

FORT DONELSON AND THE NEED FOR HISTORICAL REVISIONISM.

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Fort Donelson and the Need for Historical Revisionism.

A Master's Thesis

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Of the Requirements for the Degree

Of Master of Arts in Military History

James Dean Glick

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
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ABSTRACT

JAMES DEAN GLICK. Fort Donelson and the Need for Historical Revisionism. (Under the direction of DAVID R. SNYDER).

Revisionism applies skepticism to history for the purpose of correcting mistakes of fact or analysis in order to improve our understanding of historical events. This paper critiques different versions of four different episodes during operations around Fort Donelson in February 1862, with an emphasis on establishing which of the accepted facts are correct, correcting those which are not, and then explaining how incorrect facts led to faulty analysis. This will illustrate the continued need for rigorous revisionism, not just for the study of military history, but for the study of all history.

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CHAPTER I

Introduction

Revisionism applies skepticism to history for the purpose of correcting mistakes of fact or analysis in order to improve our understanding of historical events.¹ This paper critiques different versions of four different episodes from the Battle of Fort Donelson in February 1862, with an emphasis on establishing whether or not the accepted facts are correct, correcting them if they are not, and then explaining how incorrect facts lead to faulty analysis. Too many historians do not exploit primary sources well, or simply ignore them in favor of faulty secondary sources. We need revisionism that not only tries to reinterpret history based on facts but is dedicated to making sure that the facts themselves are correct because an interpretation based on faulty information is itself likely to be wrong. We need rigorous revisionism, not just for military history, but for all history.

WHY SHOULD HISTORIANS GET IT RIGHT?

Historical professionalism relies on honesty. “An undetected counterfeit undermines not just the historical arguments of the forger, but all subsequent scholarship that relies on the forger’s work.”² The American Historical Association could have added that a detected counterfeit undermines the forger’s credibility and creates a mess for other historians to clean up.³ Such a case occurred with Michael Bellesiles’ attempted revisionist work, *Arming America* (2000). According to Bellesilles, firearms ownership was uncommon in America until the American Civil War. Although some specialists suspected his work was flawed even before it was published, his book was awarded the Bancroft Prize. It took many scholars, each conducting meticulous footnote-by-footnote

research in their own specialties, to show that his research was riddled with errors and omissions, and, in fact, fortified by either fraud or outright stupidity. It took months to clean up the damage Bellesiles wrought, and years for him to regain his former credibility.⁴

Professionalism is not the only motivation for accurate history. Tacitus stated that history's highest function was "to let no worthy action be uncommemorated and to hold out the reprobation of posterity as a terror to evil words and deeds."⁵ This idea goes back to Herodotus, the "Father of History," who argued that one should not let "great and wonderful" deeds go unsung (or low deeds be forgotten, presumably).⁶ Historian John Monnett expanded on Herodotus and Tacitus, arguing that historians are morally accountable to the people they study. Historical inaccuracy violates this charge, dishonoring (or unfairly honoring) history's participants. Revisionism can set things right. In *Where a Hundred Soldiers Were Killed* (2008), Monnet showed that it was probably 2nd Lieutenant George Grummond, rather than Captain William Fetterman, who fell for the Indian trap at Fort Phil Kearney, resulting in their deaths and the deaths of 79 other U.S. soldiers and contractors. He also pointed out that it takes two sides to make a successful ambush; the Indians deserve some credit for setting up the ambush.⁷

The final reason to get the facts right is the utilitarian one. The American Historical Association notes that it is difficult to analyze and learn from the past if the understanding is based on faulty information.⁸ Military historian Shelby Stanton noted that "military history cannot be anchored on fabled exaggerations," a statement that is not invalidated by the fact that he himself was caught adding to the Vietnam War's "fabled exaggerations" with lies of his own supposed exploits.⁹ Jan Verbruggen and David

Glantz observed that if a historian's basic facts are wrong, then any analysis the historian does based on that is also likely to be wrong; bad analysis is the inevitable poisonous fruit of false evidence, because causality is lost.¹⁰ Understanding causality is particularly important for the military. Robert Citino, who otherwise disliked counterfactual scenarios, grudgingly admitted that it is a necessary tool for those in the profession of arms.¹¹ Military historian and retired Brigadier General Michael Reynolds noted that academics may have the luxury of debating the utilitarian value of history, but soldiers, whose lives and missions depend on the practical lessons of military history, do not.¹² Neither does a free citizenry that is expected to make intelligent choices regarding military affairs.¹³

Operational military history is one of the most utilitarian uses of history. Robert Citino observed that "operational history, once synonymous with military history, has become something of a historiographical stepchild. . . the new military history. . . seemed willing to discuss everything about armies but the actual wars they fought."¹⁴ In part, this might be a misguided attempt to avoid the Fallacy of Tunnel History, whereby history becomes overly specialized and isolated. Military history is often accused of this, but the sometimes conscious decoupling of "traditional" military history and "new" military history is artificial and unfortunate.¹⁵ First, the so-called New Military History is not really new. Herodotus' *Histories* provided a political and social-science background (i.e. "new" military history) to illuminate the campaigns and battles (i.e. "traditional" military history) between the Greeks and Persians.¹⁶ Second, if "the raison d'être of an army. . . is to plan, train for, and fight wars," then studying an army without investigating how it tried to fight, or how well it fought, would be like studying a farm community without

bothering to investigate what crops and livestock it tried to raise or whether it ever produced a surplus. This divorces the historian from the concerns of the subjects he is trying to study.¹⁷ In the interest of broadening context, some military historians might actually be losing the most important context.

WHY DO HISTORIANS GET IT WRONG?

Historiographical critic David Hackett Fischer observed that historians of the relativistic school are not interested in nailing down facts because they believe that the search for objective truth is a fool's errand. He observed that historical relativism's logic is an internally inconsistent "form of intellectual suicide," because the relativists' recognition that bias is possible is itself a recognition that there might actually be an objective truth to be sought. It is right to beware of bias, but the answer for the historian is to give one's best interpretation, not give up.¹⁸

Fischer observed that an obsession with historical moral conduct is open to abuse, including the Furtive Fallacy and the Moralistic Fallacy. Historians who commit the first over-emphasize the insidious and invidious, while those who commit the later reduce history to the role of moral philosophy's handmaiden. But it is hard to argue with Tacitus that history can provide the student with examples of how (or how not) to act.¹⁹

Historians face a difficult challenge. They are expected to do meticulous research and be faithful to the historical record, while at the same time being expected to tell a good story.²⁰ This can tempt the historian into the Prodigious Fallacy, which emphasizes the extremes and oddities of history over facts which are more mundane but have a wider applicability. It can also tempt the historian into accepting apparently interesting but dubious facts (with Fischer identifying Herodotus as an early and frequent violator).²¹

Too often, historians simply accept others' expertise in place of their own, particularly when dealing with conventional wisdom. Fischer called this the Fallacy of Prevalent Proof.²² This happened to military historian Charles Oman, who condemned medieval commanders for their supposed lack of tactical sophistication as evidenced by their supposed failure to form lavish tactical reserves. Verbruggen's careful research showed that medieval armies did form tactical reserves when they had the chance (as at Lake Antioch in 1098 and at Thielt in 1128). The real reason that tactical reserves tended to be small or nonexistent was that medieval armies were small. For example, the French army at Bouvines (1214) had to spread itself thin simply to keep from being outflanked. Oman's uncritical acceptance of popularly accepted strength figures led him to mischaracterize medieval commanders' competence.²³

Although some historians may be consciously dishonest, it is far more common to either subconsciously accept evidence which fits one's preconceptions or to blind oneself to evidence that contradicts them. In retrospect, Staughton Lynd realized that he used a sample (i.e., late-eighteenth century Dutchess County, New York) that comfortably validated his thesis regarding class conflict during the ratification of the U.S. Constitution. In his self-critique, he noted that this did not necessarily invalidate his findings, but it did not help either, and it certainly limited whatever wider application his findings may have had. He concluded that a subconscious bias is a common pitfall for historians.²⁴ Fischer argued that the trick is to recognize where one's biases lay, admit them up front, and then do one's best to control and neutralize those biases.²⁵

Sometimes, the historian simply misses the implications of his own evidence. Medieval military historian Jan Verbruggen notes the case of scholars who cited primary

sources which implied knights fought in disciplined, well-practiced formations, but these scholars ignored the evidence because they did not understand the implications of those details. In this case, they simply did not understand military operations.²⁶ In other cases, some historians are so skeptical of primary sources that they overlook the useful ones, making their research incomplete. This results in glossing over details which are necessary to understand the big picture. This is why military historian Hans Delbrück failed to understand the disciplined nature of medieval combat.²⁷ Some primary sources are untrustworthy, contradictory, or insufficient, but the good ones are indispensable.²⁸ The difference between good sources and bad sources is admittedly a judgment call.

In some cases, it is hard to tell where the flaw lies. Did Holocaust scholar Daniel Goldhagen dishonestly ignore some of his own evidence regarding friendly German guards, or did he subconsciously discount that which did not fit his preconceptions? Either way, the facts that Goldhagen already had in his possession should have indicated that many Germans were not unrelentingly anti-Semitic.²⁹ Did Oman's preoccupation with technology lead him to overrate the medieval longbow's actual limitations, or did his ignorance of the longbow's limitations lead him to underestimate French tactical acumen?³⁰

As we have seen, there are many pitfalls waiting for the historian, and each of them can result in faulty historical analysis. A detailed study of the battle of Fort Donleson will illustrate how and why historians get it wrong and why it matters from both the professional and utilitarian points of view as well as determining the judgment of posterity.

THE BATTLE OF FORT DONELSON, UNREVISED


On 6 February 1862, Federal forces under the overall command of Major General Henry Wager Halleck, and under the immediate command of Brigadier Ulysses S. Grant and Commodore Andrew Foote, took Fort Henry, a Confederate post on the Tennessee River. The next objective, about 12 miles away on the Cumberland River, was Fort Donelson, near the town of Dover, Tennessee. As a result of the loss of Fort Henry, the overall commander of Confederate troops in Department Number Two, General Albert Sidney Johnston, sent reinforcements to hold Fort Donelson while withdrawing forces from Nashville, Tennessee.


On 12 February, Grant left a small force at Fort Henry and took the remainder on an overland march to attack the Confederates at Fort Donelson. It was a warm sunny day, so many of the Yankees threw away their blankets, ponchos, and overcoats, not seeing any need to be burdened with them in Dixie (at least according to some historians). The only opposition to Grant's advance came from Colonel Nathan Bedford Forrest's cavalry. Steaming up the Cumberland River was the naval flotilla under Foote, escorting a convoy of additional troops from Halleck's Department of the Missouri and Brigadier General Don Carlos Buell's Department of the Ohio.

Brigadier General John Bell Floyd took command of the rebels after arriving with reinforcements on 13 February. As a political general who had been the Governor of Virginia and the U.S. Secretary of War, historians generally portray him as something of an empty suit. His second-in-command, politician Brigadier General Gideon J. Pillow, was (supposedly) an arrogant buffoon with a controversial record as a general during the Mexican War. Brigadier General Simon B. Buckner, a West Point-trained Regular Army

"Fort Henry to Fort Donelson." Map by Hal Jespersen, www.cwmaps.com.

Accessed at: http://www.posix.com/CWmaps/Fort_Henry_to_Fort_Donelson.png





“Fort Donelson Map, Showing Improved Tour Route.” National Park Service.

Accessed at: <http://www.nps.gov/fodo/photosmultimedia/virtualtour.htm>

Modern	1862
Spring Street	Charlotte Road
Main Street	Forge Road
Forge Road	Road Linking Wynn Ferry Road & Forge Road
Sandy Road	Pinery Road

The Charlotte Road (now Spring Street) crossed Lick Creek at Smith Ford off the map.

veteran, is typically seen as the bright spot in the Confederate command. Historians generally accept the contemporary perception that he was a chivalrous and noble officer with the best understanding of military issues. He commanded a division on the Confederate right flank. Brigadier General Bushrod Johnson, another West Pointer, commanded the left flank.

Soon after Floyd's arrival, Grant's division commanders, Brigadier General John McClelland (1st Division) on the right and Brigadier General Charles F. Smith (2nd Division) on the left, both conducted unsuccessful (and unauthorized) attacks, so Grant ordered them to make no further movements without orders.

On 14 February, Grant received reinforcements from Fort Henry and the Cumberland, bringing his forces up to 27,000 men. These extra men allowed Grant to form an additional unit, christened 3rd Division, under Brigadier General Lew Wallace in the center of his line. This left C. F. Smith to command the Union left and McClelland's 1st Division to complete the encirclement on the right. In the afternoon, Foote's ironclads attacked Fort Donelson's river defenses but were repelled, and Foote was wounded. The weather turned colder as the wind picked up and a wintery mix of rain and snow began falling. Grant's men began to regret their foolishness in throwing away all of that gear during the march.

Realizing that they were surrounded and badly outnumbered, the Confederate commanders decided to break out. At dawn on 15 February, the Confederate forces massed against the Federal right. With the help of the hard-charging Forrest, as well as Buckner's division (brought in from the right), each Federal brigade on the right was defeated in turn. At this point, Lew Wallace finally sent the remainder of his division

into the fight and stopped the attack, but not before the Confederates had opened a free and clear escape route. Supposedly, all the Confederates had to do was march out of the trap. Instead of exploiting the obvious opportunity, Pillow declared victory and sent everyone back to their lines over the objections of an astounded Buckner, who found it impossible to reason with Pillow. At this point, Grant, who had been at a meeting with the wounded Foote upriver, returned. Realizing that Confederate success could only be explained by an economy-of-force measure, Grant correctly deduced that the rebel right would be weak and ordered Smith to attack. Smith's 2nd Division overran the token defenders before Buckner's troops got back to their old position, and Lew Wallace's 3rd Division reoccupied 1st Division's old lines, cutting off the escape route.

The Confederates thought themselves surrounded and considerably outnumbered; thus, that night, Pillow, Buckner, and Floyd debated their best possible strategy. Pillow advocated either a break-out or a rear guard action to hold out until they could use returning steamboats to evacuate at night, but Buckner argued that they could neither hold out nor conduct a fighting retreat without it turning into a massacre. With his posturing false heroics revealed for what they were, Pillow finally admitted that surrender was the only solution, but he and Floyd then abandoned their men and left Buckner to heroically share the fate of the 14,622 other soldiers that he would lead into captivity. At dawn, Floyd evacuated his division by steamboat and Pillow escaped on a raft. Forrest, refusing to surrender, crossed his cavalry and hundreds of other men over the cold and swollen Lick Creek and escaped.

How much of this conventional wisdom is true? Did U.S. soldiers really blithely throw away their gear in "Sunny Dixie?" Is the frequently cited "14,623 prisoners" really that

precise? Was Pillow really such a buffoon? Was Buckner really the steady professional? How good was Grant's judgment? Knowledgeable analysis based on a rigorous study of primary sources will call many of these supposed facts into question.

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE ANALYZED WORKS

This section gives an overview of commonly used secondary sources for Fort Donelson. Chapters II through V will rigorously analyze how these sources used the primary sources from the battle, what conclusions the historians drew from those sources, and how accurate those conclusions were.

The earliest of the commonly used secondary accounts for Fort Donelson is Adam Badeau's *Military History of Ulysses S. Grant* (published 1868), which covers Grant's American Civil War service. Although Badeau later became one of Grant's aides, he did not join the Army of the Tennessee until May 1862, so he is not a primary source for the Battle of Fort Donelson.³¹ Other Grant biographies include British military theorist John F.C. Fuller's *The Generalship of Ulysses S. Grant* (1929), William McFeely's *Grant: A Biography* (1981), which covers Grant's entire life, and a chapter on Grant as a commander in British military historian John Keegan's *Mask of Command* (1987).³²

Albert Sidney Johnston's son and Confederate veteran William P. Johnston wrote *The Life of General Albert Sidney Johnston* (1878). His work has the expected advantage of familiarity with the subject and dedication to completing the work, and the (recognized, and self-admitted) disadvantage of bias for the subject and bias against his subject's detractors. Albert Sidney Johnston was not present at the battle, but William invested considerable effort in analyzing the battle because of the impact it had on his father's reputation.³³

The biographies of three of the four Confederate generals at Fort Donleson are historian Arndt Stickles' apologetic *Simon Bolivar Buckner: Borderland Knight* (1940), written with plenty of assistance from the Buckner family. Charles Cummings' Bushrod Johnson biography, *Yankee Quaker, Confederate General* (1971), and Civil War historians Nathaniel Hughes and Roy Stonesifer's somewhat revisionist *The Life and Wars of Gideon J. Pillow* (1993).³⁴

Forrest biographer John Allan Wyeth served in an Alabama cavalry company that had been one of the original elements of Forrest's old regiment at Fort Donleson. Although he did not join the unit until over a year after Fort Donelson, he was "impressed by the enthusiastic devotion to [Forrest] of these veterans." Wyeth decided to improve on J. P. Pryor's *The Campaigns of Lieutenant-General N. B. Forrest and of Forrest's Cavalry* (1868), since even the author (who Wyeth knew) admitted that it suffered from having been written too soon after the war. Wyeth gathered information from veterans and consulted *The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies* (henceforth, *ORA*). The result was *Life of General Nathan Bedford Forrest* (1899), later revised as *That Devil Forrest* (1959).³⁵

Manning F. Force's *From Fort Henry to Corinth* (1882) is another early (and frequently cited) secondary source. Force was an officer in the 20th Ohio Infantry, which only arrived on the battlefield after most of the fighting was over. Thus, Force was not a primary source for most of the battle itself, but his unit did escort the prisoners on their way north, and he had access to eyewitnesses soon after the event.³⁶ Woodworth's *Nothing but Victory* (2005) covered the Army of the Tennessee's history from the beginning of the war to the end.³⁷

Walter Geer's *Campaigns of the Civil War* (1926) contained a short chapter on Fort Donelson.³⁸ Novelist Shelby Foote's account of Fort Donelson is in volume one of *The Civil War: A Narrative* (1958).³⁹ Civil War historian Bruce Catton's *Grant Moves South* (1960), another respected classic of the Centennial, covered the early part of the western campaign.⁴⁰ Currently, the most popular general history of the war is probably James McPherson's *Battle Cry of Freedom* (1988). This tome covers the entire antebellum and war period and is sometimes used as a text for university-level Civil War classes.⁴¹ It suffered from the excessive influence of secondary sources.

Edwin Bearss was the Chief Historian for the National Park Service, and originally wrote a pair of articles on the decision to surrender and the aftermath in 1962 for *Tennessee Historical Quarterly*. It was revised in pamphlet form as *Unconditional Surrender: The Fall of Fort Donelson*.⁴² It provided one of the first level-headed looks at the actual decision to surrender.

Roy Stonesifer's *The Forts Henry and Donleson Campaign: A Study in Confederate Command*. (1965) is a frequently used doctoral dissertation.⁴³ It is the first full length treatment dedicated to the battle rather than treating it merely as a part of someone's biography or as part of a wider campaign or the war. Stonesifer's 1965 view of Pillow was distinctly non-revisionist, but even he nonetheless found Stickles's biography of Buckner to be a bit "too eulogistic."⁴⁴

James Hamilton studied history at Oberlin, but went into politics and teaching, so his *Battle of Fort Donelson* (1968) might be considered the work of an amateur historian or a non-academic, but Civil War historian Benjamin Cooling advised him on his work before

publishing. It was the first full-length scholarly book (not counting Stonesifer's dissertation) to cover the Fort Donelson campaign.⁴⁵

Benjamin Cooling's *Forts Henry and Donelson* (1987) was the first major effort to cover the campaign by a practicing academic. He occasionally cites Hamilton, who he had influenced. It is an improvement on Geer, Fuller, Foote, and Catton's accounts in terms of detail and the level of skepticism he brought to the topic. Cooling's other account, *Fort Donelson's Legacy: War and Society in Kentucky and Tennessee, 1862-1863* (1987), touches on the surrender and its aftermath.⁴⁶

Kendall Gott's *Where the South Lost the War* (2003) was the work of a United States Army officer. It appears to have been his thesis for Command and General Staff School.⁴⁷ Jack Hurst's *Men of Fire* (2007) and James Knight's *The Battle of Fort Donelson* (2011) are both largely syntheses of the existing primary and secondary sources. Knight, a field interpreter at the Battle of Franklin Trust, covered Forts Henry and Donelson, while Hurst, a Forrest biographer, focused on Grant and Forrest.⁴⁸ As with McPherson's effort, Hurst and Knight relied too heavily on secondary sources, a common vulnerability of syntheses.

Badeau, William Johnston, and Force lacked easy access to primary sources; research would have been much more difficult before the *ORA* was published. Badeau, William Johnson, and Wyeth were aware of the dangers of a biographer's partiality for their subject, but they seem to have fallen for them despite their best efforts. Force may have done the same with his subject, the Army of the Tennessee. The latter works did not just take their inspiration from the earlier works, they frequently cited them. Later generations in turn cited and influenced each other, as with Hamilton and Cooling. This incestuous

historiography resulted in the continuation of error, and sometimes its exaggeration, as in Stickles' virtual hagiography of Buckner. Of course, some historians create their own errors. Gott, whose conclusions are generally the best, manages to make serious (and mysterious) errors in his analysis of Confederate strength and losses during the battle.

We will test these works in light of four controversial topics based on their critical use of primary sources. The first is "Sunny Dixie," which explores whether or not Brigadier General Ulysses S. Grant's soldiers threw away cold- and wet-weather gear in an undisciplined fashion. The second topic, "Fort Donelson: The Numbers," will determine the actual correlation of forces during the battle. This is important for the analysis of the next two topics, "Decisions: Afternoon, 15 February" and "Decisions: Morning, 16 February," which will analyze the leadership decisions of two of the Confederate commanders. In each case, poor knowledge of the facts, or a misunderstanding of what the facts meant, led to poor historical analysis, which in turn has led to myth-making instead of history.

Tracking the historians' citations and inspirations can be difficult. Some historians either have a very odd threshold for what they consider evidence or they have simply cited the wrong page. Some, like Hamilton, write three paragraphs with a single endnote, but with half-a-dozen citations, leaving the researcher to figure out which citation refers to which part of the text based a combination of order and context. Others, like Gott, also use three-paragraph endnotes, but they only include a single citation that does not cover most of the content of those paragraphs.

CONCLUSION

The need for revision is hardly limited to the American Civil War, or even military history generally, but the four examples will all come from the battle of Fort Donleson. This investigation will illustrate that even a relatively small (albeit important) battle has plenty of room for re-interpretation.

NOTE

All subjects' ranks are as of the time of the battle, unless otherwise noted.

Units are infantry, unless otherwise stated by branch or title (e.g., "battery" for artillery").

Readers should be aware that there are several different printings of Grant's memoirs, each with its own page count. *Smoke, Sound and Fury*, is an edited version of Lew Wallace's *Autobiography*, concentrating on the Civil War. There is a lesser problem with Wyeth's *Nathan Bedford Forrest* and the revised edition, *That Devil Forrest*, as well as Bearss' article "Unconditional Surrender" and the same work in booklet form, *Unconditional Surrender*. A similar snare for the unwary occurs with the primary source collections *Medical and Surgical History in the War of the Rebellion* and *The Rebellion Record: A Diary of American Events*; different sections of same volume have their own page counts. This makes checking citations a challenge.

CHAPTER II

Sunny Dixie

Most secondary accounts of the Battle of Fort Donelson mention the cold-weather misery of Grant's troops, but there are differences in how historians have explained the circumstances behind it. A favorite is the "Sunny Dixie" thesis: Grant's inexperienced troops marched twelve miles from Fort Henry to Fort Donelson on a warm sunny day (12 February 1862) and either left behind their cold and wet-weather gear or threw it away under the assumption that cold-weather gear was unnecessary in Sunny Dixie. Grant's men began to pay for their folly on the night of 13 February when a howling north wind brought rain, sleet, and snow that continued throughout the rest of the battle, teaching the green Yankees a lesson they would never forget: Cold weather does not stop south of 36° 30' latitude. Few authors argue that the soldiers may have had legitimate reasons for not having their gear. How many of Grant's men really dropped or left behind their cold-weather gear during the march to Fort Donelson? Why did they do it? Was any of this authorized? What does the reality of that march say about Grant's soldiers and American Civil War operations?

BACKGROUND TO THE MARCH ON FORT DONELSON

Civil War soldiers were not noted for their self-discipline on the march, and often shed what they thought was excessive gear. Some of the men who participated in the march to Fort Donelson were sick or not yet properly conditioned, but many of Grant's units had been on tough marches before, including the infamous "Kentucky mud march" in January, and more recently during the march to Fort Henry and Fort Heiman on 6 February. The better trained and experienced men were capable of carrying heavy loads

for long distances. Some elements of 1st Division got a four mile head start on 11 February, but the men of 2nd Division did not leave Fort Donelson until the morning of 12 February after crossing from Fort Heiman, with some not leaving until just before noon. Overall, the latter group marched 12 miles in about four hours over terrain that some contemporary accounts considered “difficult.”⁴⁹ This would be challenging, but not excessive, for most of Grant’s troops, who had some experience in marching. When the Confederates retreated from Fort Henry on 6 February, it took them anywhere from 9 to 15 hours to get to Fort Donelson, but that was over muddier roads, partly in the dark, with their rear guard harassed by Union cavalry, and via a longer roundabout route (22 miles).⁵⁰

ANALYSIS OF GEER’S VERSION OF SUNNY DIXIE

Geer’s version of Sunny Dixie has the soldiers blithely tossing away their blankets and overcoats in the sunny spring-like weather. Fuller, Shelby Foote, Catton, Hamilton, Cooling, Keegan, McPherson, Woodworth, and to a certain extent, Stonesifer, Hurst, and Knight accept this. Badeau could be interpreted this way, and he may have influenced Fuller and Hurst’s analysis.⁵¹ Of the historians’ primary sources, there were four that appear to support this interpretation: Brinton’s *Personal Memoirs*, Grant’s *Personal Memoirs*, and possibly Colonel Morrison’s after action report, found in *The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies* (henceforth *ORA*).⁵² Woodworth cites Carl Dean Gebhardt’s 1968 master’s thesis, “The Eleventh Illinois Infantry Regiment in the Civil War,” which in turn sources to the primary source *1st [sic] Re-Union, Co. A, 11th Illinois Infantry, September 3, 1885*.⁵³ Gebhardt exemplifies Geer’s Sunny Dixie meme in its full glory:

“On the march from Fort Henry, the weather had turned unseasonably warm. As the columns moved eastward, the road became littered with overcoats and blankets. The sweating marchers discarded just about anything that interfered with their comfort. The men of the 11th were also guilty of discarding many articles they would need later. A private soldier in the 11th claimed that on the night of the 13th, a single rubber poncho was used to cover his entire company “by being repeatedly stolen from its sleeping owner.”⁵⁴

Other primary sources not cited in any of these secondary works might support this version: Mahon and Smith in the *History of the Seventh Iowa* and Hicks’ “Fort Donelson.” A frequently cited primary source, but not in relation to the Sunny Dixie story, is Riddell’s “Movements of the Goochland Light Artillery.”⁵⁵ Morrison’s report was written right after the battle. Grant’s is the next earliest account (1885), while the others did not complete their accounts until later.

Colonel William Morrison, commander of the 49th Illinois Infantry Regiment and 3rd Brigade, 1st Division, wrote to McClelland “[The men]. . . encouraged by your presence [during] the advance, swept over underbrush, fences, ravines, and brooks in the best possible order, casting away their knapsacks, overcoats, and every inconvenience to their most speedy advance.”⁵⁶ This actually sounds as if the men discarded their gear on their own initiative, but with the knowledge (and perhaps, encouragement) of their chain of command.

Grant’s command surgeon, Dr. Henry Brinton, rode alongside Grant during the march to Fort Donelson, and probably would have had the opportunity to see men dropping their gear or putting it on wagons.⁵⁷ His comment that men “left [overcoats] by the roadside”

at first sounds as if it was the soldiers' idea to do so, but Brinton might simply have meant that they did so after being ordered to or while following a standing operational procedure.⁵⁸ Brinton served for over three years after Fort Donelson, so it would be odd if he misunderstood what he saw, but perhaps he never became familiar with infantry procedure. Brinton also did not specify which men were doing this.

According to Lieutenant Colonel Parrott's report for the 7th Iowa the regiment bivouacked without shelter or blankets. The testimony of two of his officers, S. Mahon and Henry Smith, however, supports Geer's Sunny Dixie thesis.⁵⁹ Mahon's account has the same problem as to the context of "thrown away" that the other accounts do, but Smith's observation that "many of the men having thrown away their blankets and overcoats to keep from straggling" does not.⁶⁰ It seems that many men in the 7th Iowa simply could not keep up. As part of 2nd Division, the 7th Iowa would have marched the full distance to Fort Donelson without a head start, but it apparently took its time, not reaching its final position until 6 p.m.⁶¹ The sight of the veterans of the 7th Iowa throwing away their gear might have convinced Grant and his staff that this was a widespread practice. But Grant and his staff left Fort Henry at 10 o'clock, so the 7th Iowa might not have even departed before Grant's staff had passed the Iowans on their way to the head of the column. Perhaps Grant's staff heard about it by hearsay.

During the march to Fort Donelson, Lieutenant Herbert Hicks was part of the cavalry screen at the head of 1st Division's column.⁶² Most likely, he would only have observed the infantry after Forrest's counterattack.⁶³ If Hicks actually saw men dropping their gear, and was not merely recounting hearsay, he may have misinterpreted what he saw. As a

cavalryman, he may not have appreciated how much of a burden that gear would have been to dismounted men about to go into combat.

Grant stated twice in his *Personal Memoirs* that men had “thrown away” their coats and blankets; if anyone from 1st Division had done this, he would have had the chance to witness it.⁶⁴ Both of his passages tell the same story that Hicks and Brinton do, with the possibility of ambiguity of context. As a former infantry officer, Grant was familiar with infantry procedure, as we shall see. Unlike Hicks or Brinton, if Grant wanted the reader to believe that soldiers dropped their gear under orders or as per a standard operating procedure, he was certainly capable of writing a sentence or two to put their actions into context. Since he did not, he might have wanted the reader to believe that his men’s actions were unauthorized. However, if his men had done this without permission, one wonders why he did not do anything about it. In John Simon’s *Papers of Ulysses S. Grant* (1972), there is a 17 February message from Grant to Colonel George Cullum (Halleck’s chief of staff):

Several regiments of my command, Gen. McClellands [sic] Division, were repulsed for a time on the morning of the 15th and [the word “lost” is crossed out, and the sentence continues] their blankets fell into the hands of the enemy. I am trying to have these collected and returned. All those lost I believe are grey with the letters US in the center. All such, found upon the prisoners, I would recommend should be taken from them and returned here.⁶⁵

Another of Grant’s letters claimed that his men had lost 5,000 blankets and 1,000 overcoats “on the field of battle” (or “on the battle-field.”).⁶⁶ The Confederates did not range far from their defenses during their assault on 15 February, so if the Confederates

captured “thousands” or even hundreds of blankets, it could not have been the result of Yankees tossing them away over the course of a 12 mile march. To have been close enough to capture so many blankets, it must have been the result of the Yankees downing their gear in preparation for combat at some point during the battle, either on 12 February when 1st Division was in hot pursuit or more likely after they were overrun during the attack on 15 February. This in fact is implied by Cullum’s line, “Very few blankets are in this office, General McClelland having taken them all.”⁶⁷ The *History of the 31st Illinois Volunteers* confirms the latter. For the night of 14/15 February, the men “rolled themselves in their overcoat[s] and blankets in the snow” with no mention of missing gear, but on the night of 15/16 February, after the big break-out battle, “the tired fellows again bivouacked [sic] in the snow, without tents, many without over coats or blankets.”⁶⁸ Either way, Grant gave no hint of improvident rookies casting away their gear under the siren song of *Sunny Dixie* in the immediate aftermath of the battle. Grant and his staff already had a track record of creatively accounting for unpleasant events, but it is also possible that the blame shifting might not have been conscious; the memory of one or two malefactors might have justified it in their minds.⁶⁹ But if so, Grant, like Hicks and Brinton, did not identify these men’s units.

Gebhardt’s careless reading of the account of “A” Company’s reunion seems to support the *Sunny Dixie* narrative, but it does not. The speaker reminisced that on 6 February, they had “moved in light marching order for Fort Henry” and arrived at Fort Henry “without tents and blankets,” obviously because they had been marching in “light marching order.” He also clearly states that the poncho stealing incident occurred at Fort Henry (probably on the night of 6 and 7 February), not at Fort Donelson. A few sentences

later, the speaker states that they “brought up knapsacks which had been left back two miles,” so it seems that they were concentrated in one spot, not scattered along the route.⁷⁰ This does not support Sunny Dixie. This seems to be a case of a historian (Gebhardt) carelessly reading a source in light of his preconceptions and seeing what he expected to see, and another historian, Woodworth, then repeating the error because he did not check his secondary source (Gebhardt) against the primary source.

Private Thomas Riddell, a Virginian in the Goochland Light Artillery (Guy’s Battery), wrote an article about his experiences for the *Richmond Dispatch* in 1895. In the freezing early morning of 16 February, he and his bunkie were awakened by his battery commander. To stay warm, they had been laying between layers of captured blankets, with nine or ten blankets each on both top or bottom.⁷¹ This confirms that at least some Confederates were using captured blankets that had obviously not been dropped along a 12-mile march.

ANALYSIS OF MCFEELY’S VERSION OF SUNNY DIXIE

McFeely believes that a combination of naivety, laziness, and sunshine convinced everyone to leave their cold and wet-weather gear behind at Fort Henry. Cooling and, to some extent, Hurst and Knight, also accept this.⁷² Two sources support this version of Sunny Dixie: Lew Wallace and William H.L. Wallace.⁷³ None of our analyzed historians used four other sources that confirm that some units left their knapsacks behind: Kiner, Benjamin F. Thomas, Peter Wilson, and David Reed, all from Iowa units in 2nd Division.

Lew Wallace commanded the garrison at Fort Henry on 12 February, so he would not have witnessed soldiers throwing away their gear along the route of march unless it was in the first mile or so.⁷⁴ He only led reinforcements to Fort Donelson starting on the pre-

dawn hours of 14 February, so if there were any roadside debris, he could have seen it after the sun rose, but only if it had not been covered by the previous night's sleet and snow.⁷⁵ However, Lew Wallace stayed behind on 12 February, so he would have been ideally placed to know if units had stored their gear in the rear.⁷⁶

Colonel William H. L. Wallace, commander of 2nd Brigade, 1st Division, substantiates Lew Wallace's account. Since he wrote his letter on 11 February, it has nothing to do with dropping or tossing gear during the march on 12 February.⁷⁷ It does seem that the men had a hand in convincing their commander to acquiesce in this.⁷⁸ So, at least some of the men in 2nd Brigade, 1st Division, had no overcoats to toss aside during the march.⁷⁹

David Reed was an officer in the 12th Iowa Infantry.⁸⁰ His regiment marched in light order, taking blankets, but not knapsacks or overcoats. The men did this on their initiative, although the commander obviously allowed it.⁸¹

First Sergeant F. F. Kiner and Private Benjamin Franklin Thomas, both of the 14th Iowa Infantry, wrote that they left behind their knapsacks (including overcoats) for the march to Fort Donelson, taking only their blankets against the weather.⁸² Private Peter Wilson, also of the 14th Iowa, explained that the rest of their gear was transported to Fort Donelson by boat and was supposed to be waiting for them once they had taken Fort Donelson.⁸³ Reed noted that the 12th Iowa Infantry had previously done this during their march to Fort Henry.⁸⁴ Brinton may have touched on this when he wrote, ". . . in the march across the country, many of the men had found their blankets and overcoats cumbersome, and had left them by the roadside, or placed them in wagons, which had failed to make a redistribution."⁸⁵ Some men may have placed their overcoats in wagons during the march without authorization, but in other cases, units probably intended to

transport their heavy gear by wagon, as the 7th Illinois Infantry had previously done for the march to Fort Henry.⁸⁶ The problem for units like the 14th Iowa was that the unit was unable to link up with the boats, and thus their gear. Many overcoats were left behind or trusted to transport under the assumption that it would be easy to retrieve them once Fort Donelson fell. A unit that transported their gear by wagon would have been in a similar predicament, because the wagons had difficulty making the trip to Fort Donelson.⁸⁷

ANALYSIS OF THE SKEPTICS

Manning F. Force (1882) is the earliest of the sources to hint that some units may have downed their gear to prepare for action.⁸⁸ Aaron Bolerjack, Gott, Hurst, and Stonesifer explore this, with Stonesifer and Gott arguing it was the primary reason that troops dropped their gear. Hurst in fact put a little more emphasis on the Sunny Dixie variants.⁸⁹

Hurst's source is Morrison's ambiguous after action report. Crummer is Stonesifer's stated source, and Gott seems to rely on his (twentieth century) military experience. A recently discovered source, the diary of William Bolerjack, hints at this interpretation in his descendant's doctoral dissertation.⁹⁰ None cited him, but Dr. H. P. Stearns' report supports skepticism of the Sunny Dixie thesis as well.

Temporarily downing gear was risky because "temporarily" could last longer than expected. Private Wilbur F. Crummer (45th Illinois, of 2nd Brigade, 1st Division) consulted Badeau when writing his memoirs, but makes no mention of anyone throwing away their gear out of laziness or weakness during the march to Fort Donelson. Although W. H. L. Wallace's letter stated that many units in his brigade left Fort Henry without their knapsacks, Crummer notes that the 45th Illinois had theirs, but the men were ordered to drop their packs in preparation for taking part in an attack.⁹¹ This became a problem

when they had advanced so far past the drop-off point (one or two miles) that they were unable to bring up their packs once they stopped for the night.⁹²

Sergeant William Bolerjack's diary indicates that the 29th Illinois Infantry (1st Brigade, 1st Division) did without blankets or food for the remainder of 12 February (after dropping their gear) and most of the next day; their gear did not arrive until the night of 13 February, after they were able to send men back to get their blankets and haversacks. Considering the distances involved, it is far more likely that these were downed after making contact with the Confederate picket line, rather than being left behind at Fort Henry or tossed along the way.⁹³

Surgeon H. P. Stearns was 1st Division's surgeon. His report, found in the *Medical and Surgical History of the War*, states:

"The First Brigade suffered from the want of blankets and rations for thirty-six hours; the Second Brigade was without blankets, rations, or knapsacks for thirty hours. The Third Brigade was, during part of the march, destitute of blankets, rations and overcoats. In the First Brigade, 144 cases of frost bite were reported; in the Second, 23 by name, and a large number not designated by military description; in the Third, only two cases were reported."⁹⁴

This is obviously open to interpretation, but the apparent return of 3rd Brigade's gear almost immediately upon their settling into position calls the Sunny Dixie thesis into question: If everyone had been just tossing their gear along an eight to twelve mile route as the fancy struck them, they would not have gotten it back so quickly, if at all, nor would they have gotten their gear back at the same time. Perhaps their gear was, by plan, transported on wagons, or perhaps they got their gear back so quickly because they were

closest to where they had downed it, in one place, *as a unit*. The latter is the most likely, since it dovetails with Crummer, Bolerjack, and the 11th Illinois reunion's accounts. The timing also implies that most of 1st Division had their blankets on 15 February. This, in turn, confirms Grant's original February 1862 reports to Cullum, which claimed that the blankets and overcoats were only lost when the rebels overran 1st Division's positions. It does not fit with Grant's later tale that he scattered them over hill and dale during their march on 12 February.

OVERALL ANALYSIS

For anyone caught outside on the evening of 13 February, it was indeed unpleasant, but those who were missing cold- and wet-weather gear suffered the most. First it rained, then it got cold enough to sleet, then it snowed.⁹⁵ Since waterproof gear existed but was rare, even those men who were properly equipped generally ended up with wet blankets, wet overcoats, and wet uniforms. Fortunately, most of the uniforms, blankets, and overcoats were wool, which unlike cotton, retains much of its heat-retaining capability when wet, but the conditions were still miserable and health-threatening. The men were ordered not to build campfires on the line for tactical reasons, although they were allowed to visit those built in the rear on the reverse slopes and hollows by relay.

American Civil War soldiers were prone to throwing away heavy gear in order to lighten their load. They might do this when they were fleeing an enemy, as the Confederates did during their retreat from Fort Henry to Fort Donelson on 6 February.⁹⁶ In such cases, the soldiers did not expect to ever see the discarded items again. Soldiers also threw away gear when it was hot and was likely to stay so. A journalist from the *Missouri Democrat* thought that heat was a factor during the march to Fort Donelson, but

he makes it clear that the main reason was imminent combat, and that the men expected to retrieve their gear when the fighting was over.⁹⁷ One explanation for missing blankets not mentioned in any of the sampled secondary sources is that some men used their blankets as stretchers or donated them to for hospital use; Surgeon Brinton's official report mentions the need for blankets.⁹⁸ Even in the modern era, soldiers use ponchos or shelter halves to transport the wounded.⁹⁹ Overall, though, the most common reason for units downing their gear was to lighten the load for combat. Examples from primary sources are abundant. The men of the 7th Illinois (of 2nd Division) seem to have retained their knapsacks during the march, because their colonel ordered them to down packs and retrieve their overcoats before undertaking an assault on 13 February.¹⁰⁰ Their brigade commander, Colonel John Cook, confirms this.¹⁰¹ This is probably the reason that some of them did not have their blankets for the night.¹⁰² Some of them might have jettisoned their blankets on the march, but it seems unlikely that a man would carry a backpack, but jettison a rolled blanket. The 17th Kentucky (Union) left behind "blankets, knapsacks, and a few greatcoats" before reinforcing the faltering 1st Division for the fight on 15 February.¹⁰³ Later the same day, the 13th Missouri dropped their packs and blankets while getting ready to fight "*at the suggestion of General Grant*" [emphasis mine].¹⁰⁴

Federal troops were not the only ones to down their gear during the battle. Forrest's cavalymen dropped their blankets when fighting dismounted during the sortie on 15 February, and apparently did not have an opportunity to retrieve them until they rode out the next morning.¹⁰⁵ The 32nd Tennessee Infantry of Buckner's division left their knapsacks (probably including their blankets and overcoats) in the entrenchments when they took part in the same attack.¹⁰⁶

Downing gear was not a phenomenon limited to the western theater. Major General George B. McClellan instructed the Army of the Potomac to leave their knapsacks in their regimental wagons before entering combat, and some even did so for picket duty.¹⁰⁷ This was not new to the American Civil War, but had been done in previous wars.¹⁰⁸ Even in the modern era, it is a common procedure when making contact, and the light infantry manual recommends caching gear during patrols and movements in order to “reduce the soldier’s load.”¹⁰⁹

Sometimes, soldiers did down gear on their own initiative. A soldier in an overcoat could quickly become dangerously over-heated, even in very cold weather. Captain Nott, temporarily attached to the 14th Iowa Infantry, states how he prepared to take part in an assault on the Confederate defenses: “I hooked up my cavalry sabre, unbuttoned my great coat so that I could quickly throw it off, and took my place beside the lieutenant colonel with whom I was to act.” When the order came, he threw off his overcoat.¹¹⁰

Most of Grant’s men were already familiar with weather south of the Ohio River, and would not have been surprised that it gets cold and wet in Dixie. Operational overconfidence may have had more to do with a lack of gear than Tennessee’s deceptive weather, and the overconfidence started at the top. Grant gambled that taking Fort Donelson would be as easy as taking Fort Henry.¹¹¹ On 6 February, he sent Major General Halleck a message predicting that he could “take and destroy” Fort Donelson in a single day, and then return to Fort Henry.¹¹² When departing on 12 February, he predicted that word of Fort Donelson’s capture would be telegraphed the next day.¹¹³

Had Grant’s gamble worked, the end result of the lightened loads would have been a faster, less tiring march that would have allowed Grant’s men to bag a larger number of

fleeing rebels. Here, Grant was probably trying to make up for his failure to capture most of the escaping rebels at Fort Henry.¹¹⁴ Had things gone Grant's way, his men might have only had to spend the night of 12-13 February outdoors, when the weather was still relatively pleasant, and under circumstances which would have better allowed them to build shelters and safely build fires for heat, drying clothes, and cooking. Food would not have run low and the men would have had more time for sleeping instead of pulling picket duty.¹¹⁵ The next day, some of them would have stayed in the cabins of Fort Donelson, while some would have returned to Fort Henry.¹¹⁶ All of these "would haves" were based on the Confederates acting as they had at Fort Henry. Grant's order that each soldier only take two days' rations (not even the three that a haversack could hold) with a reserve of only three days' rations in unreliable wagons, his prohibition on tents, and his order limiting each man to just 40 rounds of ammunition without any immediate plans for resupply all indicate that he did not expect to stay out of supply for long.¹¹⁷ He did not know that Fort Donelson's water batteries were better positioned to defeat the ironclads than those at Fort Henry, and he did not care that the Confederates had massed several times as many troops at Fort Donelson as they had at Fort Henry, probably because he underestimated the Confederate soldiers' (and Pillow's) willingness to fight.¹¹⁸

CONCLUSION: GRANT'S OVERLOOKED RESPONSIBILITY

What happened to those 5,000 blankets and 1,000 overcoats?¹¹⁹ Some of Grant's units decided to leave their cold-weather gear behind in order to facilitate the march to Fort Donelson. This was in accord with Grant's operational concept, but the transportation system was unable to bring the gear and supplies forward quickly enough. Another reason was an unfortunate byproduct of the men downing their packs before carrying out

an assault, whether under orders to or not. As the soldiers advanced, they got further and further from where they had dropped off their gear. Once the unit got to its final position, it was difficult to release men to go back because they needed the manpower on the line. Finally, some of Grant's men were not the best disciplined nor used to marching, but this was probably far down on the list of reasons for missing cold- or wet-gear, even under the supposed effects of Sunny Dixie; they could not throw away gear that they did not have in the first place. In his notes, Shelby Foote makes a quip about one of the "latter-day authorities" who cautioned against using Lew Wallace's recollections as a source for the account of Grant's council of war before the march to Fort Donelson, because Wallace was a novelist.¹²⁰ Perhaps Foote should have taken that advice regarding Sunny Dixie as well.

Why the popularity of the Sunny Dixie story? To some extent, it would be surprising if 15,000 men had marched 12 miles and not one of them had thrown away something without authorization, so the story has initial credibility, but it looks as if a small percentage became the mass (a Fallacy of Statistical Sampling). In part, it may have simply been a misunderstanding of what "dropping" meant, although there may have been an effort—subconscious or otherwise—to shift blame from Grant and his staff to his men. Accepting the story as a given, a professional soldier and military theorist like Fuller might have seen an attractive illustration of poorly trained and poorly disciplined soldiers bringing themselves to ruin, with the obvious lessons (the Didactic Fallacy). Others might have seen Grant's soldiers as stand-ins for hapless youth (the Fallacy of Archetypes), or in Foote's case, for hapless Yankees. Once enough secondary sources

told the tale, it became “common knowledge” and an example of the Prevalent Proof fallacy.

CHAPTER III

Fort Donelson: The Numbers

Historians calculate that Confederate strength was between 12,000 and 21,123 men at the Battle of Fort Donelson, a factor difference of 1.76. How many men did they actually have? Could both range extremes be correct? There is less divergence in the estimates for Union forces but they are still open to interpretation. Few doubt that Grant's troops eventually outnumbered Floyd's, but to what extent? If the correlation of forces was not too wide then Confederate defeat was not inevitable. What might the correlation of forces tell us about the respective capabilities of the two forces and their leaders? If the Confederates performed better than their numbers would indicate, that would say something about their and their opponent's competence. What effect did the surrender have on later operations? Even if the Confederates had contested the Federals on 16 February, several thousand additional men might have escaped to fight in additional battles during the spring and summer of 1862, particularly Shiloh.

BACKGROUND TO PERSONNEL STRENGTHS

Why do the numbers matter? Carl von Clausewitz noted that all other things being equal, a larger force will defeat a smaller force, and its chances of success grow as the numerical odds increase. In the case of Fort Donelson, if 10,000 Confederates had tried to hold off 30,000 Federals, they probably would have failed, but if it had been 15,000 versus 20,000, their chances would have been much better; a few thousand men could be the difference between a massacre—preempted by a surrender—and victory.¹²¹

Bushrod Johnson, Pillow, Floyd, and Buckner all commanded the forces at Fort Donelson at some point during the two weeks preceding the surrender.¹²² None of them

seem to have tried to collect an overall record of how many men defended the place.¹²³ Even Federal figures are largely based on Grant's calculations. This makes strength and loss calculations, and therefore analysis of the opposing sides' performance, complicated.

Each side's forces arrived from different places during the fighting, often in haste. Most of Grant's forces came from his own District of Cairo, with reinforcements from other elements of Major General Henry Halleck's Department of the Missouri or from Brigadier General Don Carlos Buell's Department of the Ohio. One group, consisting of all of 1st Division and most of 2nd Division, marched from Fort Henry on 12 February. Another group, Lew Wallace's brigade, left Fort Henry on 14 February. The remainder came up the Cumberland River by steamboat.¹²⁴ In this flurry of action, administrative record-keeping may have come up short.

The Confederate forces at Fort Donelson may have suffered from the same lack of administrative precision because of their varied origins. Colonel Adolphus Heiman's 1st Brigade, Colonel Joseph Drake's 2nd Brigade, and Colonel John Head's brigade originally belonged to Brigadier General Lloyd Tilghman's 4th Division of Major General Leonidas Polk's command; Head's brigade was Fort Donelson's original garrison and Heiman and Drake's brigades fled Forts Heiman and Henry on 6 February 1862.¹²⁵ Buckner's 2nd Division, Floyd's 3rd Division, and Clark's brigade (including Colonel Nathan Bedford Forrest's cavalry regiment) all arrived later; Floyd, Buckner, and Clark's units were all part of Major General William Hardee's Central Army of Kentucky. Baldwin's brigade (part of Buckner's division) did not arrive until the early hours of 13 February and McCausland's brigade (of Floyd's division) arrived with Floyd himself

about daybreak. The 41st and 42nd Tennessee arrived later in the day, with the 42nd Tennessee actually reaching Heiman's defenses during the middle of a Federal assault.¹²⁶

The lack of a single overall list for the strength of either side makes calculations difficult. One way to calculate personnel strength would be to add up the personnel in each of the subordinate units. The other method would be to add up the men's fates: In the Confederate case, take the number who were captured, add the numbers who were evacuated or escaped, then add the number who were killed. Incomplete records are a problem but they would at least help establish a minimum number. Oddly, this might be a better technique for the Confederates than the Federals because the Federal casualty records seem to be complete, but they had no reason to note how many men came through the battle unharmed.

ANALYSIS OF THE CALCULATIONS FOR THE FEDERALS

The secondary sources accept Grant's reports and recollections that he took 15,000 men on the march from Fort Henry to Fort Donelson on 12 February, leaving 2,500 men at Forts Henry and Heiman under Lew Wallace, most of whom would reinforce Grant on 14 February.¹²⁷ Several thousand more arrived at the landing downriver from Dover.¹²⁸ Shelby Foote probably added the 15,000 marching from Fort Donelson on 12 February, the 10,000 steaming up the Cumberland, and Lew Wallace's 2,500 on the Tennessee to come up with his total of 27,500 but did not take into consideration that some of Lew Wallace's 2,500 man force stayed at Forts Henry and Heiman.¹²⁹ If he had done this, his calculation would be closer to 27,000. On the high end is William Johnston, who noted that his 27,000 figure does not include the navy, or those troops who were "supporting [the siege] but not engaged." With the latter included, Johnston argued there may have

been as many as 35,000 Federals involved.¹³⁰ All the other calculations seem to be differences in defining “engaged” or include deductions for losses.¹³¹ Shelby Foote put total Federal losses at 3,000, Gott at 2,614 from the “engaged” strength (rounded up to 2,700 in the text), and Stonesifer and Hurst both came up with a total of 500 killed, 2,108 wounded, and 224 missing.¹³² How well do the historians’ calculations of Federal strength compare with the primary sources?

Grant’s after action report stated that two divisions (a total of 15,000 men) marched from Fort Henry on 12 February, while six additional regiments steamed up the Cumberland at the same time.¹³³ Grant’s *Memoirs* repeats the 15,000 figure and adds that the troops who initially came up the Cumberland (with Cruft and Thayer) numbered 5,000 (without mentioning that more followed). Grant also mentions the 2,500 men that C. F. Smith left behind at Forts Henry and Heiman, implying that Lew Wallace brought all of them as reinforcements on 14 February.¹³⁴ Grant put his total forces at 27,000 by the end of the battle, including those needed to guard his line of supply and communication.¹³⁵ Doctor Brinton, possibly relying on secondary sources, put the Federals at fewer than 30,000 men.¹³⁶ Another member of Grant’s staff, Lieutenant Colonel James B. McPherson, confirmed the identity of the divisions and arrival times in his official report.¹³⁷

An article in the *New York Herald*, dated 21 February 1862, describes Hoosiers and Buckeyes (including the 31st Indiana) steaming to Fort Donelson without giving strength data.¹³⁸ John T. Smith, author of the *Thirty-First Regiment of Indiana Volunteer Infantry* (1900), commanded one of those companies during the battle.¹³⁹ In his account, two

Indiana and two Kentucky (not Ohio) infantry regiments steamed to the battle from Buell's Department of the Ohio via Fort Henry. He does not mention numbers.¹⁴⁰

Lew Wallace's "The Capture of Fort Donelson" mentioned that Grant set out from Fort Henry with 20,000 men, but an editorial footnote states "General Grant estimates his available forces at this time at about 15,000, and on the last day at 27,000, 5,000 or 6,000 of whom were guarding transportation trains in the rear." The latter seems to be what Hamilton and Gott used, so their citation of Wallace is really a citation for Grant.¹⁴¹ Grant implied that Lew Wallace brought his entire brigade from Forts Henry and Heiman, but in fact Wallace left some cavalry at Fort Heiman and the 23rd Indiana Infantry at Fort Henry to secure those locations. Wallace even wrote that Grant himself asked about that, ordering his staff to "Note that."¹⁴² Perhaps Grant forgot. Foote may not have paid close attention to Wallace's memoirs, explaining why he assumed that Wallace arrived with his full 2,500 force instead of a smaller number.

William Johnston provides a few sources which other historians do not exploit, including two otherwise unknown War Department memoranda and a letter from Buell to the *New York World*. Buell estimated that he sent 10,000 men, so Grant's total forces should have numbered 30,000-35,000. Perhaps this is the origin of a claim by Major Alexander Casseday, one of Buckner's staff officers, that C. F. Smith said that the Federals had a total of "five and thirty thousand" men, a story that Buckner repeated later.¹⁴³ One of the War Department memos put Grant's effective force at "about 24,400" and the second, dated 1 January 1862, put them at 27,113. Regardless of the provenance of the memoranda, the total of 27,113 men is annotated "Grant's command," which would have included the entire District of Cairo, not just his field force at Fort

Donelson.¹⁴⁴ All of these sources include men who did not fight at Fort Donelson, meaning that those who actually did would have been fewer than 35,000.

Johnston also cites a report from Surgeon H. P. Stearns to his divisional commander, McClelland. It provides strength and loss data (including frostbite cases) for 1st Division (see Appendix, Table III-1).¹⁴⁵ The casualty returns for the entire District of Cairo, 12-16 February 1862, show a total of 500 killed, 2,108 wounded, and 224 missing (see Appendix, Table III-1). These losses are broken down by individual unit, so the “500” killed is not an estimate, but a precise figure.¹⁴⁶

ANALYSIS OF THE CALCULATIONS FOR THE CONFEDERATES

Due to the number of contradictory sources giving different estimates based on varying accounting techniques, there is no consensus among the secondary sources for the Confederate’s strength and losses at Fort Donelson.¹⁴⁷ Badeau’s strength and loss estimates are on the high end, crediting the Yankees with having killed or wounded at least 2,500 Confederates (based on his judgment) and taking 14,623 rebels prisoner. He estimates 3,000 men escaped with Floyd and 1,000 escaped with Forrest. This adds up to at least 21,123 rebels present during the battle.¹⁴⁸ Hamilton’s 500 killed and 1,500 wounded (400 left to be captured) is on the low end for loss estimates, and he suspects that most estimates of Confederate strength are too high, assessing them at 14,000 after the arrival of Floyd on the morning of 14 February, which would not have included the last minute arrival of the 41st and 42nd Tennessee, or 400 “raw recruits” who arrived on the morning of 16 February.¹⁴⁹ Other historians fall somewhere in between these estimates.¹⁵⁰ Hamilton notes that his figures for “regimental strength is based on average regimental rosters, where other information is lacking.”¹⁵¹ Gott’s attempt at a complete

regiment-by-regiment breakdown for Confederate strength relies on the *ORA* and various (unnamed) memoirs.¹⁵² Gott's lack of detailed end-noting for his calculations makes tracking his reasoning difficult.

Albert Sidney Johnston's report to Secretary of War Judah Benjamin stated that the troops at Fort Donelson numbered about 7,000 on 8 February. This would have included the entire 4th Division of Polk's command and Wharton's brigade of Floyd's 3rd Division. Clark's brigade, still on its way from Hopkinsville, would not have been included.¹⁵³ This would indicate that Heiman, Drake, and Head's brigades alone numbered 7,000.

Floyd reported his force as "not exceeding 13,000 men." He estimated that his own battle losses would "not be far from 1,500 killed and wounded." He put his four Virginia regiments at 986 about a week later when they arrived at Murfreesboro. This, added to the killed and captured, would be a good starting point for a minimum number for these units. Floyd (truthfully) notes that the 20th Mississippi Infantry "handed in no report at Murfreesborough [sic]," probably because most of that regiment had been left behind. A few Mississippians escaped or were evacuated (including the sick commander), later meeting up with a few men who were absent for one reason or another.¹⁵⁴

Pillow's reports put Confederate losses at 2,000. About 400 of the wounded were captured and 1,134 were evacuated. The remainder were dead. He noted the escape of Floyd and Forrest's commands, and claims that "thousands" of others got out as well, including himself and his staff by flatboat. On the other hand, he mentions "400 raw troops" who arrived by steamboat just as the surrender was underway. These may have included two companies of the 48th Tennessee.¹⁵⁵ Overall, Pillow noted that "Northern papers" only seem to list 5,170 privates taken prisoner.¹⁵⁶ Colonel John Burch, Major W.

H. Haynes, Major Gus Henry, and Lieutenant Hunter Nicholson, all members of Pillow's staff, confirm that Pillow escaped, and based on the date of their reports, they did, too.¹⁵⁷ Captain Jack Davis (7th Texas Infantry) reported escaping in a flatboat between first twilight and sunrise. Hamilton implies that this was Pillow's raft.¹⁵⁸

Buckner reported that at the time of the surrender, "the aggregate of the army, never numbering greater than 12,000 men, was now reduced to less than 9,000 men after the departure of Floyd's brigade." In a 1909 interview with the *Nashville Banner*, Buckner put the Confederates at 12,000-13,000 men before the breakout attempt. After the losses of that day, and the escape of Floyd's division (Buckner numbers them at 1,200-1,500), Forrest's cavalry, and other escapes, he claims that only "a little over 8,000 men" surrendered. This is the lowest primary source estimate for Confederate strength.¹⁵⁹

Forrest reported that "over 500" cavalry escaped with him (the commanders of the 9th Tennessee Cavalry Battalion and two Kentucky cavalry companies refused to leave). Joining him were about 200 men from other units and the horses of Porter's battery.¹⁶⁰ There does not seem to be any direct support here for Hamilton's claim that "one out of four cavalymen was authorized to take a rider behind him," although it may have merely been an inference.¹⁶¹

One of Forrest's scouts and couriers, Adam R. Johnson, recounted that he was ordered to accompany Floyd on the steamboat. The other scout, Robert Martin, went with Pillow. Johnson claimed that Pillow crossed over the Cumberland on the first trip, rather than taking a raft as most accounts have it, but whether he said this as an eyewitness or from hearsay is hard to tell.¹⁶² In this case, two members of Forrest's command ended up

leaving with other elements. This means that we cannot simply take the strength of evacuating unit before 16 February as the number of men who evacuated with the unit.

In his initial report, dated 4 March 1862, Bushrod Johnson stated that the sick at Fort Donelson had been sent away before 9 February. This implies that there were relatively few sick to be captured. He also noted the ease with which he escaped with an aide on 18 February after most of the prisoners had been shipped north and noted that many others did as well.¹⁶³

Colonel Daniel Russell was the commander of the 20th Mississippi, the unit that was left behind while guarding the boat landing during Floyd's evacuation. He had been sick during the entire battle and was evacuated with Floyd. In answer to a congressional investigation, Russell gave his regiment's strength and noted that somewhere between 5 and 25 of his men avoided capture (see Table III-2). One of those may have been L. J. Bailey, who escaped in the morning by commandeering a boat from a black man who said he was searching for his master. Bailey met other escapees along the way, but gives no details. This indicates that a percentage of the 20th Mississippi avoided capture even though it was not one of the evacuated units. As the senior officer present, Major William Brown was the acting commander of the 20th Mississippi. He explained that his regiment was left behind while guarding the boat landing after Buckner had ordered the boats to depart or risk "hav[ing] a bomb-shell thrown in it" to avoid breaking the truce; he claims that about 200 Virginians from the 56th Virginia were also left behind when the *General Anderson* cast off.¹⁶⁴

On 24 March, Lieutenant Colonel Milton Haynes, chief of Tennessee Artillery, reported that he heard that "Captain Bidwell, Lieutenant Burt, with 36 men, the horses of

Porter's light battery, Forrest's cavalry, and many stragglers from various corps effected their safe retreat on Saturday night [15 February, sic; actually Sunday morning]."¹⁶⁵ In a reply on the same day to the Fort Donelson investigation, he tells the same story, except adding a private escaped with Bidwell, and making the number of men to "about 40."¹⁶⁶ Given the date of his reports, Colonel Haynes got out as well.

Captain B. G. Bidwell was commander of Company A, 30th Tennessee Infantry, which manned four of the river defense's 32-pounder cannon. He stated that he was consulting with the "colonel of a Tennessee regiment" at Dover when his company was "unnecessarily and wrongfully surrendered," and that he had "no chance to communicate with my men or save them." His post script added that he is "with the army, moving west somewhere" at the time of writing. He never rejoined his unit.¹⁶⁷ In 1899, Bidwell wrote Wyeth that he escaped on a skiff across the Cumberland with a Captain Frank Duffy of the 35th Tennessee.¹⁶⁸ Where Milton Haynes got the impression that Bidwell rode out over Lick Creek with about 40 men is anyone's guess. Since Bidwell does not mention anyone else other than Duffy, this may have been a different raft than Pillow's, which would explain why Milton Haynes did not know how Bidwell got out. Wyeth accepts Bidwell's report as a primary source, but this is an example of a secondary account masquerading as a primary account. Bidwell was only a primary source for his own and Duffy's escape. We have to remember that just because someone was at the battle does not mean that they saw everything at the battle.

As an 18-year old, Lieutenant John Watson Morton took over Porter's Tennessee Battery after the name-sake commander was wounded. His 1909 memoirs, *The Artillery of Nathan Bedford Forrest's Cavalry*, noted (at first) that 37 of the 48 men who served on

the gun crews became casualties, but then specifically stated that of the 48 men and officers who worked the guns, 8 were killed and 25 wounded. He noted that the limber crews, the caisson crews, and the artificers suffered few casualties (without providing details), but many of the horses were hit. As Haynes mentioned, Lieutenant Burt took most of mounted elements with him when they found out about the surrender, leaving him to surrender 11 other men to the Yankees. Morton mentions that three blacks cooked for his mess, but did not accompany the officers to Camp Chase.¹⁶⁹

Wyeth cites several escapes, supported by the sworn affidavits of James Woodward, S.G. Morgan, and First Sergeant Chandler of the 27th Alabama.¹⁷⁰ Lieutenant LeGrand Wilson of the 1st Mississippi wrote that he hid in a private home for several days before escaping while wearing civilian clothes. On safely arriving, he “was much surprised and delighted to find my old regimental commissary, Captain Gannaway, who made his escape early Sunday morning, crossing the river before the surrender.”¹⁷¹

Private Riddell of Guy’s battery escaped by wading neck deep in the cold floodwaters of the Cumberland in order to be pulled aboard the *General Anderson* just as she was pulling away. He reports that at least three other men of his battery escaped by various means but implies that most of the battery did not make it out; Riddell writes that he was temporarily assigned to the Brigade surgeon since “my company [was] captured at Fort Donleson.”¹⁷²

Among the commonly used sources for Confederate strengths and losses is the Nashville *Patriot*’s strength and casualty list. Published “soon after the surrender,” it soon found its way into *The Rebellion Record: A Diary of American Events*, published in

1862. William Johnston and Force both use it to put Confederate strength at 13,829, and losses at 231 killed and 1,007 wounded (see Appendix, Table III-2).¹⁷³

Another Southern attempt to count Confederate strength and losses was discovered in 1864 by H. Z. Gill, a U.S. Army surgeon. Gill found a list at the home of the father-in-law of Major Thomas Johnson of the 1st Mississippi, who apparently had access to official reports. His list shows 273 killed, 949 wounded (all of whom were apparently evacuated), 2,286 who were listed as “escaped” or “missing,” and 11,738 surrendered (including those wounded and captured), giving a total of 15,246 “engaged.”¹⁷⁴ In *From Fort Henry to Corinth*, Force compared the list to known unit records (see Appendix, Table III-2) and noted that the list is incomplete.¹⁷⁵

Grant’s original report put the number of prisoners at 12,000-15,000, based on the estimate Buckner gave him during their initial meeting. His letter to his wife repeated this estimate, as did his *Memoirs*. In a note to Cullum, dated 16 February, Grant disclosed his plans to withhold 250 prisoners to exchange for a similar number of his men. Grant’s letters discuss the possible release of many prisoners, but most of them seem to have been transported north.¹⁷⁶

Badeau and Grant note a record from the commissary general of prisoners at Cairo, who issued 14,623 rations to rebel prisoners on their way north.¹⁷⁷ The document now seems to be lost. It seems like a comfortingly precise number, but Hamilton notes the opportunity for corruption in fudging the number of rations supposedly supplied to prisoners.¹⁷⁸ Another source of creative record keeping could be Confederate. If the distribution of rations was at the unit level, then some units may have over-counted their

numbers in order to get extra rations for their men at Yankee expense. William Johnston hints at this in arguing that the number may have been based on muster rolls.¹⁷⁹

A letter from Confederate Surgeon H. Griffin to Halleck, dated 3 March 1862 aboard the captured steamer *D.A. January*, shows that the commissary system at Paducah, Kentucky was not that strict about how many rations it issued out.¹⁸⁰ On 19 February, Surgeon John Patterson of the 18th Tennessee Infantry wrote Grant, recommending that they and the wounded prisoners be paroled.¹⁸¹ Not all Confederate medical personnel went north to prison camps, at least not immediately.

On 24 February 1862, Meigs ordered his quartermasters to issue rations and supplies to prisoners without regard to rank.¹⁸² It is hard to tell whether that was merely a reminder to those who had already been carrying out that policy or if he felt the need to issue the order because it was not being done before that. Additional rations were considered a part of an officer's pay. Lieutenants through majors received four rations per day; lieutenant colonels, five; colonels, six; brigadier generals, twelve.¹⁸³ Considering the number of captured officers (even after attrition), that could easily add up to 2,000, and perhaps over 4,000, additional rations.¹⁸⁴ If some commissaries were doing this, it would mean that one ration does not necessarily correlate to one prisoner. On 27 February, Captain Noble wrote Stanton that "about four thousand rations have been furnished to rebel prisoners and guards."¹⁸⁵ This confirms that not all of the rations issued during prisoner arrivals were for the prisoners. Whether they were accounted for differently is not stated. This is another reason to question the accuracy of Badeau's Cairo commissary ration list.

Buckner's quartermaster Major Samuel Hays gave the Yankees a unit list, of which Colonel George Whittlesey kept a copy. Somehow, it found its way into the *Cincinnati Commercial* as well. It totaled 9,929 prisoners to be sent north by unit (see Appendix, Table III-2).¹⁸⁶ Gott argued that the list is obviously an undercount, because it was "compiled in great haste. . . it was wildly inaccurate by Buckner's admission," although Gott does not cite anything Buckner wrote about the creation of the list.¹⁸⁷ Nevertheless, he may be right. The copy in Whittlesey's records show obvious mistakes, e.g., the "232nd Tennessee for the 32nd Tennessee, "Col. Lugg" for Colonel Sugg (51st Tennessee), and lists 1,120 men as part of "scattered companies, not reported"—if they were "not reported," how did they come up with a number of 1,120? Whittlesey added that "the report does not include the sick and wounded in the hospital at Dover, of whom there should have been several hundred."¹⁸⁸ It would also not necessarily include anyone who escaped before the list was made (assuming that a headcount was made, instead of a unit roster), or who was paroled or exchanged on site. However, it is hard to imagine that Hays would have deliberately undercounted the prisoners if the list was meant to plan for the feeding and transport of the prisoners.¹⁸⁹ Overall, this undercuts Buckner's enduring claims that he surrendered "fewer than 9,000" men at Fort Donelson.¹⁹⁰

Besides Hay's list, Whittlesey noted two other memoranda from his records. One stated "there were 10,300 men distributed to the several prison camps," and another one put the number at 10,389; presumably someone rounded off instead of rounding up.¹⁹¹ This coincides with a message he sent Halleck stating that he was bringing 10,000 prisoners north.¹⁹² Since Whittlesey's regiment, the 20th Ohio Infantry, processed and escorted most of the prisoners to Cairo, these documents are an obvious starting point for

a discussion of the prisoner tabulations, although the 52nd Illinois handled some others, and the 25th Indiana escorted Buckner's group, these units did not report to Whittlesey, and he does not mention whether these prisoners were part of the count.¹⁹³

On 25 February, Halleck gave orders to send Buckner and Tilghman to Fort Warren, Massachusetts, via Camp Morton.¹⁹⁴ That the Federals were still processing Tilghman reminds us that not all of the prisoners in the counts were captured at Fort Donelson. Tilghman put the number of prisoners at Fort Henry as 12 officers, 66 enlisted men, and 16 sick. The 4th Illinois Cavalry captured an additional 38 men as the rebels retreated to Fort Donelson, including two officers.¹⁹⁵

Instead of trying to calculate how many prisoners were sent north, it might be useful to count the number who arrived from the south. A 1930s Work Progress Administration effort observes that the prisoners went through many prisons before reaching their final destination. Unfortunately, this might result in double-counting, so getting an accurate prisoner tally requires a tight snapshot in order to avoid over counting. On the other hand, men who were released or exchanged back in Tennessee, who escaped, or who died before arriving at a camp would not show up in this count, either, resulting in an undercount.¹⁹⁶ Fortunately, Confederate accounts show that most of the prisoners left late on 17 February or on 18 February, and Federal correspondence indicates that most of prisoners went to Cairo and points north by 20 February, giving the prisoners plenty of time to arrive at their camps by 24 February.¹⁹⁷ Taking the messages which we have analyzed for that day, we find that there were "at least 10,000 prisoners" in Illinois, that there were "upwards 4,000" at Camp Morton, Indiana, and that Captain Walker of the 25th Indiana was escorting 179 prisoners, including Buckner and his staff, to Camp

Morton, but had not yet arrived.¹⁹⁸ Later, there would be 4,000 at Camp Morton, 500 at Terre Haute, and 800 (or 806) at Lafayette on 27 February, although some of the increase may be those counted elsewhere.¹⁹⁹ So, allowing for the fuzziness of round numbers, and the difficulties determining whether or not prisoners in transit were being counted as processed at their last location (as with Buckner's group), there were over 13,000 prisoners in Illinois and Indiana, or on their way, as of 24 February, and maybe as many as 15,500 in the north on 24 February.

Lieutenant Colonel W. Hoffman's report, dated 10 March, notes that there were "about 1,700" men confined at Camp Butler but does not detail how many of them had been taken prisoner at Fort Donleson or where the 1,300 or more of the others had gone, although the officers had been transferred to Camp Chase or Fort Warren.²⁰⁰ By 4 April 1862, Halleck's aides report that there were 791 Confederate prisoners at Alton, of whom only 130 came from "Fort Henry and its vicinity," without specifying if any of those actually came from Fort Donelson. By this time, 459 of the prisoners came from Pea Ridge (fought 6-7 March), so the number of prisoners in the camps was no longer any sort of a proxy for those taken at Forts Henry and Donelson.²⁰¹

Edward Smith's *Incidents among Shot & Shell* contains a collection of narratives from a variety of sources, most of whom were members of the Christian Commission.²⁰² One week after the surrender (presumably 23 February), B. F. Jacobs notes that enough sick and wounded rebels remained to fill "23 log-house hospitals." Unfortunately, he does not define "log-house hospital."²⁰³ If he means the cabins between Fort Donelson proper and Indian Creek, they were normally designed to hold four enlisted men per cabin (using double bunks, two men per bed (see "Fort Donelson Map, Showing Improved Tour

Route").²⁰⁴ Most of the prisoners, including the sick or wounded, had been sent north by then. That would imply that 92 (or 46, if each patient got a bed to himself) sick or wounded Confederates remained after most of the prisoners had been sent north or exchanged.

In what might be the unfortunate final word on the topic of Confederate prisoner counting, Charles Sedgwick, a New York congressman, queried the adjutant general regarding the number of Confederate soldiers taken prisoner at Fort Donelson. Lorenzo Thomas's reply was to refer him to Grant's original report: "I am pleased to announce to you the unconditional surrender this morning of Fort Donleson with 12,000 to 15,000 prisoners." Thomas concludes: "No further report on the subject has been received."²⁰⁵

After his exchange, Captain Flavell Barber of the 3rd Tennessee recreated and helped maintain the regimental records. According to these, the 3rd Tennessee suffered 59 wounded, of whom 45 were evacuated on the night of 15 February, 2 were sent home, and 12 were captured and imprisoned (one of whom apparently escaped before transport). If the 3rd Tennessee is representative of the Confederate forces as a whole, then Pillow's estimate that 26 percent of wounded Confederates were captured (400 of 1,534) was roughly—and surprisingly—accurate, and even a little low if one adds two men who were sent home (presumably before the night of 15 February) and one man who was surrendered but escaped. However, not every man who was evacuated was wounded in battle. In addition to the 45 wounded, one of the 3rd Tennessee's evacuees is listed as sick, and both the regimental chaplain and clerk left with the wounded. The latter two would not be part of the regiment's "engaged" strength but were obviously present and contributing operationally before their evacuation. Were they part of the 1,134

“wounded” who were evacuated? Additionally, 28 other men who were surrendered are listed as sick or wounded (one of whom died on the way north). These men would not have been part of the “engaged” or “present for duty” strength, but were obviously “present” enough to become prisoners. Pillow wrote “wounded” and used it as part of his casualty report, but the number probably included a few sick, but not many. Those who attended the patients were presumably not part of the count, but who can be sure?

Another group who were not present for duty with the regiment, but were captured, were those on detached duty (1 man) and those who were otherwise absent (including 2 who were absent without leave).²⁰⁶ Finally, the roster notes 21 men who avoided capture, about 3% of the unit.²⁰⁷

As a final consideration, not every prisoner was a Confederate soldier, at least as normally defined. In a 1906 account, Commissary Sergeant John S. Wilkes of Brown’s brigade mentioned that the commander had a “negro servant,” Ned, who briefly rode next to Brown while carrying a pistol and undergoing shellfire before asking return to his usual cooking and animal husbandry duties in the rear. There, Ned quarreled with a bayonet-wielding black man whose bombproof he had appropriated. This highlights the blacks who served at Front Donelson.²⁰⁸ Many of them became prisoners: Halleck wrote Governor Morton of Indiana that he could “let the negroes go if they wished,” but if they wanted to stay, then they would be under military discipline.²⁰⁹ Captain Barber wrote that any “Negroes who were found with our army at Donelson were carried to Camp Chase and treated as prisoners of war.” After arriving at Camp Chase, the camp administration and anti-slavery visitors told the slaves that they were free. Most stayed with their masters. Captain Andrew Jackson of the 48th Tennessee and Lieutenant Colonel Randall

McGavock of the 10th Tennessee Campbell tell similar stories. McGavock and Casseday both note that servants and slaves were forbidden to go to Fort Warren with the field grade officers, which the blacks apparently found upsetting. The Confederates noted these cases with satisfaction.²¹⁰ These men may have been included in the transport figures. If they were counted, but we do not want to count them as Confederate soldiers, then to subtract their numbers from the total we will have to find a way to calculate their numbers.

Because the straight figures for Confederate figures seem to be incomplete, if we subtract the blacks and add up the known fates of the Confederates who served at Dover, we should be able to come up with a “total, present” number. So far, we can narrow Confederate prisoners to between 12,023 and 16,323 (not including blacks), between between 2,845 and 4,264 who escaped or were evacuated, and between 206 and 466 killed. This totals between 15,074 and 21,053 “total, present,” which is still a variance of 1.39. Once we narrow down this figure, we can compare it to the Federal figures to find out what options were reasonable at certain points of the battle, and which ones might not have been. But even here, we run into a few problems.

OVERALL ANALYSIS

For many battles, analyzing strengths and losses is not just a matter of numbers but of time and space. We have to determine not just the numbers but when those numbers become part of the calculations. In this case, the battlefield’s isolation makes it relatively easy to exclude units that were tied down by other duties. This includes Federal units at Forts Henry and Heiman, and at the boat landing down river. It also includes Confederate units operating against those units, including the largely overlooked presence of the 1st

Louisiana Cavalry on the northern side of the Cumberland which was (keeping tabs on the boat landing), and of Confederate cavalry threatening Fort Heiman on 13 February. These units contributed operationally to the battle by facilitating or hindering the flow of supplies and intelligence, but did not contribute directly to the fighting for the Dover defenses.²¹¹ This is what William Johnston and Buell mean when they write about forces that supported Grant but did not engage.²¹² In the case of a newly arrived unit, there is a moment that it becomes part of the battle, so we have to accept some ambiguity. Fortunately, the examples in the next chapters are fairly cut and dried.

In some cases, the Confederates' varying estimates of their own strength could be the result of different ways of calculating unit strength because most units were more interested in how many men were "effective" or "engaged" for the fight than in knowing how many men happened to be in the Dover area. The official categories for unit strength were "present" versus "absent." Present could include "for duty," "extra duty," "in arrest," and "sick."²¹³ "Sick" and "in arrest" are fairly self-explanatory. "Extra duty" implied that the soldier was on some sort of duty within the army but detached from his company or regiment. Common examples of extra duty for enlisted men included soldiers serving as teamsters or nurses, or, for officers, serving on a headquarters staff. They would not normally be a direct part of an army's "fighting power," but they contributed to overall military effectiveness. "Present for duty" meant everyone who was present and able-bodied, performing their normal duties. But even these were not necessarily a part of direct "fighting power," since it included "non-combatants," such as medical and supply personnel, musicians, artificers, and chaplains, and sometimes drummers and fifers (who were considered to be separate from musicians).²¹⁴ These were deducted for some

calculations, with those remaining being denoted “effective” strength. That portion of a regiment’s “rank and file” strength (i.e., musket-bearing privates and corporals) is an even tighter accounting. “Engaged” would be those actually in combat (however the recorder defined “combat”). Since every company usually had a few sick, and a few men performing as teamsters and the like, the difference could be noticeable.²¹⁵

There are two ramifications to the different definitions of “strength.” The first is that the different types of strength are not exactly comparable. The second is that totaling up the regimental returns does not necessarily reveal the maximum number of casualties (killed, wounded, or captured) for either side, since even “non-combatants” can be counted as casualties, particularly during a mass surrender like Fort Donelson.

How many Federals were there? Most historians seem to agree that 15,000 Federal soldiers marched to Fort Donleson on 12 February, and a total of 27,000 Federal soldiers had arrived before the surrender. This is largely because their sources agree, and the ultimate source for all of those sources is either Grant’s after action report, or his *Memoirs*, which itself is based on the after action report. In theory, Grant should be a good source for the size of his own force, but it is obvious from the nice round numbers that he never made a precise accounting.²¹⁶

The most modern attempt at a detailed accounting for either side’s strength is Gott’s, but his analysis is riddled with problems (see Appendix, Tables III-2 and III-3). He admitted that strength and loss calculations are a difficult challenge, but some of his work is sloppy, and the rest could use some explanations in order to understand his analysis. Gott uses Stearns’ returns from the *Medical and Surgical History* for 1st Division, but for the 8th Illinois, he ignores Stearns in favor of Lieutenant Colonel Rhoads’ report even

though it shows an “engaged” figure rather than “effective” strength. Rhoads’ report also seems to be for the fighting on 15 February, after the regiment would have taken quite a few cold weather casualties, and perhaps a few battle casualties from sniping or shelling, so even if it used the same standard, it is still not quite comparable to Stearns’ numbers.²¹⁷ Gott’s final count, 24,090, seems to be an attempt to represent regimental “effective” strength, but his sources included so many different definitions, from different days, that his calculations add up to a jumble. This is clearly a case of comparing apples and oranges, compounded by a lot of guesswork for units for which there seems to be no data. Gott’s count overlooked several dozen men serving on brigade (or higher) staffs.

Gott seems to accept Grant’s figure of 27,000 as representing the “total present” (including those who became sick, or were wounded or arrested during battle). If the figures of 15,000 marching on 12 February, 10,000 arriving by steamboat, and 2,500 at Fort Henry (minus the strength of the 23rd Indiana, plus a cavalry detachment) are correct, then 27,000 will have to do, despite the suspicious round numbers.

To calculate personnel strengths for 16 February, we would have to deduct the losses incurred up to that time. The U.S. Army’s casualty returns for Fort Donelson are generally reliable. As with any source, historians are dependent on the accuracy of those who create and copy the original primary source; if the first sergeant or adjutant who wrote a return or who copied one was tired, it is only by luck that we might fix the mistake. For example, the casualties of the 45th Illinois Infantry at Fort Donelson are listed as 2 killed and 20 wounded in the *ORA*’s official tabulation, but their regimental records have a hand-written (cursive) account that states the number of wounded as “twenty six.”²¹⁸ Perhaps “26” is the right number, and the supposed “0” in “20” is just a

sloppily written “6,” or maybe, someone later misread “20” as “26,” and wrote that into the letter book. That is a 30% difference in casualties. If errors like that were common, it would make quite a difference. Fortunately, it seems to be an isolated case for the Federals.

After correcting the returns, U.S. Army casualties were 500 killed, 2,114 wounded, and 224 missing (mostly captured), for a total of 2,838.²¹⁹ In addition, Stearns’ medical report shows a total of 144 cold-weather injury cases in 1st Brigade, 1st Division, and 23 more specifically reported in 2nd Brigade (plus others known, but not recorded), and only 2 in 3rd Brigade.²²⁰ Given that 1st Division led the advance on Fort Donleson, this is probably the result of downing their gear before going into the attack and then not being able to retrieve it; frostbite losses in 2nd and 3rd Divisions were probably minimal.²²¹

Gott’s calculations for the Confederates suffer from the same problems as his Federal numbers (see Appendix, Table III-2). Some early sources for Confederate numbers, including the Nashville *Patriot* and Major Johnson’s lists seem to cover only the number “engaged,” rather than the total present, and seem to be estimates—tidy round numbers being the giveaway. Attempting a count based on returns can only give a general idea of numbers, and both lists seem to be an accounting of “engaged” rather than “total present.” Some of the unit returns use “rank and file” strength, some “effective,” some “engaged,” and others “total present.” Gott uses Major Johnson’s list most of the time, but occasionally ignores it. An explanation of his rationale would have prevented the suspicion that Gott’s preferences are arbitrary. For example, he credits the 56th Virginia with 270 men, larger than any figure given by any of the primary sources, but put the 26th Mississippi Infantry at only 400 men, which is *lower* than that of any primary source. A

mysterious example of Gott's analysis is that of the three Kentucky cavalry companies. Forrest's report states that William's company left when he did, but that Wilcox's company (or its commander) refused to leave. Nonetheless, Gott shows Wilcox's entire company somehow escaping, but only about half of Williams'.

Some anomalies seem to be the result of poor copying. Gott's preference for Major Johnson's list gets him into trouble when he accepted the 4th Mississippi's losses as "40 killed, 38 wounded." Even Surgeon Gill thought the ratio of killed to wounded was odd; it was probably the reason he sent the list to the Medical Department in the first place.²²² A look at the Nashville *Patriot* probably explains what happened; its figures show "8 killed, 38 wounded." The "40" might be some sort of typo. Another example is the 7th Texas Infantry's three official returns showing 20 killed and either 34 or 39 wounded. This is probably the result of someone on Colonel Simonton's staff misreading "39" for "34," but Gott accepts "39." Another is the likely transposing of "443" men for "434" for the 26th Mississippi's strength found on Major Johnson's list. The discrepancy over that regiment's killed and wounded makes sense if the return showing 11 killed and 68 wounded was made before one of the wounded men died, making the total 12 killed and 67 wounded for a later. The three different returns for the 20th Mississippi are harder to reconcile; each may have been based on incomplete or wrong information.

One issue with Major Johnson's list is the interpretation of the category "missing and escaped." Gott interprets almost every case in that category as an escape, ignoring that it includes the word "missing" as well as "escaped." "Missing" can mean several things. A missing man could have been wounded or killed, but unaccounted for. Francis Bateman, of the 78th Ohio Infantry, provides an example. On 22 February, his unit found a

wounded rebel in a brush heap, wearing shirt sleeves. Both of his legs had been shattered by a cannonball, his face was frozen black, and his hands had frozen off, but he was still alive, and asked for water.²²³ Using Gott's reasoning, he would be counted among the escaped. Others may have been taken prisoner during the battle. Colonel Morgan L. Smith, commanding Lew Wallace's old brigade, reported that the 8th Missouri took five prisoners during their attack on the afternoon of 15 February.²²⁴ These men would probably have been listed as missing. Someone who went absent without leave (AWOL) or defected might well have been listed as missing as well, if the command did not suspect what happened. In the case of the Goochland Light Artillery (Guy's battery), Major Johnson listed all 58 men under "missing and escaped," so Gott lists all as "escaped," but Riddell explained that most had been captured.²²⁵ Gott makes similar mistakes with the 27th Alabama and the 50th Virginia, probably because he missed the relevant primary sources.²²⁶

An example of enthusiastic but careless research concerns Gott's inclusion of two companies of the 11th Tennessee Cavalry in the Confederate tally. A check of the *Military Annals of Tennessee (MAT)* showed that those companies did indeed fight at Fort Donelson, each taking casualties, but they did so during a raid on 3 February 1863, not during the 12-16 February 1862 battle.²²⁷ In an example of a historian accepting bad information and passing it on, Knight repeats Gott's error.²²⁸

Although never known to be part of a regiment's "engaged" strength at Fort Donelson, blacks served the Confederates as teamsters, cooks, and servants, holding positions that would have been filled by soldiers in most other mid-nineteenth century (or modern) armies, so they should be counted at some level.²²⁹ Even if we reject this approach,

blacks seem to have been counted when they were transported north or imprisoned. This complicates the analysis of Confederate strength and losses. How many blacks were there? The Confederates often mentioned their presence, particularly during their imprisonment when the Federal government, or northerners in general, tried to subvert their loyalty, but did not specifically number them.²³⁰ Colonel Brown of the 3rd Tennessee had his own servant, as did Randall Southall, the adjutant of the 10th Tennessee. Porter's Tennessee Artillery had three servants for their officer's mess (one captain and four lieutenants at full strength). On the other hand, Buckner's entire staff seems to have had only one efficient slave.²³¹ The various units had over 1,400 officers at full strength, so there would have been hundreds, and possibly as many as one thousand personal servants, never mind the laborers at the landings. How many went north? Did the various prisoner lists include them? If the list was for the purpose of planning the prisoner's transport and feeding, it would have included the blacks.²³²

What if we add up the prisoners, the dead, and the survivors (see Table III-2)? The most common fate of Confederate soldiers at Fort Donleson was northern imprisonment. On 24 February, there were at least 10,000 prisoners at Camps Douglas and Butler, and over 3,000 at Camp Morton, and there were hundreds, maybe thousands, of others in transit, but it is hard to tell where (or if) they were accounted for. To check this, we have Hays' incomplete list at 9,929 prisoners at Dover, Cullum's report of 9,900 to 11,600 prisoners having gone through Cairo by 20 February (allowing for the error inherent in round numbers), and Whittlesey's 10,389, which may or may not have included the 179 prisoners (including Buckner and his staff) that the 25th Indiana is known to have escorted through Indiana, or the unknown number of prisoners escorted by the 52nd

Illinois. Including these men, who probably were not counted in the Camp Morton numbers, brings the total to about 14,179. We can subtract the numbers of prisoners who had not yet been paroled or exchanged from earlier engagements, specifically 132 prisoners taken in and around Fort Henry, and 40 of the 95 missing from the battle of Mill Springs, totaling 13,952. For what it is worth, this even fits in with the Cairo ration list (14,623), if one remembers the caveats involved.

The apparent ratio of officers per black gives us a range of 100-1000 blacks, an average of 550. Confederates with black slaves or servants presumably were captured in roughly the same proportion as those who were not (about 80%). In these cases, the vast majority of Blacks initially went with their captured masters, perhaps over 90% of the total. Based on Halleck's orders, and the precedent from the eastern theatre, blacks seem to have been included in the prisoner counts.²³³ If so, then the prisoner count includes about 400 blacks.

Not every prisoner went north immediately, and some did not go at all. Grant intended to keep about 250 prisoners on site to be exchanged, but there is no evidence of the exact number. About 400 stayed in hospitals, at least for a while; a minimum of 46 were still in Dover a week after the surrender. Some escaped after capture, some died along the way.

As for those who were never captured, 1,134 men were evacuated on the night of 15 February. If the 3rd Tennessee's records are representative, most of these were wounded, with a few sick, but whether they were wounded or sick does not change the count if we are trying to determine the total who were present but avoided capture. A few able-bodied men who accompanied the wounded may or may not have been included in the total. If every unit that had wounded or sick men had sent one or two men to accompany

them, and these are in excess of the 1,134 mentioned by Pillow, this could add up to 60 additional men who were evacuated. Alternately, the 3rd Tennessee sent two men to accompany 45, a ratio of 1 aide for 22.5 sick or wounded men. If this ratio is representative, it would add 50 men to the evacuation, very close to the total if we use two men per regiment.

Based on the returns from Murfreesboro, at least 995 men seem to have left with Floyd (the four Virginia regiments, Floyd's staff, Pillow's servant, Adam Johnson, and (probably) a member of Buckner's staff who left with Floyd, and at least 1 man from the 20th Mississippi and two from the Goochland Artillery. At least 650 men left with Forrest, including Lieutenant Burt and 36 other men of Porter's Tennessee Battery, plus the Goochland artilleryman, which could be interpreted as 650-800. Pillow left with his staff and a few others, totaling at least 14.

Others left on their own or in small groups including Bidwell and Duffy, three from the 27th Alabama, two from the 1st Mississippi, five from the 14th Mississippi, at least four (and maybe as many as 25) from the 20th Mississippi, one from the Goochland Battery, and 21 from the 3rd Tennessee. Most of this is on an anecdotal basis and is incomplete, but it does indicate that a sizable number of men who were not evacuated in any of the major groups nevertheless avoided capture, perhaps as high as 5% in the case of the 20th Mississippi.

If we consider that over 1,000 Confederates were evacuated for wounds and that some of the wounded were left behind, Pillow's estimate that 466 were killed seems high, but not beyond reason. Taking the various primary sources and adding the minimum number of killed for each unit from those sources totals 206 killed. If we add the maximum

number of deaths, except for the 4th Mississippi's likely misprint, and Gott's bogus inclusion of the 11th Tennessee, the total is 286. The total could go as high as 466 if those who died of their wounds before the surrender are acknowledged. Additionally, this could be incomplete, since some of the "missing" were probably dead.

Table III-3 Fate of Confederates at Fort Donelson

Fate	Minimum	Maximum	Likely
POWs in northern camps ²³⁴	13,000	15,485	14,179
POWs who were exchanged on site ²³⁵	200	260	225
POWs in southern hospitals	46	450	100
POWs who escaped before reaching northern camps ²³⁶	3	100	60
POWs who died before reaching northern camps ²³⁷	1	200	20
POWs captured at other engagements in theatre in northern camps	-227	-172	-212
Black POWs in northern camps ²³⁸	-1000	-0	-400
Subtotal: CS POWs captured at Ft. Donelson	12,023	16,323	13,992
Evacuated with WIA ²³⁹	1,134	1,194 (including 60 caretakers)	1,189 (including 55 caretakers)
Evacuated with Floyd. ²⁴⁰	995	1,300	1,000
Evacuated with Forrest ²⁴¹	650	800	725
Evacuated with Pillow ²⁴²	14	20	14
Avoided capture by other, or by unknown, means ²⁴³	52	950	600
Subtotal: CS troops who avoided death or capture	2,845	4,264	3,528
Subtotal: CS troops KIA	206	466	286
Total	15,074	21,053	17,786

All together, the secondary estimates range from a little over 15,000 to a high of 21,123 with about 17,786 being the best estimate (see Table III-3). The wide discrepancies in

Confederate figures, and the smaller ones that are likely in the Federal figures makes it difficult to analyze the battle, since military analysts have found that even a one percent difference in combat power makes a noticeable difference in casualty rates and advance rates.²⁴⁴ However, Badeau's assumption that the Confederates must have had at least 21,123 men is too high, while Buckner's claims that the rebels never had more than 13,000 men are ludicrous if that refers to "present" strength, but are more reasonable if it represents "effective" strength.

CONCLUSION: 27,000 U.S. VS. 17,786 C.S. TROOPS

Ever since Buckner surrendered to Grant, Grant adherents have tried to puff up the Federal success by maximizing the Confederates' numbers while others, especially Lost Cause devotees, have minimized them. The "total present" for Federal strength at Fort Donelson during the battle was 27,000. The equivalent Confederate strength would have been at least 15,000 and possibly as high as 21,000, with about 17,700 likely. The next chapters will analyze the commanders' decision-making in light of the numbers and losses. The Confederates successfully took the tactical offensive on the morning of 15 February despite their numerical inferiority. This suggests that the Confederates outperformed the Federals. This might have been Grant's fault. Later in the day, the numbers also show that Buckner's division might have proven a weak reed if it had tried to "hold the door open" for an evacuation on the same day. On the other hand, the Confederates would have had a good chance of holding out until dark on 16 February if they had tried to. Finally, the number of prisoners lost at Shiloh had a measurable impact on the battle of Shiloh.

CHAPTER IV

Decisions: Afternoon, 15 February

Pillow's decision to return to the trenches after the successful sortie on 15 February 1862 is widely considered to be the worst decision of his career.²⁴⁵ According to conventional wisdom, the Confederates attacked the Federal right flank in order to escape the tightening encirclement, but having cleared an escape route, Pillow did not give his troops the order to march out, but instead sent them right back to their own lines. Grant's men merely reoccupied the roads, and Pillow had thrown away the last chance to save the Confederate force. Some historians simply see Pillow's decision as an example of his arrogance, incompetence, or both; few argue that it was the right decision. What circumstances did Pillow actually face? Did Pillow actually change the plan? Was there a plan? When should the evacuation have begun? Should Pillow have kept his forces outside the lines? If so, which units? Might he have been *right* to return to the trenches?

BACKGROUND FOR THE DECISIONS

The Confederate commanders' rapport was problematic. Pillow and Buckner did not get along. They had had disagreements before the war, and the West Point-trained Buckner apparently resented taking orders from a man he thought of as a vain buffoon. Additionally, both seemed to take turns dominating their ostensible commander, Floyd, who seemed unable to control the "troublesome, insubordinate" Pillow.²⁴⁶

The spur for the dawn attack was the Confederates' exaggerated intelligence assessments of Federal strength.²⁴⁷ Bushrod Johnson's division, Forrest's cavalry, and other units took part in Pillow's main effort against the Yankee right. As they exited the far left of their own lines, they swept the Yankees clockwise across the Confederate front,

at which point Buckner's division (starting on the center-left of the Confederate line) joined the attack. This left only two thinly spread brigades (Heiman and Head's) to defend the center, the right, and Fort Donelson itself.²⁴⁸ By 1:00 P.M., the Confederates had defeated several Federal brigades and had overrun the Charlotte and Forge roads, and Buckner's division held an extra buffer zone to protect the exit to Wynn's Ferry Road (but not the entire road itself). Historians debate what the Confederates planned to do next, and what they should have done. Pillow ordered the troops back to their original lines, and Buckner objected. Floyd, who did not find out about the withdrawal until it was under way, was reportedly angry enough to rebuke Pillow, but finally endorsed his decision under the impression that C. F. Smith's 2nd Division was preparing to assault the thinly held Confederate right.²⁴⁹ The Federals broke through the still lightly held defenses before Buckner's troops returned to their original positions.²⁵⁰

ANALYSIS OF THE IMMEDIATE EVACUATION PLAN THESIS

Buckner claimed that the sortie's objective was to clear the Charlotte Road for an immediate evacuation. Buckner's division would hold off any Federal counterattacks while Pillow's forces marched out. When Pillow's men had passed, Buckner would disengage and follow Pillow.²⁵¹ To facilitate this operation, Buckner's men planned to carry all the gear they would need for an immediate escape.²⁵² Whether Pillow made a mistake by "throwing away" the evacuation plan partly depends on whether this plan actually existed because a fighting withdrawal is difficult, even with proper planning. Force, Stickles, Foote, Catton, and James M. McPherson all seem to accept the "planned immediate withdrawal" thesis. In his 1965 doctoral dissertation, Stonesifer offers an interesting variant of this theory, arguing that Pillow knew what Floyd wanted, but that

he deliberately left the briefing vague in order to subvert his commander's intent. This makes Pillow immediately responsible, but Floyd ultimately responsible, since it is a commander's responsibility to make sure that a briefing is clear.²⁵³

In his 11 August 1862 report, Buckner claimed that the council of war (including the regimental commanders) had unanimously decided to attack the Federal right with the objective of opening a way in order to retreat to Nashville. Pillow's force would provide the main attack, with Buckner's division in support. If the way was clear, the force would withdraw, with Buckner's division providing the rear guard. In his interview to the *Nashville Banner* in 1909, Buckner claimed that he suggested the attack and evacuation plan at the council of war on the evening of 14 February. Floyd, who he claimed thought it was a "novel idea," immediately accepted it. That would be strange, since Floyd was already angry with Pillow for having cancelled a similar attack that afternoon. The "novel" part might refer to the evacuation (immediate or otherwise), but Cooling refers to the article's "possibly contrived dialogue."²⁵⁴ He is probably being generous. Floyd's reports largely follow Buckner, but he explicitly noted that he wanted 2nd Division to hold the way open to prevent the Yankees from reoccupying the area *during the night* [*italics mine*]. This probably indicates that Floyd wanted to evacuate Dover, but in the morning, not immediately.²⁵⁵

Pillow's initial report, dated 18 February 1862, stated that his force would push the Federals back to Wynn's Ferry Road with Buckner's division supporting him on his right. A small force would hold the remainder of the line. The objective was to "cut open a route of exit. . . we had fought a battle to open a way for our army and to relieve us from an investment." This is essentially Floyd or Buckner's plan, but it does not address

timing. His follow up report largely repeated his February report, but now, the objective was strictly to “cut up the investing force.” Letters dated 12 and 18 September claim that evacuation was neither contemplated nor discussed. He also claimed that he saw Buckner’s division and was “satisfied that they had not the rations and other necessary preparations for the march,” but does not explain how he could tell that they were not ready. He notes the practical difficulties of taking “the necessary rations, blankets, knapsacks, &c., for the march.” Pillow’s 10 October letter to Secretary of War George Randolph protested his being found guilty of “grave errors of judgment,” and claimed that the sortie’s only objective was to defeat the Federals, and that there was no “suggestion or proposition” made at the time to evacuate; the weather and the tactical situation would have prevented it anyway. He also references a conversation with Major Jeremy Gilmer, the chief engineer on site, who supported Pillow’s claim that no plans had been made for an evacuation. This is a reasonable argument, but it clearly contradicted his 18 February report.²⁵⁶

Bushrod Johnson’s 4 March 1862 report confirmed the basic attack plan. The *plans* (i.e., perhaps more than one objective) allowed for “every contingency” and were “skillfully and minutely adjusted,” including designated rally points behind the Federal lines in case something went wrong. The objective was to “roll the enemy’s right wing back on his left, and at least for our forces to retreat and save our army.”²⁵⁷ This sounds as if an evacuation would have been a mere consolation prize. If the Federal right had been thrown back far enough, would an escape have been necessary?

Heiman’s report confirmed the basic attack plan, but explicitly stated that they would “act according to circumstances, either to continue the fight or to cut through their lines

and retreat toward Nashville.” Holding the entire right in place of Buckner’s entire 2nd Division, he claimed that he warned Floyd that his forces were probably too weak to hold their lines in case the Federals attacked.²⁵⁸

Head reported that elements of his brigade took the place of Buckner’s division on the right, and that they were spread too thin. He does not explain why the 30th Tennessee Infantry was taking the place of Buckner’s men in the first place.²⁵⁹ The 30th Tennessee’s account in the *MAT*, which none of the historians thought to use, did: “We expected the army to go out, leaving us to hold the fort and surrender.”²⁶⁰ This implies that the 30th Tennessee knew about a plan for immediate evacuation at the time, one that was likely to leave them behind.

In his diary, Colonel McGavock noted that he was less than impressed when he found out about the plan “because I saw plainly that Col[onle] Heiman’s Brigade—together with the Reg[iment] in the F[ort] were to be sacrificed and I believe that every military man will condemn it in the future” (the 10th Tennessee was part of Heiman’s brigade).²⁶¹ He wrote that he learned of this at the 11:30 P.M. briefing on 14 February. The comment is from his 14 February 1862 entry, but he had to re-write much of his diary during his imprisonment at Fort Warren, Massachusetts, (this part of his diary was lost at Fort Henry).²⁶² Did he really find out about the evacuation plan at the briefing or did he hear about one after the fact, and only “remember” it later?

Gilmer’s initial report claimed that the attack’s goal was open-ended. It could open an escape route, but if very successful, it could result in “disaster to the invaders.” In his response to the Pillow investigation (2 December 1862), he claimed that neither the council nor Pillow’s briefing covered anything about whether to take knapsacks,

blankets, or overcoats, the timing of the withdrawal, or the order of movement once a way was opened, and even seemed to leave open the possibility of delivering “a disaster upon the besiegers.”²⁶³ In an attempt to undermine testimony that exculpates Pillow, Stickles argues that Gilmer’s testimony contradicts Pillow’s regarding a lack of planning, but the planning that Gilmer describes refers to the attack, not to an evacuation.²⁶⁴

Forrest’s initial report, dated February 1862, claimed that the attack had opened three roads (Charlotte, Forge, and Wynn’s Ferry) that could have been used to evacuate Dover “as was deemed best in the council the night before.” That seems to indicate that an evacuation was considered and probably preferred, but not necessarily how, or at what point, it might occur, and it might not have been the only option considered. Forrest’s response to the Pillow investigation stated that he thought that the “ultimate intention” was to evacuate Dover, but they did not intend to “retreat from the field,” and that none of the practical logistics had been worked out, particularly when considering the terrain, road, and weather conditions.²⁶⁵ Stickles argued that Forrest’s accounts are “at some variance with nearly all others,” and in part attributes it to his loyalty to Pillow, a fellow Tennessean.²⁶⁶ Perhaps, but it is also possible that his “variance” in perspective was what inspired him to escape Dover on 16 February instead of surrendering. Besides, Forrest’s accounts agree with Bushrod Johnson, Heiman, and Gilmer. Stickles also pokes fun at Forrest’s (and Pillow’s) differentiation between “retiring” and “retreating” as face-saving hair splitting, but from the context, the difference is that between simply evacuating as opposed to conducting a fighting retreat.²⁶⁷ It does not take a military expert to realize that the former is much easier to execute than the latter.

Adam R. Johnson was one of Forrest's scouts and couriers during the battle. In his memoirs, Adam R. Johnson remembered running a message to Forrest, whom he found talking to Floyd, Buckner, and Pillow. In reply to Buckner's statement that "if we intend to move according to the program we ought to do so at once," Pillow replied, "I am not in favor of retreating. . . we can drive them into the Tennessee River."²⁶⁸ Buckner's comment implies that he thought there was a plan to follow, while Pillow's reply ignores the issue.

The regimental reports of the 3rd Tennessee Infantry, 18th Tennessee, the 14th Mississippi, and the report for Brown's brigade all support Stickles' claim that some units brought all their gear, implying an immediate break-out, as does Stonesifer's source, Cook (32nd Tennessee). Additionally, Cook alluded to Floyd, Pillow, and Buckner's order to the regimental commanders to be ready to evacuate. Baldwin added that he thought that the sortie's objective was to "extricate the army by a bold and vigorous attack." Stickles cited Palmer, but not page 353 of the *ORA*, where he wrote that the commanders had decided to evacuate Fort Donelson and go to Nashville, which does confirm the immediate evacuation thesis.²⁶⁹ All of these regiments were part of Buckner's division. In his *Memoirs*, Grant corroborated this, writing that some of his soldiers told him that the rebels carried all their gear during the fight and attributed this intelligence to his decision to counterattack. However, even Stickles admitted that not all of the units had worked these issues out.²⁷⁰ More importantly, Stickles, unlike Stonesifer, never cites Cook, whose report notes that the 32nd Tennessee had marched to their new positions with all their gear, but had left their knapsacks in their new positions before attacking.²⁷¹ We do not know if any other units in Buckner's division did this, but it raises the possibility that

others downed their gear in the usual fashion before carrying out an assault. At the very least, we know that the 32nd Tennessee would have had to return to the trenches for their gear before leaving, regardless of what Buckner may have planned.

ANALYSIS OF THE EVENTUAL EVACUATION PLAN THESIS

Cummings, Hamilton, and Cooling concur that the sortie's objective was to effect an evacuation, but argue that there was no accepted plan for the timing or execution. They argue that Floyd and Buckner may have wanted to evacuate immediately, but conclude that there was no final decision, so Pillow may have thought that he was carrying out the plan (as he understood it), just as much as Buckner thought that Pillow's decision was a change in "the program." Cooling also finds it plausible that Pillow may well have known what Floyd and Buckner wanted to do, but that he exploited the morning's victory as an excuse to continue defending Dover in order to gain a decisive operational victory over Grant. Stonesifer, in collaboration with Hughes (and perhaps older and wiser than he was for his doctoral dissertation) blames Pillow's incomplete and ambiguous briefing for the confusion. The ambiguity might have been unintentional, but they argue that as the briefing officer, it was Pillow's duty to make it clear. Cooling blames Floyd, since it was his duty as commander to make sure that the plan was clearly understood and obeyed. Geer, Fuller, and Hurst also seem to accept the Eventual Evacuation thesis.²⁷²

In his 8 November follow up to Randolph's inquiries, Pillow acknowledged that the defenders probably "would ultimately have been forced to retire from the position [Dover]," but claimed that in the meantime, the sortie was meant to "cut up the enemy." He claimed that they had "settled the plans for battle, nothing else." This sounds reasonable (and is in line with Cooling's thesis), but leaves open the question of why

Pillow did not definitively state that as the mission in his original 18 February report.²⁷³ Did he change his argument after February in light of the investigation, or was he returning to his original (and sincere) objection at the time to giving up Fort Donelson?

Unlike previous advocates of the Eventual Evacuation Thesis, Cummings and Cooling use Bushrod Johnson's 8 November 1862 response to the Pillow investigation which repeated the attack plan found in his (and everyone else's) earlier reports. Cooling observes that the March report's statement that "all the plans were skillfully and minutely adjusted" does not mean that the evacuation was to be executed immediately. The November report, however, clearly indicates what the March report only hinted at: The sortie was meant to end the siege by throwing back the Federals, and evacuation was only a lesser consideration. However, Johnson also seems to jettison the "skillfully and minutely executed" claim, at least as far as an evacuation goes, claiming that there were no arrangements for an evacuation, particularly food, ammunition, and how the men would be expected to carry this during a battle.²⁷⁴ Is this merely a change in emphasis or is it colored by Johnson's knowledge that what he wrote would partly determine Pillow's fate?

Robert M. Hughes' article in *Confederate Veteran* introduces a letter from Floyd's assistant adjutant general, Peter Otey, to his father, Robert W. Hughes. Otey described Floyd as being furious with Pillow when he found out what Pillow had done. Otey assessed Floyd's plan as allowing for an eventual evacuation, not necessarily an immediate one, although Otey himself seemed to prefer the latter.²⁷⁵

Unfortunately, all the primary sources in this case are tainted. Pillow was obviously trying to defend himself, Bushrod Johnson may have been trying to shield Pillow, and

Otey was defending Floyd's reputation. Each thesis is plausible, but it is hard to take any of these sources as definitive.

OPEN-ENDED OBJECTIVE THESIS

Gott believes that the sortie was an open-ended mission, with no definite plan. He finds equivocation in Floyd's report and even in Buckner's 11 August report because an evacuation was not a given for Floyd, and he doubts that even Buckner was certain of what he wanted to do at the time. If he had, he argues that Buckner, the trained professional, would have objected to the vague briefing and demanded specific details. Even if Buckner was desperate to escape Dover, he did not convince anyone to make it a clearly stated objective.²⁷⁶

Gott notes that Floyd's anger with Pillow does not seem to have been based on his failure to conduct an immediate evacuation, but for giving up the road upon which one could be conducted later. This is in accord with Otey's recollection of Floyd's intent.²⁷⁷ That could support the open-ended mission thesis, but in his report, Floyd explicitly states that he intended to evacuate Dover, and wanted Buckner to hold the ground to prevent the Yankees from reoccupying it overnight in preparation for an evacuation in the morning. Otey supports that.²⁷⁸ It would probably be more accurate to say that Floyd chastised Pillow for giving up the road that Floyd intended to use in the morning.

Gott interprets Cook's statement that they would march to Nashville "if we succeeded" as equivocal, but that is stretching the meaning of equivocation.²⁷⁹ Of course, all missions are dependent on intermediate tasks. Using that standard, all missions are open-ended. This makes for an interesting philosophical point, but not a practical

argument. Bushrod Johnson and Gilmer's reports support Gott's thesis better (and unlike Pillow, more consistently).²⁸⁰

OVERALL ANALYSIS OF THE PLANNING

Geer denigrates Pillow on principle as an "officer of but little merit." Cummings castigates his personality as "arrogant, egocentric, insubordinate, perverse," "dominantly assertive," and questions his "vari-colored" Mexican War experience. Fuller thinks Pillow "lost his head" at the moment of success. Stickles portrays him as domineering. Cooling merely takes issue with the way that Pillow "presumptuously" made his decisions. Stonesifer (in his 1965 PhD) finds Pillow to have been "troublesome" and "insubordinate" due to his selfish ambition. Even though Stonesifer's later collaboration with Hughes presented a more sympathetic portrayal of Pillow, the reviewers who supposedly read the book apparently missed it.²⁸¹ Buckner's old friends, Grant and Lew Wallace, portrayed Pillow as a buffoon.²⁸² Those who were captured at Fort Donelson resented Pillow's conduct after the surrender, and the senior officers, imprisoned at Fort Warren, were susceptible to Buckner's "spin."²⁸³ But it is interesting that many of Forrest's men thought Pillow's performance during the battle outshined Floyd or Buckner's, and Forrest himself seems to have continued to think well of Pillow; even after the transfer of command, it was to Pillow that Forrest looked for orders, not Floyd or Buckner.²⁸⁴

Floyd, unlike Buckner, wanted to wait until morning, but he still wanted to maintain a strong force at the Wynn's Ferry Road in order to secure the Charlotte and Forge Roads overnight. It was not Pillow's "failure" to order an immediate evacuation which infuriated Floyd, but the withdrawal of Buckner's division. But even here, Pillow

did not leave the way entirely unprotected, since (at Bushrod Johnson's suggestion) he left Drake's brigade, the 20th Mississippi Infantry, and Forrest's cavalry to both hold the line, look for wounded, and scavenge for equipment. When the attack came, they proved to be inadequate to the task, conducting a delaying action as they fell back to the trenches. How much better would Buckner's division have done?

Bushrod Johnson, Forrest, and most of the Confederates who were not part of Buckner's division argued that they were not ready for an immediate evacuation. Forrest asserted that many men had wandered back to their camps or into town (probably with the wounded, in many cases). Heiman and Head's brigades claimed to have known about a pre-planned evacuation, but they assumed that they would be left behind. Buckner's division was the one unit which was supposed to be able to pick up and go without having to return to the trenches, but Cook and Palmer both state that their regiments returned to the trenches *before* they got Pillow's order because they were running low on ammunition, and in the case of the 32nd Tennessee, Cook wrote that they had left their knapsacks in their new positions before taking part in the assault. They (at least) would have had to go back anyway. The 32nd Tennessee was probably not the only unit in Buckner's division to down their gear.

Just because Buckner wanted to conduct an immediate withdrawal did not make that "the program." Many of the participants who were at the council of war seem to have been familiar with the idea of an immediate withdrawal, even if one subtracts the cases of retroactive memory. On the other hand, many other officers claimed that an immediate withdrawal was not planned on, including Floyd, whose preference was a morning evacuation.²⁸⁵ But others (like Bushrod Johnson and Gilmer) argued in their initial

reports that they thought that the mission was open-ended.²⁸⁶ Buckner's division seems to have been the only one to have planned for an immediate evacuation, but there were too many others who were aware of Buckner's plans for Pillow to reasonably argue that there had not even been a "suggestion or proposition" of such a thing unless he really was as deluded as his detractors make him out to be. In this light, Stonesifer's 1965 argument makes more sense than his later argument: If Pillow knew that Floyd intended to evacuate in the morning, but Floyd did not make that intent clear, then the confusion is ultimately Floyd's fault, since Floyd was the overall commander, and it was Floyd's intent that mattered, not Pillow or Buckner's.²⁸⁷

ANALYSIS OF PILLOW'S DECISION

According to this thesis, Pillow sent the troops back to the trenches over Buckner's savvy professional objections and Floyd's doubts, thereby throwing away the Confederate's last opportunity to escape. This was from overconfidence, incompetence, or both. Geer calls Pillow's decision a "fatal blunder." Fuller simply states that Pillow had "lost his head" because they did not have a plan for the evacuation. Stickles argues that Pillow was overconfident, hoping to drive the Federals back to Fort Henry, and muses that Pillow must have thought that a retreat would be easier in the dark; he theorizes that Pillow's apparent growing panic during the midnight conference was a result of realizing how badly he had blundered. Stickles even argues that Buckner should have rebelled against Pillow's order and immediately marched his troops out, because Grant's troops were so demoralized that they could not have followed for a considerable time.²⁸⁸ Stonesifer grants that Pillow thought he had good reasons to delay the evacuation, but nonetheless attributes his decision to his "twisted, egotistical mind,"

which convinced him he had won a “brilliant victory.” Shelby Foote, Catton, and Cummings largely agree that Pillow made a terrible mistake.²⁸⁹

Floyd’s reports stated that he intended to keep the route open with Buckner’s division, but that Pillow had ordered everyone back. Floyd ultimately endorsed it because “the enemy was pressing on the trenches [on the right].” The Yankees breached Buckner’s right before they returned.²⁹⁰

In all of his reports, Pillow consistently claimed that he called off the attack and sent the troops back to their original positions in part because he thought that Yankees had received “large forces of fresh troops.” Later, in his responses to investigators, Pillow noted the practical problems of an evacuation (e.g., exhaustion, disorganization, lack of ammunition, road conditions). He argued that the enemy would have been on them before they could evacuate, and noted that Buckner’s men did not make it back to their defenses in time to stop the Federals from overrunning the trenches. Over a year after the fact, Pillow’s 1 October 1863 letter to President Jefferson Davis reiterated (with the supporting testimony of Bushrod Johnson, Forrest, and Gilmer) the difficulties of conducting an evacuation and claimed that the Federals never actually reoccupied the Charlotte Road.²⁹¹

Buckner reported that his division (six infantry regiments and four artillery batteries) was ready to secure the evacuation when Pillow ordered him back to the trenches. At this time, Buckner also thought that Floyd was “surprised” at the order, but endorsed it because of a Yankee threat on the right. He then notes that even though his men were “already much exhausted,” that they had secured some captured cannon. After a two-mile march, they arrived just in time to watch C.F. Smith’s troops overrun their old position.²⁹²

Bushrod Johnson wrote that he was ordered to return all his troops to the trenches, but that after “hazarding the suggestion,” Pillow allowed him to use Drake’s brigade to perform the mission. After finding out that Buckner was asking for reinforcements to the right, he sent Forrest’s cavalry (instead of infantry) to reinforce Drake.²⁹³

Gilmer noted the difficulty of a possible evacuation, calling the choice to march or return to the lines “a choice of evils.” He also reported C. F. Smith’s capture of the lines on the right before Buckner’s division returned.²⁹⁴ Stickles merely uses Adam R. Johnson’s memoirs to confirm that Buckner wanted to escape, while Pillow wanted to keep fighting.²⁹⁵

Stickles is right that Floyd and Buckner wanted to evacuate Dover at some point, and that Pillow was less eager to do so, but that is not controversial. Was Pillow’s decision a mistake? Stickles assumes that most of the force merely had to go back to pick up some gear and march out. He does not give an estimate for how long that would have taken, or what would happen to Head’s brigade, holding the right and the river defenses. He also does not question whether there was a connection between Buckner’s delay in following Pillow’s order and his failure to stop C. F. Smith’s breakthrough. He also ignores the fact that Pillow endorsed Bushrod Johnson’s decision to leave Drake’s brigade and Forrest’s cavalry to take Buckner’s place in holding the Forge Road.

ANALYSIS OF THE SKEPTICS

Not every historian believes that Pillow’s order was necessarily a result of either his stupidity or his vanity. The skeptics’ arguments emphasize practical issues of timing and priorities. James M. McPherson, Hamilton, Cooling, Hughes and Stonesifer, Gott, and Hurst all note that organizing a march would have taken a lot of time; even Cummings

and Stonesifer (in his dissertation) admit this. How much time did the Confederates have before the Federal counterattack? If Buckner's division was to be a rear guard, how long would it have been able to hold out? How quickly could the Confederates have formed up on the Charlotte (or Forge) Road and marched out? What about the supply stockpiles in Dover? What about the (mostly Yankee) equipment abandoned on the field? Should that all be left to the enemy? Cooling, Gott, and even Cummings note the problem of transporting the wounded. Force, Cooling, and Hughes and Stonesifer (and even Hurst) note the threat to Heiman and Head's brigades (including the men of the water batteries) left holding the rest of the positions during the sortie. Should they have been abandoned? Hughes and Stonesifer argue that the Yankees had received a "drubbing." Stickles agrees with this. So why not take the time to do everything right in the morning, while waiting (as Gott and James M. McPherson noted) in the safety of the rifle pits? Hamilton argues that the mistake was not that some units fell back, but that *Buckner's* division did so. But Hamilton notes that even some of Buckner's regiments left their knapsacks in the trenches before taking part in the attack.²⁹⁶

Otey thought Pillow made two separate mistakes: The failure to evacuate immediately, and the failure to continue defending the route for future use, with the latter being decisive.²⁹⁷ Hughes and Stonesifer suspect that some of the dialogue in this account may have been contrived, but the analysis seems genuine and reasonable.

The 30th Tennessee's account in the *MAT* noted that "we expected the army to go out, leaving us to hold the fort and surrender."²⁹⁸ Whether or not they actually knew about such a plan at the time, it is not surprising that they would not have appreciated it. Head's after action report notes that 450 men covered the trenches formerly covered by most of

Buckner's division, that Buckner's men "commenced arriving" at 2:00 P.M., but that when the Federals attacked at 4:00 P.M, the 2nd Kentucky still had not arrived. Head noted that "the men of General Buckner's command were greatly exhausted" as a result of the fighting on the left.²⁹⁹

McGavock's condemnation of what he saw as the planned abandonment of Heiman and Head's brigades is interesting. The scheme condemned was Buckner's, and McGavock grew to respect Buckner and to despise Pillow based on their respective actions after the surrender, but he apparently agreed with Pillow here.³⁰⁰ Perhaps he saw it as a mistake by the otherwise honorable Buckner, or maybe he thought the plan was Pillow's, and Buckner never disabused him of the notion.

Cook noted that both his regiment (32nd Tennessee) and Palmer's (the 18th Tennessee) had already returned to their new entrenchments before one of Buckner's staff officers ordered them to return to their old position on the right; in Cook's case, his men had to go back to the new positions in order to retrieve their knapsacks.³⁰¹ Palmer had sent for more ammunition (the 18th Tennessee was running low), and was in the process of finding his dead and wounded when he received an order "said at the time to come from General Pillow" to take his regiment back to his old trenches. He did not have time to get all of his dead and wounded off the field. Just a few minutes after they returned to their old positions, the Federals overran the yet-to-return 2nd Kentucky's trenches.³⁰²

Brown and Doss' reports stated that they were ordered back to their original positions on the right (probably by Pillow, seconded by Floyd). Brown noted that the 2nd Kentucky's positions were over-run after his brigade "had scarcely [re-]deployed in the

rifle pits.³⁰³ Doss' report stated that by the time they got back, the 2nd Kentucky's old position had already been overrun.³⁰⁴

OVERALL ANALYSIS OF PILLOW'S DECISION

Regardless of whether or not Pillow was carrying out his commander's desires, he was the man on the spot.³⁰⁵ Did Pillow's decision make any sense? Stickles claims that the decision was so stupid that Buckner should have just ignored Pillow and marched because Grant's force was so "demoralized" that "all authorities agree it could not have followed for a considerable time."³⁰⁶ This would be an example of Fischer's Fallacy of Prevalent Proof, even if any of these "authorities" were cited (and they are not).³⁰⁷ Hughes and Stonesifer note that if the Federals were that demoralized, then one could reasonably argue that the Confederates had plenty of time to rest, reorganize, and resupply before evacuating Fort Donelson instead of abandoning most of their wounded, a large part of the garrison, and a supply stockpile (which an immediate evacuation would have required, as even Stickles' work implies).³⁰⁸ The speed of Lew Wallace and C.F. Smith's successful counterattacks undermine Stickles' argument anyway, unless Stickles' definition of a "considerable" amount of time is "brief."

According to Gott, everything depends on how much time the Confederates actually had to evacuate.³⁰⁹ Unfortunately for the analyst, the sources give widely different times for the same event.³¹⁰ Although all the historians agree that Pillow made his decision between 1:00 P.M. to 1:30 P.M., there is a wide variation in how much time each historian thinks the Confederates had between that time and the moment the hammer fell. Stickles allows 3 hours, Stonesifer allows 1 hour and 45 minutes on the right and only 45 minutes at Wynn's Ferry Road, Cooling allows only 45 minutes on the right. In part, the

time discrepancies might be due to some officers not keeping precise time, and in part because they were not using the same time standard (time zones were in the future). While absolute time is hard to nail down, relative time might not be. Cooling states that Buckner's division was just returning as C.F. Smith's division struck the rebel right.³¹¹ What do the primary sources say?³¹²

Buckner reported that his division moved only two miles from the time he received Pillow's order and the time that C. F. Smith's 2nd Division overran his rifle pits.³¹³ It is unlikely that any Confederate unit would have gotten two miles down the Charlotte or Forge Roads in that amount of time; even the 32nd Tennessee of Buckner's division would have had to return to the trenches to get their gear. Additionally, no one described the roads outside the defenses as being in better condition than those inside. Grant testified to the difficulty of the roads around Fort Donelson, attributing his long absence from the field on the morning of 15 February to this. This was partly due to the weather and partly due to their constant use during the battle. The rains had been heavy in the weeks preceding the battle, and the cold snap had frozen them in such a way as to leave them "cut up so as to be hardly passable."³¹⁴ Of course, neither the Charlotte nor the Forge Road had been used as much as the paths between Grant's headquarters and the boat landing downstream, so they might not have been as bad, but the roads within the defenses, and those that the Federals used around the perimeter, would have been in bad shape.

In both his report and in his 1909 interview, Buckner mentioned his argument with Pillow and Floyd. He described the "hesitation" as brief, "perhaps ten minutes."³¹⁵ Without noticing a possible correlation, he then noted that his troops arrived back to their

old lines just a few minutes too late to stop C.F. Smith's attack. What did those who were there say about the timing?

While holding Buckner's old positions, the 30th Tennessee heard the firing stop on "the left" (probably Wynn's Ferry Road) at 2:30 P.M., watched 2nd Division prepare an assault at 2:30 P.M., and saw the assault begin at 3:30 P.M. Immediately after that, they saw Buckner's 2nd Kentucky double-timing to return to their old positions, but arriving just too late.³¹⁶ In the 18th Tennessee's account, they had just stacked arms and eaten a little snack when they saw 2nd Division attack the 2nd Kentucky's old position to their right.³¹⁷ The regiment to their left, the 3rd Tennessee, noted that they had only been back to their trench a few minutes when the assault began. The 2nd Kentucky was still arriving during the assault and was thrown back into the 18th Tennessee.³¹⁸ Strangely, none of the historians exploit the report of Colonel Hanson, commander of the 2nd Kentucky. He reported, "When I returned to my position and before the companies had reached the trenches, the enemy attacked in large force and took them."³¹⁹ That is how close the 2nd Kentucky was to being in position to repel C. F. Smith's attack.

Buckner wasted "perhaps ten minutes" arguing. If he had simply followed Pillow's orders, the 2nd Kentucky could have arrived just in time to face the attack. The 2nd Kentucky repelled a 2nd Division assault handily when they defended the exact same trenches on 13 February, and Buckner contained C. F. Smith's attack on 15 February *after* his men arrived. This indicates that the timely arrival of the 2nd Kentucky probably would have turned C.F. Smith's assault into yet another bloody fiasco for Grant.³²⁰

The strategic and operational-level argument between Pillow, Floyd, and Buckner was whether or not Dover was a good place to fight the Federals, and if it was, how long to

stay there.³²¹ Cooling and Gott argue that Pillow probably wanted to defend Dover regardless of circumstances, while Floyd and Buckner never wanted to put a large number of troops there, preferring to concentrate their forces upriver at Cumberland City, which had the virtue of a rail line.³²² Floyd and Buckner only saw Dover and Cumberland City as places from which to delay the Yankees on their way to Nashville, to which General Albert Sidney Johnston's force was retreating from Bowling Green, Kentucky.³²³ They wanted Pillow, commanding a small force, to pin down Grant at Fort Donelson while they threatened Grant's rear. They properly noted the imperfect nature of the Dover defenses, but they did not explain how Pillow was supposed to hold these imperfect defenses with only three brigades, nor did they explain how they would defend Cumberland City (or anywhere else) without any prepared defenses, or how they would stop Foote's ironclads at Cumberland City without heavy cannon. They did not even argue that the terrain at Cumberland City was better. Its sole virtue was that it was a better place to run away from.³²⁴

Gott concludes that the fighting up until the afternoon of 15 February shows that Pillow was right. Properly manned, Dover turned out to be a good place to tie down Grant in a siege. Dover was resistant to both land and river attack, with every attempt (except C. F. Smith's) repelled. Johnston would have had the opportunity to mass his forces against Grant as he later would at Pittsburg Landing, but with better odds and less urgency. Whether or not he would have exploited the opportunity is a different question.³²⁵ Even without an effort by Johnston, Hurst argues that if C.F. Smith's assault had not been successful, Halleck might have relieved Grant as a result of the humiliation he had suffered up to that time at the hands of the despised Pillow.³²⁶ Pillow was probably

right to want to stay, but ultimately, it depended on what the Confederates did with the opportunity. During the night, the Confederates used their additional time to recover most of their wounded (a total of 1,134 men, including some sick) and transport them to safety upriver, along with over 200 prisoners.³²⁷ Their next major step was flight and surrender, but that was not the preordained result of Pillow's decision, but based on choices that Floyd, Pillow, Buckner (and Grant) made after Pillow gave his order.

The entire evacuation debate is only relevant because the Confederates were able to take the Charlotte and Forge Roads in the first place. If we subtract as many as 1,000 battle casualties and cold weather cases, and deduct the strength of the 20th Ohio (which had yet to arrive), then Grant had at least 25,000 men on the morning of 15 February. Even if we accept the highest reasonable estimates of Confederate strength (19,000), the Confederates were outnumbered by a factor greater than 1:1.25, yet they managed to push the Yankees back about two miles while inflicting serious losses on them. Under these circumstances, it does not require any deep analysis or expertise to see that the Federals performed poorly. The Confederate's morning success was not due to overall superior numbers, but due to the local superiority they enjoyed during the firefights. How was that possible? There was the initial operational (not tactical) surprise that the Confederates gained against 1st Brigade, 2nd Division (McArthur's, temporarily attached to 1st Division). After that, the Federal units were simply defeated in detail because Grant had given his division commanders orders not to move without his permission.³²⁸ If Grant's arrival in the afternoon saved the day, it was only because the day needed saving because of his hand-tying orders.³²⁹

How long could Buckner's division have held off a counterattack on Wynn's Ferry Road? Head states that when Buckner's men returned to their old lines, they were "greatly exhausted from the severe conflict they had been engaged with the enemy in the forenoon."³³⁰ Some of that exhaustion may have actually been due to the return march (with those filled knapsacks and haversacks that Buckner ordered them to carry), but how much? Additionally, Buckner's units were low on ammunition, so his 3,200 tired infantrymen would have been trying to hold hastily selected positions (instead of prepared defenses) while running low on ammunition. They would have been hard pressed to hold off 6,000 or more relatively fresh attackers.³³¹ Gott's point about the Confederates having a better chance in a fortified position than in the rugged (but unprepared) position around Wynn's Ferry Road is a fair one.³³²

CONCLUSION: PILLOW WAS NOT A BUFFOON

Pillow was almost certainly being disingenuous when he claimed that the idea of immediate evacuation had never been discussed. Several different objectives were probably proffered during the council of war, and Pillow's briefing was (intentionally?) vague enough to have left everyone thinking that their plan was the accepted plan. This in turn contributed to the failure to plan for an immediate evacuation and to the delay in Buckner's return to his old position on the right. However, as commander, it was ultimately Floyd's responsibility to ensure that Pillow's briefing was clear and that the briefing was in line with his intent to evacuate in the morning. He did not do this.

As for the decision itself, if there was no prearranged plan, it would be unreasonable to blame Pillow for not carrying it out. His decision to withdraw Buckner's division from Wynn's Ferry Road is more problematic. Some of them may have had to return to the

trenches to stock up on ammunition and retrieve their knapsacks, but they were the ones most psychologically prepared for the mission; Drake's small, worn-out brigade was a poor substitute. Of course, even Buckner's division might not have been able to repel 3rd Division's counterattack; perhaps a defense in the open had no real chance against superior numbers of relatively fresh troops. Furthermore, once it became obvious that 2nd Division was about to attack the right, there was little choice anyway, unless they meant to abandon Head and Heiman's brigades. The 2nd Kentucky's failure to get to their old position in time was the result of Buckner and Floyd wasting time arguing with Pillow. Once Grant returned to the battlefield and put his troops in motion, the Confederates faced a challenge no matter what decisions Pillow might have made. Whatever decision they took, it had to be made quickly. It was not.

Why has Pillow's decision been so widely condemned? It would be decades before anyone had a proper understanding of what the actual force ratios (which effected the perceived need for an immediate evacuation) actually were, or of the time interval between the withdrawal and the counterattacks. Pillow had always had enemies (some deserved), and Pillow's actions during the surrender made him a handy Confederate scapegoat. Many of the captured senior officers learned to resent him even more under Buckner's tutelage. On the Federal side, Buckner's friends (Grant and Lew Wallace) obviously found it easier to accept Buckner's story than Pillow's, as did West Pointers on either side; denigrating Pillow united them (including Jefferson Davis). Forrest, being neither a pre-war friend of Buckner's, nor part of his prison clique, nor a West Pointer was immune to these impulses, as were his men. But Grant, Wallace, and Buckner's version of the story won out.

Chapter V

Decisions: Morning, 16 February

The story of Fort Donelson's surrender is probably the best known incident of the battle. Conventional wisdom has the Confederate commanders discovering that the Yankee hordes had blocked off any escape with their overwhelming numbers. Instead of waiting for the inevitable Yankee assault, Floyd and Buckner fled. Buckner accepted responsibility for arranging the surrender and nobly went into captivity alongside his men; Forrest and his men escaped on horseback by fording Lick Creek. What should the commanders have done? Was the surrender necessary? If not, whose fault was it? What can we learn about how the surrender was spun at the time, and later? It is possible that Buckner, far from being the rational professional, threw away a great Confederate opportunity out of spite?

BACKGROUND TO THE DECISION TO SURRENDER

The Confederates had been under occasional shellfire and sniping since 12 February. They had fought off assaults on 13 February and stopped an ironclad attack on 14 February. The next morning, they had made a successful sortie against the Federal right flank, but Grant ordered Charles F. Smith's 2nd Division to attack the Confederate's own right, while Buckner's division was still returning from the sortie; they lost the trenchline, but were able to hold out on the ridgeline behind it. By the early morning hours of 16 February, the Confederates, who assessed their own effective strength at 12,000 – 13,000 men, were under the impression that the Federals now had 50,000 troops (at least 15,000 of them facing Buckner's positions), at least 10,000 of whom were supposedly fresh and rested. There were reports that Lew Wallace's 3rd Division had reoccupied the Forge and

Charlotte Roads.³³³ The Confederates, including their commanders, were worn down by four days of fighting and cold weather. Floyd initially put all of these factors together and decided that evacuation was the best solution, but Buckner believed that surrender was the only alternative to massacre. Only Pillow thought they could hold out another day.

ANALYSIS OF THE NECESSARY SURRENDER THESIS

Of all the analyzed historians, Stickles is Buckner's strongest adherent, arguing that the impossibility of holding the line and the difficulty of escape made surrender the only reasonable option on 16 February.³³⁴ Stickles (and Buckner and Floyd's) catalogue of woes include the loss of Buckner's entrenchments to C. F. Smith's 2nd Division, the reoccupation of the Forge Road by Lew Wallace's 3rd Division, Lick Creek's impassibility to infantry, the Federals numerical superiority, the gunboat threat, the troops' physical exhaustion, and the lack of time to gather gear and rations.³³⁵ With these considerations in mind, Stickles believes that Buckner was right to surrender.³³⁶

What were Floyd and Buckner's thoughts? Their reports cited the correlation of forces (about a four to one Federal superiority), the exhaustion and sickness of the men (particularly frostbite), and a supply shortage. They claimed that the Federals had reoccupied the Forge Road area, so using that route would have required a fight. They wrote off that option, concluding that they would have lost three-fourths of their remaining men. Even if they could punch a way through, Federal cavalry, artillery, and gunboats would have cut them to pieces during the retreat. The Charlotte Road was impractical for all except mounted men; the medical chief had determined that its three feet of cold water would result in the death of more than half the infantrymen who attempted to ford it. Buckner even claimed that the Federal encirclement had extended to

Lick Creek so quickly that one company of Forrest's regiment (Captain Overton's) was snared when, just a few minutes late, it tried to follow the rest of the unit out. Floyd and Buckner were never happy with either the location of the defenses or their state of preparation, and the loss of the trenches in Buckner's sector left them with no prepared defenses to aid them against the Federals vastly superior numbers of fresh troops. In 30 minutes, the Federals would overrun the water batteries, allowing the gunboats to complete the massacre.³³⁷

Stickles does not cite Buckner's original report, but Grant biographer Badeau apparently did. It catalogues Buckner's litany of fatigue and cold, the lack of ammunition, the supposedly overwhelming Federal numbers, and the impending massacre "without any advantage resulting for the sacrifice." Nonetheless, Buckner claimed that he intended to make "such resistance as was possible to the overwhelming force of the enemy" and was only preempted by Grant's demand for unconditional surrender, backed up by the threat of immediate assault. In this initial report to his government it looks as if Buckner forgot to mention that he had already decided to surrender.³³⁸

In his 1909 interview in the Nashville *Banner*, Buckner repeated his claims that the Forge Road was blocked (with the illustrating anecdote of the fate of Overton's company), that the Lick Ford was impassible to men on foot, and that he was horribly outnumbered—although this time reducing Federal numbers to 37,000, based on a comment of C.F. Smith's after the surrender—but also reducing the time he would have been able to hold out (only 15 minutes).³³⁹ Is Buckner arguing that the Yankees somehow become more powerful with fewer numbers? Or are his claims simply becoming more

exaggerated? Considering that forty years was surely enough time to research the defining day of his life, he probably was not interested in learning the truth.

Pillow's initial (18 February) report noted that Buckner argued against his suggestions to cut their way out, to use Smith Ford, or to hold out until the steamboats would allow them to either cross their troops to the other side of the Cumberland or simply steam upriver. Not being able to convince Buckner and Floyd, Pillow acquiesced to a surrender of the garrison; Floyd consented on condition that he be allowed to evacuate his command. Buckner accepted this, so Floyd passed command through Pillow, who, not accepting the premise that surrender was necessary, "instantly" passed it to Buckner. Pillow then ordered Forrest to "cut his way out." Pillow "retired from the garrison" before Buckner began arranging a truce with Grant.³⁴⁰

Pillow provided more detail of the debate in his 14 March follow-up report. They were still bringing in their wounded until about midnight; to have left before then would have meant abandoning them (as mentioned in the Bates letter, they clearly could not recover them all in a few hours). Troops in the trenches reported that they heard dogs barking, which they interpreted as the Federals returning to the left. Scouts sent to investigate reported that Yankees had reoccupied the Forge Road, while Smith's Ford at Lick Creek was leg deep in mud, saddle-skirt deep in cold water, and filled with tree branches. This was confirmed by a local citizen. Pillow then stated that he wanted to cut his way out, but met the same objections from the same people (except for Gilmer, who Pillow later discovered had left the room), as did his proposal to hold out for another day.³⁴¹ The affidavit of Colonel Burch, one of Pillow's staff officers, supports Pillow's reports.³⁴²

What did the scouts actually report? Adam R. Johnson later wrote that he and Robert Martin passed through their own picket lines undetected (they did not have the challenge / password). After discovering that Lick Creek was “easily crossed on horseback” at Smith Ford, and that the closest Yankee pickets were about one-half mile from there, they slipped back through their own lines and made their report to Floyd, Pillow, and Buckner. While drying off, Johnson listened in on their discussion. His impression was that Pillow was against surrender, Buckner was for it, and Floyd was “non-committal.”³⁴³ If the closest Federal pickets were one-half mile from Smith Ford, then the Federals had not yet covered the Charlotte Road and may or might not have covered Forge Road.³⁴⁴

For some reason, Stickles cites Private Samuel Cox’s diary as a source for the situation on the Confederate right. Cox served in the 17th Kentucky Infantry (Union), part of Cruft’s 1st Brigade, 3rd Division. This regiment fought on the Federal right on 15 February. Therefore, Cox did not witness 2nd Division’s breakthrough on the Federal left, and could not personally assess the tactical situation there. Cox does mention that he thanked Heaven that he and his comrades did not have to assault the Confederate lines in the morning.³⁴⁵ If the men who had to actually conduct the assault were this dissuadable, it is not a ringing endorsement of Stickles’ theory that Confederate resistance would have been a sacrifice “without any advantage.”

Wyeth argues that Forrest would have saved the Confederate force and probably won a spectacular victory, had he been in command. In order to indict this theory, Stickles criticizes Forrest’s initial report, noting that he claimed that his cavalry, with some assistance from other units, had killed 350 men in two clashes alone, and that they had killed many other Federals in other fights. Noting that the Federal casualty returns show a

total of only 500 killed (see Appendix, Table III-1), Stickles drily observes that “the remainder of the Confederate army must have been very poor marksmen indeed. . .”³⁴⁶ Stickles assessment of Forrest’s battle damage analysis is a fair one. Stickles missed a better example: Forrest’s ludicrous claim that his men had killed 100 Federals and wounded hundreds more during the fighting on 12 February. Federal cavalry lost only five wounded and two missing during the entire battle, and McClelland’s report notes total losses from all units during the advance from Fort Henry was one killed and four wounded; an article from the Missouri *Democrat* attributes the four wounded to the 8th Illinois when they repelled a charge by some of Forrest’s men.³⁴⁷ But exploiting exaggerated battle damage assessments to discredit Forrest’s overall judgment drifts into the Fallacy of Irrelevant Proof.³⁴⁸ Exaggerated battle damage assessment is normal (as Stickles himself admitted elsewhere) and no less common than the exaggerated enemy order of battle assessments to which Buckner seems to have been liable. Does that invalidate all of Buckner’s testimony? There is a difference between Forrest’s post-surrender assessment of the Forge and Charlotte Roads and Buckner’s assessment: Forrest was actually there. As for his assessment of the Yankee cavalry, Forrest had fought them, and found no reason to be as impressed with them as Buckner was.

ANALYSIS OF THE BREAK OUT OR SLIP OUT THESIS

Wyeth is the earliest of the analyzed sources to argue that the surrender was unnecessary. A variety of routes were open during the early morning hours of 16 February—Smith Ford over Lick Creek only being the most obvious—and the difficulties of crossing it were exaggerated. As proof that the Confederate force could have marched out safely, Wyeth cites the testimony of local citizens and of some of the men who

avoided capture.³⁴⁹ Wyeth even rejects Buckner's claim that one of Forrest's companies (Overton's) was cut off, although he provides no citation.³⁵⁰ On Confederate exhaustion and the medical objections to marching men on foot across Lick Creek, Wyeth cites Floyd and Buckner only to disagree with them. Probably making an oblique reference to his own experiences, Wyeth observes "how strange this [assessment] would have sounded to the veterans of 1864."³⁵¹ Shelby Foote, Catton, Stonesifer, Hamilton, and Hughes and Stonesifer agree with one or both aspects of Wyeth's "slip out" thesis.³⁵² Some of Lew Wallace's *Autobiography* implies that his troops might not have reoccupied the Forge Road until after daylight.³⁵³

Wyeth includes quite a few accounts, some of them relevant to the issue of men leaving by way of Lick Creek on foot on the morning of 16 February. Woodward escaped on horseback, but passed other men who *were* leaving on foot, apparently willing to cross the icy waters of Lick Creek. The testimony of others shows that at least 11 men from three different regiments did manage to get to Lick Creek without being observed, then crossed the cold waters without dying of hypothermia or frostbite. In his account, Chandler mentions that he did not begin his escape until it was daylight and the white flags had already gone up, while Woodward's recollection was that the sun was "one hour high" when he rode out of Dover. These disprove Buckner's claim that anyone who tried to use the Charlotte Road after Forrest left was caught by the Yankees.³⁵⁴

As for the locals, Doctor J. W. Smith was a resident of Dover at the time of the battle. As verified by Hunter Nicholson's report, he was the one who accompanied Major Rice and some scouts to Lick Creek, and confirmed the width and depth of Smith's Ford. Smith and fellow Dover residents G. W. Bufford and Ed Waters claimed that the closest

Federals were over half a mile away for most of the morning (Waters puts it as late as 10:00 A.M.). Smith notes that Hays' Ford, 300 yards upstream from the Smith Ford, was only 18 inches deep.³⁵⁵ He does not note that the Confederate commanders did not seem to have considered this route or why.

As part of the Pillow investigation, Gus Henry testified that on the night of 15 February, one group of scouts had come in, claiming that the enemy had reoccupied their old lines and that a second group had found the enemy's campfires "burning in every direction." Two of Forrest's scouts found the way over the Lick River passable to cavalry, but not to infantry. He characterized the debate that followed as one in which Pillow advocated holding out for a day or fighting their way out (leaving the dead and wounded), with Buckner coming up with reasons why it wouldn't work, and Floyd siding with Buckner.³⁵⁶ Major W. H. Haynes' and Hunter Nicholson's testimonies are similar to Henry's.³⁵⁷ Stonesifer suspected that Henry garbled the report of fires rekindled by wounded and searchers as hordes of Yankees.³⁵⁸ He may not have been the only one; it probably influenced Floyd, Pillow, and Buckner's thinking.

Forrest's testimony stated that Pillow ordered him to send out scouts to find out if Federal troops had returned to the left and to check the ford. Of the Federal positions, the scouts reported that they did not see the enemy, but they saw fires in the locations that the Federals had held the night before. Forrest himself rejected reports that the Federals had returned to the left because he had just been over that part of the field. With the assistance of a citizen living on the Charlotte Road (certainly Doctor J. W. Smith), they determined that the mud was about a "half-leg deep," that the water came up to a horse's saddle-skirts, and the water was about 100 yards wide. Buckner did not receive Pillow's

suggestion to cut their way out very well; he argued that they would be seen and “cut to pieces,” losing three-fourths of their men. Additionally, Buckner did not believe that Forrest’s cavalry could hold off their Federal counterparts. He also worried about what the Federal artillery would do. At this point, Forrest left the room. When he returned, he discovered that the command intended to surrender. Forrest told them that he intended to break out, even if he only saved one man. He asked Pillow what he should do. Pillow replied “Cut your way out.” Forrest left the meeting for good. He later testified that when his regiment, Captain Helm’s (Kentucky) company, and some of Porter’s artillerymen crossed the ford, it was as described. In defense of the commanders’ acceptance of surrender (particularly Pillow’s), he noted a doctor’s opinion that infantrymen would not have been able to make it safely across.³⁵⁹

Forrest’s initial report stated the same things in less detail; he thought that the fires that the scouts saw were old fires fanned by the wind rather than evidence of the Federal’s return to their old positions. He concluded two-thirds of the command could have left if they had evacuated in the morning and that if they had stayed to fight, they would have won.³⁶⁰

Forrest’s authorized biography stated that his men did not see any U.S. troops on Forge Road as late as 09:00 P.M. Additional scouts, sent out later, confirmed this. After discovering that reports of Federals defending the Charlotte Road were in error, Forrest and some of his men scouted three-quarters of a mile to the right, where they found the blankets that they had dropped before going into action the morning before. Going further, the only enemy they saw were wounded men sitting around fires trying to stay warm; the only men *they* had seen were scouts (both rebel and Yankee). Forrest’s

executive officer, Major D. C. Kelley, stated that there was no sign of Federals anywhere near the Charlotte Road as late as 8:00 A.M. on Sunday.³⁶¹ Despite Buckner's decades-long claims to the contrary, Overton's company was not cut off from escape; Captain Overton himself was captured because he personally missed the order, but his company left safely.³⁶² Writing much later in 1895, J.C. Blanton, who served in "C" Company of Forrest's regiment noted that Captain Overton (of "A" Company) himself "stayed," but most of his company left with Forrest.³⁶³ Therefore, an evacuation via the Charlotte Road would not have resulted in a massacre.

Catton cited Colonel Whittlesey's claim that the attack on the morning of 15 February had driven the Federals one mile from Lick Creek, but that the counterattack in the afternoon had closed it again.³⁶⁴ However, as commander of the 20th Ohio, Whittlesey might not have been familiar with the furthest limit of the Union right flank.

ANALYSIS OF THE HOLD OUT UNTIL DARK THESIS

Wyeth, echoing Forrest (and Pillow), seems to accept that the Confederates could have held out for the day. Wyeth argues that plenty of food and ammunition were available and notes that C. F. Smith's attack on the right stalled once Buckner's troops arrived on scene.³⁶⁵ Geer does not see the supply situation as a reason to surrender, and Stonesifer's dissertation, Hughes and Stonesifer's book, and Cooling all consider Pillow's suggestion reasonable.³⁶⁶ The location and condition of the defenses have been criticized, but Gott notes that they held off several assaults, only falling to C. F. Smith's attack when they were undermanned.³⁶⁷

In a report to Cullum dated 19 February, Grant calculated that Buckner surrendered enough supplies to sustain his force for 20 days, although with too little coffee and too

much rice for his liking.³⁶⁸ Wyeth argued that if the Confederates had a supply problem, it was due to poor distribution.³⁶⁹

Colonel Roger Hanson, commander of the 2nd Kentucky (Confederate), reported that their fallback position turned out to be an inherently stronger one than their original one, although exhaustion made it “utterly impossible” to improve it to the same standard as the original trenches overnight.³⁷⁰ Colonel J. E. Bailey, commander of Fort Donelson’s garrison brigade, reported that only five companies of the 50th Tennessee were deployed from the fort itself. The remainder stayed in reserve. He mentions that Lieutenant Peter Stankiewicz’s three-gun section, based in Fort Donelson proper, played a key role in holding off Smith’s attack on the evening of 15 February, particularly the section’s 8-inch howitzer.³⁷¹ According to the 50th Tennessee’s account in the *MAT*, only four companies (“B,” “C,” “D,” “E”) companies went to assist Buckner, with “A” remaining with the water batteries.³⁷² Either way, Buckner had powerful artillery support and a small, but previously uncommitted, reserve for the battle on 16 February.

If Buckner had reasons to be confident, C. F. Smith had reasons to worry. According to Colonel James Tuttle, the 2nd Iowa Infantry led the assault and overran the rebel trenchline, but they wound up on the wrong end of friendly fire and were running low on ammunition. The Hawkeyes fell back to the captured entrenchments, using the outer parapet for protection.³⁷³ Meanwhile, Colonel McArthur’s 1st Brigade, 2nd Division returned to Smith’s control. They had had the misfortune of holding the Federal’s far right flank under 1st Division during Pillow’s initial assault. After their day of heavy fighting on 15 February, they constituted 2nd Division’s only reinforcements.³⁷⁴

OVERALL ANALYSIS

On the Confederate right, Buckner's 2nd Division was thrown back one ridgeline to a position that was arguably a better natural position than the original one, although they were not able to dig in. They had a small, but completely fresh, tactical reserve. They were backed by the firepower of Fort Donelson proper.³⁷⁵ Meanwhile, the Federals could not even occupy the Confederate's old positions safely and had to stay on the outer side of the parapet. Their "reinforcements" from McArthur's brigade consisted of three regiments that had been heavily engaged the previous day and had taken heavy losses (see Appendix, Table III-1 for the 9th Illinois, 12th Illinois, and 41st Illinois). This hardly seems like the pushover scenario Buckner described, but he was under the impression that he faced far more Yankees than he actually did.

Stonesifer (in his dissertation), Cooling, Hughes and Stonesifer, and Gott emphasize the importance of the Yankees' supposedly overwhelming numbers in the Confederate commanders' decision making.³⁷⁶ It is always difficult to assess an enemy's strength, something that Stickles grants to Floyd and Pillow, while (typically) excluding Buckner's name from the list of offenders.³⁷⁷

In their first order of battle assessment on the evening of 12 February, Buckner's commissary of subsistence in Cumberland City sent a telegraph to Governor Isham Harris of Tennessee, with a reasonable (even understated) estimate of 10,000-12,000 Federals approaching Fort Donelson.³⁷⁸ Unfortunately for the Confederates, the estimates of reinforcements by transport grew far faster than their actual numbers. The steamboat arrivals were reported accurately, but the estimate of the number of boats, and the number of men which they carried, was way off. By the morning of 16 February, the

Confederates thought they faced 50,000 men, with more on the way.³⁷⁹ Some of the Confederates' later estimates for Yankee strength reached ridiculously exaggerated extremes, probably in a subconscious effort to explain the defeat. After the battle, Lew Wallace found their estimates amusing, but felt no need to disabuse them of their delusions.³⁸⁰ This affected Confederate thinking in two ways. First, they had to consider the obvious difficulty of holding off a force that supposedly outnumbered them several times over. Second, as Bearss observed, the inflated estimates supported claims that the Federals had blocked the planned evacuation routes.³⁸¹ One suspects that the Confederates would have fought on if they had known how many men Grant really had. Rarely noted is who provided the bad intelligence.³⁸² Before arriving at Fort Donelson, Buckner had ordered his divisional cavalry, the 1st Louisiana Cavalry, to secure the north side of the Cumberland against Federal attempts to interdict steamboat traffic to Dover.³⁸³ The regiment never joined the rest of 2nd Division in Dover. Instead, it fed Buckner intelligence reports on the new Yankee arrivals from downriver.

One might object that the Confederate commanders had to work with the information they had, not what is known in hindsight. This brings up two counter-objections. First, this was not the first case of an exaggerated order of battle assessment in history. As generally well-educated men, they might have known that. As lawyers, Floyd and Pillow should have been familiar with the concept of unreliable testimony. Pillow was an experienced commander and Buckner was a trained professional, but they seem to have accepted the exaggerated reports without question. In comparison, on the afternoon of 12 February, Grant's intelligence put Confederate numbers at 20,000-25,000.³⁸⁴ Trying to

conduct a siege against a force that outnumbered him either did not bother him, or, unlike his opponents, he simply took some exaggeration into account.

Even if the Federals had had the strength that the Confederates credited them with, Buckner and Floyd showed inconsistent thinking. On 15 February, they had successfully attacked what they thought were 40,000 Yankees, driving them back two miles. Why did they think that these same men who had just attacked (and pushed back) 40,000 defenders would not stand a chance against 50,000 attackers, when this time they would be the ones who would exploit the advantage of the defense? True, their numbers were diminished from the previous day, but they should have considered that the same was also true of the enemy's numbers (particularly if they accepted their own bloated battle damage assessments). There is the matter of exhaustion, but why did it not occur to them that the Federals, with the exception of the new reinforcements, were in roughly the same shape? This was a failure to put themselves in the enemy's place. Considering the results of the previous days' fighting, should 10,000 fresh (but from the rebel view, incompetent) Yankee attackers really have made that much of a difference?

Shelby Foote referenced the oft-heard claim that an attacker needs a three-to-one advantage over a defender to succeed.³⁸⁵ This is a popular rule of thumb, but it has hardly proved to be a hard and fast rule.³⁸⁶ Military historian and analyst Trevor N. Dupuy has determined that the three-to-one rule is exaggerated at divisional level. It represents the overkill needed for an easy breakthrough, not simply to push back a defender. Additionally, the needed superiority to push back a defender was probably a little less than it is today. The exact ratio is dependent on a number of factors, including the preparation of the defenses, the terrain, and the weather, not to mention the quality of the

forces, their equipment, and state of supply.³⁸⁷ Floyd and Buckner might have taken this into account if their uncritical acceptance of bad intelligence had not convinced them that the odds were overwhelming. Pillow also seems to have accepted the intelligence, but apparently trusted his men and his defenses to make up for the odds.

Using Dupuy's model as a conceptual tool, and assuming that the Confederates would have had the advantage of defending under favorable weather and terrain conditions, the Confederate defenders had a relative combat power advantage of at least 1.95 per man (see Appendix, Table V-1). If we accept that the Federals had approximately 24,376 men present for duty on the morning of 16 February (after deducting 500 killed, 224 missing, and perhaps 1,900 wounded and frostbite cases who had yet to recover), then the Confederates would have needed about 12,501 men present for duty in order to completely repulse a Federal attack ($12,501 \times 1.95 = 24,377$).

As a Confederate worst case scenario, the low end range for Confederate soldiers present throughout the battle is 15,074 (not counting blacks). Allowing for Pillow's high-end deduction of 2,000 for the number who were killed or incapacitated (and perhaps evacuated) for wounds, frostbite, or illness, that still leaves at least 13,074 men present. Based on the numbers and defensive posture factors (including posture, terrain, and weather factors), this would give the Confederates a combat power factor advantage of 1.05 ($13,074 \times 1.95 = 25,494$; $25,494 / 24,376 = 1.05$).

Assuming that Grant would not gain tactical surprise, that the opposing forces were equally competent, equally motivated, equally equipped, and supplied, and assuming that all other factors (both material and intangible) balanced out (except for numbers favoring the Federals and defensive posture favoring the Confederates), this would indicate that

the Confederates would hold the line until nightfall, probably inflicting almost twice as many losses on their attackers as they themselves lost.³⁸⁸ This is not outside the norm of the Civil War, a war in which assaults tended to be unsuccessful or indecisive, including most of the actual Federal assaults at Fort Donelson. Additionally, 13,074 is the low end estimate for Confederates who were present for duty; a worst case scenario for them.

They probably started with 17,786 men, reduced to 15,911 (286 killed, 1,534 wounded and ill who had not yet recovered, and 55 caretakers; see Table III-3 and 3rd Tennessee roster analysis). That would have given the Confederates a powerful combat power edge of 1.27 ($15,911 \times 1.95 = 31,026$; $31,026 / 24,376 = 1.27$). To beat these numbers would have required a noticeable Federal superiority in a variety of other factors.

If Grant, his commanders, and his men had enjoyed a noticeably higher level of combat effectiveness (CEV), then they might have had a chance for a breakthrough, but based on their performance of the previous day, it seems unlikely that they had a significant tactical edge over their opponents, if any. If the Confederates really were far more fatigued than their opponents, if they were all as demoralized as Buckner, if material factors of equipment and supply favored the Federals more than the above calculations allow, that might have made the difference. However, some of the more intangible factors might have favored the Confederates; the battlefield performance of Forrest's cavalry certainly outshined that of their Federal counterparts. Additionally, the Confederates on the right could have fallen back another 400 meters and would still have had a ravine to their front and Fort Donelson itself to back them up, so they could afford a little slippage (i.e., they could afford a slight combat power inferiority).

Ultimately, even if the numbers have not been precisely calculated, the Confederate's situation was hardly hopeless and the odds of holding out until dark were probably in their favor. Considering that Buckner's surrender cut ferrying efforts short, two steamers still evacuated over 900 men in less than two hours. With over 12 hours darkness, additional steamboats, and more time to plan, far more could have been saved.³⁸⁹ Pillow was right; they did stand a chance. Buckner and Floyd were wrong to accept their intelligence uncritically.

One final consideration is that it never occurred to any of the senior commanders to let the soldiers decide for themselves whether to try to escape or accept surrender. It took Forrest to ask Pillow for permission for his unit to escape, by fighting if necessary. Forrest in turn encouraged not only those in his command, but in other units, to escape. It is also interesting that Forrest asked Pillow, not Floyd (who had ostensibly been in charge) or Buckner (who was in charge).³⁹⁰ Perhaps he simply asked the man he thought would give him the answer he wanted, and assumed that Floyd and Buckner would not have the nerve to interfere. If so, he was correct. But Forrest was not known for suffering fools gladly, and he seemed to genuinely respect Pillow. Forrest's men respected Pillow as well; Major Kelley referred to Pillow's "high credit," earned on 15 February, and described Floyd and Buckner as "almost useless."³⁹¹ Whatever Pillow's other flaws, Forrest and his men saw something in him which contemporary commentators, and many historians since, have missed.

CONCLUSION: PILLOW WAS RIGHT

After the surrender, Pillow, who had plenty of enemies and was never popular among West Pointers, became the perfect scapegoat. Catton, perhaps subconsciously working off

the myth of Pillow the Buffoon, seems to attribute the panic at the meeting to Pillow, even though Pillow was the most optimistic of the three senior commanders and the most skeptical of the northern boogeymen.³⁹² The evidence seems to show that Pillow was right: The Confederates could have held out, bloodied Grant's forces, and then evacuated by steamboat, on horseback, and on foot. Hurst observed that Halleck might have relieved Grant if he had not taken Fort Donelson quickly, particularly after the beating that the despised Pillow gave him on Saturday.³⁹³ An unsuccessful and bloody Sunday might have finished Grant, as Wyeth theorizes (and perhaps, fantasizes).³⁹⁴ Although Bearss avoids coming down on one side or the other, it is difficult to read him without agreeing with Hughes and Stonesifer that Buckner had "lost his grip," and that for some reason (as Gott puts it), he was "stubbornly fixated on surrendering the garrison."³⁹⁵ Buckner rejected Pillow's suggestions, throwing away a great opportunity to advance the Confederate cause out of pettiness, just as his delay to return to his trenches set the circumstances for the greatest Federal success on 15 February.³⁹⁶

Chapter VI

Conclusion

IMPACT OF FORT DONELSON

Some losses are difficult to assess and measuring the metrics of disaster is tricky. But regardless of how the Confederate propaganda machine tried to spin the battle into a moral victory against overwhelming odds, Fort Donelson was a psychological blow to the Confederacy in general and Tennesseans in particular.³⁹⁷ It guaranteed the loss of Columbus, Kentucky (“the Gibraltar of the West”), the “Great Western Iron Belt” (a major iron producing region), and Nashville, Tennessee (the state’s capital and a vital communications hub).³⁹⁸ Easier to quantify were the millions of dollars’ worth of supplies that the Federals captured at Fort Donelson and the millions of dollars’ worth of property that the Confederates destroyed to prevent its falling into Yankee hands. This included two partially constructed gunboats.³⁹⁹

The number of Confederate soldiers who surrendered (over 13,000) was unprecedented at that point in the war. This alone was enough to qualify Fort Donelson as a Confederate disaster. To put the sum in perspective, the Confederates lost more prisoners at Fort Donelson than they had during the entire war up to that time (approximately 4,353, see Appendix, VI-1). A different comparison shows that the Confederates lost more prisoners at Fort Donelson than the Federals had in every engagement up to that point in the war (approximately 6,850 Union POW/MIA, see Appendix, VI-2). The ramifications were immediately understood, as paroled U.S. soldiers petitioned the government to be exchanged for a return to duty.⁴⁰⁰

Although the Confederates would suffer catastrophes aplenty in the coming years, Table VI-3 shows that the only Federal surrender to rival Fort Donelson was at Harper's Ferry during the Antietam campaign in September 1862.

Major U.S. Surrenders (Table VI-3)⁴⁰¹

Engagement	Date	MIA/POW
Lexington, MO	20 SEP '61	3,500
Richmond, KY	30 AUG '62	4,303
Harper's Ferry	15 SEP '62	12,520
Munfordsville	16 SEP '62	4,076

Wyeth and Stonesifer speculate on what might have happened had the men who were captured at Fort Donelson been able to fight at Shiloh, 6-7 April 1862.⁴⁰² If the Confederates had fought and held on 16 February, and even if they had lost as many as 4,000 additional killed and wounded and additional 2,000 captured, the 8,000 additional evacuees would have been available for future operations (see Table III-3). Admittedly, not all of those 8,000 men could have fought at Shiloh. In the period of time between 16 February and 6 April 1862, typical attrition (death, desertion, and discharge) might have amounted to 3 percent, cutting that number down to 7,760. Accounting for those who would have been sick, under arrest, or absent (about 30.3% of total strength, or 2,351) still would have added about 5,409 additional men to the 41,669 who were actually "present for duty or extra duty" on the first day at Shiloh.⁴⁰³ That would have resulted in roughly 12 percent more combat power, assuming that these men would have been as competent, as well equipped, and as well supplied as the average Confederate soldier in that battle. This increase in combat power certainly would have resulted in heavier losses for Grant's Army of the Tennessee on 6 April, and if it had resulted in them being thrown back an additional kilometer toward Pittsburg Landing or Owl Creek, it might have

resulted in disaster. Had Lew Wallace's men arrived earlier, Grant might have been saved, but not because the reinforcements marched to the battlefield more quickly, but because the battlefield would have marched more quickly towards *them*.⁴⁰⁴ At the very least, Beauregard's Army of the Mississippi would have been in better shape to face the Yankees the next day, and for month's afterward.

Rigorous fact-checking is a prerequisite for good historical analysis. Limited time and resources at times make that difficult. But given its impact on the war, at a time when Confederates still had a chance to win the war, Fort Donelson would certainly seem a worthy candidate for thorough research.

CONCLUSION: PRIMARY SOURCES; ACCURATE REVISIONISM

From the aspect of utilitarian operational history, properly analyzing the four examples underlines the need for historians to go to primary sources. We learn the importance (and ubiquity) of soldiers lightening their load before going into combat, the difficulty of making accurate order of battle or battle damage analysis assessments, and the difficulty of making decisions based on incomplete or false intelligence. These lessons were muted, lost, or distorted because historians accepted previous historians' analysis uncritically, allowed their personal biases or the lure of an entertaining story to influence their analysis of whatever primary sources they did track down, or because they simply did not understand the implications of the primary evidence they had in hand. On historians' mandate to give the people of the past their due, we learn that Grant's grunts might not have been as lazy or as stupid as they have often been portrayed, that Grant might deserve a little opprobrium for allowing his soldiers to take the blame for his miscalculations, that Buckner might not have been the thorough professional he has

frequently been portrayed to be, and Pillow might not have been the buffoon *he* has normally been portrayed to be; he may have even been right from time to time. As for those who merely consume history for its entertainment value, hopefully they will discover that “truth is not only stranger than fiction, it is more interesting.”⁴⁰⁵

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Appendices

APPENDIX A: TABLES

Table III-1 Strength and Losses of Union Forces

Unit	<i>Medical and Surgical History</i> (present rank & file 12 FEB) ⁴⁰⁶	<i>Ft. D Casualty Returns</i> ⁴⁰⁷	Other	Gott ⁴⁰⁸
7 IL INF		3k, 19w.		(500). 18k, 2w.
8 th IL INF	751.	54k, 188w.	613 total engaged (15 FEB). ⁴⁰⁹	613. 54k, 186w, 10m.
9 IL INF		36k, 165w, 9m.		(500). 36k, 165w, 9m.
11 th IL INF	579.	70k, 181w, 90m.	About 500 men (-D Co. detached 15 FEB). ⁴¹⁰	579. 19k, 41w, 31m.
12 IL INF		19k, 62w, 8m.	612 effective men, not inc. officers. ⁴¹¹	612. 19k, 62w, 8m.
17 th IL INF	750.	13k, 61w, 7m.	750 effective. ⁴¹²	750. 13k, 61w, 7m.
18 th IL INF	671.	53k, 157w, 18m.		671. 53k, 158w, 18m.
20 th IL INF	758.	18k, 108w, 6m.		758. 19k, 66w.
29 th IL INF	542.	25k, 61w, 13m.		542. 25k, 61w, 13m.
30 th IL INF	568.	19k, 69w, 6m.		568. 19k, 69w, 6m.
31 st IL INF	598.	31k, 117w, 28m.		598. 31k, 117w, 28m.
41 st IL INF		14k, 113w, 3m.	500 present (15 FEB). ⁴¹³	500. 15k, 117w, 3m.
45 th IL INF	615.	2k, 20w.	2k, 26w. ⁴¹⁴	615. 5k, 26w.
46 th IL INF		0k, 3w.		(500). 0k, 3w.
48 th IL INF	512.	8k, 31w, 3m.		512. 20k, 34w, 31m.
49 th IL INF	645.	15k, 44w, 12m.	627 effective. ⁴¹⁵	627. 15k, 44w, 12m.
50 th IL INF		0k, 12w.		(500). 0k,

57 th IL INF	1k, 1w.		12w.
58 th IL INF	5k, 12w.		975. 1k, 0w, 6m.
11 th IN INF	4k, 29w.		887. 5k, 12w, 6m.
25 th IN INF	16k, 75w.		(500). 4k, 29w.
31 st IN INF	9k, 52w, 1m.	727 effective (15 FEB). ⁴¹⁶	(500). 16k, 75w.
44 th IN INF	7k, 35w.		727. 9k, 51w, 1m.
52 nd IN INF	4k, 48w.		(500). 7k, 34, 2m.
2 nd IA INF	33k, 164w.		(500). 4k, 48w.
7 th IA INF	2k, 37w.		620. 33k, 164w.
12 th IA INF	3k, 22w, 1m.		(500). 2k, 37w.
14 th IA INF	2k, 28w.		(500). 1k, 27w.
17 th KY INF	4k, 34w, 3m.	510 effective (15 FEB). ⁴¹⁷	(500). 2k, 28w.
25 th KY INF	15k, 61w, 12m.		510. 4k, 34w, 3m.
8 th MO INF	7k, 40w.	680 present (15 FEB). ⁴¹⁸	(400). 15k, 61w, 12m.
13 th MO INF	0k, 1w, 1m.		680. 7k, 40w.
14 th MO INF (Birge's Western SS)	1k, 3w.		(500). 0k, 1w.
1 st NE INF	2k, 6w, 1m.		(500). 1k, 8w.
20 th OH INF	0k.		816. 3k, 7w, 1m.
58 th OH INF	1k, 9w.		490. 0k.
68 th OH INF	0k.		630. 1k, 9w.
76 th OH INF	0k, 9w.		(500). 0k.
A/ 32 nd IL INF	0k, 7w.		(500). 0k.
4 th IL CAV	0k, 0w, 1m.		(500). 0k.
A & B/ 2 nd IL CAV	0k, 4w, 1m.		105 & 95. (0k).
Carmichael's	0k.		(50).

IL CAV Co.				
Dollin's IL CAV Co.		0k, 1w.		(0k).
O'Harnett's IL CAV Co.		0k.		(50). (0k).
Stewart's IL CAV Co.		0k.		(50). (0k).
C/ 2 nd US CAV		0k.		(50). (0k).
I/ 4 th US CAV		0k.		(50). (0k).
A/ 1 st IL LT ART		0k, 3w.		135. 0k, 3w.
B/ 1 st IL LT ART		1k, 8w.	120 rank & file. ⁴¹⁹	120. 1k, 2w.
D/ 1 st IL LT ART		0k, 2w.		133. 1k, 11w.
D/ 2 nd IL LT ART		?		113. 0k, 1w.
E/ 2 nd IL LT ART		2k, 3w.		129. 2k, 3w.
D/ 1 st MO LT ART		0k, 0w, 1m.		(120). (0k).
H/ 1 st MO LT ART		1k.		(120). 1k.
K/ 1 st MO LT ART		0k, 1w.		(120). 0k, 1w.
HQ/ District of Cairo			11 (only officers listed). ⁴²⁰	
HQ/1 st Div.			7 (only officers listed). ⁴²¹	
HQ/2 nd Div.			8 (only officers listed). ⁴²²	
HQ/3 rd Div.			5 (only officers listed). ⁴²³	
HQ/ 1 st Bde./ 1 st Div.			10 min. ⁴²⁴	
HQ/ 2 nd Bde./ 1 st Div.			4 min. ⁴²⁵	
HQ/ 3 rd Bde./ 1 st Div.			5 min. ⁴²⁶	
HQ/ 1 st Bde./ 2 nd Div.			4 (only officers listed). ⁴²⁷	
HQ/ 1 st Bde./			4 min. ⁴²⁸	

3 rd Div. Unit	<i>Medical and Surgical History of the War (present 12 FEB)</i>	<i>Ft. D Casualty Returns</i>	Other	Gott (present)
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Table III-2 Strength and Losses of Confederate Forces

Unit	Nashville <i>Patriot</i> ⁴²⁹	Major Johnson (engaged)	Major Hays ⁴³⁰	Other	Total	Gott ⁴³¹
5 th TN INF	650. 12k, 75w.	650. 12k, 76w, 558pow, 4m or escape.	500 pow	750; 750 total present for duty. 12k, 76w; or 11k, 59w, 21 escape. ⁴³² 743 engaged. 13k, 56w, 722 pow. ⁴³³	650- 750	750. 12k, 76w, 658 pow, 4 escape.
10 th TN INF	750. 1k, 5w.	750. 1k, 5w, 700pow, 44 m or escape.			750- 750	750. 1k, 5w, 701pow, 44 escape.
18 th TN INF	615. 4k, 85w.	685. 4k, 40w, 615pow, 26 m or escape.	600 pow	625. 10k, 38w, 4m. ⁴³⁴	615- 685	685. 10k, 38w, 633 pow, 4 escape.
26 th TN INF	400. 11k, 85w.	400. 11k, 85w, 301pow, 3 m or escape.	421 pow	401; 400 (15 FEB); 410 total engaged (15 FEB). 11k, 78w; or 11k, 85w. ⁴³⁵	400- 410	400. 11k, 85w, 301 pow, 3 escape.
30 th TN INF (not inc. A Co.)	654.	751. 9k, 19w, 730pow, 2 m or escape.	700 pow		654- 751	751. 9k, 10w, 730 pow, 2 escape.
32 nd TN INF	558. 3k, 35w.	586. 3k, 25w, 557pow, 1 m or escape.	558 pow.	400; 555 rank & file present; 534 engaged (15 FEB). 3k, 36w, 1m, 528 pow, 1 escape. ⁴³⁶	400- 586	586. 3k, 25w, 557pow, 1 escape.
41 st TN INF	450. 2k, 6w.	575. 2k, 1w, 552pow,	481 pow.	575 total present. 2k, 6w, 26m. ⁴³⁷	450- 575	575. 2k, 6w, 541pow,

42 nd TN INF	498. 0k, 11w.	20m or escape. 498. 2k, 9w, 465pow, 22 m or escape.	539 pow.	498 rank & file engaged. 4k, 7w. ⁴³⁸	498- 539+	26 escape. 498. 4k, 7w, 465pow, 22 escape.
48 th TN INF	230. 0k, 1w.	291. 1k, 11w, 270pow, 9m or escape.		360 pow. Co.s E & K arrived late 15 FEB 1862? ⁴³⁹	230- 230	291. 1k, 11w, 420 pow (inc. those arr. 16 FEB), 9 escape. ⁴⁴⁰
49 th TN INF	300. 4k, 13w.	372. 7k, 14w, 351pow, 0 m or escape.	429 pow.	300 effective (15 FEB). 4k, 17w. ⁴⁴¹	300- 429+	372. 7k, 17w, 348pow.
50 th TN INF (not inc. A Co.)	650.	650. 2k, 6w, 547pow, 95 m or escape.	518 pow.	1k, 3w. ⁴⁴²	518- 650	650. 2k, 6w, 547pow, 95 escape.
51 st TN INF	80. 0k, 0w.	200. 0k, 0w, 185pow, 15m or escape.	183 pow.		80- 200	
53 rd TN INF	280. 6k, 12w.	420. 8k, 20w, 382 pow, 10 m or escape.	382 pow.		280- 420	420. 8k, 20w, 344 pow, 48 escape.
2 nd KY INF	618. 13k, 57w.	618. 13k, 57w, 500 pow, 48m or escape.	450 pow.	600. 60k & w? ⁴⁴³	450- 618	618. 13k, 57w, 500 pow, 48 escape.
8 th KY INF	300. 19k, 60w.	350. 19k, 41w, 290 pow, 0 m or escape.	290 pow.	19k, 57w, 1m. ⁴⁴⁴	290- 350	350. 27k, 72w, 220 pow, 31 escape.
7 th TX INF	300.	385.	313	305 officers &	300-	385.

	20k, 30w.	20k, 34w, 300 pow, 31m or escape.	pow	men; 350-360 engaged. 20k, 34w; 20k, 34w; 20k, 39w. ⁴⁴⁵ 1 escape. ⁴⁴⁶	385	20k, 39w, 295 pow, 31 escape.
15 th AR INF	270. 7k, 17w.	304. 11k, 23w, 270 pow, 0 m or escape.	318 pow.		270- 318+	304. 11k, 23w, 270 pow.
27 th AL INF	216. 0k, 1w.	280. 0k, 1w, 279 pow, 0 m or escape.	282 pow.	3 escape. ⁴⁴⁷	216- 282+	280. 1w, 279 pow, 0 escape.
1 st MS INF	280. 17k, 76w.	352. 19k, 66w, 267 pow, 0 m or escape.		331 total engaged (15 FEB). 16k, 61w. ⁴⁴⁸ 2 escape. ⁴⁴⁹	280- 352	352. 19k, 66w, 267 pow, 0 escape.
4 th MS INF	535. 8k, 38w.	665. 40k, 38w, 550 pow, 27 m or escape.			535- 665	665. 40k, 38w, 587 pow.
14 th MS INF	475. 17k, 84w.	685. 17k, 84w, 554 pow, 3 m or escape.	600 pow.	659. 17k, 85w, 10m. ⁴⁵⁰ 5 escape. ⁴⁵¹	475- 685	658. 17k, 84w, 554 pow, 3 escape.
20 th MS INF	562. 19k, 59w.	562. 19k, 59w, 484 pow, 0 m or escape.	454 pow.	552 present, 200 absent; 500 engaged (15 FEB). 19k, 60w; or 18k, 55w; or 20k, 58 w, 454 pow. ⁴⁵² >300 total present Murfreeseboro? ⁴⁵³ 5-25 escape. ⁴⁵⁴	454- 562	562. 19k, 59w, 454 pow, 30 escape.
23 rd (3 rd) MS INF	500. 5k, 19w.	624. 5k, 19w,	600 pow	546 officers & men.	500- 624	624. 4k, 46w,

26 th MS INF	434. 12k. 71w.	443. 12k, 71w, 334 pow, 26 m or escape.		5k, 46w. ⁴⁵⁵ 443; 443 engaged (15 FEB). 11k, 68w; or 12k, 67w ⁴⁵⁶	434- 443	573 pow. 400. 11k, 85w, 301 pow, 3 escape.
36 th VA INF	250. ?k & w.	280. 0k. 280 m or escape.		14k, 46w. ⁴⁵⁷ ~3 pow. ⁴⁵⁸ 243 total present Murfreeseboro. ⁴⁵⁹	250- 280	280. 14k, 46w, 0 pow, 220 escape.
50 th VA INF	400. 8k, 68w.	400. 8k, 68w, 324 m or escape.	8 pow.	10k, 40w. ⁴⁶⁰ 285 total present Murfreeseboro. ⁴⁶¹ 1 pow. ⁴⁶²	400- 400	400. 10k, 68w, 0 pow, 322 escape.
51 st VA INF	275. 5k, 45w.	275. 5k, 45 w, 225 m or escape.		9k, 43w. ⁴⁶³ ~2 pow. ⁴⁶⁴ 274 total present Murfreeseboro. ⁴⁶⁵	275- 275	275. 5k, 45 w, 0 pow, 225 escape.
56 th VA INF	350. 0k, 0w.	350. 0k, 350 m or escape.		8k, 37w. ⁴⁶⁶	350- 350	270. 8k, 9 w, 0 pow, 253 escape.
1 st TN INF Bn.	270. 0k, 0w.	270. 0k, 270 pow, 0 m or escape.		5 x Co.s. ⁴⁶⁷	270- 270	270. 270 pow.
Bn./ 26 th AL INF	60. 3k, 3w.	60. 0k, 60 pow, 0 m or escape.			60- 60	72. 72 pow.
(3 rd) TN CAV (Forrest)	600. 8k, 15w.	600. 8k, 15w, 100 pow, 470 m or escape.		7 pow. ⁴⁶⁸	600- 600	600. 8k, 15w, 107 pow, 470 escape.
9 th TN CAV Bn.	227. 0k, 1w.	340. 1k, 5w, 303 pow, 31 m or escape.		6 x Co.s. ⁴⁶⁹	227- 340	340. 1k, 5w, 303pow, 31 escape.
CAV Co. (Preston's)			73 pow.		0-73	

[Note: Unit Identity unclear]						
Co. (Milton/Melton's) [Note: Unit Identity unclear]	15. 0k, 0w.	15. 1k, 14 pow.	27 pow.	40. ⁴⁷⁰	15- 40	52. 52 pow.
D (Williams')/ 1 st KY CAV					?	(85). (45 pow), (40 escape).
G (Wilcox's)/ 1 st KY CAV					?	(85). (85 escape)
K (Huey's)/ 1 st KY CAV					?	112. 112 pow.
Water Btys. (inc. A/30 th TN INF, A/50 th TN INF, others) (Dixon, Culbertson)				80 30 th TN present, +instructors. ⁴⁷¹ 75 50 th TN present, +instructors. ⁴⁷² +~200 attached. ⁴⁷³ 1k. ⁴⁷⁴	80- 200	300. 300 pow.
TN Bty. (Ross')	166. 2k, 2w.	113. 2k, 2w, 110 pow, 2 m or escape.			113- 166	116. 2k, 2w, 110 pow, 2 escape.
Section/1 st TN HVY ART (Stankiewicz)				10 present. ⁴⁷⁵	10- 10	34. 1k, 1w, 32 pow.
TN Bty. (Maney's)	100	100. 5k, 9w, 60 pow, 26 m or escape.			?	100. 5k, 9w, 63 pow, 23 escape.
Porter's TN Bty./ (Porter's)	113. 0k, 9w.	113. 7k, 4w, 90 pow, 12 m or escape.	24 pow.	90? ⁴⁷⁶ 8k, 25w; 37 k&w?; 25 K&w?; 12 pow. ⁴⁷⁷ 37 escape? ⁴⁷⁸	90- 113	113. 7k, 4w, 90 pow, 12 escape.

TN Bty. (Parker's)					?	134.
(Murray's Bty.)	80. 0k, 2w.				80- 80	34 pow.
Issaquena Bty. KY (Graves')	50. 0k, 4w.	70. 0k, 4w, 50 pow, 16 m or escape.		3 k&w? ⁴⁷⁹	50- 70	70. 50w, 19 pow, 1 escape.
KY Bty. (French's)					?	54. 54 pow.
KY Bty. (Green's)	76. 0k, 1w.	76. 0k, 1w, 40 pow, 35 m escape.			76- 76	76. 1w, 40 pow, 35 escape.
VA Bty. (Jackson's)	84. 0k, 0w.	54. 0k, 54 m or escape.			54- 84	70. 70 pow.
Goochland Bty./ VA (Guy's)	58. 0k, 0w.	58. 58 m or escape.	35 pow.		58- 58	58. 58 escape.
Baldwin's Bde. HQ				5 (officers only listed); (15 FEB). 2w (15 FEB); 2k, 15w. ⁴⁸⁰	5-5	
Floyd's HQ				3. ⁴⁸¹	3-3+	
Pillow's HQ				13 (officers only listed). 0k, 0w. ⁴⁸²	13- 13+	
2 nd Div. HQ (Buckner's)				12 (officers only listed). ⁴⁸³ 2k, 2w. ⁴⁸⁴ 1 escape. ⁴⁸⁵	12- 12+	
4 th Div. HQ (B. Johnson's)				5 (officers only listed). 5 pow. ⁴⁸⁶	5-5+	
Unit	Nashville <i>Patriot</i>	Major Johnson (engaged)	Major Hays	Other	Total	Gott

Notes & Abbreviations for Tables Appendix-1 and Appendix-2:

Volunteer units use the two-letter state abbreviation; US signifies U.S. Regular Army.

Branch: ART = Artillery; CAV = Cavalry; HQ = Headquarters element;

LT ART = Light Artillery; HVY ART = Heavy Artillery; INF = Infantry;

SS = Sharpshooters.

Echelon: Bn. = Battalion; Bty. = Battery; Co. = Company; Div. = Division;

HQ = Headquarters element; all other units Regiments.

Example: “ ‘A’ Company, 11th Illinois Volunteer Infantry Regiment” = A/11th IL INF.

Strengths: First strength number refers to strength; (-) = estimate.

Losses: k = killed; w = wounded; m = missing; pow = prisoner of war.

Strengths: (-) = estimate.

Table V-1 Selected Defensive Variables and their Factors⁴⁸⁷

Variable	Defensive Factor Advantage
Hasty Defensive Posture	1.30 (1.20 for ACW implied)
Improved Defensive Posture	1.40 (1.30 for ACW implied)
Prepared Defensive Posture	1.50 (1.40 for ACW implied)
Semi-Fortified Defensive Posture	1.55 (1.50 for ACW implied)
Rough, Wooded Terrain	1.35
Somewhat Wet, Cool Weather	1.11

A combination of hasty, improved, prepared, and semi-fortified would multiply a defender's power by at least 1.30 during the American Civil War.

Rough, wooded terrain would multiply a defender's combat power by 1.35.

Wet, cool weather would multiply a defender's combat power by 1.11.

So, the Confederate numbers are multiplied by a factor of 1.948 on 16 FEB 1862 to account for their defensive advantage ($1.30 \times 1.35 \times 1.11 = 1.948$).

Table VI-1 C.S. P.O.Ws/M.I.As before Fort Donelson⁴⁸⁸

Engagement	Date	MIA/POW
Camp Jackson, MO	10 MAY '61	689
Rich Mountain, WV	11-12 JUL '61	63
Beverly, WV	13 JUL '61	555
Booneville, MO	17 JUN '61	60
1 st Bull Run, VA	21 JUL '61	13
Wilson's Creek, MO	10 AUG '61	30
Greenbrier River, WV	3 OCT '61	13
Ball's Bluff, VA	21 OCT '61	2
Saratoga Springs, KY	26 OCT '61	21
Belmont, MO	7 NOV '61	117
Camp Allegheny, WV	13 DEC '61	28
Dranesville, VA	20 DEC '61	8
Mill Springs, KY	19 JAN '62	95
Ft. Henry, TN	6 FEB '62	132
Roanoke Island, NC	8 FEB '62	2,527
Total		4,353

This table is not all inclusive, so the number of Confederate prisoners from engagements previous to Fort Donelson could be higher. On the other hand, not everyone in the missing in action category would have been prisoners of war, so it roughly balances out.

Table VI-2 U.S. P.O.Ws/M.I.As before Fort Donelson⁴⁸⁹

Engagement	Date	MIA/POW
San Antonio, TX	23 APR '61	14
Saluria, TX	25 APR '61	400/500
San Lucas Spring, TX	9 MAY '61	320
Big Bethel, VA	10 JUN '61	5
Vienna, VA	17 JUN '61	9
Carthage, MO	5 JUL '61	5
Blackburn Ford, VA	18 JUL '61	26/ 28
1 st Bull Run, VA	21 JUL '61	1,792/ 1,793
San Augustine Springs, NM	27 JUL '61	500/700
Wilson's Creek, MO	10 AUG '61	291
Cross Lanes, WV	26 AUG '61	200
Lexington, MO	19-20 SEP '61	1,624/ 3,500
Big River Bridge, MO	15 OCT '61	33
Little River Turnpike, VA	15 OCT '61	2
Bolivar Heights, WV	16 OCT '61	2
Ball's Bluff, VA	21 OCT '61	714
West Liberty, KY	23 OCT '61	2
Belmont, MO	7 NOV '61	99
Blake's Farm/ Cotton Hill, WV	10-11 NOV '61	6
Fall's Church, VA	18 NOV '61	26
Vienna, VA	26 NOV '61	26
Fishing Creek, KY	8 DEC '61	15
Annadale Church, VA	13 DEC '61	14
Camp Allegheny, WV	13 DEC '61	10
Sacramento, KY	28 DEC '61	35
Bath/ Hancock/ Great Cacapon Bridge/ Alpine Station/ Sir John's Run, WV	3-4 JAN '62	8
Middle Creek, KY	10 JAN '61	14
Roanoke Island, NC	8 FEB '62	13
Total		4,971/ 6,850

Note: Not all missing in action (MIA) were necessarily prisoners of war (POWs).

APPENDIX B: ADDITIONAL PRIMARY SOURCES

Chapter III: Fort Donelson: The Numbers

During the battle, 18-year old Lieutenant John Watson Morton took over Porter's Tennessee Battery after the name-sake commander was wounded. In his 1909 memoirs, *The Artillery of Nathan Bedford Forrest's Cavalry*, he notes (at first) that 37 of the 48 men who served on the gun crews became casualties, but then specifically states that of the of the 48 men and officers who worked the guns, 8 were killed and 25 wounded. He notes that the limber crews, the caisson crews, and the artificers suffered few casualties (without providing details), but notes that many of the horses were hit at point. He mentions that Lieutenant Burt took most of the mounted elements with him when they found out about the surrender, leaving him to surrender 11 other men to the Yankees. He mentions three blacks who cooked for his mess, but who did not accompany the officers to Camp Chase. During his time at Camp Chase, Morton kept an autograph book which shows the signatures of 137 officers and senior non-commissioned officers (including one Quartermaster Sergeant and Lieutenant Colonel Gantt) taken at Fort Donelson.⁴⁹⁰

In answer to a congressional investigation, Colonel Russell (20th Mississippi) put his engaged (fighting) strength at 552, and his total (present and absent) at "something over 800" on 13 February. He noted that he was aware of only one of his soldiers who made it on board the *General Anderson*, a Henry Williford. His son (Lieutenant Russell) and two others (Adjutant Couper and Lieutenant Conway) escaped by wading Lick Creek. He knew of a total of at least five men from the 20th Mississippi who escaped, and it may have been as many as 25.⁴⁹¹

Private Thomas Riddell recorded his experiences for the *Richmond Dispatch* in 1895. Although he repeats many of the mistaken claims which most Confederates held in the aftermath of the battle (a common failure, even after the publication of the *ORA* and *Battles & Leaders*), and seems to imply that Pillow himself escaped on the *General Anderson*, he seems credible when he sticks to his own activities. He waded neck deep in the near-freezing Cumberland, and was pulled aboard the *General Anderson* just before she pulled away. He discovered that Private Perkins of his battery had also escaped in this manner. Another member of the battery, W. M. Sharp, left with Forrest. Apparently, at least one other man must have escaped, because four men of Guy's battery eventually found of their battery's wagons full of food and baggage, left behind on their way to Dover. This implies that most of the battery was not with them; although Gott's table shows that "58" men of this battery escaped and "0" of them surrendered, most of the Goochland Artillery seems to have been captured; Riddell wrote that he was temporarily assigned to the Brigade surgeon since "my company [was] captured at Fort Donleson."⁴⁹²

Adam R. Johnson wrote that he was ordered to accompany Floyd on the steamboat while his partner, Robert Martin, went with Pillow. He claims that Pillow crossed over the Cumberland on the first trip (rather than taking a raft as most accounts have it) but whether Martin was an eyewitness or heard it from hearsay is hard to tell.⁴⁹³

A letter from Confederate Surgeon H. Griffin (of the 50th Virginia Infantry) to Halleck, dated 3 March 1862 aboard the captured steamer D.A. January, shows that the commissary system at Paducah, Kentucky was not that strict about how many rations it issued out, and that at least one Confederate was captured from the 50th Virginia Infantry (Gott shows "0" surrendered).⁴⁹⁴ This overlooking of a surgeon in the Confederate's

count indicates that most of the numbers account for those “engaged,” not “present.” It also shows that not all Confederate medical personnel went north, at least immediately. On 19 February, Surgeon John Patterson of the 18th Tennessee Infantry writes Grant, recommending that they and the wounded prisoners be paroled.⁴⁹⁵

The 48th Tennessee Infantry’s chapter in the *MAT* notes that two companies (E and K) arrived late on 15 February, and puts the total number of their unit’s prisoners at only 360 men because many of the men were either sick or had been detailed to collect clothing and baggage to make up for that which was lost at Fort Henry. The enlisted prisoners went to Camp Douglas, the line officers to Camp Chase (followed by Johnson’s Island), and the field-grade officers went to Fort Warren.⁴⁹⁶

In a letter to his family from Fort Warren, one of Buckner’s staff officers, Major Alexander Casseday noted that “we reluctantly returned to the trap from which escape would be impossible,” and confirmed that Buckner and the field-grade officers went to Fort Warren.⁴⁹⁷ None of the secondary sources noted the fact that one of Buckner’s staff escaped, or how.⁴⁹⁸

A letter by Francis Bateman of the 78th Ohio Infantry, dated 23 February, noted that the day before, they had found a wounded rebel in a brush heap, wearing shirt sleeves. Both of his legs had been shattered by a cannonball, his face was frozen black, and his hands had frozen off, but he was still alive, and asked for water.⁴⁹⁹ Not every wounded Confederate was accounted for immediately.

Colonel Morgan L. Smith, commanding Lew Wallace’s old brigade, reported that the 8th Missouri took five prisoners during their attack on the afternoon of 15 February.⁵⁰⁰ These men would probably have been listed as missing.

The account of the 49th Tennessee in the MAT mentioned an example of a black body servant at Fort Donelson. On the night of 15 February, the badly (an ultimately, mortally) wounded Lieutenant Colonel Alfred Robb was dropped in the Cumberland while he was being transferred to a steamboat for transport to Clarksville. His “faithful old servant,” Uncle Abram Robb, dived in and rescued him.⁵⁰¹

Wyeth cites several accounts of escapes, often supported by sworn affidavits. One was Bushrod Johnson, who, with his aide, escaped two days after the surrender. Johnson’s statement that “hundreds” of men escaped is vague, but his observation that he has not heard of a single man who tried to escape who “met any obstacle” is, if accurate, interesting. James Woodward failed to get aboard one of the steamboats, so he appropriated a horse abandoned by a black man, and crossed over Lick Creek. He passed many men on foot heading the same way.⁵⁰² S.G. Morgan and James Ellison of the 14th Mississippi Infantry waded across Lick Creek after the surrender and met up with James Grady, L. C. English, and Bence Tubb of the same regiment.⁵⁰³ First Sergeant Chandler of the 27th Alabama Infantry escaped by wading Lick Creek with two other men from his regiment after the surrender.⁵⁰⁴ In an appendix, Wyeth notes the testimonial of Captain Hermann Lieb of the 8th Illinois who argued that the Confederates probably would not have been able to escape, but that Confederate troops held their old position until after morning. This would have left the Charlotte Road open, and perhaps the Forge Road as well.⁵⁰⁵

Chapter V: Decisions: Morning, 16 February

Wyeth cites several escape accounts, often supported by sworn affidavits. Milton Haynes and Bushrod Johnston’s accounts are not relevant to the question of men on foot

evacuating by way of Lick Creek on the morning of 15 February. Milton Haynes was not an eyewitness to the departure of Bidwell, nor of the men of Porter's Tennessee Battery. According to him, they left on horseback. The escape of Bushrod Johnson and his aide is not relevant either, having occurred two days after the surrender during a period of relaxed vigilance. Johnson's statement that "hundreds" of men escaped is vague, but his observation that he has not heard of a single man who tried to escape who "met any obstacle" is, if accurate, interesting. James Woodward, failing to get aboard one of the steamboats, appropriated a horse abandoned by a black man, and crossed over Lick Creek. He passed many men on foot heading the same way.⁵⁰⁶ S.G. Morgan and James Ellison of the 14th Mississippi Infantry waded across Lick Creek after the surrender and met up with James Grady, L. C. English, and Bence Tubb of the same regiment.⁵⁰⁷ First Sergeant Chandler of the 27th Alabama Infantry escaped by wading Lick Creek with two other men from his regiment after the surrender.⁵⁰⁸

APPENDIX C: EXAMPLES OF END-NOTING ERRATA

For Chapter II: Sunny Dixie

McFeely confuses Lew Wallace with William H. L. Wallace.⁵⁰⁹

For Chapter III: Fort Donelson: The Numbers

While discussing Federal strength figures, William Johnston cites Stearns' account in the *Medical and Surgical History* as being in volume one, part one, but it is actually in volume one, part one, *appended documents* section, which has its own page count; page 34 of the main section would take the baffled reader to a chart on sickness and mortality for white troops in the Army of the Potomac, July to November 1861.⁵¹⁰

Catton uses Whittlesey's memoir as a source for the chaotic conditions of the battlefield and surrender (as he did with Brinton and Grant), but completely ignores Whittlesey's prisoner transport lists just three pages away.⁵¹¹ For Confederate prisoners, Catton, 181 cites Brinton, *Personal Memoirs of John H. Brinton*, 142, but should have should cited page 133.

Bearss identifies Private Riddell's account as Captain Guy's: Guy was Riddell's battery commander.⁵¹²

Stonesifer, 207 cites Wyeth, *That Devil Forrest*, 37, but should have cited Wyeth, *That Devil Forrest*, 584.⁵¹³

Regarding Federal troop numbers, Cooling sources Johnston's *Albert Sidney Johnston*, but probably cites the wrong page; 237-242 discuss Johnston's service during the Mormon campaign.⁵¹⁴

Gott quotes one of Lew Wallace's staff officers as saying that Grant left Fort Henry with 15,000 men, but does not cite Lew Wallace's autobiography, which is the obvious

source, citing page 162 of Lieutenant Colonel McPherson's report instead. This page does not refer to Grant's strength, and is only tangentially related to anything in the paragraph; Gott was discussing Wallace's plans to reinforce Grant on 12 February, while McPherson discussed Wallace's actual march on 14 February.⁵¹⁵ Gott also lists the number of escapees from the 27th Alabama Infantry as "0," even though Wyeth (whom Gott apparently ignored) discusses the account of at least three men escaping.⁵¹⁶

For the number of Confederate prisoners, Hurst cites Simon's *The Papers of Ulysses S. Grant* Grant, but cites the wrong page.⁵¹⁷

For Chapter IV: Decisions: Afternoon, 15 February

Hamilton's discussion of the 18th Tennessee and the 32nd Tennessee's return to the trenches coming before Puillow's order due to ammunition concerns, and the latter regiments downing of their gear in the trenches before going into an assault are sourced to *ORA*, page and 353 and 356, but the full account continues on 354 and 357 respectively.⁵¹⁸

McCausland merely noted that Pillow called off the pursuit after pushing the enemy back two miles. For a discussion of what followed, Cummings probably should have cited page 278 instead of 277.⁵¹⁹

For Chapter V: Decision: Morning, 16 February

Of Wyeth's escape accounts, Milton Haynes and Bushrod Johnston's accounts are not relevant to the question of men on foot evacuating by way of Lick Creek on the morning of 15 February. Milton Haynes was not an eyewitness to the departure of Bidwell or the men of Porter's Tennessee Battery, and according to him, they left on horseback. The escape of Bushrod Johnson and his aide is not relevant either, having occurred two days

after the surrender during a period of relaxed vigilance. Johnson's statement that "hundreds" of men escaped is vague, but his observation that he has not heard of a single man who tried to escape who "met any obstacle" is, if accurate, interesting.⁵²⁰

APPENDIX D: EXAMPLES OF EFFECTIVE HISTORICAL REVISIONISM

For Chapter I: Introduction

Revisionists

Katie Letcher Lyle's *Scalded to Death by the Steam* (1983) compares American railroad disasters from the late nineteenth and early-twentieth century to the songs they inspired. Folk history is "a rather inglorious combination of 'artistic' changes, forgetfulness, mishearing, illiteracy, and other factors," and Lyle's corrections give the reader a better understanding of the trains, the railwaymen, the railroads and even the music business of the era. The various inaccuracies seem to reveal an America which craved heroes who were simultaneously individualistic yet dutiful in the face of death.⁵²¹

Niklas Zetterling analyzes World War II operations in the light of revisionist research. His "Analyzing World War II Eastern Front Battles" (1998) critiques G. F. Krivosheev's analysis of Soviet military losses found in *Russia and the USSR in the Wars of the Twentieth Century: Losses of the Armed Forces. A Statistical Study* (2001; itself a ground-breaking work). "Loss Rates on the Eastern Front during World War II" (1996) corrects the studies of Fritz Stoeckli and the Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst's analyses of German versus Soviet combat effectiveness.⁵²² *Normandy 1944* reassesses the conclusions of Stephen Ambrose's *D-Day* (1994), John S. Brown's *Draftee Division* (1986), Max Hastings' *Overlord* (1984), John Keegan's *Six Armies in Normandy* (1982), and Peter Mansoor's *The GI Offensive in Europe* (1999) in the light of primary source evidence. Zetterling concludes that the Allies consistently outnumbered the Germans by a wider margin, while losing fewer casualties, than is normally claimed.⁵²³ Zetterling's collaborative effort with Anders Frankson, *Kursk 1943* (2000), did a similar service for the Eastern Front. They discovered that the operation has been given more importance

than it deserves based on exaggerated Soviet claims for panzer losses and the overlooking of available production.⁵²⁴

Retired British Army officer Michael Reynolds consciously avoided the “Prevalent Proof” fallacy in order to sort out the all the inaccurate German and American accounts of World War II combat.⁵²⁵ His revisionism (or, as one reviewer puts it, “corrective surgery”) compares various primary accounts against each other and to the terrain in the light of his military experience.⁵²⁶ In *The Devil’s Adjutant* (1995), Reynolds recognized that primary accounts of the Battle of the Bulge had their flaws, and applied a critical eye to the accounts of his main subject Colonel Jochen Peiper, keeping in mind that besides the ordinary vanities, much of Peiper’s testimony was the result of coercive interrogations in preparation for his war crimes trial.⁵²⁷ Reynolds sifts through a variety of American fantasies as well, including the difficulty involved in following German activities when the Americans claimed every vehicle to have been a widely-feared Tiger and every gun as an “88.”⁵²⁸ Reynolds debunks a number of myths, solves a variety of tactical issues, and rules out the wilder claims concerning the motives and conduct of the Malmedy Massacre.⁵²⁹ In *Steel Inferno* (1997), he tackles the actual age of the members of the 12th SS *Hitlerjugend* Panzer Division (not much younger than that of the average infantryman on either side), the myth of superbly equipped SS divisions, and debunks the exaggerated claims and excuses of Canadian units during the Normandy Campaign.⁵³⁰ He discovers that at several points, members of the 12th SS Division turned the usual pattern of combatants who exaggerate the enemy’s losses by exaggerating their *own* losses.⁵³¹ This is a case where “Truth is not only stranger than fiction, it is more interesting.”⁵³²

Napoleonic War Revisionism: Line versus Column, or Firepower versus Shock?

In 1910, British historian Charles Oman tried to explain how the British army consistently defeated their French opponents during the Napoleonic Wars. Oman concluded that their success was due to using the reverse slope technique (to counter the French advantage in artillery), the effective use of skirmishers (to counter the French skirmishers and harass the main assault force), and most importantly, the stationary line of red-coated infantry which demolished the attacking French columns with their sustained firepower. Of the last factor, Oman noted that a unit in a two-rank line could train all of its muskets on the enemy, while a column would only be able to return fire with a small part its available muskets. Logically, in a face to face confrontation, a unit in line would have a big advantage over a unit in column (Oman may have been inspired by the naval tactic of “crossing the ‘T’”).⁵³³

In a June 1981 article, American historian James Arnold objected to the third proposition, which attributed British success to their defending in lines against column attacks. First, Arnold noted that French doctrine authorized lines for combat (whether a firefight or a bayonet charge) and columns for quick movement, and allowed for entire battalions to attack in skirmish order. Divisions frequently deployed their battalions in a mutually supporting combination of skirmishers, lines, and columns, known as the mixed order (*ordre mixte*).⁵³⁴ Second, Oman had overlooked several eyewitnesses. These showed that in battle after battle, the French either initially carried out their assaults in lines (not columns), or else started in a column with the intent of forming into a line formation before coming under fire. In these cases, French units were unexpectedly caught while still in column, and had to quickly change formation under fire.⁵³⁵ Faced

with the primary evidence in 1912, Oman had revised his analysis, arguing that the key issue was actually the mathematical superiority of the British two-rank line versus the French three-rank line. Unfortunately many printings of Oman's work retained his old analysis.⁵³⁶ Arnold set out to spread the word with the support of historian David Chandler, the head of Sandhurst's military history department and a repentant "sinner" on the issue of Oman's interpretation.⁵³⁷

At about the same time (1981), Sandhurst lecturer Paddy Griffith wrote *Forward into Battle*. He argued most of the same points as Arnold, and with a new twist. French columns were *too* heavy, deploying not battalions, but entire brigades, divisions, or corps in an unwieldy mass. But the real problem was not the number of muskets bearing on the enemy, but inflexibility. A close reading of the primary sources shows that British tactics were not static at all, but relied on shock rather than firepower. Far from delivering volley after volley into the advancing *fantassin*, the redcoats normally waited for them to come in range, fired a few, or even a single volley, then counter-attacked the intimidated Frenchmen with the bayonet. The French normally fled, frequently dropping their weapons and gear.⁵³⁸ The redcoats did show "solidity," but in the sense of calmly executing difficult maneuvers in the face of the enemy and holding their fire until just the right moment. The question of whether the opposing sides were in column or line formation, or how many ranks were in the line was largely irrelevant. Griffith also observes that the British did not fight in two ranks in order to facilitate sustained combat (since three ranks would better account for losses); they did it to maximize their frontage for a quick assault. The key factors were the commander's timing of the volley and charge, their men's superior discipline and aggressiveness, and a decline in the quality of

the average French soldier as their losses mounted year after year. Arnold and Chandler eventually agreed.⁵³⁹

Griffith theorizes that Britons found Oman's interpretation attractive because they like to think of their soldiers as "expert shots who can get far more from their personal weapons than their excitable alien opponents," who held their ground, "doggedly firing until the foreign hordes melted away."⁵⁴⁰ Griffith also argues that commentators had been subconsciously exaggerating the efficacy of technology at the expense of behavioral factors up until the time of his writing, a premise which John Keegan accepts. In this case, training, discipline, and leadership mattered more than a specific tactical deployment. The redcoats' target was not so much the French soldier as the French soldier's mind.⁵⁴¹ These are important things to keep in mind at any time, but the real lessons were overshadowed for decades because of Oman's historiographical stranglehold.⁵⁴²

Arnold, Griffith, and Chandler all note the difficulty of changing historian's minds once a theory like Oman's takes hold (a likely example of Fischer's Fallacy of Prevalent Proof). Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the revisionist interpretation gained ground, but a review of Richard Hopton's *The Battle of Maida* (2003) showed that there were still a few historians who had not entirely gotten the word. Although Hopton understood that the French also fought in line during that battle, he was still obsessed with the imagined dominance of the firefight, even though his own account shows that most of the actions involved one or two volleys, followed by a bayonet charge; the inexperienced 78th Regiment of Foot, the least experienced British unit, got sucked into a sustained firefight and took far greater losses than the other British units, which relied on shock.⁵⁴³

American Civil War Revisionism: The Myth of the Rifle-Musket

Paddy Griffith's Napoleonic-era findings were not his only revisionist success. Until then, most military historians thought that the replacement of smoothbore muskets with minié ball-firing rifle-muskets resulted in heavier combat losses, especially for attackers, which in turn made frontal assaults almost impossible, which in turn made decisive, Napoleonic-style battles unlikely. The supposed wonder weapon was credited with giving Americans a taste of World War I in the 1860s. To counter the rifle-musket, both sides started digging in to an unprecedented extent, and adopted slower advancing, more decentralized offensive tactics. Historians based this analysis on the assumption that if rifle-muskets had three or four times the range of smoothbore muskets, then they must have been three or four times as deadly.⁵⁴⁴

Griffith knew that French and Prussian troops had successfully attacked rifle-musket-armed defenders, including defenders that were dug in, in 1859, 1864, and 1866. In 1870, the Germans faced French defenders who were armed with breech-loaders which were more advanced than anything available to American Civil War armies; although they often took bloody losses, they were frequently successful. What accounts for the difference between the European and American experiences?

In 1985, Griffith took his insights on the limits of technology and wrote a short article which argued that rifle-musket technology had little to do with the American Civil War's heavy losses, the seeming indecisiveness of its battles, or the supposed change in its tactics.⁵⁴⁵ Griffith pointed out that American armies did not fully adopt the best rifle-muskets until the later part of the war, and poor long-range marksmanship and densely wooded terrain limited the effectiveness of the rifle-musket in actual combat.

Additionally, Americans did not extemporize new tactics in reaction to the death-dealing minié ball. These were adaptations of the French army's tried and tested *zouave* and *chasseur* tactics. Earthworks were not a reaction to rifle-muskets, either. Americans were digging in before they had had much of a chance to face any sort of firepower, let alone minié rifles (Fort Donelson being a case in point). America's pre-war doctrine assumed that militiamen would not be able to hold their positions without them. Entrenchments and heavily wooded terrain combined to limit the decisiveness of American battles because entrenchments not only slowed down an attacker, but dampened a defender's opportunities to conduct effective counter-attacks. In the American Civil War, battalion columns could still move flexibly, but larger columns usually advanced into disaster against minié rifles—just as they had during the Napoleonic-era when faced by mere smoothbores. Griffith finally observed that the decisiveness of Napoleonic-era battles was exaggerated, anyway.⁵⁴⁶

In 1987, Griffith followed up his article with the full-length work *Rally Once Again*, to which he added poor discipline, poor leadership, and bad training as factors for the Civil War's failed assaults and indecisive combat. The rifle-musket did not make the offensive use of close-range artillery noticeably less effective, partly because it was never that effective to begin with, and he also observes that smoothbores firing buck and ball ammunition were actually deadlier than minié rifles at close range.⁵⁴⁷

As with the "Line versus Column" myth, historians did not immediately convert en masse, but the tide seems to be turning.⁵⁴⁸ In 2008, Earl Hess wrote *The Rifle Musket in Civil War Combat: Reality and Myth* which supports Griffith's arguments. It details the practical difficulties of long-range estimation and adds that the rifle-musket did not

exactly make sabre charges obsolete either; their effectiveness in the Napoleonic era was exaggerated to begin with.⁵⁴⁹

Griffith theorized that the typical American's love of gadgets (particularly firearms) had a role to play in the imagined powers of the rifle-musket, while their self-conscious maverick disdain for rules and theory (particularly if European) fed the comforting myth of American improvisation and adaptability.⁵⁵⁰ When the troops were well-disciplined, well-trained, and their leadership was good, Civil War soldiers could achieve decisive results, just as the redcoats did against the French, but as with the "Line versus Column" issue, the obsession with technology obscured important behavioral factors.⁵⁵¹

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⁴ James Lindgren, "Fall from Grace: Arming America and the Bellesiles Scandal," review of *Arming America: The Origins of a National Gun Culture* by Michael A. Bellesiles, *The Yale Law Journal*, vol. 111, no. 8 (June 2002): 2195-2249, 2197, 2221, 2203-2204, 2205-2206, 2210-2212, 2226-2228, 2234-2249, 2203-2204, 2215, 2221, 2223-2224, 2232, 2234-2235, 2235, 2237, 2240-2241; on Bellesiles' mistakes ruining his thesis: 2222-2224, 2237; on Bellesile winning the 2201; on the researchers: 2195, 2197-2199, 2201, 2197.

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⁸ American Historical Association, "Statement on Standards of Professional Conduct," section 5. Accessed 19 March 2012 at:

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¹⁰ Niklas Zetterling and Anders Frankson, *Kursk 1943: A Statistical Analysis*, forward by David M. Glantz (London; Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2000), xii.

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¹¹ Robert M. Citino, *The German Way of War: From the Thirty Years' War to the Third Reich* (Lawrence: University of Kansas, 2005), 269.

Robert M. Citino, *Death of the Wehrmacht: The German Campaigns of 1942* (Lawrence: University of Kansas, 2005), 12-13.

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¹³ American Historical Association, "Statement on Standards of Professional Conduct," section 6. Accessed at: <http://www.historians.org/pubs/Free/ProfessionalStandards.cfm> Updated 8 June 2011 ; downloaded 19 March 2012.

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¹⁴ Citino, *The German Way of War*, 11.

¹⁵ Fischer, *Historians' Fallacies*, 142-144.

¹⁶ Herodotus, *The Landmark Herodotus*, 1.1.1, ix, x-xi, xiv-xvii, xxviii-xxxii, xxxvii, xxxviii-xxxix.

¹⁷ James S. Corum, *The Roots of Blitzkrieg: Hans Von Seeckt and German Military Reform* (Lawrence: University of Kansas, 1992), xi.

¹⁸ Fischer, *Historians' Fallacies*, 41-43, note 4 on 42-43, 181-182.

¹⁹ Fischer, *Historians' Fallacies*, 74-78, 78-82.

²⁰ Burkett and Whitley, *Stolen Valor*, 435.

²¹ Fischer, *Historians' Fallacies*, 70-74.

²² Fischer, *Historians' Fallacies*, 40-41, 51-53.

²³ Verbruggen, *The Art of Warfare in Western Europe During the Middle Ages*, 259.

Verbruggen, *The Art of Warfare in Western Europe during the Middle Ages from the Eighth Century to 1340* (1977 edition), 200, 204, 208, 231.

²⁴ Fischer, *Historians' Fallacies*, 83-85.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 43, 66, 79.

²⁶ Verbruggen, *The Art of Warfare in Western Europe During the Middle Ages*, 36, 106.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 3-4, 9.

²⁸ Verbruggen, *The Art of Warfare in Western Europe During the Middle Ages*, 9.

Zetterling, *Kursk 1943*, xi-xii.

²⁹ Christopher R. Browning, review of *Hitler's Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust* by Daniel Goldhagen, *Indiana University Press*, vol. 8, no. 1 (Summer 1996): 88-108.

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³⁴ Arndt M. Stickles, *Simon Bolivar Buckner: Borderland Knight* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1940), vii.

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⁴⁹ United States War Department, *The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies*, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1880-1901; reprint; Gettysburg: The National Historical Society, 1972), series 1, volume 7, 162, 183, 193, 220.

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⁵¹ Geer, *Campaigns of the Civil War*, 56.

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⁹⁸ US Surgeon General, *Medical and Surgical History*, part 1, vol. 1, "Appended Documents," 27, 34.

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¹⁰¹ Charles F. Hubert, *History of the Fiftieth Regiment Illinois* (Kansas City, MO: Western Veteran Publishing Company, 1894), 74.

¹⁰² Ambrose, *History of the Seventh Regiment Illinois*, 32.

¹⁰³ Frank Moore, editor, *The Rebellion Record: A Diary of American Events*, vol. 4, "Documents" (New York: G.P. Putnam, 1862), 146.

¹⁰⁴ *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 224.

¹⁰⁵ Jordan and Pryor, *The Campaigns of Lieutenant-General N. B. Forrest*, via *Ft. H & D Source Book*, 1348.

¹⁰⁶ *ORA* s. 1, vol. 7, 356.

¹⁰⁷ Brent Nosworthy, *The Bloody Crucible of Courage: Fighting Methods and Combat Experience of the Civil War* (New York: Carroll & Graf Publishers, 2003), 270.

ORA, s. 1, vol. 25, part 1, 626.

ORA, s. 1, vol. 11, part 2, 301, 305.

¹⁰⁸ Paddy Griffith, *Forward into Battle*, 30.

¹⁰⁹ Department of the Army, *Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad*, FM 7-8, (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, 1992), 2-41, Appendix I, 1a (2), Appendix I, 1c. I was trained to do this during my service in the U.S. Army (1984-2000).

¹¹⁰ Nott, *Sketches of the War*, 30, 35.

¹¹¹ Samuel Hawkins Marshall Byers, *Iowa in War Times*, (Des Moines: W.D. Condit & Company, 1888), vol. 1, 95.

¹¹² *ORA* s. 1, vol. 7, 124.

¹¹³ Feis, *Grant's Secret Service*, 70.

¹¹⁴ *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 129-130, 135, 152.

¹¹⁵ Ambrose, *History of the Seventh Regiment Illinois*, 32.

Brinton, *Personal Memoirs*, 124.

Nott, *Sketches of the War*, 26-28.

ORA, s. 1, vol. 7, 174.

Missouri *Democrat*, 17 February 1862 via *Ft. H & D Source Book*, 602.

Hicks, "Fort Donelson," via *Ft. H & D Source Book*, 858.

Thomas, *Soldier Life*, 20-22.

Uptmor, *Civil War Experiences of Henry "Soldier" Uptmor*, 2.

¹¹⁶ Ambrose, *History of the Seventh Regiment Illinois*, 28.

Wilson, *Many Must Fall*, 40.

¹¹⁷ *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 601.

¹¹⁸ Feis, *Grant's Secret Service*, 69-72.

Stonesifer, *A Study in Confederate Command*, 212-213.

¹¹⁹ Grant, *The Papers of Ulysses S. Grant*, vol. 4, 233-235.

ORA, s. 1, vol. 7, 424; 644.

¹²⁰ Foote, *The Civil War*, vol. 1, 815.

¹²¹ Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, revised F. N. Maude, trans. J.J. Graham, (revised, reprint, New York: Barnes & Noble, 1968), vol., 1, book 3, chapter 8, 193-194..

Trevor N. Dupuy, *Numbers, Predictions & War: Using History to Evaluate Combat Factors and Predict the Outcome of Armed Conflict* (1977; revised, Arlington, VA: HERO Books, 1985), 12-13, chart on 213-214.

¹²² *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 358, 278, 267, 328, 327.

¹²³ *Ibid.*, 267-275; 278-327; 327-337, 358-366.

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*, 578, 588-589.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, 152, 843, 855.

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*, 337, 852, 853.

On Forrest's rank, see *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 64, 387, 42.

¹²⁷ Badeau, *The Military History of Ulysses S. Grant*, vol. 1, 35-36.

William Johnston, *Albert Sidney Johnston*, 444-445.

Force, *From Fort Henry to Corinth*, 38, 40.

Foote, *The Civil War*, vol. 1, 198, 201.

Hamilton, *The Battle of Fort Donelson*, 122-23.

McPherson, *Battle Cry of Freedom*, 398.

Gott, *Where the South Lost the War*, 144.

Knight, *The Battle of Fort Donelson*, 101.

¹²⁸ Badeau, *The Military History of Ulysses S. Grant*, vol. 1, 35-36.

Force, *From Fort Henry to Corinth*, 38.

Foote, *The Civil War*, vol. 1., 198, 200.

Gott, *Where the South Lost the War*, 143.

¹²⁹ Catton, *Grant Moves South*, 181.

Foote, *The Civil War*, vol. 1, 198, 201.

Cooling, *Forts Henry & Donelson*, 281.

¹³⁰ William Johnston, *Albert Sidney Johnston*, 445, 538.

¹³¹ Hamilton, *The Battle of Fort Donelson*, 122-23.

Stonesifer, *A Study in Confederate Command*, 394.

Gott, *Where the South Lost the War*, 246; 262, 282-285.

¹³² Foote, *The Civil War*, vol. 1, 215.

Stonesifer, *A Study in Confederate Command*, 374.

Hamilton, *The Battle of Fort Donelson*, 286.

Gott, *Where the South Lost the War*, 262, 284.

Hurst. *Men of Fire*, 315.

¹³³ Badeau, vol. 1, 35-36 probably uses *ORA* s. 1, vol. 7, 159.

William Johnston, 444 probably cites *ORA* s. 1, vol. 7, 159 via Badeau, vol. 1, 35-36.

Force, 38 probably uses *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 159 (Grant).

Stonesifer, 200-201 cites *ORA* s. 1, vol. 7, 159 via Benjamin F. Cooling, "The First Nebraska Infantry and the Battle of Fort Donelson," *Nebraska History*, no. 45 (June 1964): 131-146, 134.

Cooling, 216 cites *ORA* s. 1, vol. 7, 159 via William Johnston, *Albert Sidney Johnston*, 237-242, should cite: William Johnston, *Albert Sidney Johnston*, 443-445.

¹³⁴ Grant, *Memoirs* (AMS Press), 176, 180.

¹³⁵ Grant, *Memoirs* (DSI), vol. 1, 298, 313.

Stonesifer, 200-201 cites Grant, *Memoirs* (DSI style), vol. 1, 298 via Benjamin F. Cooling, "The First Nebraska Infantry and the Battle of Fort Donelson," *Nebraska History*, no. 45 (June 1964): 131-146, 134.

Stonesifer, 212 cites Grant, *Memoirs* (DSI style), 298.

James McPherson, 398 cites Grant, *Memoirs* (DSI style), 305.

Gott, 143-144 cites Grant (AMS style), 185.

¹³⁶ Brinton, *Personal Memoirs of John H. Brinton*, 133.

For Confederate prisoners, Catton, 181 cites Brinton, *Personal Memoirs of John H. Brinton*, 142, should cite Brinton, 133.

¹³⁷ *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 162.

Stonesifer, 200-201 cites *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 162 via Benjamin F. Cooling, "The First Nebraska," *Nebraska History*, no. 45, 134.

¹³⁸ *NY Herald*, 21 FEB 1862.

Gott, 143-144 cites *NY Herald*, 21 FEB 1862, via *Ft. H&D Source Book*, 541-42.

¹³⁹ Smith, *Thirty-First Regiment of Indiana Volunteer Infantry*, 19.

Stonesifer. 200-201 cites John T. Smith, *A History of the Thirty-First Regiment of Indiana Volunteer Infantry in the War of the Rebellion* (Cincinnati: Western Methodist Book Concern, 1900), 10, 11.

¹⁴⁰ Smith, *Thirty-First Regiment of Indiana Volunteer Infantry*, 10, 11.

¹⁴¹ Wallace, "The Capture of Fort Donelson," *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*, vol. 1, editorial footnote on 406.

¹⁴² Hamilton, 122-123 cites Wallace, *Autobiography*, vol. 1, 379, 383, 384.

¹⁴³ Casseday, "The Surrender of Fort Donelson," *The Southern Bivouac*, 697, 696.

Morton, "Buckner Tells the Story of the Fall of Fort Donelson," *Nashville Banner*, December 11, 1909.

Bearss, *Unconditional Surrender*, 45 cites Casseday via the *Ft. H & D Source Book*.

William Johnston, 444 cites US Surgeon General, *Medical and Surgical History of the War*; vol. 1, part 1, 34, should cite US Surgeon General, *Medical and Surgical History of the War*; vol. 1, part 1, *Appended Documents*, 34, because the appended documents section has an entirely different page count.

¹⁴⁴ William Johnston, *Albert Sidney Johnston*, 445 cites two War Dept. memos; 538 cites War Department memos.

Cooling, 216 cites William Johnston, *Albert Sidney Johnston*, 237-242, should cite William Johnston, *Albert Sidney Johnston*, 443-445, 538.

¹⁴⁵ US Surgeon General, *Medical and Surgical History in the War of the Rebellion*, vol. 1, part 1, "Appended Documents," 34.

¹⁴⁶ *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 167-169.

Stonsifer, 374 cites *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 167-169.

Hamilton, 286 cites *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 167-169.

¹⁴⁷ Geer, *Campaigns of the Civil War*, 55, 59; Cooling, *Forts Henry & Donelson*, endnote 39 on 307; Gott, *Where the South Lost the War*, 262-63.

¹⁴⁸ Badeau, *The Military History of Ulysses S. Grant*, vol. 1, 50, 51, footnote on 51-52.

¹⁴⁹ Hamilton, *The Battle of Fort Donelson*, 124, 285.

ORA, s. 1, vol. 7, 346, 370.

¹⁵⁰ William Johnston, *Albert Sidney Johnston*, 443, 469, 473-482.

Force, *Fort Henry to Corinth*, 35-36, 36-37, 40, 63.¹⁵⁰

Wyeth, *Nathan Bedford Forrest*, 59-63, 67-71.

Geer, *Campaigns of the Civil War*, 55, 59.

Shelby Foote, *The Civil War*, vol. 1, 201, 215.

Catton, *Grant Moves South*, 181.

Bearss, *Unconditional Surrender*, 40-43, 45.

Stonesifer, *A Study in Confederate Command*, 207, 371-372, 393, 394.

McPherson, *Battle Cry of Freedom*, 161.

Gott, *Where the South Lost the War*, 262-63, 286-288.

Hurst, *Men of Fire*, 314- 315 cites *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 335; Grant, *The Papers of Ulysses S. Grant*, vol. 4, John Y. Simon ed., vol. 4, 221.

¹⁵¹ Hamilton, 361.

¹⁵² Gott, 281-288 cites unspecified *ORA*, to tabulate strength and losses, and personal accounts to fill in the gaps.

¹⁵³ *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 863.

Cooling, 126 cites *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 6, 823; *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 862-63.

¹⁵⁴ *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 270, 275.

William Johnston, 469, 473-482 probably cites *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 275.

Wyeth, *Nathan Bedford Forrest*, 59-63, 67-71 cites *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 275.

Bearss, 45 cites *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 270.

Stonesifer, 207 cites Wyeth, *That Devil Forrest*, 37, should cite: Wyeth, *That Devil Forrest*, 584.

Hamilton, 321 cites *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 275.

Hurst, 315 cites *ORA*, s 1, vol. 7, 270.

Hurst, 314-315 cites *ORA*, s 1, vol. 7, 335.

¹⁵⁵ Gott, 255, endnote 7 for chapter 13 on 315 cites *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 415 to explain the identification of the “400 raw recruits as Mississippians rather than the last-minute arrival of E & K / 48th TN INF. Pillow’s statement is *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 302.

MAT, 546.

¹⁵⁶ *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 291.

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid*, 293-294, 296-297, 297-298, 299-300.

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid*, 407.

Hamilton, 321 cites *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 409.

¹⁵⁹ Casseday, “The Surrender of Fort Donelson,” *The Southern Bivouac*, 697, 696.

Bearss, *Unconditional Surrender*, 45 cites Casseday via the *Ft. H & D Source Book*.

¹⁶⁰ *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 386, 296.

Badeau, vol. 1, 52 probably uses *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 386.

William Johnston, 469, 473-482 probably cites *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 386.

Hamilton, 308, cites *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 386.

Cooling, 205 cites Jordan & Pryor’s *The Campaigns of LTG N.B. Forrest and of Forrest’s Cavalry* via *Ft. H&D Source Book*, 1347, 1349, footnote on 1349, which in turn probably uses *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 386; Wyeth, *Nathan Bedford Forrest*, 55; John Watson Morton, *The Artillery of Nathan Bedford Forrest’s Cavalry*. (Nashville, TN / Dallas, TX: Publishing House of the M.E. Church, 1909; reprint, Paris, TN: The Guild Bindery Press, 1988), 33-34.

¹⁶¹ Hamilton, *Fort Donelson*, 308.

¹⁶² Adam R. Johnson, *The Partisan Rangers*, 70, 73.

¹⁶³ *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 358, 364.

Wyeth, *Nathan Bedford Forrest*, 59-63, 67-71 cites *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 364, 367.

Hamilton, 340 cites *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 364.

¹⁶⁴ *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 380, 392, 415-416. Russell was ill during the battle.

L. J. Bailey, "Escape From Fort Donelson," *Confederate Veteran*, issue 12 (December 1913): 64, 64.

Wyeth, *Nathan Bedford Forrest*, 59-63, 67-71 cites *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 416, 380, 392.

Hamilton, 319-20 cites *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 379, 415.

Hamilton, 321 cites *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 382; 415 but should cite: 379.

Hamilton, 323 cites *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 416.

Cooling, 215, 217 cites Charles M. Cummings, *Yankee Quaker, Confederate General*, 207-213 [actually 206-213], which in turn cites *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 365 [actually 364-365], should cite: *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 415-416.

¹⁶⁵ *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 390; Wyeth, *Nathan Bedford Forrest*, 60.

Wyeth, 59-63, 67-71 cites *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 412.

¹⁶⁶ *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 412.

Hamilton, 313-314 cites 390.

¹⁶⁷ *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 394-395.

Hamilton, 313-14 cites 396.

¹⁶⁸ Wyeth, *Nathan Bedford Forrest*, 60, *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 416.

¹⁶⁹ Morton, *The Artillery of Nathan Bedford Forrest's Cavalry*, 363-374.

¹⁷⁰ Wyeth, *Nathan Bedford Forrest*, 59-63, 60-61, 61-62, 67-71.

Wyeth, 59-63, 67-71 cites account/ affidavit of James Chandler.

Hamilton, 323, 324-25, 326 cites Wyeth, *Nathan Bedford Forrest*, 60-61.

Hamilton, 324 cites Wyeth, *Nathan Bedford Forrest*, 61.

Hamilton, 333, 335-336, 339, 344 cites Wyeth, *Nathan Bedford Forrest*, 71.

¹⁷¹ Wilson, *The Confederate Soldier*, 47- 78.

Cooling, 215 cites LeGrand James Wilson, *The Confederate Soldier*, chapters 6-14.

¹⁷² Riddell, "Movements of the Goochland Light Artillery," *Richmond Dispatch*, 10 February 1895 via *Ft. H&D Source Book*, 1354, 1355, 1355, 1356.

Cooling, 207-208 cites Riddell, "Movements of the Goochland Light Artillery," *Richmond Dispatch*, 10 February 1895.

Gott, 255-256 cites Riddell, "Movements of the Goochland Light Artillery," *Richmond Dispatch*, 10 February 1895 via the *Ft. H & D Source Book*, 1354.

¹⁷³ Frank Moore, ed., *The Rebellion Record: A Diary of American Events*, vol. 4, 187.

William Johnston, 469, 473-482, cites *Medical and Surgical History of the War*, which in turn cites Major Thomas Johnson's list, *Nashville Patriot*.

Bearss, *Unconditional Surrender*, 41 cites Force, *From Fort Henry to Corinth*, 61, which in turn probably cites the list from the *Nashville Patriot*.

Gott, 262-263 cites Force, *From Fort Henry to Corinth*, 61, which in turn uses William Johnston, *Albert Sidney Johnston*, 479.

¹⁷⁴ *Medical and Surgical History of the War*, part 1, vol. 1, "Appended Documents," 35-36 which in turn cites Major Thomas Johnson's list.

Bearss, *Unconditional Surrender*, 40-43 cites Force, *From Fort Henry to Corinth*, 61, which in turn cites Thomas Johnson's list .

Gott, 262-263 cites Force, *From Fort Henry to Corinth*, 61; perhaps William Johnston, *Albert Sidney Johnston*, 479.

¹⁷⁵ Force, *From Fort Henry to Corinth*, 61-62.

¹⁷⁶ Grant, *The Papers of Ulysses S. Grant*, Simon ed., vol. 4, 224, 229, 240, 248.

ORA, s. 1, vol. 7, 159, 625.

Geer, 55, 59 cites Grant, *Memoirs* (DSI edition), vol. 1, 314-315.

Badeau, vol. 1, 50-51, probably uses *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 159.

Catton, 181 cites *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 10, part 2, 62.

Cooling, 283 cites Grant, *The Papers of Ulysses S. Grant January*, Simon ed., vol. 4, 221, footnote 1 on 226.

Hamilton, 333, 335-336, 339, 344 cites *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 625; Grant, *Memoirs* (AMS edition), 185.

Cooling, 216, 283 cites Grant, *The Papers of Ulysses S. Grant*, Simon ed., vol. 4, 221, footnote 1 on 226, which in turn cites [Grant's] *Memoirs*, 313; *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 335; *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 944, *ORA*, s. 2, vol. 3, 282, 283; Badeau, *Military History of US Grant*, 51, 51n-52n.

Cooling, endnote 39 on 307 cites Grant, *The Papers of Ulysses S. Grant*, vol. 4, editor Simon, 221, footnote 1 on 226.

Hurst, 315 cites *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 270, 91, 628 [actually, 625], Grant's *The Papers of Ulysses S. Grant*, Simon, ed. Vol. 4, 226, and Bearss which (again) cites Simon, but adds 229.

Hurst, 314-315 cites *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 335.

¹⁷⁷ Badeau, *Military History of US Grant*, vol. 1, 51, 51n-52n; Grant, *Memoirs*, vol. 1, 314 cites commissary ration list.

¹⁷⁸ Hamilton, *The Battle of Fort Donelson*, 344.

¹⁷⁹ William Johnston, *Albert Sidney Johnston*, 474.

¹⁸⁰ *ORA*, s. 2, vol. 3, 346.

¹⁸¹ *Ibid*, 300.

¹⁸² *Ibid*, 316-317.

¹⁸³ George F. Watson, editor, *Hardee's Rifle and Light Infantry Tactics* (revised, bootleg copy with supplemental appendices, New York: J.O. Kane, 1862), 157-158.

Cooling, 205 cites Wyeth, *Nathan Bedford Forrest*, 55, should cite: Morton, *The Artillery of Nathan Bedford Forrest's Cavalry*, 33-34.

¹⁸⁴ *ORA*, s. 4, vol. 1, 128. At full strength, a CS INF/CAV/ART company had 1 x captain and 3 x lieutenants; a RGT had 1 x colonel, 1 x lieutenant colonel, 1 x major, and 1 x adjutant.

¹⁸⁵ *ORA*, s. 2, vol. 3, 333.

Stonesifer, 371-372 cites *ORA*, s. 2, vol. 3, 299, 309, 311, 312.

¹⁸⁶ Grant, *The Papers of Ulysses S. Grant*, vol. 4, ed. John Y. Simon, footnote 1 on 226, which in turn cites *Cincinnati Commercial*, 26 FEB 1862.

¹⁸⁷ Gott, *Where the South Lost the War*, 263.

¹⁸⁸ George Whittlesey, *War Memoranda: Cheat River to the Tennessee 1861-1862* (Cleveland: W.W. Williams, 1884), 42.

¹⁸⁹ Whittlesey, *War Memoranda*, 41-42.

Hamilton, 333, 335-336, 339, 344 cites Whittlesey, *War Memoranda*, 42.

¹⁹⁰ *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 335; Morton, "Buckner Tells the Story of the Fall of Fort Donelson," *Nashville Banner*, December 11, 1909.

Bearss, *Unconditional Surrender*, 40-43 cites *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, M.B. Morton, "Buckner Tells the Story of the Fall of Fort Donelson," *Nashville Banner*, December 11, 1909.

¹⁹¹ Whittlesey, *War Memoranda*, 42.

¹⁹² *ORA*, s. 2, vol. 3, 283; Whittlesey, *War Memoranda*, 41-42.

¹⁹³ Whittlesey, *War Memoranda*, 41-42.

ORA, s. 2, vol. 3, 272, 318-319.

Campbell, *Diary of Andrew Jackson Campbell*, ed. Garrett, 23 (20th OH INF still escort 25 FEB 1862). Whittlesey, *War Memoranda*, 42.

¹⁹⁴ *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 320, 309.

¹⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 136.

Avery, *Fourth Illinois Cavalry Regiment*, 55-56, 57. Avery reasserts that 41 men were captured, not 38, but postulates that 3 may have escaped while being escorted back to Ft. Henry.

¹⁹⁶ Cecil Miller, "Forgotten Chapter in Lafayette's Civil War," Works Project Administration Project 1938-1939.
Accessed at: <http://www.countyhistory.com/tippecanoe/civilwar.htm>

¹⁹⁷ Barber, *Holding the Line*, edited by Ferrell, 39-40; Campbell, *Andrew Jackson Campbell*, ed. Garrett, 21-25, Randall W. McGavock, *Pen and Sword: The Life and*

Journals of Randall W. McGavock, the Political and Civil War Journals, 1853-1862. ed. By Jack Allen (Jackson, TN: The Tennessee Historical Commission, 1960), 598-599.

ORA, s. 2, vol. 3, 276, 278, 282, ORA, s. 1, vol. 7, 944, 283, 281, 291.

Bearss, *Unconditional Surrender*, 40-43 cites ORA, s. 2, vol. 3, 278, 282, 311, 315, 325, 325.

Stonesifer, 371-372 cites ORA, s. 2, vol. 3, 299, 312, 309, 311.

¹⁹⁸ ORA, s. 2, vol. 3, 318-319.

¹⁹⁹ Ibid, 278, 311, 312, 312, 315, 317, 318-319, 320, 325, 325.

²⁰⁰ Ibid, 367-368.

²⁰¹ Ibid, 421.

²⁰² Smith, *Incidents Among Shot & Shell*, 5-8.

²⁰³ Smith, *Incidents Among Shot & Shell*, 63.

Cooling, endnote 39 on 307 cites Smith, *Incidents Among Shot & Shell*, 63.

²⁰⁴ Fort Donelson National Battlefield, Tennessee, Tour Stop 3; conversation with Park Ranger, sometime in 2000-2001; "Fort Donelson Map, Showing Improved Tour Route."

²⁰⁵ ORA, s. 2, vol. 3, 408.

²⁰⁶ Barber, *Holding the Line*, 189-251; 37, 222.

²⁰⁷ Ibid, 189-251.

²⁰⁸ John S. Wilkes "First Experience of Battle: Fort Donelson," *Confederate Veteran*, vol. 14, no. 11 (November 1906): 500-501, 501.

²⁰⁹ ORA, s. 2, vol. 1, 808.

²¹⁰ Campbell, *Andrew Jackson Campbell*, 25, 32; Barber, *Holding the Line*, 49; 2, 22; McGavock, *Pen and Sword*, ed. Jack Allen, 600; Casseday, "The Surrender of Fort Donelson," *The Southern Bivouac*, 696, 697.

²¹¹ ORA, s. 1, vol. 7, 328, 416.

²¹² William Johnston, *Albert Sidney Johnston*, 445-538.

Cooling, 216, 283 cites William Johnston, *Albert Sidney Johnston*, 237-242 relating to ASJ's service in Utah, should cite: Johnston, *Albert Sidney Johnston*, 443.

Cooling, endnote 39 on 307 cites William Johnston, *Albert Sidney Johnston*, 237-42, probably should cite: Johnston, *Albert Sidney Johnston*, 443.

²¹³ *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 10, part 1, 398.

²¹⁴ Buel and Johnson, "The Opposing Forces at Shiloh," *Battles & Leaders*, vol. 1, 538.

²¹⁵ William Johnston, "Albert Sidney Johnston at Shiloh," *Battles and Leaders*, vol. 1, 552.

²¹⁶ *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 10, part 1, 112.

²¹⁷ US Surgeon General, *Medical and Surgical History of the War*, vol. 1 part 1, 34.

²¹⁸ 45th Illinois Letter Book, RG Number 94, Stack 9W3, National Archives and Records Administration, Washington D.C., 154.

ORA, s. 1, vol. 7, 168.

²¹⁹ *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 167-169.

45th Illinois Letter Book, 154.

²²⁰ *Medical and Surgical History of the War*, part 1, vol. 1, "Appended Documents," 34.

²²¹ *Ibid*, 34.

²²² *Ibid*, 35-36.

²²³ Francis M. Bateman, letter dated 23 February 1862. Civil War Manuscripts, Library of Congress.

²²⁴ *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 233.

²²⁵ Riddell, "Movements of the Goochland Light Artillery," *Richmond Dispatch*, 10 February 1895 via *Ft. H&D Source Book*, 1354, 1355, 1355, 1356.

Cooling, 207-208 cites Riddell, "Movements of the Goochland Light Artillery," *Richmond Dispatch*, 10 February 1895.

Gott, 255-256 cites Riddell, "Movements of the Goochland Light Artillery," *Richmond Dispatch*, 10 February 1895 via the *Ft. H & D Source Book*, 1354.

²²⁶ Gott, table on 286 should cite: Wyeth, *Nathan Bedford Forrest*, 59-63, 67-71, 60, 61.
ORA, s. 2, vol. 3, 346.

Gott's bibliography is on 319-331.

²²⁷ *MAT*, 708, 711.

²²⁸ Knight, *The Battle of Fort Donelson*, 145.

²²⁹ Wilkes "First Experience of Battle," *Confederate Veteran*, 501.

²³⁰ Campbell, *Andrew Jackson Campbell*, ed. Garrett, 25, 32; Barber, *Holding the Line*, 49; McGavock, *Pen and Sword*, ed., 600.

²³¹ Casseday, "The Surrender of Fort Donelson," *The Southern Bivouac*, 697.

Lew Wallace mentions Buckner's slave: *Autobiography*, vol. 1., 429.

²³² *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 796, 799. Halleck's policy in the Department of the Missouri was to exclude runaways from military camps to avoid becoming "negro-catchers or negro stealers."

²³³ *ORA*, s. 2, vol. 3, 309.

²³⁴ *ORA*, s. 2, vol. 3, 318-319.

²³⁵ Grant, *The Papers of Ulysses S. Grant*, Simon ed., vol. 4, 224, 229, 240, 248.

ORA, s. 1, vol. 7, 159, 625.

²³⁶ *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 364.

Barber, *Holding the Line*, 189-251.

²³⁷ Barber, *Holding the Line*, 37, 222.

²³⁸ Bailey, "Escape From Fort Donelson," *Confederate Veteran*, issue 12: 64, 64.

Morton, *The Artillery of Nathan Bedford Forrest's Cavalry*, 363-374.

Wilkes "First Experience of Battle: Fort Donelson," *Confederate Veteran*, vol. 14, no. 11 (November 1906): 500-501, 501.

Campbell, *Andrew Jackson Campbell*, 25, 32.

McGavock, *Pen and Sword*, ed. Jack Allen, 600.

Casseday, "The Surrender of Fort Donelson," *The Southern Bivouac*, 697.

²³⁹ *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 291.

Barber, *Holding the Line*, 189-251.

²⁴⁰ *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 275.

Casseday, "The Surrender of Fort Donelson," *The Southern Bivouac*, 697, 696.

Adam R. Johnson, *The Partisan Rangers*, 70, 73.

Riddell, "Movements of the Goochland Light Artillery," *Richmond Dispatch*, 10 February 1895 via *Ft. H&D Source Book*, 1354, 1355, 1355, 1356.

²⁴¹ *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 296, 386, 390.

Morton, *The Artillery of Nathan Bedford Forrest's Cavalry*, 363-374

Riddell, "Movements of the Goochland Light Artillery," *Richmond Dispatch*, 10 February 1895 via *Ft. H&D Source Book*, 1354, 1355, 1355, 1356.

Wyeth, *Nathan Bedford Forrest*, 59-63, 60-61, 61-62, 67-71.

²⁴² *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 284-285, 407.

Adam Johnson, *The Partisan Rangers*, 70, 73.

²⁴³ Bailey, "Escape From Fort Donelson," *Confederate Veteran*, 64.

Barber, *Holding the Line*, 189-251.

Riddell, "Movements of the Goochland Light Artillery," *Richmond Dispatch*, 10 February 1895 via *Ft. H&D Source Book*, 1354, 1355, 1355, 1356.

Wilson, *The Confederate Soldier*, 47- 78; 68-69, 74-76.

Wyeth, 59-63, 67-71.

²⁴⁴ Trevor N. Dupuy, *Attrition: Forecasting Battle Casualties and Equipment Losses in Modern War* (Falls Church, VA: NOVA Productions, 1995), 107, 109-111; 116-117.

Dupuy, *Numbers, Predictions & War*, 12-13, 48-49, chart on 213-214; 157-158

²⁴⁵ Gott, *Where the South Lost the War*, 243.

²⁴⁶ Foote, *The Civil War*, vol. 1, 206.

Cooling, *Forts Henry and Donelson*, 181.

Stonesifer, *A Study in Confederate Command*, 219-220, 334-335.

Gott, *Where the South Lost the War*, 279-280.

²⁴⁷ *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 52, part 2, 272, 273.

ORA, s. 1, vol. 7, 330, 386.

²⁴⁸ *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 263, 265; 281, 282.

²⁴⁹ *Ibid*, 332-333.

²⁵⁰ *Ibid*, 228, 229.

ORA, s. 1, vol. 52, part 1, 8, 10.

²⁵¹ *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 330-331.

²⁵² *Ibid*, 356.

²⁵³ Force, *From Fort Henry to Corinth*, 47.

Stickles, *Simon Bolivar Buckner*, 141, 144, 147-152, 149.

Foote, *The Civil War*, vol. 1, 206, 207

Catton, *Grant Moves South*, 164, 170-171.

Stonesifer, *A Study in Confederate Command*, 263-266.

McPherson, *Battle Cry of Freedom*, 400, 401.

²⁵⁴ *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 330-331.

Morton. "Bolivar Buckner Tells the Story of the Fall of Fort Donelson," Nashville *Banner*.

Stickles, 149-151 cites *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 330-333.

Stickles, 151-152 cites *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 332-333; M.B. Morton, "Buckner Tells the Story of the Fall of Fort Donelson," Nashville *Banner*, December 11, 1909.

Hamilton, 157-162 cites *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 330-331.

Hamilton, 245-248 cites *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 332.

Hamilton, 249-250 cites *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 333.

Stickles, 151-152 cites M.B. Morton, "General Simon Bolivar Buckner Tells the Story of the Fall of Fort Donelson," Nashville *Banner*, December 11, 1909 (plan).

Cooling, 180-183 cites *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 332-333; M.B. Morton, "General Simon Bolivar Buckner Tells the Story of the Fall of Fort Donelson," Nashville *Banner*, December 11, 1909.

Hughes and Stonesifer, 223 cites *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 330.

For the aborted 14 FEB attack, see *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 379.

Stonesifer, 263-265 cites *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 330-331.

²⁵⁵ *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 268-269, 271-273 (Floyd 20 MAR 1862).

Stickles, 149-151 cites *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 268-269.

Stickles, 151-152 cites *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 269, 270-275.

Catton, 170-171 cites *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 269-275.

Cooling, 180-183 cites *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 269.

Hughes and Stonesifer, 223 cites *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 268.

Gott, 220 cites *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 268-269.

²⁵⁶ *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 281-284, 285-286, 314, 316, 318-319.

Stickles, 149-151 cites *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 281, 282, 286, 319.

Catton, 170-171 cites *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 287-289.

Stonesifer, 263-265 cites *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 286, 318.

Hamilton, 157-162 cites *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 268.

Hamilton, 245-248 cites *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 269, 273.

Cooling, 180-183 cites *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 283, 318-319, 323 Pillow.

²⁵⁷ *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 360 (Bushrod Johnson).

Stonesifer, 263-265 cites *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 360.

²⁵⁸ *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 369 (Heiman).

Stonesifer, 263-265 cites *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 369.

Hughes and Stonesifer, 223-224, 224 cites *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 369.

Jack Hurst, 229-230 cites 369.

²⁵⁹ *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 377.

Stonesifer, 263-265 cites *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 377.

²⁶⁰ *MAT*, 443.

²⁶¹ McGavock, *Pen and Sword*, ed. Jack Allen, 591.

²⁶² *Ibid*, 582.

²⁶³ *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 263, 265-266.

Stonesifer, 263-265 cites *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 263.

Cummings, 197 cites *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 263.

Cooling, 180-183 cites *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 265-266.

Jack Hurst, 229-230 cites 263.

²⁶⁴ Stickles, *Simon Bolivar Buckner*, 149-150.

ORA, s. 1, vol. 7, 265-266, 282, 286.

²⁶⁵ *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 385, 387.

Stickles, 149-151 cites *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 383-387.

Catton, 164 cites *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 383-387.

Stonesifer, 263-265 cites *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, Forrest.

²⁶⁶ Stickles, *Simon Bolivar Buckner*, 144.

Stickles, 144 cites *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 297, 298.

For Pillow and Forrest in 1863, see *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 23, part 2, 827-828.

²⁶⁷ Stickles, *Simon Bolivar Buckner*, 150-151, 155.

ORA, s. 1, vol. 7, 384.

²⁶⁸ Johnson, *The Partisan Rangers of the Confederate States Army*, 65.

Stickles, 149-151 cites Adam R. Johnson, *Partisan Rangers*, 65.

²⁶⁹ *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 353.

Stickles, 149 cites *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 352.

²⁷⁰ *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 338-339; 347; 352, 355, Grant, *Memoirs*, 252.

Stickles, 149 cites *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 338-339, 347, 352; Grant, *Memoirs*, vol. 1, 252.

Stickles, 151-152 cites Grant, *Memoirs*, vol. 1 (World Publishing edition), 157.

Stonesifer, 263-265 cites *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 347, 355.

Stonesifer, 309 cites Grant, *Memoirs*, vol. 1, 305-307.

Hamilton, 157-162 cites *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 352.

Hamilton, 245-248 cites *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 356, 345, 353.

Hurst, 229-230 cites 338.

²⁷¹ *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 356.

²⁷² Geer, *Campaigns of the Civil War*, 57 (no plan).

Fuller, *The Generalship of Ulysses S. Grant*, 86.

Cummings, *Yankee Quaker, Confederate General*, 197.

Hamilton, *The Battle of Fort Donelson*, 157-162, 245-248, 249-250, 279.

Cooling, *Forts Henry and Donelson*, 182-183, 181-182, 198.

Hughes and Stonesifer Jr., *The Life and Wars of Gideon J. Pillow*, 223, 330, 365, 223-224, 224.

Hurst, *Men of Fire*, 229-230..

²⁷³ *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 283, 314, 318, 323.

Fuller, 86 cites *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 283, 314, 318.

Hamilton, 157-162 cites *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 282, 285-286.

Hamilton, 245-248 cites *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 290, 316.

Hughes and Stonesifer, 223-224, 224 cites *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 281-282.

Hughes and Stonesifer, 224 sources to *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 317-318, 323.

Gott, 220 cites *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 290.

Gott, 244 cites *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 322, 387.

²⁷⁴ *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 360.

Cummings, 197 cites *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 360, 365.

Hamilton, 157-162 cites *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 365.

Hamilton, 249-250 cites *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 361.

Cooling, 164-165 cites *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 360.

Cooling, 180-183 cites *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 365.

Hughes and Stonesifer, 223-224, 224 cites *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 365.

Gott, 244 cites ORA, s. 1, vol. 7, 365.

²⁷⁵ Hughes, "Why Fort Donelson Was Surrendered," 303.

Cooling, 180-183 cites Hughes, "Why Fort Donelson Was Surrendered," 303.

²⁷⁶ Gott, *Where the South Lost the War*, 189, 220, 243-244, 275.

²⁷⁷ Gott apparently uses, but does not cite, Hughes, "Why Fort Donelson Was Surrendered," 303, 317.

ORA, s. 1, vol. 7, 268-269.

²⁷⁸ ORA, s. 1, vol. 7, 290.

Hughes, "Why Fort Donelson Was Surrendered," 303.

²⁷⁹ ORA, s. 1, vol. 7, 355.

²⁸⁰ ORA, s. 1, vol. 7, 360, 365, 263, 265-266.

²⁸¹ Geer, *Campaigns of the Civil War*, 55.

Fuller, *The Generalship of Ulysses S. Grant*, 86.

Stonesifer, *A Study in Confederate Command*, 205, 265-266.

Cummings, *Yankee Quaker, Confederate General*, 193.

Cooling, *Forts Henry and Donelson*, 181.

James A. Ramage, Review of *The Life and Wars of Gideon J. Pillow*, by Nathaniel Cheairs Hughes Jr. and Roy P. Stonesifer Jr., *The American Historical Review*, vol. 100, no. 2 (April 1995): 587, 587.

W. Wayne Smith, Review of *The Life and Wars of Gideon J. Pillow*, by Nathaniel Cheairs Hughes Jr. and Roy P. Stonesifer Jr., *Pennsylvania History*, Volume 62, Number 2 (Spring 1995): 256-257, 257.

²⁸² Grant, *Memoirs* (AMS Press edition), 108-111, 182, 184-185.

Wallace, "The Capture of Fort Donelson," *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*, vol. 1, 401, 428.

Wallace, *Smoke, Sound and Fury*, 95.

²⁸³ Flavell C. Barber, *Holding the Line*, 31.

McGavock, *Pen and Sword*, 611, 599, 611, 601-657.

²⁸⁴ Foote, *The Civil War*, vol. 1, 206.

Cooling, *Forts Henry and Donelson*, 181.

Stonesifer, *A Study in Confederate Command*, 219-220, 334-335.

Stickles, *Simon Bolivar Buckner*, 144.

Ft. H & D Source Book, 1383-1385, 1412-1413.

Stickles, 144 sources to *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 297, 298.

ORA, s. 1, vol. 7, 386.

MAT, 764, 763-764.

²⁸⁵ *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 268-269.

²⁸⁶ *Ibid*, 360, 365, 263, 265-266.

²⁸⁷ *Ibid*, 314, 316, 318-319.

²⁸⁸ Fischer, *Historian's Fallacies*, 51-52.

²⁸⁹ Geer, *Campaigns of the Civil War*, 57, 58.

Fuller, *The Generalship of Ulysses S. Grant*, 86.

Stickles, *Simon Bolivar Buckner*, 145, 147-150, 152, 155-156.

Foote, *The Civil War*, vol. 1, 207.

Catton, *Grant Moves South*, 167, 170-172.

Cummings, *Yankee Quaker, Confederate General*, 200.

Stonesifer, *A Study in Confederate Command*, 303-304, 305, 307.

²⁹⁰ *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 269.

Catton. 170-172 cites *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 269-275.

Hamilton. 249-251 cites *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 269.

²⁹¹ *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 283, 316, 318-319, 323-32, 325-326.

Stickles. 148-150 cites *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 283, 314-327.

Catton. 170-172 cites *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 283-284, 287-289.

Stonesifer, 304 cites *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 318.

Hamilton, 249-251 cites *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 290, 316.

Hamilton, 254 cites *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 283, 291.

Cooling, 180-183 cites *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 318, 332-333.

Hughes and Stonesifer, 229 cites *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 283.

²⁹² *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 332-333.

Cummings, 200 cites *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 332.

Hamilton, 245-248 cites *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 332.

Hughes and Stonesifer, 229 cites *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 283.

²⁹³ *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 361 362.

Cummings, 200 cites *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 361.

Hamilton, 249-251 cites *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 361.

Cooling, 189 cites *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 361, 362.

²⁹⁴ *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 265 [wrong page? actually 266].

Stickles, 145 cites *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 265 [266].

Hamilton, 245-248 cites *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 253.

²⁹⁵ Johnson, *The Partisan Rangers of the Confederate States Army*, 65.

Stickles, 152 cites Johnson, *The Partisan Rangers*, 65.

²⁹⁶ Force, *From Fort Henry to Corinth*, 54.

Hamilton, *The Battle of Fort Donelson*, 245-248, 249-251; 254, 280, 280, 353, 356.

Cummings, *Yankee Quaker, Confederate General*, 200.

Cooling, *Forts Henry and Donelson*, 180-183, 189; 165; 182, 183.

McPherson, *Battle Cry of Freedom*, 400-401.

Hughes and Stonesifer, *The Life and Wars of Gideon J. Pillow*, 229, 230.

Gott, *Where the South Lost the War*, 219-220, 222-223, 243, 246.

²⁹⁷ Hughes, "Why Fort Donelson Was Surrendered," 303, 317.

Hughes and Stonesifer, 231 cite Hughes, "Why Fort Donelson Was Surrendered," 303. They find this account questionable.

²⁹⁸ MAT, 443.

²⁹⁹ ORA, s. 1, vol. 7, 377-378.

³⁰⁰ McGavock, *Pen and Sword*, 591.

Cooling, 165 cites McGavock, *Pen and Sword*, 590 [actually, 591].

³⁰¹ ORA, s. 1, vol. 7, 356 [-357].

Hamilton, 245-248 cites ORA, s. 1, vol. 7, 356.

³⁰² ORA, s. 1, vol. 7, 353 [-354].

³⁰³ Ibid, 348.

³⁰⁴ Ibid, 345.

Hamilton, 245-248 cites ORA, s. 1, vol. 7, 345.

³⁰⁵ ORA, s. 1, vol. 7, 269.

³⁰⁶ Stickles, *Simon Bolivar Buckner*, 162.

³⁰⁷ Fischer, *Historian's Fallacies*, 51-52.

³⁰⁸ Hughes, *The Life and Wars of Gideon J. Pillow*, 230-231.

Stickles, *Simon Bolivar Buckner*, 154.

³⁰⁹ Gott, *Where the South Lost the War*, 243.

³¹⁰ *MAT*, 763.

Hughes, "Why Fort Donelson Was Surrendered," 301.

³¹¹ Stickles, *Simon Bolivar Buckner*, 145, 151.

Stonesifer, *A Study in Confederate Command*, 303, 309, 310, 315, 316, 320-322.

Cummings, *Yankee Quaker, Confederate General*, 145, 151.

Cooling, *Forts Henry and Donelson*, 183, 180, 185, 187.

Hurst, *Men of Fire*, 271.

Hughes and Stonesifer, *The Life and Wars of Gideon J. Pillow*, 229.

Hamilton, *The Battle of Fort Donelson*, 251, 256.

³¹² Stickles, 145 cites *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 264.

Stonesifer, 321-322 cites to Jordan and Pryor, *The Campaigns of Lieutenant-General N. B. Forrest*, 84 via *Ft. H & D Source Book*, 1341.

Hamilton, 251 cites *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 221 and *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 52 part 1, 8.

³¹³ *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 333.

³¹⁴ Grant, *Memoirs*, vol.1 (World Publishing edition). 155.

³¹⁵ *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 333.

Morton, "Buckner Tells the Story of the Fall of Fort Donelson." Nashville *Banner*.

³¹⁶ *MAT*, 443-444.

³¹⁷ Cooling, 187 cites G.W. Dillon.

³¹⁸ *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 350-351.

³¹⁹ Ibid, 344.

³²⁰ Cooling, *Forts Henry and Donelson*, 187.

³²¹ Gott, *Where the South Lost the War*, endnote 6 for chapter 16 on 316.

³²² Gott, *Where the South Lost the War*, 275.

³²³ *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 272, 328-329, 334.

³²⁴ Ibid, 422-423.

³²⁵ Gott, *Where the South Lost the War*, 141-142, 245-246.

³²⁶ Hurst, *Men of Fire*, 274.

³²⁷ *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 159, 167-69 159, 291.

³²⁸ Lew Wallace, *Autobiography*, vol. 1, 390.

³²⁹ Ibid, 390.

³³⁰ *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 278.

³³¹ *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 337. See tables in Appendix, III-1, III-2, V-1. Assumes CS 2nd DIV had 3,425 engaged infantrymen minus fewer than 300 battle losses, vs. 2nd and 3rd BDEs/ 3rd DIV and 5th BDE /2nd DIV minus fewer than 100 battle losses.

³³² Gott, *Where the South Lost the War*, 246, 247.

³³³ *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 283, 284, 285, 285, 293, 283, 330, 386.

ORA, s. 1, vol. 52, part 2, 272-273, 273.

³³⁴ Stickles, *Simon Bolivar Buckner*, 152.

³³⁵ Ibid, 145, 146, 152-157.

³³⁶ Ibid, 158-159.

³³⁷ *ORA*, s. 1, vol, 7, 267, 273-275, 333-345.

On the situation on the CS right, Stickles, 145, 146, 152, 156-157 cites *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 275.

On CS perceptions of the correlation of forces Stickles, 153, 156 cites *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 275; 334-335.

On supplies, Wyeth, *Nathan Bedford Forrest*, 58-59 skeptically cites *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 334.

On the decision to surrender, Cooling, 202, skeptically cites *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 333.

On the state of the defenses Gott, 246-247 skeptically cites *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 267, 275.

Badeau, vol. 1, 47 apparently mentions *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 327-337.

³³⁸ *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 327-328.

Badeau, vol. 1, 47 apparently mentions what would become *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 327-337.

³³⁹ For situation on the CS left and Lick Creek, Stickles, 154-155 cites Morton, "Buckner Tells the Story of the Fall of Fort Donelson," *Nashville Banner*.

For the odds, Stickles, 153, 156 cites *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, Morton, "Buckner Tells the Story of the Fall of Fort Donelson," *Nashville Banner*.

³⁴⁰ *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 282-284 (Pillow).

Stickles, 145, 146, 152, 156-157 cites *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 282 for the situation on the CS right.

Stickles, 153-154 cites *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 282.

³⁴¹ *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 287-288 (Pillow).

³⁴² *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 293-294.

On the reasoning behind the surrender, Stickles, 153-154 cites *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 294.

³⁴³ Adam R. Johnson, *The Partisan Rangers*, 67-68.

For the situation on the CS left and Lick Creek, Stickles, 154-155 cites Adam R. Johnson, *The Partisan Rangers*, 67-68.

³⁴⁴ National Park Service, "A Guide to the Park (Scale Map)," Fort Donelson (Government Printing Office; reprint, 2010).

³⁴⁵ Samuel K. Cox, "Civil War Diary," 16 February 1862.

For the situation on the CS right, Stickles, 145, 146, 152, 156-157 cites Samuel K. Cox, "Civil War Diary," 16 February 1862, Kentucky Collection, West Kentucky State Teacher's College.

³⁴⁶ For critiquing Wyeth and Forrest, Stickles, 160-161 cites Wyeth, *Nathan Bedford Forrest*, 38-40; *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 167-169, 383-386.

³⁴⁷ Forrest's claim for 12 FEB 1862: *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 383-384.

ORA, s. 1, vol. 7, 167-179, 171.

Ft. H & D Source Book, 595 cites an article from the *Missouri Democrat*, 17 February 1862.

³⁴⁸ Fischer, *Historians' Fallacies*, 51-53.

³⁴⁹ Wyeth cites the accounts/ affidavits of Chandler, S.G. Morgan, and Woodward, Bufford, J.W. Smith; *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 364, 412, 416.

³⁵⁰ Wyeth, *Nathan Bedford Forrest*, 57-65.

³⁵¹ Wyeth, *Nathan Bedford Forrest*, v, 57-65; *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 273 (contra Floyd); 334.

³⁵² Shelby Foote, *The Civil War*, vol. 1, 210.

Catton, 174 cites Whittlesey, *War Memoranda*, note 7 on 37.

Stonesifer, *A Study in Confederate Command*, 332-333 cites *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 296; 324-325.

Hamilton, 278, 287; 296-297 cites *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 269-270, 273-275; 283-284, 287-289, 302-307, 325; 327, 333, 334, 335; 365; 386, 295; 293-294; 296-297; 297-298 (W.H. Haynes); 209, 300 [probably 299-300]; Hamilton probably uses the name of Dr. JW Smith from Wyeth, *Nathan Bedford Forrest*, 63-65 without citing him, although Smith's testimony is mentioned in Pillow, Forrest, and Nicholson's reports, but not by name.

Hughes and Stonesifer, *The Life and Wars of Gideon J. Pillow*, 231-232 cites *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 293-294, 295, 295-296, 296-297, 297-298, 299-300, 295. Pillow mentions the testimony of Captain Hinson, but does not include it.

³⁵³ Lew Wallace, *Autobiography*, vol. 1, 422-424.

³⁵⁴ Wyeth, *Nathan Bedford Forrest*, 57-65 the testimony of Chandler, 60, the testimony of S. G. Morgan on 61, Woodward affidavit 16 MAY 1898 on 61-62.

ORA, s. 1, vol. 7, 380, 392, 415-416. Russell was ill during the battle.

L. J. Bailey, "Escape From Fort Donelson," *Confederate Veteran*, issue 12 (December 1913): 64, 64.

Wyeth, *Nathan Bedford Forrest*, 59-63, 67-71 cites *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 416, 380, 392.

Hamilton, 319-20 cites *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 379, 415.

Hamilton, 321 cites *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 382; 415 but should cite: 379.

Hamilton, 323 cites *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 416.

Cooling, 215, 217 cites Charles M. Cummings, *Yankee Quaker, Confederate General*, 207-213 [actually 206-213], which in turn cites *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 365 [actually 364-365], should cite: *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 415-416.

³⁵⁵ Wyeth, *Nathan Bedford Forrest*, 57-65 cites the GW Bufford affidavit 4 J AN 1898 on 62, affidavit of Ed Waters 18 FEB 1898 on 62-63, sworn testimony of JW Smith on 63-65 1 JAN 1897; *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 358, 364, 365-366, 416.

³⁵⁶ *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 296-297.

³⁵⁷ *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 299-300, 297-299.

³⁵⁸ Stonesifer, *Study in Confederate Command*, 332-333 cites *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 296 for the fires along the US right.

³⁵⁹ *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 295-296.

³⁶⁰ *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 386.

³⁶¹ *MAT*, 764 cited via *Ft. H & D Source Book*, 1361.

³⁶² Jordan and Pryor, *Campaigns of Lieutenant-General N. B. Forrest* cited via *Ft. H & D Source Book*, 1344, 1347-1349.

³⁶³ J.C. Blanton, "Forrest's Old Regiment," *Confederate Veteran*, vol. 3, no. 2 (February 1895): 41-42, 41.

Wyeth, *Nathan Bedford Forrest*, 25, 26 notes that "A" Company from Boone County, Kentucky was Captain Overton's.

³⁶⁴ Catton cites Whittlesey, *War Memoranda*, note 7 on 37.

³⁶⁵ On supplies, Wyeth, *Nathan Bedford Forrest*, 58-59 cites *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 334, 638.

³⁶⁶ On supplies, Geer, 58-59 cites Steele, *American Campaigns*, vol. 1 and atlas a secondary source.

On Lick Creek, Stonesifer, *A Study in Confederate Command*, 324 cites the testimonies in Wyeth, *That Devil Forrest*, 581; *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 1, 295.

On the overall chance of a successful assault Stonesifer, *A Study in Confederate Command*, 319, 325 cites the *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 216; Lew Wallace, *Autobiography*, vol. 1, 419.

Hughes and Stonesifer, *The Life and Wars of Gideon J. Pillow*, 233-235.

Cooling, 202, cites *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 333.

³⁶⁷ On Floyd's complaints about the defenses, Gott, 246-247 cites *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 267, 271.

³⁶⁸ *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 638.

³⁶⁹ On supplies, Wyeth, *Nathan Bedford Forrest*, 58-59 cites *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 638.

³⁷⁰ *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 344.

³⁷¹ *Ibid*, 391-392.

³⁷² *MAT*, 559 via *Ft. H & D Source Book*, 1372.

³⁷³ *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 229.

³⁷⁴ *Ibid*, 215-216.

On the overall chance of a successful assault Stonesifer, *A Study in Confederate Command*, 319, 325 cites the *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 216.

³⁷⁵ *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 391.

³⁷⁶ Stonesifer, *A Study in Confederate Command*, 333-38.

Cooling, *Forts Henry and Donelson*, 213.

Hughes, *The Life and Wars of Gideon J. Pillow*, 232.

Gott, *Where the South Lost the War*, 246.

³⁷⁷ Stickles, *Simon Bolivar Buckner*, 153-154.

³⁷⁸ *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 52, part 2, 272.

³⁷⁹ *Ibid.* 272; *Ibid.*, vol. 7, 284, 330, 334, 335.

³⁸⁰ See COL Baldwin's estimate of 60,000 in *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7; CPT Jack Davis' estimate of 80,000 in 409; CPT Campbell's estimate of 65,000, *Andrew Jackson Campbell*, 18.

Lew Wallace, *Autobiography*, vol. 1, 429.

³⁸¹ Bearss, *Unconditional Surrender*, 4 cites *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 278, 279.

³⁸² Robert W. Barnwell, "Fort Donelson—By Official Record," *Confederate Veteran*, 38 (January 1930): 16-20, 17. This a secondary source study of the *ORA* which does mention the 1st LA CAV's participation in the campaign.

³⁸³ *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 328.

³⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 162.

³⁸⁵ Foote, *The Civil War*, vol. 1, 200, 215.

³⁸⁶ John Sloan Brown, "Colonel Trevor N. Dupuy and the Mythos of Wehrmacht Superiority: A Reconsideration," *Military Affairs*, vol. 50, no. 1 (January 1986): 16-20, 17.

³⁸⁷ On assessments in general, see Dupuy, *Numbers, Predictions & War*, 11-13, 43-44, 185, 202-205, 213-221, 228-231; Dupuy, *Attrition*, 146-152.

In modifying 20th century standards to the ACW, see Dupuy, *Numbers, Predictions & War*, 97-99, 156-158, 216; Dupuy, *Attrition*, 116-117. In general, the ACW defense is 10% weaker e.g. 20th century hasty defense 1.3 becomes 1.2 in the ACW.

³⁸⁸ On CS infantry weapons, see Charles Carleton Coffin, *Four Years of Fighting: A Volume of Personal Observation with the Army and Navy* (Boston, 1866), 81.

³⁸⁹ On vessel capacity, *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 302, Pillow noted in *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 302 that one vessel had just brought 400 troops to Dover, while the other was loaded with other cargo. The actual evacuees numbered over 900, even though the vessels only arrived just a little before sunrise (see Major Brown, *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 381 and Floyd on, 274. For the hours of darkness at Dover on 16 February, see 5 Day Forecast, Local Conditions. Accessed 15 February 2014 at: <http://www.localconditions.com/weather-dover-tennessee/37058/forecast.php>

³⁹⁰ *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 386.

³⁹¹ *MAT*, 764.

³⁹² Catton, *Grant Moves South*, 171-172.

³⁹³ Hurst, *Men of Fire*, 274.

³⁹⁴ Wyeth, 39-42.

³⁹⁵ Bearss, 3-21.

Hughes and Stonesifer, *The Life and Wars of Gideon J. Pillow*, 233-234, 387.

Gott, *Where the South Lost the War*, 240, 246-247, 266.

³⁹⁶ Hughes and Stonesifer, *The Life and Wars of Gideon J. Pillow*, 233-235.

³⁹⁷ John Miller McKee, *The Great Panic, Being Incidents Connected with Two Weeks of the War in Tennessee, By an Eye-Witness*, ed. Charles Elder, intro. Hugh Walker (Nashville: Johnson & Whiting, 1862; reprint, Nashville: Elder-Sherbourne, 1977), 7-9, 11, 13-14.

Moore, ed., *The Rebellion Record*, vol. 4, 187.

Ft. H & D Source Book, 101-102.

³⁹⁸ William B. Feis, *Grant's Secret Service: The Intelligence War from Belmont to Appomattox*, (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 2002), 73.

ORA, s. 1, vol. 4, 558.

³⁹⁹ McKee, *The Great Panic*, 10, 12, 20-21; 35.

⁴⁰⁰ *ORA*, s. 2, vol. 3, 292, 298-299, 346-347, 368-369.

⁴⁰¹ Fox, *Regimental Losses*, 544.

⁴⁰² Stonesifer, *A Study in Confederate Command*, 363-64.

Wyeth, *Nathan Bedford Forrest*, 39.

⁴⁰³ *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 10, part 1, 398.

⁴⁰⁴ Dupuy, *Numbers, Predictions & War*, 43-44, 185, 202-203, 204-205, 213-214. For the QJM applied to ACW: 97-99, 156-158. For advance rates, 12 percent could have resulted in an additional advance of between 200 and 1,200 meters: 213.

⁴⁰⁵ William Randolph, BrainyQuote.com, Xplore Inc, 2013. accessed August 26, 2013 at: <http://www.brainyquote.com/citation/quotes/quotes/w/williamran183368.html#TCOzkzuAGjyEcowd.99>

⁴⁰⁶ *Medical and Surgical History of the War*; part 1, vol. 1, Appended Documents, 34.

⁴⁰⁷ *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 167-169.

⁴⁰⁸ Gott, *Where the South Lost the War*, 282-284.

⁴⁰⁹ *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 189.

⁴¹⁰ *Ibid*, 199.

⁴¹¹ *Ibid*, 217.

⁴¹² *Ibid*, 211.

⁴¹³ *Ibid*, 219.

⁴¹⁴ 45th Illinois Letter Book, RG Number 94, Stack 9W3, National Archives and Records Administration, Washington D.C., 154.

⁴¹⁵ *Ibid*, 211.

⁴¹⁶ *Ibid*, 246.

⁴¹⁷ *Ibid*, 249.

⁴¹⁸ *Ibid*, 236.

⁴¹⁹ *Ibid*, 209.

⁴²⁰ *Ft. H & D Source Book*, 685-688, extract from *New York Herald*, 17-18 FEB 1862.

⁴²¹ *Ibid*, 685-688, extract from *New York Herald*, 17-18 FEB 1862.

⁴²² *Ibid*, 685-688, extract from *New York Herald*, 17-18 FEB 1862.

⁴²³ *Ibid*, 685-688, extract from *New York Herald*, 17-18 FEB 1862.

⁴²⁴ *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 187.

⁴²⁵ Ibid, 198.

⁴²⁶ Ibid, 213.

⁴²⁷ *Ft. H & D Source Book*, 685-688, extract from *New York Herald*, 17-18 FEB 1862.

⁴²⁸ *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 246.

⁴²⁹ Moore, ed., *The Rebellion Record*, vol. 4, "Documents," 187.

⁴³⁰ Whittlesey, *War Memoranda*, 41.

⁴³¹ Gott, *Where the South Lost the War*, 282.

⁴³² *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 337, 349, 351, Barber, *Holding the Line*, 189-251.

⁴³³ *MAT*, 177.

⁴³⁴ *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 337, 355.

⁴³⁵ Ibid, 337, 342, 345.

⁴³⁶ Ibid, 337, 355, 357.

⁴³⁷ Ibid, 346.

⁴³⁸ Ibid, 355, 357, 370-371.

⁴³⁹ *MAT*, 546.

Gott, 255, endnote 7 for chapter 13 on 315 cites *MAT*, 546; Andrew Jackson Campbell. *Andrew Jackson Campbell 1861-1863*, ed. Jill Knight Garrett (n.p: 1965), 131.

⁴⁴⁰ Gott, 315, cites *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 415 to explain the occasional identification of the 400 as Mississippians rather than last minute arrivals from the 48th TN INF, as he believes.

⁴⁴¹ *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 391.

⁴⁴² Ibid, 391.

⁴⁴³ Ibid, 337.

⁴⁴⁴ Ibid, 375.

⁴⁴⁵ Ibid, 337, 374, 376.

⁴⁴⁶ Ibid, 407.

⁴⁴⁷ Wyeth, *Nathan Bedford Forrest*, 60-61.

⁴⁴⁸ *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 374.

⁴⁴⁹ Wilson, *The Confederate Soldier*, 47, 68-69, 74-76.

⁴⁵⁰ *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 337, 344.

⁴⁵¹ Wyeth, *Nathan Bedford Forrest*, 61.

⁴⁵² *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 337, 342, 379, 415.

⁴⁵³ Ibid, 267, 275.

⁴⁵⁴ Ibid, 415-416.

L. J. Bailey, "Escape From Fort Donelson," *Confederate Veteran*, issue 12 (December 1913): 64, 64.

⁴⁵⁵ *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 374.

⁴⁵⁶ Ibid, 337, 342.

⁴⁵⁷ Ibid, 278.

⁴⁵⁸ Ibid, 364.

⁴⁵⁹ Ibid, 267, 275.

⁴⁶⁰ Ibid, 278.

⁴⁶¹ Ibid, 267, 275.

⁴⁶² Ibid, s. 2, vol. 3, 346.

⁴⁶³ Ibid, s. 1, vol. 7, 276.

⁴⁶⁴ Ibid, 364.

⁴⁶⁵ Ibid, 267, 275.

⁴⁶⁶ Ibid. 267.

⁴⁶⁷ Civil War Centennial Commission of Tennessee, *Tennesseans in the Civil War: A Military History of Confederate and Union Units with Available Rosters of Personnel* (Nashville: Civil War Centennial Commission, 1965; reprint The University of Tennessee Press, 1984), vol. 1, 164.

⁴⁶⁸ *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 364.

⁴⁶⁹ *MAT*, 748.

⁴⁷⁰ *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 148.

⁴⁷¹ Ibid, 389, 390, 412.

⁴⁷² Ibid, 389.

⁴⁷³ Ibid, 390.

⁴⁷⁴ Ibid, 280, 398.

⁴⁷⁵ Ibid. 389, 391.

⁴⁷⁶ William Johnston, *Albert Sidney Johnston*, 468.

⁴⁷⁷ Morton, *The Artillery of Nathan Bedford Forrest's Cavalry*, 33, 28.

ORA, s. 1, vol. 7, 337.

⁴⁷⁸ *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 390.

Morton, *The Artillery of Nathan Bedford Forrest's Cavalry*, 363-374.

⁴⁷⁹ *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 337.

⁴⁸⁰ Ibid. 337, 342.

⁴⁸¹ Hughes, "Why Fort Donelson Was Surrendered." 300-303.

⁴⁸² *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 284, 302.

⁴⁸³ Ibid, 331, 336.

⁴⁸⁴ Ibid, 337.

⁴⁸⁵ Casseday, "The Surrender of Fort Donelson," *The Southern Bivouac*, 697.

⁴⁸⁶ *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 364.

⁴⁸⁷ On assessments in general, see Dupuy, *Numbers, Predictions & War*, 11-13, 43-44, 185, 202-205, 213-221, 228-231; Dupuy, *Attrition*, 107-123, 146-152.

In modifying 20th century standards to the ACW, see Dupuy, *Numbers, Predictions & War*, 97-99, 156-158, 216; Dupuy, *Attrition*, 116-117. In general, the ACW defense is 10% weaker e.g. 20th century hasty defense 1.3 becomes 1.2 in the ACW.

⁴⁸⁸ William F. Fox, *Regimental Losses in the American Civil War 1861-1865*. (Albany: Albany Publishing Company, 1893), 549 (CS losses 1861-FEB 1862).

ORA, s. 1, v. 7, 136 *ORA*.

Ibid, vol. 3, 5 (Camp Jackson); 13 (Boonville).

ORA, s. 1, vol. 4, 217 (Saratoga Springs).

Jacob D. Cox, "McClellan In West Virginia," *Battles & Leaders*, Clarence Buel and Robert Johnson ed. (Secaucus, NJ: Castle, 1887; reprint, n.d.), vol. 1., 132 (Rich Mt.); 134 (Beverly).

P.O. Avery, *History of the Fourth Illinois Cavalry Regiment* (Humboldt, NE: The Enterprise Print Shop, 1903), 55-57 (retreat from Ft. H).

⁴⁸⁹ Fox, *Regimental Losses*, 543.

ORA, s. 1, vol. 1, 16-17 (Baylor: San Augustine Springs); 552-553 (San Antonio); 561 (Saluria); 568 (San Lucas Spring).

ORA, s. 1, vol. 3, 188 (Lexington MO).

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Frederick H. Dyer, *A Compendium of the War of the Rebellion* (Des Moines: Dyer Publication Company, 1908), 894 (Big Bethel); 894 (Vienna); 797 (Carthage); 895 (Blackburn's Ford); 895 (1st Bull Run); 798 (Wilson's Creek); 970 (Cross Lanes); 798 (Lexington); 799 (Big River Bridge); 895 (Little River Turnpike); 971 (Bolivar Heights); 896 (Ball's Bluff); 730 (West Liberty); 799 (Belmont); 971 (Blake's Farm/ Cotton Hill); 896 (Fall's Church); 896 (Vienna); 730 (Fishing Creek); 896 (Annadale Church); 971 (Camp Allegheny); 971 (Bath, etc.); 731 (Middle Creek); 818 (Roanoke Island).

⁴⁹⁰ Morton, *The Artillery of Nathan Bedford Forrest's Cavalry*, 363-374 (POWs).

⁴⁹¹ *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 380, 392, 415-416. Russell was ill during the battle.

L. J. Bailey, "Escape From Fort Donelson," *Confederate Veteran*, issue 12 (December 1913): 64, 64.

Wyeth. *Nathan Bedford Forrest*, 59-63, 67-71 cited *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 416, 380, 392, 57-65, the testimony of Chandler, 60, the testimony of S. G. Morgan on 61, Woodward affidavit 16 MAY 1898 on 61-62.

Hamilton, 319-20 cites *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 379, 415.

Hamilton, 321 cites *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 382; 415 but should cite: 379.

Hamilton, 323 cites *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 416.

Cooling, 215, 217 cites Charles M. Cummings, *Yankee Quaker, Confederate General*, 207-213 [actually 206-213], which in turn cites *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 365 [actually 364-365], should cite: *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 415-416.

⁴⁹² *Ft. H&D Source Book*, 1352 (extract of Riddell, "Movements of the Goochland Light Artillery," *Richmond Dispatch*, 10 February 1895, (Pillow talking to Floyd on the General Anderson?); 1354 (evac PVT Perkins on *General Anderson*); 1355 (evac of WM Sharp w/ Forrest); 1355 (4 men find wagons); 1356 ("my company having been captured at Fort Donelson...").

Cooling, 207-208 cites Thomas Riddell, "Movements of the Goochland Light Artillery," *Richmond Dispatch*, 10 February 1895.

Gott, 255-256 cites *Richmond Dispatch* 1895 via *Ft. H&D Source Book*, 1354.

⁴⁹³ Adam R. Johnson, *The Partisan Rangers*, 70, 73 (Johnson & Martin).

⁴⁹⁴ *ORA*, s. 2, vol. 3, 346 (Griffin to Halleck 3 MAR 1862).

⁴⁹⁵ *Ibid*, 300 (Patterson 19 FEB 1862).

⁴⁹⁶ *MAT* (CS), 546 (48th TN INF).

⁴⁹⁷ *Ft. H & D Source Book*, 1025 (Ft. Warren); 1026 (Surrender).

Morton M. Casseday, "The Surrender of Fort Donelson," *The Southern Bivouac*, vol. 2, no. 2 (April 1887): 694-697, 697.

⁴⁹⁸ Casseday, "The Surrender of Fort Donelson," *The Southern Bivouac*, 697, 696.

⁴⁹⁹ Francis M. Bateman, C Company, 78th Ohio Volunteer Infantry, letter 23 February 1862. Civil War Manuscripts, Library of Congress.

⁵⁰⁰ *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 233 (M.L. Smith).

⁵⁰¹ *MAT*, 553.

⁵⁰² Wyeth, *Nathan Bedford Forrest*, 61-62 (Woodward affidavit 16 MAY 1898).

Wyeth, *Nathan Bedford Forrest*, 59-63, 67-71 cites account of James Woodward.

⁵⁰³ Wyeth, *Nathan Bedford Forrest*, 61 (S. G. Morgan sworn testimony).

Wyeth, *Nathan Bedford Forrest*, 59-63, 67-71 cites account/ affidavit S.G. Morgan.

⁵⁰⁴ Wyeth, *Nathan Bedford Forrest*, 60-61 (Chandler: "Testimony in the possession of the author.").

Wyeth, 59-63, 67-71 cites account/ affidavit of James Chandler.

Hamilton, 323, 324-25, 326 cites Wyeth, *Nathan Bedford Forrest*, 60-61.

Hamilton, 324 cites Wyeth, *Nathan Bedford Forrest*, 61.

Hamilton, 333, 335-336, 339, 344) cites Wyeth, *Nathan Bedford Forrest*, 71.

⁵⁰⁵ Wyeth, *Nathan Bedford Forrest*, 655 cites the letter of Hermann Lieb.

⁵⁰⁶ Wyeth, *Nathan Bedford Forrest*, 61-62 (Woodward affidavit 16 MAY 1898).

Wyeth, *Nathan Bedford Forrest*, 59-63, 67-71 cites account/ affidavit of James Woodward.

⁵⁰⁷ Wyeth, *Nathan Bedford Forrest*, 61 (S. G. Morgan sworn testimony).

Wyeth, *Nathan Bedford Forrest*, 59-63, 67-71 cites account/ affidavit S.G. Morgan.

⁵⁰⁸ Wyeth, *Nathan Bedford Forrest*, 60-61 (Chandler: "Testimony in the possession of the author.").

Wyeth, 59-63, 67-71 cites account/ affidavit of James Chandler.

Hamilton, 323, 324-25, 326 cites Wyeth, *Nathan Bedford Forrest*, 60-61.

Hamilton, 324 cites Wyeth, *Nathan Bedford Forrest*, 61.

Hamilton, 333, 335-336, 339, 344) cites Wyeth, *Nathan Bedford Forrest*, 71.

⁵⁰⁹ McFeely, 99 cites Lew Wallace's *An Autobiography*, vol. 1, 378; William H.L. Wallace, Letter, 11 February 1862.

McFeely, *Grant: A Biography*, 99; McFeely confuses W.H.L. Wallace with Lew Wallace.

⁵¹⁰ William Johnston, 444 cites US Surgeon General, *Medical and Surgical History of the War*; vol. 1, part 1, 34, but should cite US Surgeon General, *Medical and Surgical History of the War*; vol. 1, part 1, *appended documents*, 34, because the appended documents section has an entirely different page count.

⁵¹¹ Catton, *Grant Moves South*, 181 (14,000 CS POWs) cites Whittlesey, *War Memoranda*, 38-39 (Whittlesey discussing conditions of the battlefield), should cite: Whittlesey, *War Memoranda*, 41-42.

⁵¹² Bearss, *Unconditional Surrender*, 18-19 (Bearss identifies quote as coming from Guy); passage actually written by Riddell: Riddell, "Movements of the Goochland Light Artillery," *Richmond Dispatch*, 10 February 1895 via *Ft. H & D Source Book*, 1353

⁵¹³ Stonesifer, 207 cites Wyeth, *That Devil Forrest*, 37, should cite: Wyeth, *That Devil Forrest*, 584.

⁵¹⁴ Cooling, 216 cites William Johnston, *Albert Sidney Johnston*, 237-242, should cite William Johnston, *Albert Sidney Johnston*, 443-445, 538.

⁵¹⁵ Gott, *Where the South Lost the War*, 149 cites *ORA*, s 1, vol. 7, 162, should cite Lew Wallace, vol. 1 *Autobiography*, vol. 1, 378-379.

⁵¹⁶ Gott, *Where the South Lost the War*, table on 286 should cite: Wyeth, *Life of General Nathan Bedford Forrest*, 60, 61; 59.

⁵¹⁷ Hurst, 315 cites *ORA*, s 1, vol. 7, 270, 91, 628 ([actually, 625] Grant); Simon's *The Papers of Ulysses S. Grant*, 226 (which in turn cites everything listed with Cooling), and Bearss which (again) cites Simon, but adds 229 (letter Grant to wife February 1862).

Hurst, 314-315 (CS POWs) cites *ORA*, s 1, vol. 7, 335 (Buckner).

⁵¹⁸ *ORA*, series 1, vol. 7, 353 [-354]; 356 [-357].

Hamilton, 245-248 cites *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 353, 356.

⁵¹⁹ *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 277 [wrong page? actually 278] (McCausland).

⁵²⁰ On the trafficability of Lick Creek, Wyeth, *Nathan Bedford Forrest*, 57-65 cites the testimony of Chandler, 60, testimony of S. G. Morgan on 61, Woodward affidavit 16 MAY 1898 on 61-62; GW Bufford affidavit 4 JAN 1898 on 62, affidavit of Ed Waters 18 FEB 1898 on 62-63, sworn testimony of JW Smith on 63-65 1 JAN 1897; *ORA*, s. 1, vol. 7, 358, 364, 365-366, 416.

⁵²¹ Katie Letcher Lyle, *Scalded to Death by the Steam: Authentic Stories of Railroad Disasters and the Ballads That Were Written about Them* (Chapel Hill, NC: Algonquin Books, 1983), 11 (folk memory); 14-23, notes on 9-10, 27, 24-31, 32, 33.

⁵²² Niklas Zetterling and Anders Frankson, "Analyzing World War II Eastern Front Battles," *The Journal of Slavic Military Studies*, vol. 11, no. 1 (March 1998), pp. 176-203, 183, 184-185 (contra Krivosheev).

Niklas Zetterling, "Loss Rates on the Eastern Front during World War II," *The Journal of Slavic Military Studies*, vol. 9, no. 4 (DEC 1996), pp. 895-906, 894-902 (contra Stoeckli); 904 (contra Sandhurst study).

⁵²³ Niklas Zetterling, *Normandy 1944: German Military Organization, Combat Power and Organizational Effectiveness* (Altona, Canada: J.J. Fedorowicz Publishing, 2000), 32, 87-90, endnote 8 for chapter 4 (contra Ambrose); 432-434, endnote 13 for appendix 8 (contra Brown); 80-81 (contra Hastings); 81-82 (contra Keegan); 429-432 (contra Mansoor).

⁵²⁴ Zetterling and Frankson, *Kursk 1943*, 132-133, endnote 1 for chapter 9 (contra Dunnigan); xiii, 145-151.

⁵²⁵ Michael Reynolds, *The Devil's Adjutant: Jochen Peiper, Panzer Leader* (New York: Sarpedon, 1995), xvii-xviii, xviii.

⁵²⁶ Reynolds, *The Devil's Adjutant*, xviii.

Richard R. Muller, review of *The Devil's Adjutant: Jochen Peiper, Panzer Leader* by Michael Reynolds, *The Journal of Military History*, vol. 60, no. 3 (July 1996): 574-575, 574.

⁵²⁷ Reynolds, *The Devil's Adjutant*, 36, 33-34, 59-60, 60, endnote 6 on 63, 99-100, 108-109.

⁵²⁸ *Ibid.*, 69, 75-76, 76, 77, 93, 106-107, 93.

⁵²⁹ *Ibid.*, 91-97; 96.

⁵³⁰ Reynolds, *Steel Inferno*, 18, 18-19, 30, 69, 70, 74.

⁵³¹ Ibid. 85. 166-167.

⁵³² William Randolph, BrainyQuote.com, Xplore Inc, 2013. accessed August 26, 2013 at: <http://www.brainyquote.com/citation/quotes/quotes/w/williamran183368.html#TCOzkzuAGjvEcowd.99>

⁵³³ James R. Arnold, "A Reappraisal of Column Versus Line in the Peninsular War," *The Journal of Military History*, vol. 68, no. 2 (April 2004): 535-552, 535, 537, 540 footnote 72 on 551 mentions Arnold's "The Battle of Maida and Secondary Source History," *Empires, Eagles, and Lions*, no. 56 (June 1981) pp. 2-3.

James R. Arnold, "A Reappraisal of Column Versus Line in the Peninsular War," *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research*, vol. 68, no. 2 (Winter 1982): 196-208, 196-197.

Paddy Griffith, *Forward into Battle: Fighting Tactics from Waterloo to Vietnam*, forward by John Keegan (Chichester, UK: Antony Bird Publications, 1981), 12-14, 14-16, 16-17, 17-18, 22.

David G. Chandler, "Column Versus Line: The Case of Maida, 1806," *On the Napoleonic Wars: Collected Essays* (London: Greenhill Books, 1994), 130-131, 132, 134, 141-142.

⁵³⁴ Arnold, "A Reappraisal of Column Versus Line in the Peninsular War," footnote 72 on 551 (mention of Arnold's "The Battle of Maida and Secondary Source History," *Empires, Eagles, and Lions*, no. 56 (June 1981) pp. 2-3); 538-539, 545, 549.

⁵³⁵ Ibid, 536, 543-544, including footnotes 37-43 on 543-544, 545-546, 546, 546.

⁵³⁶ Arnold, "A Reappraisal of Column Versus Line in the Peninsular War," 536, 543, 545, 545-546.

Chandler, "Column Versus Line," *On the Napoleonic Wars*, 130, 143, 144.

⁵³⁷ Arnold, "A Reappraisal of Column Versus Line in the Peninsular War," 552 and footnote 73 on 552 (Arnold's original "A Reappraisal of Column Versus Line in the Peninsular War," *Society for Army Historical Research*, 60 (Winter 1982), pp. 196-208); 551-552, 552.

Chandler, "Column Versus Line," *On the Napoleonic Wars*, 131, 132, 143.

⁵³⁸ Griffith, *Forward into Battle*, 19-23, 27, 31, 39-40, 17-22, 22-23, 27-28.

Arnold, "A Reappraisal of Column Versus Line in the Peninsular War," 552.

⁵³⁹ Griffith, *Forward into Battle*, 9, 16, 17, 22-23, 29-32, 39, 41, 24, 48.

Arnold, "A Reappraisal of Column Versus Line in the Peninsular War," 548-551.

Chandler, "Column Versus Line," *On the Napoleonic Wars*, 138-140.

⁵⁴⁰ Griffith, *Forward into Battle*, 9, 16, 17.

⁵⁴¹ Ibid, unpagged forward, 137-143, 45-50, 54-55.

⁵⁴² Arnold, "A Reappraisal of Column Versus Line in the Peninsular War," 536 (Oman's false ideas extensively cited by historians).

⁵⁴³ Arnold, "A Reappraisal of Column Versus Line in the Peninsular War," 552 (Richard Hopton's *The Battle of Maida 1806: Fifteen Minutes of Glory* (Barnsley: Leo Cooper, 2002); 536, including footnote 7 covers the book review in 2003 by John Tone of Frederick Schneid's *Napoleon's Italian Campaigns, 1805-1815* in *Journal of Military History* 67 (January 2003), pp. 233-235, 552.

Griffith, *Forward into Battle*, 5.

Chandler, "Column Versus Line," *On the Napoleonic Wars*, 130-131, 143.

Richard Hopton, *The Battle of Maida, 1806: Fifteen Minutes of Glory* (Barnsley : Leo Cooper, 2002), 117-118, 127, 132-135, 148-150, 86, 119, 121-123, 97-98, 123-124, 127-127.

⁵⁴⁴ Paddy Griffith, "The 'Rifle Revolution' of the American Civil [War] -An Alternative Interpretation," *Miniature Wargames*, no. 20 (January 1985): 11-13.

Edward Hagerman, *The American Civil War and the Origins of Modern Warfare: Ideas, Organization, and Field Command* (Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1988), 16.

James M. McPherson. *Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988; republished New York: Ballantine Books. 1989). 332, 472-77 (an example of conventional wisdom).

⁵⁴⁵ Griffith, "The 'Rifle Revolution' of the American Civil [War] -An Alternative Interpretation," 11, 58-60, 63-64.

⁵⁴⁶ Ibid, 11-13.

⁵⁴⁷ Paddy Griffith, *Battle Tactics in the Civil War* (Originally published in the UK as *Rally Once Again*, 1987; revised and reprinted, New Haven, CT / London: Yale

University Press, 1989), 101-102, 163, 85-90, 88, 108, 110-115, 138, 140-142, 109, 141-142, 109-110, 74-75, 171, 175-177.

⁵⁴⁸ Hagerman, *The American Civil War and the Origins of Modern Warfare*, 16,

McPherson, *Battle Cry of Freedom*, 332, 472-77 (an example of conventional wisdom).

⁵⁴⁹ Earl J. Hess, *The Rifle Musket in Civil War Combat: Reality and Myth* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2008), 2, 4, 26-27, 29-32, 92-93, 108, 4, 32, 93, 108, 218-219, 5, 8; 198-203, 204-206, 211, 210, 206-08.

⁵⁵⁰ Griffith, *Battle Tactics in the Civil*, 27, 114.

⁵⁵¹ Griffith, *Battle Tactics in the Civil*, 140-145, 141-143.

Griffith, "The 'Rifle Revolution' of the American Civil [War] -An Alternative Interpretation," 12-13.