upon a plan which I will describe for you very briefly, it’s kind of entertaining in a way. But we said look, we’ve got to bring more people into this program and the air force needed to bring in more people and so we hit on this plan. This first step is we’re going to actively recruit girls.

Interviewer: Seventy-six is the year when women

Browder: Were allowed to go to West Point.

Interviewer: That’s right.

Browder: Yeah, we’re going to recruit girls and in order to get the girls to come in it will help if we are recruiting athletes. So we pushed for athletes and we didn’t we weren’t planning on commissioning a lot of those guys because they didn’t have the scores and so forth. But they could play basketball and they could play football, they were good at track and field. And we worked closely with the athletic department and then the girls started to come in. And when the girls started to come in then more guys started to come in. And so we started this in 77 and when I left there in 1980 we had over a thousand students in ROTC.
Browder: It went from 90 to 1,000. We still had the requirement to commission the same number of students but we had about 1,000 to draw from rather than 90. So it really made a difference and the air force, they benefitted from it, the army benefitted from it. And we had a really, really nice girl's auxiliary at the ROTC called the Scotch Guard. And they were just ambassadors or they were good for the world. They could sing, they could dance, they were polite, they went out you know they sponsored things at old folks' homes, they just did everything and they were associated with the ROTC. So that was really good and they would take our classes. And I taught Military History there and the intro course, and I started my Ph.D. program when I was there.

Interviewer: Yeah that was actually sort of my next question. Did they permit you enough time so that you could get your studies in?

Browder: Well I took one course at a time. I applied I started in January of 77. I went to LSU in the summer of 76. I started going with the Ph.D. classes in 77 and then after I had accumulated a few courses, I applied to the army for them to leave me there for an additional year because LSU had a residency requirement for a Ph.D. You had to be a fulltime student for at least a year. You could do as much as you want to on a part time basis but you had to be totally dedicated to them for a year. And so the army agreed to leave me there.

Interviewer: And they paid you?

Browder: And they paid my salary and I had all my benefits and it was free for me. And then I wrote my dissertation after I left but I completed all of my course work by the time I left there.

Interviewer: And was T. Harry Williams still there?

Browder: T. Harry Williams he passed away while I was there. He used to come to, I hung out with all the other graduate students we interacted in classes and you know talk about things. I still had all of my duties to do over in the ROTC Department and the last year that I was there I had more time. And T. Harry Williams he was kind of like an uncle he was very avuncular he was like your, everybody’s father. He would come in and talk to all the graduate students, he was just wonderful.

Interviewer: He was the most famous historian at LSU.

Browder: And military historian perhaps the most famous military historian of his time, Civil War, really big. Herman Haddaway was one of his prize students. But T. Harry Williams he was in the hospital and they had a big dinner for him and he came from the hospital on campus and I bet you there were 2,000 people. We were just packed in the huge dinning and ballroom area at the university center and it was big. And then he went back to the hospital and a couple of days later he passed, he passed away. I did not have a class with him because I was doing European History and he taught Military History.

Interviewer: Okay and so you go back to Germany in 1980 and what’s your job?

Browder: I went back in 1981. I went to Command and General Staff College after LSU, to Fort Leavenworth Kansas.

Interviewer: By 1981 of course the atmosphere is changed. The Cold War has heated up, the Russians have invaded Afghanistan, Ronald Reagan is elected President, the Evil Empire is once again challenging
Dewey Browder

People start talking about the faulty gap again, what was your job when you went there in 1981?

Browder: When I went there in 1981 I was the Deputy Adjutant General of the 1st Armor Division. And I was located in Ansbach not too far from Nuernberg. And we were one of the forward based combat arms divisions to stand on the ramparts of freedom. And so now to give you an idea of how bad the ratio was, at that time the Soviets could throw over 100 combat divisions at us on a moment’s notice. And we were there, NATO everything we had, twelve and a quarter divisions. Also, just before I got there the Soviets started to deploy the SS20s which revolutionized things. I mean it was not an evolutionary it was a revolutionary change because the weapons that they were adding, these SS20s, they had three independently targetable warheads, nuclear warheads. So one missile they could hit Paris, London, and Rome with one missile, that’s three warheads. And so that was something that I really worked my tail off on with that project after I got to Heidelberg but when I first went to the first armor division, I was there as the Deputy Adjutant General. We had five post offices, we had a mortuary, we had a band, we had five personnel or administrative companies. It was a big span of control. We did personnel and administrative management and the band and ran the post offices. The mortuary guys, I’m glad I didn’t have to work with them too much.

Interviewer: Perhaps you can explain this, the kind of tit for tat, in this era between the SS20s and the Pershings. How did that work?

Browder: Okay the SS20 was mobile and had those three independently targetable warheads that I mentioned to you. So by not being silo based, this made them really a double threat. They could move them anywhere they wanted and they had a range of up to about 5,500 kilometers so over 3,000 miles.

And you get different measurements on those if you talk about nautical miles and the pay load and the type of propulsion that they were using.

Interviewer: This is considered intermediate right?

Browder: Intermediate nuclear force. The reason it’s called intermediate, it’s not an ICBM, Intercontinental Ballistic Missile. Those are the ones that we had based in the United States and we could hit the Soviet Union with those. They had missiles where they could hit the United States.

Interviewer: At ten thousand miles, twelve thousand miles, something like that?

Browder: Oh yeah you could easily, we were vulnerable, the Soviets could hit anywhere in North America with that ICBM coming over. And that’s the reason we had a command called the North American Air Defense Command NORAD located at Colorado Springs, Colorado. They built an __ station there also. That’s where I was when I took the pictures of the laser light the first photos of the laser. But the Canadians were concerned about the Soviets shooting things over the North Pole and coming in from the Northern side. But back to the SS20s and the Pershing II’s. So they were called intermediate nuclear force weapons because they weren’t ICBMs but they were also along with the tactical theatre nukes that we had. And so when they fielded those SS20s, they started in 1978, and they were no longer silo based, means you can’t target them in advance. If you know where the silo is you can have proof where the fire is coming from. So in 1979 the Chancellor of Germany, his name was Helmut Schmidt at the time he was an SPD, he wrote a letter to President Carter on behalf of all of the other European NATO nations requesting that the United States develop a missile that would counter that
SS20 that would be based in Europe. That is the key term. They said we need to be coupled to the
United States because if the Soviets fired those SS20s and hit us and they are fired from Soviet territory,
we can’t be confident that the United States will respond with an ICBM because that’s inviting a strike
on the United States itself. And so they wanted to have this missile that coupled and they said at the
same time, this is all outlined in the letter that Schmidt sent to President Carter, we want you to pursue
negotiations with the Soviets to get rid of those SS20s. And then we will stop the development and the
fielding of our own INFs and our own INFs had not yet been named because they didn’t exist yet. So
when Carter stepped down in 1981 and Reagan took over as President he picked up on that. It’s called
the Dual-Track Decision the letter is December of 1979 that Helmut Schmidt signed. And Reagan
immediately started talking about the zero-zero option. We want zero Soviet missiles and we want zero
NATO missiles, the INF kind. And in order to get the Soviets to come to the negotiation table on this
we’re going to field our own missiles. And we had an existing missile called a Pershing missile which we
modified and called it the Pershing II and put a nuclear warhead on it. And by modifying it we could hit
anywhere in the Soviet Union from Germany where we were basing the Pershing missiles. We planned
to field 108 of them. But we were also fielding another missile called the ground-launch cruise missile
the GLCM and those were being based at airbases. We had some of those in Germany we had some in
Belgium, we put some in England, some in Italy. And so we had those two kinds of missiles that we were
developing and the Soviets agreed to go to the negotiating table in 82. And so they met in Geneva with
us and we started negotiating there. And things kind of turned sour and they walked out of the
negotiations and they were into the other assignment there. But you’re still wanting to talk about the
First Armor Division maybe?

Interviewer: Well there’s a kind of evolution of weaponry here that I’d like to mention and get your
reaction to. Battlefield nuclear weapons I mean

Browder: Tactical

Interviewer: Tactical exactly. That was thought to be a terrible terrible disaster if it ever came to that.

Browder: It would be a horrendous disaster.

Interviewer: A disaster for the Russians, a disaster for Americans, a disaster for the locals.

Browder: The real disaster would have been in Western Europe though because there was never an
intent on the part of NATO to strike first. If the Soviets would strike first they were going be in Western
Europe and that’s where we would counter them. Since they had over a hundred divisions and we had
twelve, now we had more in the reserve but we could never match their hundred. And some of ours
were based in the United States and you have to get them to Europe. We had an annual exercise called
REFORGER the Return of Forces to Germany where we always sent a division primarily from Fort Riley,
Kansas over for exercises in the fall to demonstrate our ability to respond to you know the need for
reinforcements over there. But the fighting would have been in Western Europe because that’s where
they would have launched it. And then they had those hundred and some divisions they were stacked
up from the front all the way back to beyond Moscow to the Ural Mountains. And they had to be able to
marshal those and bring them forward.

Interviewer: And this of course was by Stalin’s design you know. His thinking was this war you fight on
my territory; next time fight on your territory.
Browder: Right and so Bernie Rogers, General Bernard Rogers who had been Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army was assigned the new job to be Supreme Allied commander in Europe in Belgium. And he went to work with General Otis the guy that I ultimately was the speech writer for and political advisor for. And they developed this thing called Follow on Forces Attack. And when they were conceiving it they weren’t sure what the missiles would be but they had to have something that would strike and hit those rear echelons Soviet divisions before they could mass and get over into the west. Called the FOFA Follow on Forces Attack. If you want to read that, I’m serious I’ve got really good article on the encyclopedia of military philosophy that deals with FOFA, it’s about three or four pages long. And they’ve got it over in the Library it’s a two volume work and the article on Follow on Forces Attack that I wrote is just a few pages long. But it really explains how this worked. And General Otis was designated as the primary man to field these units, to field these forces. And he’s the senior guy in Europe he’s the senior guy in Germany, co-responsible for what goes on in Germany with the Ambassador. And so this kicks off really really big time then in 1982 and in 1983. Early 1983 State and Defense decided that we were going to have a joint conference to decide how to field these missiles. We had decided we were going to field them. Reagan has articulated the zero zero option the Dual-Track decision is in place.

Interviewer: Now Kohl is now

Browder: Kohl he takes over in fall of 1982 with a vote of no confidence they have another election in in March of 1983 and he’s then in the driver’s seat as the, and a key colleague of his in this whole process a fellow by the name of Genscher who was the German Foreign Minister and really belonged to a different political party FDP because he was in coalition with the socialists. And when the socialist turned against Helmut Schmidt and the public was really really divided on this and the media was really divided. They left Schmidt and went over to Kohl and joined him in the new coalition. Okay so in, I think it was February of 1983 maybe early March of 1983, we had this joint defense-state department conference in London. It was a real brainstorming session for about three days and I was one of the representatives that went and represented the U.S. Army. And we finally came out of that with the conclusion that the best way to field these new missiles is to be as transparent as possible. We've got to be honest we can’t hide things from the European public from the government and so forth. And so that’s when we really launched the big, big public relations program. And then the anti-missile people heavily funded by the Soviets and by East Germany put on huge huge demonstrations in the West.

Interviewer: Okay well let me play devil’s advocate here for a moment. Because from the Russian perspective well perhaps even from the East German perspective, how do I know that you tricky Americans aren’t planning first strike capability that’s going to wipe us out?

Browder: That’s a very good question.

Interviewer: How do I know that.

Browder: Right and so we told them what our plans were, I mean we still had secrets I mean we didn’t want to give away absolutely everything. But we also had what are called the military liaison missions. Let me backtrack for a minute on this. Let’s go back to about 1947 right at the end of the war or right after the war when it’s starting to become clear that the Soviets and the Americans that we are going to have a Cold War. In 1946 Churchill has already given his Iron Curtain speech. We have the famous telegram from Moscow about that same time saying that the Soviets are planning on
Interviewer: The long telegram from George Kennan.

Browder: Exactly right. So we then created teams we put together a team of Americans, a team of Brits, a team of Frenchmen, and the Soviets got to put together three teams. And their three teams they sent one to the American Zone, one to the French Zone, and one to the British Zone. And the Brits sent one team to the Soviets Zone, the French sent one team, and we sent one team. And we are free to roam around there within limitations and observe the formation of military units and what they’re doing. And that resulted in a major, major incident in March of 1985 when the Soviets shot and killed an American Major by the name of Nicholson. And we can talk about that if you want to. I worked on that one day and night. But we had these teams that were out there observing so when we were having a big maneuver the Soviets were there to watch us maneuver so they could see what we were doing. When they had their maneuvers we were there to watch them, when the French had maneuvers the British had maneuvers the Soviets could watch them. And so this is one of the principal things where you are covering the immediate area on both sides of the boarder.

Interviewer: Okay again let me state this from the Russian perspective again playing devil’s advocate. They can’t match the United States in its tactical performance, they can’t match the United States in its expenditures on the military.

Browder: They can only match us with brute force.

Interviewer: That’s right brute force. So if I’m a Russian I’m going to be mighty suspicious at this moment because my suspicions correspond to I have to say this, a kind of overheated rhetoric. And here’s what I mean. My view of Reagan is I try to be fairly nuanced. I have a lot of respect for Reagan in his second term okay, second term because he learned from his mistakes in his first term. But in his first term he sounded like a cowboy out for hell. I mean the rhetoric was pretty intense.

Browder: The rhetoric was pretty intense and it was on both sides and we call that saber rattling.

Interviewer: Yes it was on both sides.

Browder: A lot of saber rattling.

Interviewer: But we had the sabers and they didn’t.

Browder: Well they had the SS20s and we didn’t.

Interviewer: Yeah

Browder: We didn’t have them yet. We don’t get those fielded until the end of 1983.

Interviewer: Yeah I mean they’re the ones provoking things they’re the ones that set this in motion, absolutely. Bad on them it was a stupid thing to do. They should have foreseen the consequence that the Americans were going to respond in kind and they would have, we’ve got nothing here, we’ve got nothing here.

Browder: Okay so remember at the London conference that I told you about that the state and defense joined. And we invited people from the ministry of defense from Belgium and from England and Italy and the NATO countries. We said we’ve got to be open and above, we’ve got to be transparent. Okay so we launched on a series of conferences where we invited the Soviets to come participate. And one of
the institution we used was called the European Academy, you’ve probably heard about them they have institutions sprinkled around here and there all over in Europe. One of their institutions, the campus, was at a place called Otzenhausen up in the Hunsruck fairly close to Luxembourg. So they organized and we had one in Bremerhaven we had Hamburg. So they organized this big one in Otzenhausen in early 1984, I can’t remember the exact date of it. But they invited the Soviets to send a representative to meet with the NATO political and public affairs officers so they could tell us their perspective, tell us what their fears were, tell us what their worries were. And so I was the only American Army representative at this meeting. We had other Americans there from the air force and state department. The Soviets sent a guy with a wonderful title of First Secretary for Propaganda. But you know the term propaganda in Europe it doesn’t have all the pejorative meaning we have here. It’s kind of like public affairs, public relations and so this guy showed up. And when he showed up he pulled in and I’m sure his driver was KGB. It was a young athletic guy probably 30 or 35 years old but the diplomat wore a pinstriped suit, you know the picture of the diplomat. And they arrived in what looked like a bread truck and the KGB guy was driving it and he didn’t say I’m KGB, I’m calling him KGB. So I saw him pull in and I said, “This is really remarkable, here this diplomat is running around in a bread truck.” Then I thought he’s got commo equipment in there he’s going to be talking to Moscow every night after we have our meetings. So our discussions got pretty heated and we had people there, we had translators for Portuguese for Spanish, Italian, French, and I mean it was a real operation. And you could wear your ear set for whatever language you wanted to listen to. And so it got pretty heated at times and so during one of the breaks I asked him I said, “You know I’m surprised at the kind of vehicle you arrived in.” He said, “What’s so surprising?” Well I’m guessing you’ve got radio equipment in there. He said, “Do you want to see inside of my vehicle?” I said yes. He took me out there and he didn’t have any equipment in there. He had publications in there, he had pamphlets, he had posters and it was all anti American stuff. In our sense of the word, propaganda. It was all about the evils of how we were going to leave West Germany in a smoldering nuclear ruin. I said, “You know these things are false, this isn’t true.” He said, “We think they are true.” What are you going to do with them? He said, “I’m going to give them away at German Universities, I’ll empty this truck in an hour.” Pull into a university. Okay so at the very end of our expanded session there, we were saying our good byes like civilized people are supposed to do. I was a major at the time. And he came over to me and poked me in the chest and he said, “Major Browder, you’ve had your way for the last three days because you’re surrounded by friends but let me tell you, and he poked me again in the chest, he said one-day Russian Communism, he didn’t say Soviet, one day, Russian Communism is going to encircle the globe with or without the use of force.” And I said, “Well you think you’ve been at a disadvantage because I’m among friends why don’t you organize a conference of Warsaw Pact Officers and invite me to speak and you’ll be surrounded by your friends.” He said, “You know I could never do that.” And he just backed off. So I mean we did everything we could to be open and transparent about the fielding. We didn’t tell them the schedule, we didn’t tell them where we were going to put them, but we told them that they were coming. And we opened with fielding starting in I’d say December of 1983 is when the first one arrived. I’d have to go back and check the dates.

Interviewer: You know and kudos to Reagan for negotiating the INF treaty in 1987.

Browder: He did.

Interviewer: I mean hat’s off to Ronald Reagan no two ways about it. But you know the Cold War got pretty ugly in the mid-80s didn’t it?
Browder: Let me tell you another story about how ugly this got. One day the phone rang. You know what FM 100-5 is right? The army’s field manual for operations. I got a phone call one day from a friend of mine who was a graduate student at the University of Heidelberg and he said you guys have got me really upset. I said, “What are you upset about?” He said, “Well I’ve got a copy of your manual here about waging war and you’re going to leave, you’re going to turn West Germany into nuclear coals-ashes.” That’s not true, you’ve been listening to too much propaganda. He said, “Well I’m looking at your manual.” I said, “What manual is it?” He said, “Its Field Manual 100-5.” I said, “Well Field Manual 100-5 doesn’t say that at all.” He said, “Let me read you something from it.” He read a quote to me from General Otis, I was General Otis’s speech writer.

Interviewer: I didn’t write that.

Browder: And of course it wasn’t true. And he said then he read something from General Rogers that wasn’t true. I said, “What does this manual look like?” He said, “Well it’s in German.” And I said, “Our field manuals are all in English.” But he said, “Well this is in translation and he said it’s red.” And I said, “Whoa, our manuals are never published in red, I need to get a copy of that.” He said, “Okay I’ll meet you in the evening at a café downtown, he said make sure you wear civilian clothes and I’ll meet you there and I’m going to give you this.” So I went home and put on civilian clothes and went down. He had a brown paper bag, and he gave that to me and I took it back and gave it to the military intelligence people for them to translate and go through and figure out what they were going to do about it. I never heard about that again until the year 2000.

Interviewer: Really?

Browder: In 2000 I was back in Heidelberg for a conference on Americans in Germany and I was one of the speakers. And I mentioned this manual and one of the guys in the back of the room raised his hand and said, “I wrote that manual.” And I said, “You did what?” He said, “I wrote that manual.” He was there as a representative of the peace movement speaking about his experiences. I said, “Well you know it’s not true, it’s all a lie, why would you write it?” He said, “Well I thought that’s what you guys really intended to do.” So he just had it all setup in Germany and they handed it out at the universities.

Interviewer: Yeah that’s right I mean that was the level of

Browder: But he put a red cover on it.

Interviewer: That was the level of suspicion at the time. And you know I’m not obviously it was not, first strike capability was not part of the equation, I understand that. But still, it’s reasonable that they should be fearful of that possibility.

Browder: And that made a fairly easy sell to the East Germans. And there was a time on a Sunday afternoon where they organized a demonstration, an anti-NATO demonstration, where they held hands from the North Sea to the Swiss border across Germany, two o’clock on a Sunday afternoon. And on another occasion they had demonstrators came and circles the house where I lived and held hands and sang, *We Shall Overcome*. It just scared the daylights out of Helga because those people had circled the house and they weren’t always that peaceful. But the Soviets came to the table in 1987. I’m going to tell the story about it here real quick. In 1997 we had the Russian Ambassador here at APSU, because the Soviet Union no longer existed. We had the Russian Ambassador to the United States a guy by the name of Juli Vorontsov here on the Austin Peay campus. Vorontsov had been the Soviet Ambassador to France
during this crisis with the INF missiles. So after he made his presentation I asked him how important was the fielding of the Pershing II missiles in the Strategic Defense Initiative, which we haven’t mentioned yet. And he said, “They were absolutely crucial.” He said, President Reagan, Chancellor Kohl, and Prime Minister Thatcher held NATO together. And he said the fielding of the Pershing II missiles and the SDI, I’ve got the exact quote written down at home, and the Strategic Defense Initiative caused Gorbachev to go to the negotiating table. We thought you guys could do it and we just couldn’t figure it out. And that was here on this campus he made that statement.

Interviewer: And this series I was telling you about the Americans goes over this territory because it talks from the Russian perspective that they can’t match American resources. That they can’t match American science, they can’t match inventiveness, whatever you want to call it. And so they are always going to be at a disadvantage and they’re going to have to use whatever means are necessary in order to preserve themselves.

Browder: With or without the use of force.

Interviewer: And with the use of force. Absolutely I mean that’s another thing about this series. These folks don’t hesitate to kill folks who are in the way. I mean there’s no if’s and’s or but’s. You know I’m in service to a larger cause an obstacle and bye bye. And the kind of ruthlessness this sort of end justifies the means thinking is one of the things one of the themes that comes out in this presentation because you know it’s very unpleasant. It’s nothing to admire certainly not. The strategic defense initiative however you know back in the early 1970s the United States had signed a treaty banning anti-ballistic missile systems.

Browder: Right

Interviewer: And the SDI was either directly or indirectly a violation of that agreement wasn’t it?

Browder: Well it was argued that it was but it was argued that it wasn’t. So we never admitted that it would be a violation until Reagan said I’ll give it to the Soviets after we’ve developed it.

Interviewer: Right

Browder: And so that completely disarmed them, that argument. But it was a valid complaint I think in the very beginning. I don’t know how much you know, do you want to talk about the SDI?

Interviewer: Sure yeah.

Browder: Well late 1983 I guess, and I’ve got a date on that somewhere also, Ronald Reagan announced the Strategic Defense Initiative. And the press popularized it.

Interviewer: Known by its nickname Star Wars.

Browder: From the 1977 movie Star Wars. And the idea was that if Soviets fire a missile we’re going to pick it up, we’re going to be able to intercept it before it can get into the kill zone and it’s going to blow it up. It would probably be a nuclear warhead that we detonate up there somewhere. But we didn’t have any specific plans on this. So that really sort of upset the apple cart in terms of the anti-ballistic missile system that Dr. Zieren just mentioned a few minutes ago. So this was in the papers, nobody knew exactly how it was going to work. And then probably in 1984, the NATO there’s a group of retired NATO officers that hold the Legion of Merit medal, they’re all retired generals. And on a regular basis
they got together once a year and for this particular one they invited General Otis to come and speak to them and explain the Strategic Defense Initiative and he accepted the invitation and I had to write the speech. And I went in to see General Otis and I said, “Sir, you’ve given me a tough one this time, I don’t understand the SDI tell me how it’s going to work so I can write this.” And he said, “Well I don’t know how it’s going to work either, see my scientific advisor.”

Interviewer: No one really knew

Browder: Well listen to the rest of it. The scientific advisor was right there with me just a couple of doors down. I went to see him and he said, “I don’t know how it’s going to work. And he said, “I don’t know that it will ever work.” And I said, “I’ve got to write this speech.” And he said, “Well let me recommend that you talk to President Reagan’s speech writers and find out how they’ve done it.” So I called and I talked to the speech writers and they told me that they would send me the input that they used for crafting this speech.

Interviewer: Of course

Browder: So they sent me the material and I wrote the speech and it went over well. We had it translated in advance, we had it translated into French and different languages, Italian, whatever we needed for people in the audience. And nobody seemed to question General Otis on that but you know if we had not treated that like a classified topic, people on the outside would have picked up on the doubts that we had and Gorbachev may have thought twice before he decided to go to the negotiating table. If the Americans were really doubtful of it.

Interviewer: The negotiation was in Reykjavik. Well it was, what was the name of the Hungarian Scientist, the nuclear scientist who sort of first proposed this? He was a real militant anti-communist and he worked on the atomic bomb project in the 1940s. I mean he was a brilliant scientist I’m not trying to take anything away but he came up with this idea.

Browder: You’re not talking about Teller are you?

Interviewer: Yeah exactly.

Browder: He was father of the hydrogen bomb.

Interviewer: Yeah Edward Teller and I mean he’s this brilliant guy with all of kinds of incredible ideas. But he didn’t have to work out the details. He didn’t actually have to apply the idea to the real world and I have the impression that here we are in the year 2019 and they’re just beginning to be able to make it work, SDI.

Browder: Yeah and it was fully classified at the time, I’m not going to say because we’re taping this, anything about what we actually said in those conversations but there were doubts for a lot of good reason. But when Vorontsov on this campus said we thought you guys had it worked out and we just couldn’t do it, that was so telling.

Interviewer: And that’s exactly the point that this program makes. This is a show called the Americans, have you ever seen it. It’s a HBO series it ran for six seasons.

Browder: We don’t have it in the Library.
Interviewer: We don’t?

Browder: I went over after you and I talked and Joe Weber looked for me and he said, no we can’t find it and we don’t, he said we don’t have a contract that would cover where you could view it either.

Interviewer: Actually I was thinking the Public Library would have it.

Interviewer: Oh

Browder: The Public Library might have it.

Interviewer: Yeah but they go so far in the series, I don’t know if it’s accurate or not, they go so far in the series as to kidnap a Russian scientist who, a Russian Jewish Scientist is one of the Refuseniks. And left the Soviet Union under pressure from the United States to let Jewish citizens move through Israel or the United States or whatever. So the Russians capture this guy, kidnap him, and force him to go back to Russia to work on this project because they don’t know what they are doing otherwise. Now as I said I don’t know if it is accurate but it does express the idea that they didn’t really have an answer, they didn’t really know how they were going to do this. And in fact in the series it shows them using KGB agents to spy on the Americans to get information to promote the project back in Russia. There’s also, they are trying to figure out the stealth, the technology of stealth weaponry and how you bend radar by bending particular shapes so that you can’t identify what you’re looking at on a radar screen. But it clearly shows the superiority of American technology over Russian technology and the superiority of American science, the superiority of American resources generally. And that’s why it’s such it’s factually based. The guy who wrote it was a CIA agent so he knows what he was talking about. And it’s really very very well done it’s a cut above what you usually see. I’m on season five, I’ve got one more to go. How are we doing with our camera? I want to check this. Okay it is 2:30 can you go another 15 minutes, does that work?

Browder: Yeah, I’d love to talk to you a little bit about Art Nicholson’s murder if you want to hear about that.

Interviewer: The first thing I’d like to do is to talk about the generals you worked with and what was there as speech writer as adjutant as whatever your function was. What was the name of the main general that you worked with?

Browder: General Otis, General Glenn K Otis.

Interviewer: And what was his background?

Browder: Well he was a West Point graduate. He’s been in the Korean War as a machine gunner and he got appointed to West Point afterwards. He went to West Point and he graduated he was an Armor Officer. He is a real muddy boots, or was he’s dead now, but he was a real muddy boots guy. He was the Commander in Chief of the United States Army Europe he’s got half a million people that he’s kind of overseeing in one way or another. When a new weapon came in a new tank or something, he went out and he got out there and he fired that weapon and he got the feel for it. And so he knew you know he knew what it felt like. And Helga worked at Host Nation Activities when I was the speechwriter and she worked as a liaison between the German Government and the American Military. And every unit in the Army from a battalion up has a civil affairs kind of like a G5 or S5 and so that’s where the rubber meets the road. That’s where those guys do maneuver damage and it gets paid for and all of that. So Helga she
arranged these conference between the German political leaders and General Otis and his staff. And she’d brief him before the meeting: here’s where we’re going here’s what’s going to happen, he would always ask how are you feeding their driver? You know, where are they going to be staying? Are they going to be comfortable while we’re talking all day long? Are they going to have plenty to eat, are they going to have hot coffee? Just little things like that. And I was at the meeting when Casper Weinberger and Chancellor Kohl met on SDI. It’s when Chancellor Kohl announced that the German firms would be allowed to participate in the SDI. And we didn’t know what he was going to do. His office called General Otis’s office the day before and said he wanted to bring Casper Weinberger to an American installation to make an announcement. And that they wanted to go preferably to Vilseck because that’s where we were fielding the new Bradleys’ and the M1 tanks and new kinds of equipment in modernization. So General Otis and I went up to meet with Caspar Weinberger and Chancellor Kohl at Vilseck. And Kohl’s plane was a little bit late arriving, we got there early and a guy came down from, we were at the airfield, and guy came down from somewhere in the operations room and he said, “I’m putting on some coffee if you’d like to have some coffee while you’re waiting.” And so I said, “I’ll come up there and I said, General Otis can I bring you back a cup of coffee?” He said, “You’re not my aide you’re my political advisor, I’ll get my own coffee.”

Interviewer: That’s very impressive.

Browder: Very impressive. So he, that General, he taught math at West Point he was a math professor at West Point. But he was big into soldier kinds of things. I wrote about 340 speeches including stuff for Armed Service Defense Committees and so forth. And he was always so, one-time Ambassador Lodge, John Lodge, Henry Cabot Lodge brother, was visiting the headquarters, actually I think he was there on a private visit. And General Otis asked me if I would like to go to dinner with them, Helga and I were to go to dinner with the Ambassador and his wife and General and Mrs. Otis. I said, “We would love to,” And he said, “Why don’t you pick a place a German place and tell us where we’re going to be and I’ll bring the Ambassador because he’s staying in my quarters in my villa.” So I chose the Weinstube at the top of the castle in Heidelberg. A wonderful place, beautiful place.

Interviewer: Oh yes

Browder: I didn’t do my homework. Ambassador Lodge weighted close to 300 pounds and was in his 80s and there was a long narrow hallway to get up to that stair. And General Otis and Ambassador Lodge and Helga were there and I kind of looked at Ambassador Lodge like, how in the hell am I going to get him up those steps? And so Ambassador Lodge, and he kept referring to Cabot he didn’t call him Henry or whatever just Cabot. He said, “Well I’m willing to try this do you think you might be able to help me?” I said, “Sure.” So he put his hands on the banister and I pushed on his butt. We got him up those steps. The food was wonderful. It was hot. It was in the summertime. The windows were open they don’t have air conditioning over there so there was a little bit of discomfort. And they had some kind of performance going on in the hall, it wasn’t the Student Prints or anything like that, something going on.

Interviewer: Well the view on the top there is remarkable.

Browder: So we were getting ready to leave the proprietor came over to me and he said, “There’s a gentler way out the back door.” So we took him out through the kitchen and it was a gentler slope took us right back out to the parking lot. But General Otis invited us to go and just go meet with him and have dinner with him and the Ambassador and his wife which was really kind of nice, and he did that a lot he
was real generous. But General Kroesen his predecessor the guy that they tried to assassinate. They hit his vehicle with an anti-tank weapon, he was kind of like John Wayne because General Otis was about 5’7” probably, kind of big ears. He always wanted to go to church on Sundays, he was devout Catholic. And he had a German aid and he had an American aid and wherever he went one of those aids always went with him. They always had to find the nearest mass so he could go to mass. General Kroesen is still alive. He writes, occasionally you see articles from him. He was kind of like John Wayne, he was big and strong, he had presence. When he walked in to the room, everyone knew he was in the room. When I interviewed for that speech writers job the political advisors job, I interviewed with him. And he was working at his desk and he made eye contact with me when I first came in and we talked. And he said I’m listening and he kept on writing and I felt kind of like well I guess he can do two things at one time he’s a general. And then at the end he said, “well you are my speech writer I expect you to stay abreast on all the big issues and I expect you to tell me what you think I should say and if I like it I’ll say it and if I don’t you shouldn’t be offended.” I remember I wrote a real long speech for him one time he was going to be on a Rhine River cruise and the American Chamber of Commerce in Europe or something was having this big deal and they wanted him to speak at. And they wanted to know why we have American soldiers still in Germany so long after the war. So I wrote this rather, I really loved it I thought it was a great speech and I gave it to him. I didn’t go with him so I didn’t hear him when he actually spoke but the aid came back and said he didn’t use it. And I said that’s terrible that’s a good speech, I’ll give that to him on another occasion. A couple of weeks later, he was speaking to the Seventh Corps Commander’s staff and they were doing it at Kelly Barracks there right outside of Stuttgart and he used that speech. I went with him on that one, but I didn’t go into the speech. He told the Corps Commander and me to wait at the bar.