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A CONTENT ANALYSIS OF THE COVERAGE OF THE FINAL SIX WEEKS
OF OPERATION DESERT SHIELD IN
ARAB NEWS AND THE NEW YORK TIMES

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An Abstract
Presented to the
Graduate and Research Council of
Austin Peay State University

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts

by
Sonja M. Osborne-Quinnett
June 1991

ABSTRACT

This study looked at the coverage of the final six weeks of Operation Desert Shield in the English Language edition of Arab News, of Saudi Arabia, and The New York Times.

This study ascertained that The New York Times while clearly indicating it supported negotiation as a preferred way of settling the Persian Gulf crisis, was cautiously preparing the public for the possibility of an armed solution. Of the articles from The New York Times included in this study, 31% had negotiation as a theme with 27% having military preparedness as a theme.

The situation for Arab News was a little different with only 10% of their articles having negotiation as a theme, while 49% had military preparedness.

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June 1991

To the Graduate and Research Council:

I am submitting herewith a Thesis written by Sonja M. Osborne-Quinnett entitled "A content analysis of the coverage of the final six weeks of Operation Desert Shield in Arab News and The New York Times." I have examined the final copy of this paper for form and content, and I recommend that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree Master of Arts, with a major in Speech, Communication, and Theatre.



Major Professor

We have read this thesis
and recommend its
acceptance:




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Dean of the Graduate School

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Chapter One

Introduction

This thesis is a content analysis of the coverage of the crisis in the Persian Gulf for six weeks beginning December 6, 1990, with the cut off date being January 17, 1991, the day on which Operation Desert Shield became Operation Desert Storm. The analysis will be of the coverage contained in Arab News, the first English language daily newspaper of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and the New York Times.

The country of Iraq emerged from its eight year war with Iran as "...the only serious military power in the Gulf" (Marr, 1991). At the close of that war, Iraq had a standing army of more than one million persons which included the elite soldiers of the Republican Guard. Their military equipment included "...more than 5,500 tanks, more than 7,000 armored personnel carriers and more than 3,500 artillery pieces" (Marr, 1991).

In addition to this, Iraq was reported to have the largest stock of chemical weapons in the Third World, to have improved the range of the Soviet Scud missiles it had, and to have tested a rocket which, "...it hoped would ultimately carry a satellite into space..." (Marr, 1991).

The costs of the Iran/Iraq war, which included the armament of this mighty military machine, left Iraq deeply in debt, not only to its Arab neighbors, but also to the

West. The figure was estimated to be somewhere between \$30 and \$35 billion (Marr, 1991). This amount increased by about \$10 billion toward the end of July 1990.

With the drop in the price of oil during the first half of the year, Iraq's ability to repay its loans diminished and President Saddam Hussein again sought financial assistance from his neighbors. They refused. Saddam's use of his available cash to expand his military machine and not pay his debts, was of some concern. "Instead of reordering his priorities and scaling down his ambitious military program, Saddam blamed Kuwait, a defenseless neighbor, and the UAE [United Arab Emirates] for lower oil prices" (Marr, 1991).

Iraq used the 1920s boundary dispute as the stated basis for its displeasure. These boundaries had been drawn just after World War I and had granted Iraq "...only 26 miles of shoreline and [left them] without a port on the Gulf" (Marr, 1991). This was not the first time the world was hearing about Iraq's displeasure on that issue.

In 1961, Iraqi leader Abdul Karim Quasim claimed Kuwait as an historical part of Iraq, stating that the separation after World War II was an arbitrary decision made by Great Britain (Fromkin, 1991). Britain dispatched troops to the area and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was averted.

Twelve years later another Iraqi leader, Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr attacked Kuwait using the same premise. "This time other Arab states came to Kuwait's support, a deal was

struck, Kuwait made a payment of money to Iraq and the troops withdrew" (Fromkin, 1991). This action in 1973 was in spite of the fact that Iraq had formally relinquished its claim to Kuwait in 1963 (Marr, 1991).

The claims made by Iraq were unfounded. Indeed, Saudi Arabia could have made a territorial claim to a large portion of what is called Iraq.

This country did not exist before World War I, and its inception was the result of an administrative convenience which united the three former Ottoman provinces of Basra, Baghdad and Mogul (Fromkin, 1991). The linking of incompatible populations of Shiite and Sunni Muslims, Assyrian Christians and Jews, and the Kurds was called by the British, "Iraq - the well-rooted country - in order to give it a name that was Arabic" (Fromkin, 1991).

The boundaries for this new nation included "...all the land west of the Euphrates River, all the way to the Syrian frontier...which was formerly claimed by Ibn Saud of Arabia." To appease him "...the British transferred two-thirds of the territory of Kuwait, which had been essentially independent for about two centuries" (Fromkin, 1991).

These boundaries were originally created to protect the new nation of Iraq in 1922 and were denounced in the 1960s, the '70s and now again by Saddam Hussein in the 1990s.

When Iraq's financial problems intensified, Kuwait became the scapegoat for all the ills of Iraq, and when

Kuwait reneged on a promise to cut oil production in order to drive up prices on the world market, the situation between the two nations worsened. In a move which seemed to add insult to injury, Kuwait reminded Iraq of its unpaid debts to them (Marr, 1991).

In an address to the Arab league summit on May 30, 1990, Saddam Hussein said that the economic measures against his country were tantamount to war. In another speech around the middle of July, Saddam indicated that if talks did not produce the desired results, he would "resort to effective action" (Marr, 1991).

Saddam Hussein contacted the United States Ambassador to Iraq to ascertain what her nation's position was on the dispute between Iraq and Kuwait. The matter was passed up the United States diplomatic chain of command on to the Secretary of State, James Baker. Consequently, "...the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, on Baker's direct orders, told Saddam Hussein in late July that the U.S. took no position on Iraq's border and economic dispute with Kuwait. A week later, Iraq invaded the emirate" (Ogden, 1990). The date was August 2, 1990.

Prior to and during this aggression, Saddam's threatening rhetoric led to the belief that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia would be the next in line to be occupied. The unchecked movement of the Iraqi occupying forces through Kuwait toward the border with Saudi Arabia led to a meeting between the Secretary of State, James Baker and King Fahd.

After that meeting, there was a formal request from the King to President George Bush for the protection of the United States Armed Forces from the likely invasion by Iraq.

King Fahd had reason to be concerned about an invasion by Iraqi forces. In the 1960s and 1970s several dissident left-wing Saudi groups had been given safe haven by Iraq and had operated from there (Long, 1991). The Saudi monarch had no way to determine whether these factions formed part of the Iraqi military, or indeed if they were involved in any section of its chain of command.

"The year 1990 beckoned as a year in which the United States intentions and its ability to affect events in the Middle East would be tested" (Hunter, 1990). As farsighted as Hunter may have been when he made this statement, he could not have perceived the extent to which this was prophetic.

The first United States troops arrived in the Kingdom on August 8, heralding the start of the most massive deployment of American troops since the Vietnam War. Other troops of the United Nations member countries were dispatched, but America maintained the majority force.

Iraq's aggression against Kuwait created a 'new world crisis' and the media raced to be on the spot. The invasion and occupation of Kuwait was complete before United States reporters got on the scene. Television reporting of the invasion was severely hampered by the lack of photo opportunities, and Lane Vernardos, director of Special

Events, CBS News, said, "We've gone back to the basics of reporting and using skills not utilized in this business as much as they ought to be. It is nice to be back to real reporting for a while" (Broadcasting, 1990).

As the standoff on the "line in the sand" continued and built up to armed conflict, coverage in the media of the United States was constant, but not much is known about coverage in the press of Saudi Arabia.

Purpose

The purpose of this study is to look at the coverage of this conflict given by two newspapers, the English language edition of the Arab News, of Saudi Arabia, and The New York Times.

Because the geographical vantage point of a newspaper determines its gatekeeping policies with regard to daily reporting, and this situation is even more heightened in a crisis, the observation by Womack (1981), that "...the selective attention of various newspapers supplied quite different world views to their readerships," provides the basis for this study. The choice of one Middle East newspaper, its country deeply involved and committed, its reporters familiar with the scene, and the choice of one Western newspaper, its country also deeply involved and committed, but whose reporters are foreign to the scene, should provide variances in news reporting, emphasis, and themes.

"The difference between the world as presented in the

news and the world as it really exists is a fundamental problem for responsible journalism," says Womack (1981), but Brown (1979), in referring to the gatekeeping function of the press says, "...although subjective, it, [the paper,] reflects the readership it purports to serve."

The New York Times, while not the largest paper in the United States is among the most prestigious and seen as one of the major vehicles of the American prestige press (Barranco & Shyles, 1988; Mathurin, 1967; Nacos, 1990). Along with the Washington Post, The New York Times is considered to be the most widely read outside its area of publication. Both papers have also been considered to be the trendsetters, the "...foremost leaders and agenda setters for the rest of the print and electronic media and that they influence the news judgment of other organizations heavily" (Nacos, 1990).

Daugherty and Warden (1979) quoted Charles H. Wagner from his article on Elite Newspaper Opinion and the Middle East: Commitment Versus Isolation as indicating that The New York Times' stand on the Middle East was indicative of its large Jewish readership. Barranco and Shyles (1988) also found that Israel, its issues, events and leaders received more coverage in The New York Times than Arab nations. But in their own study, Daugherty and Warden (1979) concluded that the predominant theme in the editorials of The New York Times was "...one urging a negotiated peace between belligerents: neutrality."

However, they acknowledged that there was "some evidence of a pro-Israeli tone in the press...more evident in the overall picture than in any partisan prejudice." But, in a 1979 study Mishra found that of the leading newspapers he studied, The New York Times coverage of Middle East news "...provided more pictorial items and gave most attention to the hard news."

Mowlana (1976) noted that the attainment of modern mass media in the Arab world had preceded literacy. This meant, therefore, that the workers in, and consumers of, the media, and in particular the printed media were the elite. This situation has remained static. Over the years there have been few changes. "...The press in the Middle East continues to be an elite-oriented medium through which the intelligentsia and the ruling political and economic elites articulate their goals and reflect their perception on domestic and foreign policies" (Mowlana, 1976).

Because Mowlana's study did not mention any one nation in particular, his analysis has been applied to all Arab nations. That the crisis in the Gulf caused changes in the region is without doubt, and the media of the region became part of that change. It has "enlivened the once docile and heavily censored Saudi press in ways unimaginable not very long ago..." (Rossant, 1991).

The Arab News is the first English language daily of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. It is printed "...for distribution in the Arab countries, and not in Europe..."

(Skuse, January 21, 1991). Circulation is presently 80,000 copies per day, a figure which does not include subscriptions, and according to the marketing manager in Jeddah, this makes the Arab News the largest paper of its kind in the Arab World (Othman, February 23, 1991). There are subscribers in London, the United States, Oman, Qatar, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Syria, Sudan, Egypt, Japan, and before its occupation, Kuwait. These subscribers receive copies on a regular basis, as do some universities and colleges throughout this country.

Arab News is printed both in Arabic and in English with the latter being a translation of the former giving it a wide readership which includes not only the local population in Saudi, but also the Arab diaspora. This paper serves an important function by being one of a very few sources of news from the home front for many Arabs who live in voluntary exile. Whether it represents the current views of the Kingdom is uncertain, but if Brown (1979), is to be believed, it is safe to say it reflects the views of its readership.

Justification

The involvement of the United States government in wars, other military confrontations, and conflicts and the representation of these situations by the media have always been sources of much dispute (Chandler, 1972; Elias, 1978; Emery, 1972; Geyelin, 1976; Hammond, 1988; Kinnard, 1975/76; Mathurin, 1967; Merrill, 1988; Nacos, 1990; Nagy, 1990;

Newsweek, September 11, 1989; Patterson 111, 1982, 1984, 1984; Shelly, 1968; Sherer, 1989; Steele, 1985; Williams, 1989; Zaroulis, 1984).

For example, in 1957 the press using governmental information had wholeheartedly pronounced Fidel Castro dead and the Cuban revolution smashed, when the news reporter, Herbert L. Matthews dropped his bombshell. Castro was alive and well, and the revolution was far from over, for Matthews had interviewed him in the Sierra Maestra mountains of Cuba on February 24, 1957. Matthews was later accused of "...losing Cuba for us..." by the government and many of his colleagues of the press (Aronson, 1971).

Years later in speaking to the executive editor of Time news magazine, Turner Catledige, on the Bay of Pigs issue, President Kennedy remarked, "If you had printed more about the operation you would have saved us a colossal mistake" (Aronson, 1971).

Catledige was understandably skeptical (Aronson, 1971), for in spite of Kennedy's candor after the fact, it is doubtful whether he would have really appreciated the intervention of the media prior to the Bay of Pigs. Whether or not the President would have appreciated coverage prior to the invasion, he seemed to acknowledge, by his comment, that such press coverage would have set the agenda for public discussion of the merits of such action.

"It [the press] may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is stunningly

successful in telling its readers what to think about" (Cohen, 1963). Ever since Cohen wrote these words, scholars have investigated, studied, and researched in attempts to prove or disprove his thesis.

Earlier social science studies found that the media had only minimal effects on attitudes; however, later researchers have turned up "...empirical evidence of an agenda setting effect of the media" (Nacos, 1990).

The coverage of any crisis by the media not only heightens, but assists in the shaping, forming or bolstering of the opinions of the public. Coverage is not limited to the straight reporting of the events or its effects. Nowadays a lot of interpretative reporting is also presented for public consumption (Nacos, 1990).

The responsibility of interpreting the news was not always that of the reporter. In fact, before the 1950s, the reporter's job was to be as objective as possible. But change took place in the 1950s and again in the 1960s, and the job which was primarily the forte of the columnists, now was extended to include reporters as well. Nacos, in her book on The Press, Presidents, and Crises, quoted Peter Braestrup from his book The Big Story. Braestrup traced the roots of this change in the Washington Post and The New York Times to the 1950s "...when some license had been given...to ordinary reporters (as opposed to columnists, whose independence was generally accepted) to interpret and explain the news within so-called straight news stories"

(Nacos, 1990).

Because public support for any military involvement is crucial, and because it appears that there is an indication that the media agenda causes the public agenda (Salwen, 1988), it is important to examine the content of the press stories dealing with the Gulf crisis leading up to the conflict. This is important to ascertain what kinds of information the public was being given to make informed decisions about the crisis.

In any democracy, the decisions the public makes in time of crisis are vital. Decisions can only be made properly if the public is given enough information on the problem and about the background of the problem (Chu, 1973). The role of the press in providing the information necessary for the public cannot be understated.

A look at the main areas of themes, sources and emphasis would provide some clues. In the area of themes, what issues were raised? How often was the subject of oil mentioned in relation to the conflict, and how often was Iraqi aggression against Kuwait mentioned?

Sources examine the accreditation of the news. Were most of the sources military? Were the people quoted politicians? Were the news sources reporters on the spot? Were they identified, and how?

In the area of emphasis, how often was negotiation, as opposed to military preparedness and action, mentioned? How often, if ever, was the effect of the crisis on civilians of

both sides mentioned?

Was the coverage of the crisis more positive in the Arab News than in The New York Times? Which paper mentioned "oil" as a factor more often? What of the accreditation of the news? Did either of the papers mention the background to the aggression against Kuwait by Iraq?

Was the press concentrating on the events, the players, or the build up of military strength?

By doing a content analysis of the chosen newspapers, we can examine where the emphasis was being placed, what sources were being used, what themes were being portrayed, what public agendas were being created.

Chapter Two

Literature Review

The pages of the history of the United States of America are highlighted by violence and conflict. From the earliest days of settlement and colonization to the present day, there is a steady trail of conflict and violence both at home and abroad. Yet, there is a belief that Americans are a peaceful people (Devine, 1965).

"...in the absence of a common mystique of blood and soil, it is the political creed of the Declaration of Independence that holds the nation together. America's national identity and its political principles are inseparable" (Siegel, 1984).

As a nation, America has gone to war for independence in 1776, for honor and trade in 1812, for territory in 1846, "...for humanity and empire in 1898, for neutral rights in 1917, and for national security in 1941" (Devine, 1965). From 1945, America chose as its reason for involvement the defense of the democratic way of life which led to conflicts in Korea, Vietnam, Grenada, Panama, and now the Persian Gulf.

The huge costs and mass casualties of World War I had led many Americans to rethink the idea of involvement in conflicts outside of their borders, (Cole, 1953; Fish, 1962). In the 1930s, a series of Neutrality Acts were passed which were designed to keep the nation out of any

more European wars (Cole, 1953). These acts, however, were revised in November, 1939, to allow America to become the "...arsenal for the democratic belligerents" (Cole, 1953). This was as close to involvement as the American people were willing to get. Roughly 85% of the population were against involvement in a war unless America was attacked first (Fish, 1962). The 1930s loomed as a period in the history of America marked by a mood of "isolationism" (Devine, 1965).

The onset of war in Europe and the resulting polarization of the American public into "interventionists" versus "isolationists/non-interventionists," led to a struggle which still persists today. Prior to World War II, the Kellogg-Briand Pact was trotted out in defense of criticism of isolationism and non-intervention, but the attack on Pearl Harbor united both factions of the public behind a President bent on war (Devine, 1965; Fish, 1976; Melosi, 1977; Siegel, 1984).

The self-defense clause of the Kellogg-Briand Pact had come at too high a cost in American lives, and the conflicts which have followed since World War II have been in the defense of the American ideal, democracy, and against communist regimes (Devine, 1965).

The governments of the principal players in the Persian Gulf crisis do not fit either of the criteria for American involvement. The legitimate government of Kuwait could not

be called a democracy, nor the regime of Saddam Hussein, communist. What then was the reason given for intervention, and would the American people support it, given the information they were presented with and their history of a policy of non-intervention in military conflicts.

In any crisis situation, the flow of information about, and/or around it is very important. When that crisis concerns military involvement, the need for a controlled flow of information is not only necessary, but also desirable.

In World War II, President Roosevelt recognized this and, "...almost all information concerning the war originated with official sources and could be withheld as authorities saw fit. Moreover, military authorities accredited all reporters who entered the war zones, and those few whose attitudes were suspect, or whose reporting had proven obnoxious, were banned" (Steele, 1985).

President Roosevelt recognized the important role of the press in public opinion and managed the news, thereby generating the public support he so badly needed for the war.

As of December 6, 1990, the Crisis in the Gulf had been existing for almost 20 weeks. During that time there had been continuous coverage of the build up of coalition forces in the area, the negotiations that had been continuing, and the United Nations actions and reactions to the situation. The stage was being set, the major players were being

identified, and it appeared as if there was no newscast or newspaper edition that did not mention Operation Desert Shield. You could not get away from it on radio, television, or in the print media.

According to the agenda-setting hypothesis, when the news media's agenda of issue priorities has been covered by them for some time, these agenda will be adopted by the public as their own agenda (Salwen, 1988). In the 1988 study done by Salwen, the findings indicated that after a period of five to seven weeks, there was evidence of the public's adoption of the media agenda. He found that it was "...not the mere coverage alone, but the continuing endurance of an issue or issues in the news media [that] determine what the public will think about." The extensive coverage of an issue by the media transmits not only information on it, but also indicates to the public that this issue, and the media's view of it, has a certain legitimacy (Salwen, 1988). The issue, therefore, takes on not only an air of importance, but also an air of urgency, and that urgency is transferred to the public. But the issue must be clearly defined and the information concrete for this to take place.

Yagade and Dozier (1990) found that if an issue is too abstract, the media have difficulty in setting the public agenda. No amount of coverage could make it appealing or urgent enough to be adopted. Issues that were considered by the public as concrete were easily visualized and the media

were successful in setting the public agenda. Yagade and Dozier concluded that "a threshold point may exist where an issue is just too abstract to be changed on the public agenda by media coverage because (a) the issue is too difficult to visualize, and (b) the information is too complex, requiring too much cognitive work to process."

Whether the issues covered by the papers under study fall under abstract or concrete are left to be seen. Of the coverage of World War II news, there seems to be little doubt of the role the media played in setting the public's agenda. Steele (1985) reported that the attitude of the newsmen of World War II played an important part in the success of their press coverage. That coverage, he contends, "...did indeed help sustain public morale, and journalistic patriotism undoubtedly played a role" (Steele, 1985).

This conclusion reached by Steele seems to support the idea that the content of the media is shaped primarily by the journalists themselves. It is dependent to a large extent on their background, their education, their political affiliations, their socio-economic background (Aboubakr, 1977; Bagdikian, 1973/74; Brown, 1979).

In a study of American press correspondents in the Middle East, Sreebny (1979) found that, on the average, they had a total of 20 years' news experience, 14 of which were in foreign correspondence, though only five and a half of that had been spent in the Middle East. In spite of, or

because of, that their knowledge of the local languages was minimal at best. Only one in eight knew Arabic well enough to translate news releases (Sreebny, 1979). This, of course, tended to inhibit their reporting (Sreebny, 1979). The correspondents themselves indicated that they needed education about the "region's languages, history, and cultures" (Sreebny, 1979). They indicated this education is necessary for them to cover stories from that region, and it would assist in the proper selection of reliable sources.

The selection of news sources by journalists is the result of the use of a specific set of attributes. Dunwoody and Ryan (1987) indicate that these sources must be, "...able to communicate...accessible to reporters...at least minimally honest and reliable...[and] perhaps most important, they must be credible."

There have been very few studies which have examined the sources of news. Solaski (1989) quoted a 1973 study by Sigal in which he found that "...most front-page stories in The New York Times and the Washington Post, relied heavily on government officials." Over the years, the unidentified source has been making increasingly frequent appearances in the media, and in a study done by Algraawi and Culbertson (1987) it was found that, "limitations placed on news-source accessibility by societies with controlled press systems may reduce attribution specificity..."

When covering any story anywhere, how do most journalists go about it? Do they have preconceived ideas

about what facts they will find, or do they begin their research with an open mind? In a study done by Stocking and La Marca (1990), it was discovered that although most journalists formulate hypotheses when working on a story, this did not deter them from seeking to determine the truth of the matter. And while this practice is widespread, these journalists also formulate "...competing or alternative hypotheses in half of the story descriptions containing hypotheses" (Stocking & La Marca, 1990). This indicates that while harboring assumptions about the story they are going to cover, most journalists seem to keep opposing assumptions in mind, which would seem to auger well for fair reporting.

But fair reporting is only one side of the coin. Reed and Cline (1981) indicated that bias is a factor of reporting. The main areas of bias are organizational, situational, and political (Reed & Cline, 1981). They used Hofstetter's definition of political bias, "selectivity that is based on political prejudices of news personnel, individually or collectively." Situational bias was defined as coverage "influenced by a set of circumstances that may or may not be related to the structural biases of the medium" (Reed & Cline, 1981).

Reed and Cline went on to quote Edward J. Epstein from his book News from Nowhere as saying that, "...news is problematic...its final formulation is, to no small extent, a product of an organization."

Organizations are made up of people and the attitudes held by top executives of the media house also influence the types of stories carried. NBC executive News Director Don Brown, in making a comment on the lack of direct information coming out of Kuwait after the invasion by Iraq, said, "the Middle East is one of those areas where rumor and misinformation is almost an art form" (Networks struggle to..., August 31, 1990). It is not unreasonable to suggest that this attitude may be held by other top executives in the U.S. Media and would, therefore, influence the tone of the stories carried by them.

The daily newspapers of the United States are not known for outstanding international coverage (Lent, 1977). This has primarily been due to the fact that the United States has been perceived as a major news source because of its big power status rather than a receiver of news (Lent, 1977). Coverage of international news has been relegated to dealing with the bizarre, the East-West relations, and crises; and this situation can be applied to the news from the Middle East (Lent, 1979; Mishra, 1979).

News items in the American press from the Middle East have dealt primarily with Arab-Israeli relations and, for the most part, have surfaced in the times of confrontation (Barranco & Shyles, 1988; Daugherty & Warden, 1979; Lent, 1979; Mishra, 1979; Perloff, 1987; Reed & Cline, 1981). In a survey of five major papers, Mishra (1979) found that on an average, only 5.1% of all items dealt with Middle East

News, with 66.2% of those articles being hard news stories and news round-ups. He found the coverage to be "...concentrated in Israel (33.97%), Egypt (25.64%), and Iran (16.35%)," and that it dealt for the most part with internal and external politics, Arab-Israeli conflict, and American interests.

In their study, Daugherty and Warden (1979) also had similar findings and indicated that although the predominant theme of the editorials in their study could have been said to be neutrality, there were more Anti-Arab editorials in the 11-year period analyzed. They mention, however, that there were two years in which Arab support peaked and exceeded Israeli support, 1971 and 1977. "During these years, a single personality captured the attention of the press, Anwar el-Sadat" (Daugherty & Warden, 1979).

The arrival of Sadat on the political scene not only caused a change in the press support for the Arab nations, but also had an effect on the images of Arabs presented in the press. The presentation of these images in the prestige press was part of a study by Belkaoui, (1978). Between 1966 and 1974 the images of Arabs were not constant, and a shift was observed in which one Middle East leader, Nasser, was portrayed as a villain, and in 1974, another leader, Sadat, of the same country, was portrayed in a much more sympathetic manner (Belkaoui, 1977). This change was also seen in the portrayal of the Arab world in general, which in 1967 was "described as an emotional, angrily chanting

atomized mass...emerged in the 1970s with a new spirit of achievement, unity, pride, and honor" (Belkaoui, 1977).

But who decides the types and tone of the stories which appear in the press? According to Brown (1979), the press only reflects its readership. Brandner and Sistrunk (1966), while not being able to answer their research question, (do newspapers mirror or mold the values of the community), indicated that the editors in their survey probably mirrored the value system of the community they served. However, Mishra (1979) indicates that "...the accuracy of coverage is affected by such gatekeepers' problems in processing the news as leveling and sharpening effects."

Kinnard (1975/76) quoted Major General James C. Smith, who, when referring to the press and Vietnam, said, "...editors, not reporters, cause the trouble and the bad press." This comment was because the editors refused to print a series of stories a reporter turned in on the military because it was too complimentary. The press, he felt, was only interested in "...the violent aspects of the conflict" (Kinnard, 1975/76).

Perloff (1987) quoted Fields and Schuman (1976) as saying that "...People appear to look into the world and somehow see their own opinion reflected back." If this is true, then when the opinions of the reporters and the editors clash, how does the public get the correct information? To ensure some likelihood of achieving this, Stempel (1985) indicated that, "the informed citizen cannot

afford to get news from only one source." The choices to exclude or include items which reflect various viewpoints is the function of the gatekeeper of the media house. And while the gatekeeping policy of each media house is determined to a large extent by the editorial policy, according to Brown (1979), there is a need to determine to what extent the gatekeeper's decisions are a reflection of the sociological conditions which may underlie his choice. Stempel (1985), says, however, that the gatekeeping function determines the mix of the stories rather than the selection.

Aboubakr (1977) also says, like Brown (1979), that the gatekeepers are products of their socio-economic environment, but he went one step further. Aboubakr (1977) says, "their [gatekeepers] choice and selection of news becomes more militantly active in promoting the priorities of the socio-economic structure to which they belong."

If, as Aboubakr (1977) contends, our shared media information has created new neighbors for us, then the crisis in the Persian Gulf should have caused a change in the images of Arabs and the support for Arab nations in the press.

This new neighbor situation should have necessitated the delivery of background information necessary for the public to change its opinions and agenda. What then were the themes covered, the sources used, and where was the emphasis placed?

The hypotheses which have evolved, therefore, are:

1. That foreign military intervention in the crisis would be more supported in the Arab News than in The New York Times.

Because of the American history of reluctant intervention, this researcher believes that this hypothesis will be supported. Moreover, as was mentioned before, neither Kuwait nor Iraq fit any category for defense, as had been the case in previous military conflicts in Vietnam, Panama, and Grenada.

2. That the coverage in Arab News had more instances mentioned of military preparedness and action as opposed to negotiation.

As was mentioned above, America's history of non-interventionism would lead to a stance of negotiation rather than military preparedness. Because of that, this researcher believes that this hypothesis will stand.

3. That there would be more total coverage of Operation Desert Shield in Arab News, as a percentage of the news hole, than in the New York Times.

While the presence of American troops in the "line in the sand" stand-off indicates American involvement and concern at home, the kingdom of Saudi Arabia was more deeply involved. Not only were their borders threatened, their population at risk from Iraqi missile attacks, and the peace of their country at stake, but the resulting disruption of the balance of power in the

Middle East affected them greatly. This researcher contends, therefore, that this hypothesis will stand.

Chapter Three

Methodology

Three important questions which must be answered before any content analysis can be undertaken are: (1) what newspapers should be used, (2) what issues of the publications should be used for analysis, and (3) what should be measured?

The newspapers chosen were The New York Times, printed and published in the United States, and Arab News, the first English language daily of Saudi Arabia, although it is also published in Arabic. Arab News is not only a paper for Saudi Arabia. It is published simultaneously in Riyadh, Jeddah, Dhahran, and Cairo, and has subscribers in Europe, England, and the United States of America.

The choice of the sample was determined, not by using the deadline date set by the United Nations, but using the date the air war started as the point of termination. A sample of six weeks issues back from that date should provide an adequate sample for research, producing a number far in excess of that recommended by Stempel (1952). Based on his research, he indicated that a "...sample size beyond 12 does not produce marked differences in the results."

An important factor in making the decision on which issues to include was the availability of issues of Arab News. This researcher felt that it would have been preferable to take a random sample of all issues of both

publications between August 2, 1990 (the date of the invasion of Kuwait), and January 17, 1991 (the beginning of the air attack). However, all copies of Arab News could not be obtained within the United States, or even from their London Office, for the study.

Arab News is received by some universities throughout this country, but most discard one copy after a new issue is received. Others hold one week's issues, but this investigator found no institution which kept the issues for longer periods or put them on micro film. This left what was available at Austin Peay State University which, at that time, were on their way to being discarded. The issues between December 1, 1990, and January 31, 1991, were kindly rescued by the library staff.

The issues of the papers used began at December 5, 1990, with the cut off date being January 17, 1991. In both papers, the Economics and Sports sections were excluded. This was done even though there were some articles within the economics section which referred to the Crisis, but coding these proved extremely difficult because the themes under investigation were not covered by them. The articles in this section were not about the Persian Gulf Crisis, nor did they cite economics as a causal factor of the crisis, but rather, mentioned it briefly as a causal factor of the economic climate.

Measured in all issues were the following categories:

- a. Total number of items on the Gulf Crisis.

- b. News sources/bylines.
- c. Location of all items on the Gulf Crisis (i.e. within which section of the paper they were).

In terms of measurement, all news stories, opinion, editorials, and features dealing directly with the Persian Gulf crisis were included. This involved stories on political activities, diplomatic activities, and anything of a social nature which pertained to the Persian Gulf crisis.

The coding of the stories, editorials, features, and opinions/letters was done in nine categories. "Military preparedness - war," "negotiation - settlement," "oil," "aggression against Kuwait," and "economics as a causal factor of the conflict," were the major categories. Also investigated were the following: "the effects of the crisis on civilians," "background information on the Crisis," and those which mentioned the need to get Saddam Hussein out of power. There were several stories with more than one theme. For example, a story on military preparedness had within it the effects a chemical attack by Iraq would have on the civilians of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Stories with multiple themes were therefore given multiple codings.

All items included in this study were coded on a scale of five ranging from "strongly support" to "strongly against," with the middle ground being "neutral" to determine their advocacy of United States led military action against the occupying forces within Kuwait.

In the items coded, "support" was defined as being in

agreement with waging war to evict Iraq, and "strongly support", as being without reservations. Items which were in favor of military options, highlighting equipment and the readiness of the troops to do battle, were deemed supportive. In the neutral category fell all those stories which presented the facts and had no opinion one way or the other.

The items which were coded as "against" were those in disagreement, but could see the side of support, and "strongly against" were those who were in total disagreement with a war. The stories which pointed to the anticipated loss of life, the huge costs of war, and highlighted negotiation as the main alternative, were deemed to be against to the degree of the tone of the article.

The origin of the stories proved an interesting observation and was deemed worthy of categorization. There were fewer stories in the Arab News on the Gulf Crisis with a local/Arab byline, while in The New York Times, there were more stories which had correspondent bylines. Origins then were coded into "Wire services," "Reporter bylines," and a further coding of sources quoted within the stories themselves was undertaken.

The categories suggested by Graber (1990) provided the basis on which the final categorization was built. This included the following main categories:

1. Governments. This included not only the American, Saudi, and Kuwaiti governments, but also those of the

coalition partners, Iraq, and those of the Iraqi supporters. In this main category the following sub categories were placed:

a. President/fellow partisans - this to include a sub section for the Pentagon. All American government officials quoted in the articles who were not identified as being Democrats were included in this section.

b. King, Royal family members/government officials

c. Democrats (U.S.)

d. Coalition governments

e. Iraqi government

f. Iraqi supporters

2. Military. This section contained the following sub categories:

a. American

b. British

c. Saudi

d. Other Coalition military.

For each category and sub category, there was a column for those persons not identified by name, or the name of the office when there is only one person who can hold that post. For example, in an article which mentioned the source of its quote as "the President," would have that source coded as identified, but "a member of Congress" was coded as unidentified.

Chapter Four

Presentation of Findings

The total number of issues used in this study was 82, with 40 being issues of The New York Times. Because of the difference in datelines, the end of Operation Desert Shield and the beginning of Operation Desert Storm occurred for The New York Times between 6:30 - 7:00 p.m., Eastern Standard Time on January 16, 1991. In Saudi Arabia, the time was 3:00 a.m., January 17, 1991. This research, therefore, included the January 17th issue of Arab News.

The total number of articles read and included in this study was 930. The New York Times had a total of 399, and Arab News, 531.

Location of Articles

In Arab News there were 145 articles (27%) on the front page, while the majority, 236 (44%) were on the National page. Only one article appeared on the International page, while 72 (14%) were in the Local/Middle East section. There were 13 (2%) in the Features section, and 64 (12%) in the Editorial/Opinion pages. The latter pages included letters to the editor, which are included in that figure (see Table 1).

For The New York Times, the picture was a little different. The majority of their articles, 238, (60%) appeared on the International page. On the front page there was a total of 68 articles (17%), 91 (23%) in the

Editorial/Opinion section, and only one each in the National and Local/New York sections (see Table 1). It is interesting to note that the articles on the National and Local/New York pages were in the January 16 issue, the day after the United Nations deadline had expired.

TABLE 1

Location of Articles on Operation Desert Shield
in Arab News and The New York Times
by Number and Percentage

	ARAB NEWS	ARAB NEWS	NEW YORK TIMES	NEW YORK TIMES
LOCATION	% OF TOTAL	NUMBER	% OF TOTAL	NUMBER
Front Page	27	145	17	68
International Page	0	1	60	238
Local (Middle East/New York)	14	72	0	1
National	44	236	0	1
Editorial/Opinion	12	64	23	91
Features Section	2	13	0	0
Totals	99%	531	100%	399

Origin of Articles

Of the total number of articles, two thirds (357) of those in Arab News were attributed to Wire sources, with the majority coming from the Associated Press, while The New York Times had only 37 articles (9%) attributed to Wire sources. There were 13 from Reuters and 24 from the Associated Press. Bylines accounted for only 117 stories (22%) in Arab News, and 301 (75%) in The New York Times (see

Table 2). The majority of the bylines had "Special to The New York Times" preceding the journalist's name.

TABLE 2

Origin of Articles on Operation Desert Shield Used in Arab News and The New York Times by Number and Percentage

	ARAB NEWS	ARAB NEWS	NEW YORK TIMES	NEW YORK TIMES
ORIGIN	% of Total	Number	% of Total	Number
Wire Services	67	357	9	37
By lines	22	117	75	301
Other	11	57	15	61
TOTALS	100%	531	99%	399

Datelines

When the datelines were examined, the results were as follows: Arab News had the majority (231) from the Middle East, with 117 from the United States, 65 from Europe, 20 from Iraq, and 41 from Great Britain. The New York Times had, as was expected, the majority of its stories (130) from the United States, 72 from the Middle East, 44 from Iraq, 34 from Europe and 14 from Great Britain (see Table 3). Arab News had datelines from as far afield as Canberra, Australia; Manila, Philippines; Tokyo, Japan, and Moscow.

TABLE 3

Geographical Datelines of Articles on Operation Desert Shield in Arab News and The New York Times by Number and Percentage

	ARAB NEWS	ARAB NEWS	NEW YORK TIMES	NEW YORK TIMES
GEOGRAPHICAL AREA OF DATELINE.	% of Total	Number	% of Total	Number
United States	23	117	36	130
Great Britian (England, Ireland & Scotland)	8	41	4	14
Far East (Japan/China)	1	6	2	6
Middle East	46	231	20	72
Israel	0	4	3	12
Iraq	44	20	12	44
Europe (including U.S.S.R.)	13	65	9	34
Other	4	19	11	38
Totals	99%	507	100%	360
Note: Editorials and letters		24		39
Totals		531		399

Support

All 930 items were evaluated for their advocacy of military action against Iraq. They were coded on a five point scale from strongly support to strongly against military action, with the mid point being neutral. There were no items in Arab News which could be coded strongly against, and only three were against. There were 68 (13%)

neutral, 224 (42%) support and 236 (44%) strongly support. For The New York Times, there were 14 (3%) which could be coded as strong support, 110 (28%) support, 195 (49%) neutral, 73 (18%) against and 7 (2%) strongly against (see Table 4).

TABLE 4

All Articles on Operation Desert Shield in Arab News and The New York Times Coded for their Stance on Military Action by Number and Percentage

	ARAB NEWS	ARAB NEWS	NEW YORK TIMES	NEW YORK TIMES
AREA OF CODING	% of Total	Number	% of Total	Number
Strongly Support	44	236	3	14
Support	42	224	28	110
Neutral	13	68	49	195
Against	1	3	18	73
Strongly Against	0	0	2	7
Totals	100%	531	100	399

The preceding data support the first hypothesis:

That foreign military intervention in the crisis would be more supported in Arab News than in The New York Times.

Types of Articles

The types of articles were categorized and 85% (450) of those in Arab News were news stories compared to 72% (289) of those in The New York Times. Only 4% (23) of the articles in Arab News could be categorized as opinion while

14% in The New York Times could be so categorized (see Table 5).

TABLE 5
Types of Articles on Operation Desert Shield
in Arab News and The New York Times
by Number and Percentage

	ARAB NEWS	ARAB NEWS	NEW YORK TIMES	NEW YORK TIMES
TYPE OF ARTICLE	% of Total	Number	% of total	Number
News story	85	450	72	89
Editorial	2	12	3	14
Opinion	4	23	15	58
Feature	3	17	4	16
Poll	0	1	1	3
Other	5	28	5	19
Totals	99%	531	100%	399

Themes

There were nine themes being investigated and a tenth category for sundry. Military preparedness - war, and negotiation - peace, were the major ones, with The New York Times having 120 instances (31%) of negotiation as a theme and 106 (27%) of military preparedness. For Arab News, there were 59 instances (10%) of negotiation, 296 (49%) of military preparedness, 50 instances (8%) where aggression against Kuwait was mentioned, and 87 instances (14%) of the liberation of Kuwait. Oil was only mentioned as a factor in seven instances in Arab News, and two cases in The New York Times (see Table 6).

TABLE 6

Themes of Articles on Operation Desert Shield in
Arab News and The New York Times by Number and Percentage

	ARAB NEWS	ARAB NEWS	NEW YORK TIMES	NEW YORK TIMES
THEMES	% of Total	Number	% of Total	Number
Liberation of Kuwait	14	87	4	10
Saddam out of Power	1	5	1	2
Other:				
Effects on Civilians	3	21	4	16
Background information	0	2	1	2
Sundry	10	64	28	108
Military Preparedness	49	296	27	106
Negotiation	10	59	31	120
Oil	1	7	1	2
Economics	3	19	1	2
Aggression against Kuwait	8	50	2	8
Totals	99%	610	100%	382

These data support the second hypothesis:

That the coverage in Arab News had more instances mentioned of military preparedness and action as opposed to negotiation.

Sources

Sources were divided into three main areas, i.e., Governments, Military, and Civilians who were not government employees. These categories were further divided into identified and non-identified sources.

A look at the total picture reveals that The New York Times had a total of 68% government sources (586) for all the items in the survey, 64% (373) of which were identified. For Arab News, the total for government sources was slightly lower, 63% (611) with 82% (507) being identified (see Tables 7 and 10). However, unlike The New York Times the majority of the government sources in Arab News did not come from either the home government, (Saudi Arabia), or from the other major country, the United States. Their majority source was the Coalition Governments (see Table 7).

TABLE 7

Total Government Sources Quoted in Articles on
Operation Desert Shield in Arab News and
The New York Times by Number and Percentage

	ARAB NEWS	ARAB NEWS	NEW YORK TIMES	NEW YORK TIMES
GOVERNMENTS	% of Total	Number	% of Total	Number
United States	34	214	67	396
Saudi	3	19	3	15
Coalition	50	308	13	74
Iraqi and Governments supporting Iraq	13	80	17	101
Totals	100%	621	100%	586

Of the government sources, Arab News quoted sources from the Coalition Governments, which did not include United States or Saudi sources most frequently, for a total of 308 times (50% of total government sources). The New York Times

quotes from Coalition Government sources ranked third with 13% (74) (refer Table 7).

As was expected, The New York Times quoted the U. S. President and partisans more often ranking first with them (67%) than did Arab News. Their ranking for these sources was second with 34% (refer to Table 8).

TABLE 8

Government Sources Quoted in Articles on Operation Desert Shield by Number, Identified and not Identified

	ARAB NEWS	ARAB NEWS	NEW YORK TIMES	NEW YORK TIMES
SOURCES	Identified	Not identified	Identified	Not identified
U.S. President and Partisans	142	46	171	106
The Pentagon	5	2	12	29
Democrats	19	0	77	1
Saudi Government	17	2	9	6
Coalition Governments	261	47	34	40
Iraqi Government	51	11	51	27
Governments supporting Iraq	12	6	19	4
Totals	507	114	373	213

Citizens were quoted a total of 330 times. The New York Times had 167 citizen sources and Arab News quoted citizens a total of 163 times (see Table 9).

TABLE 9

Total Sources Quoted in Articles on Operation Desert Shield
in Arab News and The New York Times
by Number Identified and not Identified

	ARAB NEWS	ARAB NEWS	NEW YORK TIMES	NEW YORK TIMES
SOURCES	Identified	Not Identified	Identified	Not Identified
Government	507	114	373	213
Civilian	108	55	157	10
Military	178	30	100	10
Totals	793	199	630	233

Arab News had the largest number of quotes from military sources 208 (21%). The New York Times had only 110 (13%) military sources (see Table 9).

The largest number of military quotes came from the American Military (140, Arab News, and 108, The New York Times), with the British Military second. Arab News had quotes also from the Saudi Military (17) and other Coalition forces. The New York Times quoted no Saudi Military, no Coalition Military and only two British military sources, one of which was unidentified (see Table 10).

TABLE 10

Military Sources Quoted in Articles on Operation Desert Shield by Number, Identified and not Identified

	ARAB NEWS	ARAB NEWS	NEW YORK TIMES	NEW YORK TIMES
SOURCES	Identified	Not identified	Identified	Not Identified
American	120	20	99	9
British	17	7	1	1
Saudi	17	0	0	0
Coalition	24	3	0	0
Totals	178	30	100	10

Unidentified Sources

The overall total of sources quoted by both papers was 1,855. Arab News had 992 (53%), with 199 (20%) unidentified. The New York Times had 863 (47%), with 233 (27%) unidentified. The total unidentified sources used by both publications in this study was therefore 432 (23%) (see Table 11).

TABLE 11

Total Identified and not Identified Sources Quoted in Articles on Operation Desert Shield in Arab News and The New York Times by Number and Percentage

	ARAB NEWS	ARAB NEWS	NEW YORK TIMES	NEW YORK TIMES	TOTALS
	% of Total	Number	% of Total	Number	
Identified	80	793	73	630	1423
Not Identified	20	199	27	233	432
Totals	100%	992	100%	863	1855

Of the total sources quoted, Arab News had as its highest unidentified source, civilians - 34% followed by governments 18% and then military 14%. For The New York Times, their ranking was a little different. Highest was 36% for Government sources, followed by 9% for Military, and 6% for Civilian sources (see Table 12).

TABLE 12

Total Types of Sources Quoted in Articles on Operation Desert Shield in Arab News and The New York Times by Number and Percent not Identified

	ARAB NEWS	ARAB NEWS	ARAB NEWS	NEW YORK TIMES	NEW YORK TIMES	NEW YORK TIMES
SOURCES	Total quoted	number not iden- tified	%	Total quoted	number not iden- tified	%
Government	621	114	18	586	213	36
Civilian	163	55	34	167	10	6
Military	208	30	14	110	10	9
Totals	992	199	20%	863	233	27%

The paper with the largest number of unidentified government sources was The New York Times, 213 (36%), while the Arab News had a total of 114 (18%) (see Table 13).

TABLE 13

Total Government Sources Quoted and Those not Identified in Articles on Operation Desert Shield in Arab News and The New York Times by Number and Percentage

	ARAB NEWS	ARAB NEWS	ARAB NEWS	NEW YORK TIMES	NEW YORK TIMES	NEW YORK TIMES
GOVERNMENTS	Total quoted	Number not Iden- tified	%	Total quoted	Numbe not Iden- tifie	%
American	214	48	22	396	136	34
Saudi	19	2	11	15	6	40
Coalition	308	47	15	74	40	54
Iraqi and Governments supporting Iraq	80	17	21	101	31	31
Totals	621	114	18%	586	213	36%

Highest ranked among the unidentified government sources for The New York Times were those from the Coalition Governments, 54% with the Saudi government sources ranking second, 40% and American Government, third with 34%. For the Arab News, highest ranking was 22% for the American government sources, followed by 21% for the Iraqi government and other governments which supported Iraq.

Unidentified military sources ranked highest with Arab News, 14% (30) of the total number quoted (208), while The New York Times had 9% (10) of the total number (see Table 14).

TABLE 14

Nationality of Military Sources Quoted in Articles on Operation Desert Shield in Arab News and The New York Times by Number and Percent not Identified

	ARAB NEWS	ARAB NEWS	ARAB NEWS	NEW YORK TIMES	NEW YORK TIMES	NEW YORK TIMES
MILITARY	Total quoted	number not identi- fied	%	Total quoted	number not identi- fied	%
American	140	20	14	108	9	8
British	24	7	29	2	1	50
Saudi	17	9	55	0	0	0
Coalition	27	3	11	0	0	0
Totals	208	30	14%	110	10	9%

The News Hole

The New York Times had an average of 144.33 total stories per issue, which constitutes the average news hole for this newspaper. They had an average of 9.98 per issue on Operation Desert Shield. Arab News, on the other hand, had an average of 123.33 per issue with a 12.64 average per issue on the Gulf Crisis. The percentage of the news hole used for articles on Operation Desert Shield in The New York Times was 6.9%. For Arab News, the figure was 10%.

The preceding data thus support hypothesis three which states:

That there would be more coverage of Operation Desert Shield in Arab News as a percentage of the news hole, than in The New York Times.

Chapter Five

Discussion

The three hypotheses put forward at the end of chapter two have been supported by the data collected.

The items in Arab News, though not written mostly by their staff or stringers, scored higher on the scale in the area of support. The New York Times data indicated that the majority of the items were neutral or supportive. This neutral stance was expected because of the reluctance of the American public to support military intervention unless American lives are in danger. A further investigation could be carried out to ascertain whether the tone of the items shifted more toward support after the war started.

As Table 6 indicates, there were indeed more instances of military preparedness as a theme in Arab News, than in The New York Times. However, The New York Times had its majority in negotiation, with military preparedness as a close second, while the most frequently mentioned theme in Arab News was military preparedness (49%). The theme in Arab News which had the second highest number was 'the liberation of Kuwait,' followed by 'negotiation,' and 'aggression against Kuwait.' The theme of getting Saddam Hussein out of power did not feature largely in either paper, coming at the bottom of the list in Arab News, and being in a three way tie for last place in The New York Times with economics as a factor of the crisis and oil.

Background information to the crisis was found in only two articles in each paper, and in both cases these articles appeared close to the January 15, 1991, deadline. Since this situation had been in existence for three months before the date of the first sample, perhaps background information had been given on earlier dates.

Articles on the effects of the crisis on civilians were found in both papers, Arab News, 21, and The New York Times, 16 (see Table 6). Of those in Arab News, two were part of a series on the effects on the children, how they were coping with the possibility of war, and their thoughts on it. Other articles included information on preparation for chemical attacks, where to go for information, and what the civilians themselves were feeling about the situation. Those articles in The New York Times dealt primarily with the families of the deployed and about-to-be-deployed servicemen and women. A few articles dealt with women in the reserves who had been called to active duty and whose families would be severely affected by their departure. They covered those who were going, and those who did not want to go.

Of interest to this researcher was the location of the items on Operation Desert Shield. From Table 1, the data seem to indicate that Arab News treated the crisis as a national, local and Middle East concern. The majority military force present in the region was American. The number of soldiers there presented the largest deployment of

military might since the Vietnam Conflict. These servicemen were sent not from one area, but from all over the nation. There were Reservists, National Guardsmen, and regular Armed Forces personnel all there. There was no general area in the nation that this crisis left unaffected, yet the majority of the articles in The New York Times were placed on the international pages, with only one each on the local and national page between January 15 and 16. Further research can be carried out to see if items were shifted to a more national and local stance once Operation Desert Storm began.

Arab News appears to have a wider variety of datelines than did The New York Times (see Table 3). The overwhelming majority of their news items came from wire sources, while The New York Times had their majority in reporter bylines. The majority of these bylines it was noted were indicated as being "special to the New York Times." There were also some news stories without bylines that had that indicator.

The gatekeeping policies of Arab News which allowed the choice of wire stories that reflected support and strong support in all items were determined, as Brown, 1979, might indicate, by its editorial policy. But as Womack (1981) would predict, the geographical vantage point of the newspaper (i.e. Arab News) could have determined its gatekeeping policies in this instance. The position taken by The New York Times on Operation Desert Shield is crucial. Its coverage of the Crisis as "international" rather than

"national" news conforms to the findings of Lent, 1977. These findings indicated that the daily papers of the United States have not regarded this country as a major source of news because of its big power status (Lent, 1977). Of particular interest was the observation that, although The New York Times tended to treat Operation Desert Shield as an International issue, keeping distance between the crisis and the nation; the datelines of the stories used did not reflect an International view (see Table 3).

The New York Times is one of the most prestigious daily papers of the nation, seen to have a large role in setting the agenda for the other media, and read by many who shape and make the policy for the nation, thus helping to shape their agenda also. It is therefore significant that the majority of the items (49% in The New York Times) were coded in the neutral category with regard to its stance on military action versus negotiation. This is in keeping with the traditional isolationist stance of the American public, as was noted in the review of literature, Chapter Two.

However, it is therefore important to point out that while The New York Times clearly supported negotiation, it was still in favor of military action, as is clearly evidenced by the 28% items in support, as opposed to 18% against. Whether or not the ghosts of the Vietnam conflict and the public's reaction to it were the reason for their cautious support can only be surmised.

The case for Arab News was clearly different. With

only 13% of their items in the neutral category, they were clearly supportive (42%) and strongly supportive (44%) of United States led military intervention, as opposed to 1% against.. That the United States had not been a welcome nation in the Arab World is a fact of recent history. With the request from King Fahd, and the subsequent deployment of troops, the Arab public agenda with regard to America and its forces needed to be set.

In most of the stories in Arab News, the intervention was not highlighted as an "American" action, but rather as a "Coalition" effort led by American forces. As was clearly evidenced by the sources quoted, 50% of those in Arab News came from the Coalition governments with 34% from the American government.

In setting the agenda for the Arab peoples, the themes of the articles would play an important role. Military preparedness had 49% followed by the joint themes of aggression against Kuwait/liberation of Kuwait, 22%. The joint themes seemed to give the focus necessary for the need for military action - the liberation from aggression being committed on a brother nation. There were also several stories which seemed to introduce the American soldiers to the Arab peoples as family men, and those without families were portrayed as eager and anxious to liberate Kuwait. Of notable interest was a feature article on General H. Norman Schwarzkopf. Although it had a byline which was non-Arab and was datelined Washington, it was not carried by The New

York Times. The article seemed to introduce the leader of the Coalition forces to the Arab people, mentioning that his father had strong ties to, and had served the Arab World. Norman of Persia, as he was referred to, had helped in the liberation of Iran which put the Shah on the throne.

The present Norman, (of Arabia, it was hinted) not only had a collection of Arabian daggers, but was a seasoned soldier, according to the article. It went on to mention his experiences in Vietnam, his heroism, and his nightmare as the subject of Friendly Fire. The article portrayed him as a leader worthy of respect, with the courage to rise from adversity which is so respected in the Arab World. General Schwarzkopf was portrayed as a man worthy to, and capable of, getting the job of liberating Kuwait accomplished.

Arab News by its choice of news stories seemed to set the public agenda for its readership - support for multinational military action, led by the United States forces, to evict Iraq's occupying army from Kuwait. The dissention which Saddam Hussein sought to cause among the Arab nations by reminding them of the "Great Satan" in their midst - the United States forces - did not materialize, at least as reflected in Arab News.

A look at the major themes covered by The New York Times seems to indicate that, while their agenda appeared to be one of Negotiation, they were at the same time cautiously preparing the American public for the possibility of military action.

Most people believe that the media agenda causes the public agenda, for good or bad, and that the power of the press will always be a force to be reckoned with. Small wonder then, as the crisis developed into armed conflict, that the military made strong attempts to control the flow of information to the media. But that has to be the subject of another study.

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APPENDIX

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم



الإدارة العامة
طريق المدينة - شمال مركز العمودي
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HEAD OFFICE: P. O. BOX: 13195 JEDDAH 21493 SAUDI ARABIA
TEL: 6694700 (7 Lines)
FAX: 6607908 - TLX: 605350 SADIS SJ.

ARNWINQ1

TO : SONJA M. QUINNETT
C/O DEPT SPEECH, COMMUNICATION & THEATER
AUSTIN PEAY STATE UNIVERSITY
CLARKSVILLE, TN 37044

DATE: FEB 23, 1991

Dear Ms Quinnett,

Saudi Research & Marketing (UK) has passed your letter to us. We regret that you have not been receiving Arab News regularly of late which was due as you know to the start of the war in the Gulf. Meanwhile, we would be happy to assist you with the information you need about the paper. the following are answers to the queries mentioned in your letter:

CIRCULATION: 80,000 copies per day, excluding subscriptions. Compared with the other two papers of its kind, this figure is the largest by far.

EDITORIAL POLICY: Don't know what you exactly mean. Please clarify.

LANGUAGE: English

DISTRIBUTION: Is done through our company. We do both sales as well as subscriptions. For sales, we deliver quantities to all kinds of outlets throughout the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

IMPORTANCE: Quite important to the non-Arabic speaking communities in Saudi Arabia, since it covers all national news, including new Saudi Laws and regulations, and business updates. In addition, it follows up on global events, and the activities of these communities.

OTHER COUNTRIES: Arab News is also distributed in Oman, Qatar, Jordan, UAE, Syria, Sudan, Egypt, Japan and Kuwait before the occupation. Moreover, we have subscribers all over the world.

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٢٢٢٢٢٢٢ : نجران
٢٢٢٢٢٢٢ : الرجة
٢٢٢٢٢٢٢ : الجمعة
٢٢٢٢٢٢٢ : الرياض

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٢٢٢٢٢٢٢ : ينبع
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بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم



الإدارة العامة
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Hoping this is helpful information, may we ask you to let us know what you think of the paper.

Sincerely,



Abdul Majid Othman
Marketing Manager

٢٢٢٢١٩١ - ٢٢٢٠٦٨٠ : أبها □
١٢٢١١٦١ - ١٢٢١١٦٢ : تبرك □
٢٢٢١٧٨٢ : تيران □
١٢٢٢١٦٧ : الوجه □
١٢٢٢١٦٨ : المجمعة □
١٢٢٢١٦٩ : الرياض □

٨٢٧٢١٦٢ - ٨٢٧٢٠٧٥ : الدمام □
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١٩١٦٧٣٧ : الانلاج □
١٢٥١٨٨٢ : البوف □
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٥٢٢٠٦٧٥ - ٥٢٢١٥٥٥ : حائل □
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٧٢٢٢٢١٢ : حفر الباطن □
١٢٢٢٢١٩ : الزلفي □
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٦٦٥٢٢٠٢ : جدة □
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٧١١١٨٢١ - ٧١١١٨٢٢ : مكة □
٨٢٢٢١٨٧ - ٨٢٢٢١٨٨ : المدينة المنورة □
٢٢٢٢٢٢٢ : ينبع □
٢٢٢٠١٠١ : جيزان □



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بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ

21 January 1991

FAX TO USA
FAX NO 010 1 615 648 7475

FOR THE ATTENTION OF MRS S M QUINNETT c/o Dept Speech, Communication and Theatre

Dear Mrs Quinnett

With reference to the fax sent by your father last week, I must firstly apologise for the delay in replying to you, but I have been absent due to illness.

Unfortunately, I am unable to help you at present with your request.

As I am sure you will understand, Arab News is only printed for distribution in the Arab countries, and not in Europe, so the only copies we receive in our London office are for set subscriptions and for our archives use. We do not keep spare copies.

This means that usually I would advise you to contact our Jeddah office for more information, however, with the present situation in the Gulf I am afraid that they will not be able to supply you with so many back issues either.

I hope that you can understand that asking for one or two back issues would be acceptable (however, we do have to charge for this fee), but we are unable to help you with such a broad request.

As a last resort, maybe you could contact our Washington DC office, as they are closer to you, but I fear that they will give you the same response.

However, I give you below their telephone number:

202 638 7183

I am extremely sorry that we were unable to help you in this instance.

Yours sincerely

M. Scuse

Ms M Scuse
CIRCULATION OFFICER