

THE EXAMINATION OF WILLIAM
LEGGE, SECOND EARL OF
DARTMOUTH'S POLITICAL CAREER

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THE EXAMINATION OF WILLIAM LEGGE, SECOND EARL
OF DARTMOUTH'S POLITICAL CAREER

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Master of Science

by
Malcolm Edward Gresham

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To the Graduate Council:

I am submitting herewith a Research Paper written by Malcolm E. Gresham entitled "The Examination of William Legge, Second Earl of Dartmouth's Political Career." I recommend that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the degree of Master of Science, with a major in History.

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Research Paper

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I. Introduction and Statement of Intent

This investigation attempts to analyze the role played by a principal British political leader in developing British policy during the American Revolutionary War period. This research explores the career of William Legge, second Earl of Dartmouth, analyzing his work from 1765 through mid-January, 1775. During this period, Dartmouth served as President of the Board of Trade, retired to private life, and then returned to government service as Secretary of State for the American Colonies.

It is important to point out that much use has been made of the correspondence of the Earl of Dartmouth in developing this research. Both the official and unofficial letters Dartmouth wrote and received during his political career have been examined with great care, with the intention of gaining a clearer picture of what Dartmouth was thinking, what motivated his actions, and what his reactions were to certain events.

From the research undertaken, it is possible to draw

several inferences concerning what influence Dartmouth had in shaping the events that led to the outbreak of the conflict. Lord Dartmouth's policy toward America was never clearly stated, and usually ambiguously implied. Although he believed in the supremacy of the British Parliament, he felt that this statement of power should be implied but not acted upon unless for the most expedient reasons. This flexible and ambivalent policy encouraged American leaders to believe that Dartmouth would always seek compromise to assure his conciliatory policy would be a success. Dartmouth failed to comprehend completely the effect this ambiguous, nondefinitive statement of policy would have on American statesmen.

Dartmouth underestimated the popular Colonial support given to what he considered the radical idea of unrestricted liberties for the Colonies, although many correspondents warned him of the universal support for restricted British interference in Colonial affairs. Dartmouth also misjudged the ability of the Colonies to marshall an armed force strong enough to offer substantial resistance to the existing British forces in America. Dartmouth failed to heed the advice of his Commander of British forces in America, General Thomas Gage, in regard to the need for a large force of troops to match the strength of the Colonial irregulars. This failure deprived the British from being able to strike a decisive fatal blow at the outset of the conflict.

When Dartmouth finally gave the British commander orders to take overt action, troop strength was insufficient to provide a fatal blow. Because of military unpreparedness, the British were not ready to implement their new line of strategy. Dartmouth believed that the faction clamoring for radical action in America was restricted to a small minority, an unorganized mob, that could be brought under control with existing forces present in America. Dartmouth refused to believe "the better sort of people" would support armed resistance against Britain. Because of his conciliatory policy and his strong belief that America could be appeased by Parliamentary and governmental concessions, Dartmouth failed to act in a decisive manner that would have given British forces strength to counter the strong opposition it was to meet.

II. Dartmouth's Political Beginnings

William Legge, born in 1731, possessed the necessary qualities of a successful Eighteenth-century Englishman. By the age of twenty-five, William had inherited landed wealth and the title of Earl of Dartmouth from his grandfather, acquired an education at Oxford, and toured Europe for three years. The key to his future social and political life, however, was to be found in his family connections. William's father, Lord Lewisham, died

shortly after the birth of his son. In 1736, Lady Lewisham married a second time, introducing young William into the family of Lord North and Grey. Young William developed an intimate relationship with the entire North family. He was especially close to his stepfather, Lord North, and his stepbrother, Frederick. William and Frederick grew up in the same house, attended college together, and toured Europe together. Thus, Dartmouth, through a family connection, established a life-long relationship with Frederick North, who was later to become first Lord of the Treasury and King George III's principal minister.¹

Dartmouth's family connections introduced him to several prominent politicians. When he took his seat in the House of Lords in 1754, one of his closest friends was the Duke of Newcastle, a Whig party leader. Newcastle played an important role in influencing Dartmouth during the early part of his political career. The two corresponded quite often, and Dartmouth gradually moved into the old Duke's political circle.²

Although Dartmouth took his duties as a member of the House of Lords quite seriously, he seemed to have no ambition to gain a particular political office. He seldom spoke in Parliament, and seemed only to be interested in helping establish a stable government. Dartmouth had many personal interests that he seemed to favor above political office. Besides his family and estates, he was interested in art collecting, aiding unfortunate groups of people, and reforming the Anglican church of England.³

Dartmouth became a part of Lord Rockingham's Whig Ministry in July, 1765, only after much urging from his old friend, the Duke of Newcastle. Dartmouth accepted the position as President of the Board of Trade reluctantly. He was a very private individual, and did not relish the idea of relinquishing his freedom. On July 8, 1765, Rockingham had written to Dartmouth urging him to accept the presidency of the Board of Trade. Dartmouth responded with a request for time to consider the invitation. It is evident from this letter that Dartmouth had little political ambition. He told Rockingham that if the position needed to be filled immediately, he ought to consider him as having refused in that particular letter of reply. After much insistence from Newcastle, Dartmouth accepted the position on July 19, 1765.⁴

The governmental experience he did gain during his one-year tenure on the Board of Trade greatly influenced Dartmouth's subsequent actions as Secretary of State for America. Dartmouth's tenure in office as Secretary of State for the Colonies came at a critical time in Britain's struggle to keep dominion over the American Colonies. In order to understand the important decisions he made during this critical period between 1772 and early 1775, a brief review of his year as Head of the Board of Trade is necessary. Analysis of this year of service can provide some insight into the attitudes and feelings Dartmouth initially possessed concerning the American people. From this analysis,

it is possible to see if these ideas and attitudes changed during his year in office as First Lord of Trade. Finally, this analysis will provide a good perspective of what views and attitudes Dartmouth possessed immediately prior to his undertaking of his office as Secretary of State. These ideas greatly influenced the strategy Britain undertook during the initial phases of the American rebellion.

Review of the correspondence that came across Dartmouth's desk during the year of his initial service shows the crucial issue was the condition of existing British trade with the colonies. Letter after letter complained that the British merchants were in a state of near ruin, and only a complete reversal of policy could save British commerce.⁵ Other letters emphasized the darkening relations between the American people and the British government because of the legislation enacted by the British Parliament, particularly the taxes enacted through the Stamp Act.

Dartmouth's ideas concerning this call for a change of policy are easily distinguishable. By closely examining various correspondence addressed to him, it becomes clear that many important members of Parliament depended on him to lead in the repeal of the Acts that were causing such great disturbance among the Americans and disrupting British trade. The Earl of Huntingdon, writing to Dartmouth on January 29, 1766, expressed pleasure that Dartmouth showed great zeal in his intentions to repeal the Stamp Act. February 20, 1766, Dartmouth received a letter from the

Earl of Chesterfield expressing his desire for Dartmouth to use the former's proxy in supporting Stamp Act repeal.⁶

It is evident that those who called upon Dartmouth for help in repealing the Grenville legislation were generally motivated by economic factors. Whether the communicant was a merchant, a British agent, or member of Parliament, all bemoaned the misery and ruin being caused by the British tax measures. The resolutions passed by the various Colonial assemblies and the correspondence between American activist generally made no direct mention of economic consequences being wrought by the tax legislation. The argument expressed most often was that the British Parliament had no right to tax the American people, and that these taxes were therefore a violation and usurpation of the rights granted to Colonists under their original charters.⁷

Although Dartmouth was wholeheartedly in favor of repeal, his reasons appear to be only motivated by expediency. A letter to Dartmouth from Andrew Symmer, a West Indies trade expert, on September 21, 1765, leaves little doubt that Dartmouth felt the British Parliament possessed supreme authority over the Colonies. Symmer in his letter refers to Dartmouth's opinion that the tax simply came at a very inopportune time.⁸

In order to secure enough votes for complete repeal of the Stamp Act, Dartmouth was more than willing to support William Pitt's Declaratory Act, which stated Parliament's authority over the Colonies "to legislate in all cases whatsoever." Dartmouth's

determination to approach the Americans in a conciliatory manner was by no means an indication that he had abandoned his belief in parliamentary supremacy.

Dartmouth had not been hesitant in condemning those who had reacted violently to the Stamp Act. In October, 1765, he had gone on record admonishing those who had behaved in a riotous manner. It is evident from Dartmouth's correspondence that this violent reaction was viewed to be mainly a minority phenomenon. The reports he read from Governor Sir Henry Moore of New York contained the word "mob," hinting that only a small minority of the people were involved in the extreme outburst of resentment. Even in Massachusetts where the greatest violence had occurred, the actions of violence was characterized as the work of an unorganized mob.⁹

Dartmouth had been assured by General Thomas Gage, then commander of British forces in North America, that most people would accept the Stamp Tax after calm had been restored.¹⁰ Dartmouth had no reason to believe that the majority of the American people could not be placated by conciliatory measures. Dartmouth's view of the American attitude toward Britain is reflected in his statements acknowledging some of the congratulatory messages he received for his services as First Lord of Trade.

In a letter written to a Virginia preacher, he acknowledged his satisfaction in serving the respectable people of the Colonies, "people who pursued measures to promote the true interest of the

British empire." Dartmouth felt that the people of the colonies and those living in Great Britain shared in similar interests and therefore should have a single head--"the King-in-Parliament."¹¹

After reviewing Dartmouth's year in government, it is evident that he was a man who believed conciliatory overtures were needed to bring the colonies back under the complete dominance of Britain. He was greatly influenced by the mercantile factions of his country, groups that suffered most by the disturbances in America. Although he proved to favor pacification in obtaining his goal, he was strongly against allowing violence to go uncontested.

Dartmouth resigned from his position at the end of July, 1766, after failing to receive a promotion in Rockingham's government. Dartmouth commented that he had found his "employment most agreeable." In a letter to Denys De Berdt, London agent for the Massachusetts General Court, Dartmouth reflected his view of the American Colonies by stating that he felt that most Americans possessed sound principles. He was happy to have been able to assist in promoting the ideas of these people as long as they accepted subjection to the supreme authority in Britain.¹²

Dartmouth held no political office between 1766 and 1772, occupying most of his time with caring for his estates and tending to family problems. He did, at first, stay relatively close to the political circle of the Rockingham group. He spent numerous nights talking politics with this circle, and even considered taking an important position in the Ministry if their clique could

regain power. However, when his stepbrother, Frederick North, came to power as First Minister in 1770, Dartmouth began to reevaluate his political inclinations. Because of his personal relationship with Lord North, he refused to take part in any Rockingham measures that attempted to undercut the North ministry.¹³

In January, 1771, North, faced with a political crisis, asked Dartmouth to enter the cabinet as Secretary of State for the Southern Department. Dartmouth refused, but for personal reasons rather than political objections. Although this rejection caused Dartmouth's stepfather to react angrily, North accepted his stepbrother's refusal in an understanding way.

III. Dartmouth's First Year as Secretary of State

Dartmouth finally accepted the position as Secretary of State for the Colonies in 1772, as a personal favor to his stepbrother, Lord North. North was again faced with a political crisis when his closest friend, Lord Hillsborough, came under fire from his political opponents. Dartmouth, tempted to remain a private citizen, accepted after much urging from relatives and many friends. On August 14, 1772, he was formally sworn in.¹⁴

The reaction from the Americans to the new British Cabinet Member was generally quite favorable. Dartmouth was considered to be conciliatory and sympathetic toward the American people. It is evident from the correspondence that the Colonists expected

a change in policy with Dartmouth as Third Secretary. Thomas Woolridge, a North American land speculator, wrote to Dartmouth in late November, 1772, claiming that the colonies were rejoicing over his appointment and expected greater civil and religious liberty.¹⁵

Dartmouth may have been able to initiate an era of pacification which would have negated the work of the more radical Colonial propagandists had it not been for several incidents which completely tied his hands from initiating any dovelike policy. On June 10, 1772, two months before Dartmouth took office, the British revenue cutter Gaspee was attacked and burned in the waters of Rhode Island. The event was reported from Boston by Governor Thomas Hutchinson on June 12, in a letter to the Earl of Hillsborough. Hutchinson feared that if no action was taken, other people might be encouraged to act in like manner.¹⁶

The report of the Gaspee incident was forwarded to the Attorney and Solicitor General in late July in order to obtain legal opinions as to appropriate courses of action to pursue against any offender who might be apprehended. On August 19, a legal opinion was delivered back to the Earl of Hillsborough. It was determined that the attack constituted an act of treason against the King. It was also the opinion of King's counsel that the offenders could be tried either in London or Rhode Island.¹⁷

On August 20, 1772, the British Cabinet recommended the establishment of a Commission to investigate the Gaspee incident

in order to discover the perpetrators of the attack. King George approved the establishment of the Commission and directed that General Gage be notified to stand ready to assist the Commission should any violence be used to obstruct it from carrying out its directions. Based on the Attorney General's decision, the King also directed that the offenders be arrested and returned directly to England for trial. Apparently Dartmouth did not attend the cabinet meeting of August 20, probably because he had been sworn in only a few days earlier. Dartmouth, at his estate in Sandwell, was advised by his under secretary, John Pownall, that actions being taken by the ministry could have grave consequences. On August 29, Pownall sent Dartmouth a letter asking him to return to his office, stating that he feared a plot was underway to pledge the American Secretary to coercive measures against the American Colonies. Pownall went on to repeat that the Attorney General considered the creation of the Inquiry Commission to be of far greater consequence than the Stamp Act legislation.¹⁸

Dartmouth's response to the actions taken by the cabinet were cautious. He certainly could not give approbation to acts of mob violence, although he was completely against the ideas of some ministers who advocated the removal of Rhode Island's charter.¹⁹

Dartmouth had no alternative, except resignation, but to sign the warrant establishing the Commission. He most assuredly weighed Pownall's warning against supporting such measures. As he reviewed

the papers concerning the affair, he must have read Governor Joseph Wanton's letter to the Earl of Hillsborough explaining the incident. Wanton, Governor of Rhode Island, expressed his desire, supported by his Council and House of Deputies, to discover the parties responsible for such actions. Wanton also stated that the majority of the inhabitants of the province condemned the action. After studying the documents, Dartmouth most probably came to the conclusion that the affair was the work of a small mob, an action sanctioned by few of the residents of the Colony. Dartmouth could not have missed the fact from the correspondence that Lieutenant Dudingston, commander of the Gaspee, had made himself very obnoxious to many honest shippers because of his zeal for searching every seagoing vessel.²⁰ The attack on Dudingston's vessel seemed to have been a personal attack more than an act of violence aimed at the British crown.

Dartmouth decided to follow the recommendation of the Ministry's legal authority, and he took the steps necessary to carry out the directions of the Commission's proclamation. In reviewing the letters of instruction Dartmouth sent to various officials in America, it is noteworthy that Dartmouth literally quoted the instructions that the King had issued instead of taking direct responsibility by stating his own intentions. The most coercive measure in the instructions of the Commission was the intention to bring any offender apprehended back to England for trial. Dartmouth made certain to write in his letters that it

was "His Majesty's" intention to return persons to England for trial. Is it possible that Dartmouth could see the possible consequences of removal of people to England for prosecution? He told several friends that no order from his office would be issued to remove people to England to stand trial. He stated that he felt it was legal for trial to take place in the country where the offense was perpetrated.²¹

The Commission never was able to establish a case against anyone, therefore, no crisis took place. The establishment of the Commission, however, was used by the radical elements in the colonies to influence the more moderate into renewed protest.

Correspondence Dartmouth received during the latter part of 1772 and early 1773 expressed the concern of men who viewed with alarm the emergence of a new wave of revolutionary thought. The radicals of Massachusetts used the Gaspee affair to develop the Committee of Correspondence. This Committee condemned the Commission looking into the Gaspee incident. Initiating the correspondence concerning the effect the Gaspee inquiry might have was Thomas Wooldridge. He stated that the moderate people of the colonies questioned the consequences of such an inquiry. Other correspondents warned that the American newspapers were full of "rebellious sentiments" calling for complete independence. It was suggested that the way to counteract their new spirit was for a policy of cool restraint toward New England. Joseph Ward wrote Dartmouth that each colony was establishing a Committee of

Correspondence, and people were being greatly influenced by their propaganda.²²

IV. Petitions and Grievances from the Colonies

Dartmouth was fortunate that no one was arrested in conjunction with the Gaspee incident. He needed a period of time for both sides to cool off. It appeared that he might get this hiatus as the end of 1772 brought no serious problems. An event in January 1773, however, greatly hurt Dartmouth's chances of using this delay to defeat the undertakings of the radical leaders.

Thomas Hutchinson, Governor of Massachusetts, undertook the responsibility of instructing the Colony's General Court on the supremacy of Parliamentary legislative authority over the colonies. Hutchinson had previously expressed his belief to Dartmouth that the cause of much of the conflict between the colonies and England was a "false opinion" that the people of the colonies were no longer subject to any authority except their own legislature and that the acts of the Parliament of Great Britain were no longer binding. Hutchinson was greatly disturbed over the failure of the colonists to support the authority of the British government, but he conceded that he knew no remedy to alleviate the problem. As the Committee of Correspondence had openly challenged British authority during the latter part of 1772, Hutchinson had shown great restraint in trying not to irritate their leaders further.

His speech of January 6, 1773, was a complete abandonment of his previous restraining policy. Perhaps Hutchinson felt that he could force his General Court to acknowledge the overall supremacy of the British Parliament and thereby gain a settlement. Hutchinson's speech proved to be a very imprudent action. He went into great detail explaining his conservative interpretation of the rights the colonists enjoyed as granted by their charters.²³

Hutchinson's declaration of British supremacy was not new, even though it was the first time it had been officially stated in such a manner. One portion of his speech, however, went far beyond a statement of Parliamentary supremacy. Hutchinson declared he could see "no line that can be drawn between the supreme authority of Parliament and the total independence of the colonies."²⁴ By this statement, Hutchinson was implying that the colonists had been claiming more than local control of their governments; and were, in fact, aiming at independence.

Dartmouth's hope for a long period of restraint on both sides was quashed. Dartmouth completely agreed with Hutchinson's remedy. Dartmouth exclaimed that "the seat of the disorder is rather in the head than in the heart!" He felt that sometime in the future, when calm replaced "passion and prejudice," "reason and argument," might be a success.²⁵

It is evident from reviewing Hutchinson's correspondence written immediately after his address to the Massachusetts Council that he entertained second thoughts as to the wisdom of

his actions. On January 7, he wrote both Dartmouth and Pownall stating the reasons for his step. In both letters he expressed apprehension of the consequences his declaration might have. Hutchinson asked both Dartmouth and Pownall for comments of whether they approved of his actions. Hutchinson ended in a lamenting fashion by expressing his hope that he would not be accused of fomenting a new dispute.²⁶

Dartmouth's reaction to Hutchinson's imprudent maneuver was swift. When he received Hutchinson's letter of January 7, Dartmouth immediately replied that he questioned the wisdom of a personal explanation of the colonial constitution. Dartmouth must have received more detailed information in April because he wrote Hutchinson on April 10 recommending that he avoid any further discussion concerning the Colonial charters. Dartmouth also advised Hutchinson that it might be wise to dissolve or prorogue the General Court.²⁷

Dartmouth's anxiety was caused by the realization of his total misconception of the extent to which a majority of the General Court of Massachusetts was committed to the idea of limited Parliamentary authority. Dartmouth had previously believed that only a small fraction of people accepted the doctrine of resistance to Parliamentary supremacy. But after reviewing the declarations of the Massachusetts General Court, he realized the nearly unanimous support these ideas enjoyed. Dartmouth was to learn in the next few months just how wrong he had been in his

assessment of the colonial attitudes.

Dartmouth was next faced with what action he needed to take to two petitions drawn up by the Massachusetts Assembly. One petition, drawn up in July, 1772, called for repeal of an Act of Parliament establishing a revenue for payment of the Governor's salary, which removed the Colonial Assembly's control of the executive. In March, 1773, the Massachusetts House passed a second petition calling for repeal of measures that instituted the payment of judges' salary by the Crown. In November, 1772, Dartmouth had persuaded Benjamin Franklin, agent from Massachusetts, to withhold the first petition in hope that tempers might cool off on both sides. Franklin agreed to withhold after Dartmouth's assurance that the petition would be ultimately submitted.²⁸

When Franklin delivered the second petition, drawn on March 6, he also resubmitted the older redress. Dartmouth realized the Massachusetts Assembly now was in favor of even greater resistance than in the past November. Seeing no further reason to delay, Dartmouth accepted both petitions from Franklin at the end of May, 1773, and promised to present them to the King.²⁹

Dartmouth was not surprised at the King's reply. George III declared that, while he was always pleased to review any grievance submitted by his subjects, he was intent on resisting any attempt to reduce the authority of Parliament. The King stated that he was greatly displeased with the petitions since they questioned the authority of Parliament over the Colonies. The King concluded

by stating that he was unwilling to believe that the doctrines set forth in the petition represented the faithful majority of the residents of Massachusetts.³⁰

If the King was unconvinced of any strong support the people might give the Massachusetts Assembly's assertion of undeniable rights granted by charter, Dartmouth was certainly warned by correspondents that those ideas were beginning to have more than just faint support. Joseph Ward in May, 1773, advised Dartmouth that many Colonies had Committees of Correspondence which were quickly winning many people to the idea of limited British Supremacy. Again in June, Ward warned Dartmouth that events were taking place in America that could quickly lead to a declaration of independence. Another correspondent, the Reverend William Gordon, advised Dartmouth of the successful workings of the Committees of Correspondence in several Colonies. Gordon related how Hutchinson's speech concerning Parliament's authority had caused great "disgust" among the people.³¹

In June, 1773, Dartmouth tried to add a conciliatory note to the King's harsh reply by instructing Hutchinson that the King would allow payment of judges by the Province when "permanently competent salaries" were established. The King would also allow for the payment to the Governor's salary by the province if it were no less than 2000 pounds per annum.³² This was indeed a concession even though it did not return the control of the salaries of these officials back to the General Assembly.

The ambiguity of Dartmouth's policy, which was to be prevalent during the rest of his tenure in office, was plainly shown in his correspondence in late June to Thomas Cushing, Speaker of the Massachusetts House. Dartmouth claimed that he wrote the letter to express privately his thanks for the Massachusetts Assembly's congratulations on the appointment. However, Dartmouth took time to express his dissatisfaction with the principles expressed by the Assembly during the first of the year. He once again stated his theory of Parliamentary Supremacy. Dartmouth, however, believed there was a great difference between theoretical declaration of power and the exercise of it. Dartmouth stated that he wished Parliament would suspend the exercise of this power until such time as it proved to be necessary.³³

Dartmouth's conciliatory overtures were negated by two more new crises. The first crisis was a result of the publishing of letters written in the late 1760's by then Governor Francis Bernard, Lieutenant-Governor Hutchinson, and Secretary Andrew Oliver to Thomas Whately. The letter that proved to be the most damaging and provoked the greatest amount of outcry was one by Hutchinson to Whately, a former office holder in the Grenville ministry. Hutchinson referred to his belief that there was need for "some further restraint of liberty," in order to secure British domination over the colonies. The letters, procured by Ben Franklin, generally expressed ideas Hutchinson had declared in public. However, when the Massachusetts Committee of Correspondence

saw a chance to discredit important Colonial officials, the letters were forwarded to Massachusetts General Court to be read before that body. Franklin had entreated Speaker Thomas Cushing, to whom he forwarded the letters, not to show the material to anyone except people the former specified. Cushing, however, could not resist using the correspondence to attack the Governor.³⁴

The letters were read to the Council during the early part of June, 1773. Hutchinson wrote to Dartmouth on June 26, informing him of the mood of the Court concerning the letters. Hutchinson, disclaiming any guilt of wrong doing, conceded that his usefulness as Governor had been lessened because of the discontent precipitated by the disclosures. Hutchinson warned Dartmouth that the Assembly had voted to petition the King concerning the possibility of removing the governor and lieutenant-governor.³⁵

Hutchinson was greatly distressed by these attacks which he took personally. He had been under great difficulty since he had assumed the governorship. Hutchinson closed his letter by requesting Dartmouth to inquire of the King a leave of absence for a period of nine to twelve months.³⁶ Dartmouth would be able to use this request at a later time to carry out his plans to replace Hutchinson.

The Massachusetts Assembly drew up a petition to the King on June 23, and six days later wrote a letter to Dartmouth. Both documents blamed provincial officials for purposely misleading and deceiving the King's ministers. The Assembly named Hutchinson

and Oliver as the chief instigators of a plan to disrupt and interrupt the harmony between America and England. The petition called for the immediate removal of Governor Hutchinson and Lieutenant-Governor Oliver, citing the letters as proof of a conspiracy to cause disharmony. The letter to Dartmouth was more complete, listing various grievances that the Assembly felt needed redress. The letter to Dartmouth intimated that the Assembly was willing to lay the blame of bad feelings entirely on the former and present officials of Massachusetts. The letter concluded by stating that good will could be restored "if things were brought to the general state in which they stood at the conclusion of the late war. . . ."37

Both the petition and letter were sent to Franklin, who forwarded both documents under the cover of a letter to Dartmouth. Franklin's letter to Dartmouth restated briefly the desires of the Assembly. Franklin also stated his belief that all the disorders might be ended by a favorable reception of the petition to the King. Franklin felt that the resentment against Great Britain had been greatly abated by the discovery of the Hutchinson letters which implicated Colonial officials in wrongdoing. Dartmouth's reaction to this petition is not altogether clear. Certainly this petition offered Dartmouth a chance to initiate action that would be viewed by America as conciliatory and appeasing. Dartmouth had previously revealed his dismay and contempt towards Hutchinson because of his challenge to the

Massachusetts Assembly. Whether Dartmouth seriously considered sacrificing Hutchinson is not easily disconcertable. Review of Dartmouth's correspondence during the summer and early fall of 1773 does reveal that there was at least some consideration of recalling Hutchinson. Dartmouth was probably first informed about the Whately affair in a letter from Reverend Gordon sent from America in mid-June. Gordon informed Dartmouth about the public disgust because of the revelation of the letters, informing Dartmouth of the impending call for removal. Gordon even suggested a replacement for Hutchinson.³⁸

John Pownall wrote Dartmouth in early August suggesting that Hutchinson be recalled in order to explain to the King the condition of his government. Pownall wrote Dartmouth twice in mid-August, both times discussing Hutchinson's recall. In a letter dated August 12, Pownall told Dartmouth about a conversation he had with Lord North in which it was determined to recall Hutchinson at his own request. It is probable that Hutchinson's letter of June 25, requesting leave of absence, had arrived and been forwarded to Lord North for action. If Dartmouth had seriously considered involuntary removal of Hutchinson, he probably abandoned that notion when he read Hutchinson's request for leave. On August 17, 1773, Dartmouth wrote to Hutchinson granting him leave, but expressing his opinion that his return was not particularly necessary.³⁹

Dartmouth was in the country on a holiday when he received

the Massachusetts petition and letter with Franklin's letter of August 21. Dartmouth promised to submit the petition to the King, and remarked that he hoped that "all contentions would be replaced by a state of understanding and trust." The petition would have to be held, however, until the King's Councillors assembled in London in the fall.⁴⁰

The Massachusetts petition was not presented to the Privy Council until January 11, 1774. A Committee of the Privy Council had taken the petition under advisement and was prepared to submit it to the entire Council in late December. The Christmas holidays delayed action on the matter until mid-January. By that time the entire Council was ready to hear the petition. It had become common knowledge that Franklin, the man formally entering the petition, had played a major role in obtaining the letters upon which the grievances were based. Instead of reviewing the petition in regard to its factual merits, the Solicitor General embarked on a speech summarizing a decade of Massachusetts Province's history. The Solicitor then turned his attention on Franklin, labeling him as little more than a thief. The Solicitor's personal attack on Franklin was received with great delight by the majority of the Councillors.⁴¹ The Councillors, intent on believing that the publication of the Whately letters was for the sole purpose of inflaming the Massachusetts Council, made little attempt to consider the facts alleged in the petition itself. By a unanimous vote, including Dartmouth's, the council

rejected the petition.⁴²

Dartmouth, knowing that Hutchinson had been given permission for voluntary recall, apparently felt that the rejection of the petition did not completely destroy chances for appeasing the colonies. He was able to state once again his belief in Parliamentary Supremacy, and at the same time entertain hope that tempers would cool when Hutchinson returned to England on voluntary leave. His policy of delay, in hope of a cooling off period, was never successful. Because he failed to win approval for any grievances submitted by the Colonists, his strategy of declared but dormant supremacy of Parliament must have been greatly mistrusted by Colonial leaders.

V. Colonial Resistance to British Tea

During the latter part of 1773, Dartmouth spent much of his time at his country estates. He had been there when Franklin had forwarded Massachusetts' petition for removal of Hutchinson. His preoccupation with his leisure hours caused him to neglect his duties in the matters of governmental legislation in regard to the East India Company.⁴³ Lord North's Tea Bill introduced in April, 1773, was looked upon by the British Cabinet as strictly a revenue bill. Consequently, Dartmouth was not consulted on an important matter which was to influence greatly his strategy on reconciliation.⁴⁴

The intended purpose of the Tea Act of 1773 was to grant relief to the near-bankrupt East India Company, which had seventeen million pounds of unsold tea rotting in its warehouses. Britain saw the chance to help the failing company by letting it export tea directly to its own agents in America instead of through English merchants to American merchants as before. However, by providing the East India Company the power to appoint its own agents, the American merchants were eliminated from a process in which they had hitherto profited.⁴⁵ The most expedient means of aiding the failing Tea Company would, of course, have been to repeal the tea tax, which had survived the repeal of the Townshend Duties, left as a symbol of Parliament's right to tax. Perhaps Dartmouth, had he been close to the situation, would have used his strategy of "expedient but dormant" right to tax as a means of repealing the tea tax as well. He never had the opportunity in this situation.

The first actual resistance to the proposed East India Monopoly came from merchants in Philadelphia who had previously purchased large quantities of Dutch tea. Resolutions were introduced in that city claiming that the Act was an attack on the "liberties of America." Committees were formed to act as agents for the city to try to force the consignees of the expected tea shipments to resign. Boston, Charleston, and New York all followed the leadership of Philadelphia and established committees for the purpose of obtaining the consignees' resignations and to prevent landing and

selling of the tea.⁴⁶

In Boston the committees resorted to violence in order to persuade the consignees to resign. An attack in mid-November did not produce the desired results, as the consignees still refused to resign. When Governor Hutchinson refused to allow the tea ship Dartmouth to leave the harbor (Boston) before its customs duty was paid, several men dressed as Mohawk Indians, slipped silently into the harbor, boarded the Dartmouth, and emptied the tea chests into the water. Two other ships had joined Dartmouth, and they were emptied also. All told, 342 chests being thrown into the bay on the night of December 16.⁴⁷

The Committee of Correspondence sent word to the other Colonies the next day relating how the tea had been destroyed without harming any person or personal property. It is worth noting actions taken by the other Colonies. At Charleston, South Carolina, the consignees of the tea were forced to resign their commissions. When no one appeared to accept the cargo, custom officials seized the tea and stored it in warehouses where it subsequently rotted.⁴⁸

At Philadelphia committees had also been established to prevent the landing of the tea. A "Committee for Tarring and Feathering" was also established in case the tea was forcibly put ashore. When the tea ships were sighted, the consignees who were requested to resign obliged. The Committee met the ship and requested the captain to return to England without landing the cargo. At New York, the tea ships did not arrive until mid-April, 1774. By this

time the government had decided not to interfere with the committee appointed to reject the tea. The tea ships returned to England without any violent incident.⁴⁹

Each port had demonstrated effective and determined opposition to the Tea Act. Although no violent action was taken except in Boston, it was apparent that there was an organized, concerted effort, supported by considerable numbers of people in each of the Colonies, to resist the tea. It is also apparent that Hutchinson probably could have avoided a violent confrontation by issuing a permit for the tea ship to leave without being "entered."⁵⁰ Once again Hutchinson's decision to force a show down created another violent situation which negated any chance for cooling of tempers on both sides of the Atlantic. Had he used some common sense, avoiding the confrontation, the opposition would have not had a unifying point on which to plead their case.

It is necessary at this point to review the correspondence Dartmouth received from various Colonial inhabitants in regard to the sentiments of the people concerning the Tea Act, the inhabitant's reactions to the Boston Tea party, and their observations concerning the opposition's support. It is necessary to explore both official and private correspondence in order to see what information Dartmouth had on which to base his official policy. From New York came official inquiry on November 3, from Governor William Tryon. Tryon started his letter by stating that many of New York's inhabitants were upset on news of the intention to ship tea under a new Act. Tryon stated that the people feared either a monopoly limiting

America's liberties or a renewal of attempts to collect the tea tax. Tryon stated he was not certain what the Act said, for he had not received a copy of it from the Colonial office. Tryon closed by saying he felt certain that people would oppose the landing and selling of the tea but he would try to maintain peace. Governor Tryon had in no way characterized the opposition as "a mob resistance." Rather he knew it to be made up of merchants and artisans opposed to restricting liberties. Major General Haldiman, acting commander of British forces in America, wrote Dartmouth also in early November. He stated some opposition was possible to the tea Act, but failed to characterize the opposition.⁵¹

On November 4, Governor Hutchinson wrote Dartmouth informing him of information he had received regarding Colonial correspondence in opposition to importing of East India Tea. Hutchinson related the bullying of the consignees and characterized the committee carrying out the opposition as a "Mob Action."⁵²

Governor Tryon wrote Dartmouth again on December 1, stating that he had received information that the tea was subject to an importation duty. Tryon related the opinion of the consignees of their inability to carry out their duty to receive the tea. Tryon closed by stating that he expected no trouble in landing the tea, although the general attitude was that no tea would be bought until the duty was repealed by Parliament.⁵³

Hutchinson wrote Dartmouth again on December 2, informing him of mob attack on some of the consignees. Hutchinson intimated that the action was supported by only a few people.⁵⁴ If Hutchinson was

convinced that only a certain "bad sort" of people strongly opposed the Tea Act, his closing lines to Dartmouth belied that conclusion. Since the threatenings of the consignees had proved ineffectual, a town meeting was called for the 29th of November to decide on a new course of action.

Hutchinson described the make up of the assembly, which was a general meeting of people from country and town, as one of "varied assortment." Hutchinson admitted to Dartmouth that not only the lower class of people attended in great numbers but also many gentlemen of the community were present. Hutchinson's letter to Dartmouth on the 15th day of December emphasized the strength of the opposition. Hutchinson related that nearly one half of the towns of the province had elected committees to aid Boston in preventing the landing of the tea.⁵⁵

Governor John Wentworth of New Hampshire wrote Dartmouth on December 17, relating the measures adopted in Portsmouth against importation of tea. Wentworth did not characterize the strength of the opposition, but did relate it was impossible to prevent the people from passing the measures.⁵⁶

On December 24, Lieutenant-Governor William Bull wrote from Charleston giving Dartmouth a summary of the events which took place after the arrival of tea ships on December 2. Once again Dartmouth read of the consignees being forced to resign their commissions. Bull reported that although violence was threatened, his actions to secure the tea were successful. He closed by relating the general attitude was that no tea with a duty would be

purchased.⁵⁷

General Haldiman wrote Dartmouth again on December 28, stating that the mercantile interest in America opposed importing tea by the East India Company because of fear of a monopoly. Haldiman stated that a spirit of independence was growing, and the governors would probably choose to return the tea to England.⁵⁸

On January 5, 1774, Haldiman wrote Dartmouth once again. Haldiman confirmed previous belief that Philadelphia would reject the tea. He related how the committee in Philadelphia had forced the return of the tea ships to England on December 26. Haldiman concludes by telling Dartmouth that the violence carried out in Boston met with the general disapproval of most people. He related how a committee in Massachusetts had formed to protest the violence and call for the payment of the destroyed tea. Haldiman stated that he still felt that the mercantile interest would still influence people against the use of any imported tea.⁵⁹

After reviewing this collection of official correspondence, several points can be stated concerning information Dartmouth had about the American colonies. First, every port to which the tea was destined had reacted negatively. Violence was threatened in each. Only by tact or lack of action by governmental authorities was open rebellion prevented. Secondly, where the government did take a stand in Boston, mob violence occurred. Confrontation could have been prevented had the governor not provoked a showdown. And finally, many people who were in general support of nonimportation of taxed tea disapproved of violent destruction, and were prepared

to pay for the damaged tea. Thus, the argument that only the mob element was opposed to this Parliamentary Act was called into question.

In Dartmouth's unofficial correspondence, the information the Secretary had to reply on is made even clearer. Joseph Ward wrote Dartmouth from Boston on November 27, 1773, relating the serious problems in America. He recommended a speedy reconciliation in order to prevent foreign powers from taking advantage of the bad situation.⁶⁰

On December 11, Reverend William Gordon wrote Dartmouth from New York giving the latter his feelings about America's mood. Reverend Gordon summarized the disgust of the American merchants regarding the tea. His most interesting remarks came at the end of his letter. He made two points that Dartmouth might well have pondered over later that year. First, Gordon warned that if any colony was dealt with separately, the remainder would make its suffering "a common cause." Second, Gordon, hinting they had hidden their military strength from governmental officials, advised that the Americans could oppose any British forces set against them.⁶¹

Joseph Reed wrote Dartmouth on December 22, 1773, from Philadelphia stating the hope that the Revenue Act would be repealed in order that peace might be restored. Reed wrote again on December 27, giving Dartmouth an account of the rejection of the tea. Reed characterized the nature of the resistance as being made up of the "best sort" of people. Reed stated that the violence in Boston was received with mixed feelings but generally approved

as a necessary action.⁶² Although the unofficial information was not as plentiful as the official, it did give Dartmouth various opinions on which to base his official strategy.

Dartmouth's response to this correspondence is worth noting. On January 8, 1774, he wrote Hutchinson after having received the letters through November 15, 1773. Dartmouth commended Hutchinson on his temperate conduct and related his hope that no bad consequences would occur. He closed by stating that the military could be used only in cases of actual rebellion.⁶³

VI. Dartmouth's Response to Colonial Violence

Dartmouth in all probability received word about the Boston Tea Party on the 21st or the 22nd of January. On January 21, he received a memorandum from the chairman of the East India Company explaining that tea had been destroyed at Boston on the 16th of December.⁶⁴ Within the next few days he received other memoranda from the East India Company and the Office of Admiralty concerning the open resistance to landing the tea.

Dartmouth's reaction to this news marks a change in policy of his Colonial Office. No longer could time be allotted for cooling of tempers. Action must be taken to punish Boston for destruction of private property. There is little doubt that Dartmouth was concerned about the resistance exhibited in every port of America where tea had been introduced. On January 27th, Thomas Penn had

written Dartmouth admitting his astonishment that no word of the problems of tea had come from the acting governor of Pennsylvania. Dartmouth wrote Deputy Governor John Penn on February 5, relating his dismay at the rebellious actions taken by the inhabitants in rejecting the landing of tea at Philadelphia. Dartmouth closed by stating his surprise at nothing being done to check these violent actions.⁶⁵ By the end of January, Dartmouth was also surely aware of the rebellious acts carried out by the inhabitants of Charleston against the landing of the tea.

Dartmouth's course of action, therefore, was quite clear. He felt that in order to secure the dependence of the Colonies upon England, coercive measures would have to be taken. Dartmouth believed that reconciliation now depended upon England's ability to force the Colonies to submit. Dartmouth obviously realized that several Colonies had been guilty of rebellious action, the extreme in Boston being the worst. It appears that Dartmouth's idea was to make an example of Boston to influence the "better sort" of people to repudiate the American radicals.

Dartmouth's action was swift. On February 5, 1774, he sent a memo to the Ministry's Attorney and Solicitor General summarizing the affairs of Boston and requesting to know if the actions amounted to treason. If crimes were committed, the Ministry requested the proper method of proceeding against those responsible.⁶⁶ No mention was made of possible prosecution of the inhabitants of any Colony except Massachusetts. It is apparent that Dartmouth

hoped to implement the coercive measures through the Ministry itself. His letter to the Attorney General underlines the idea that he hoped that arresting and convicting of the radicals should prove England's conviction that the Colonies submit to dependence.

Dartmouth hoped to keep the coercive action within the Ministry, thus possibly limiting the severity of such actions. Writing to John Thorton on February 12, Dartmouth expressed his belief that no present relief could be granted to the people of Massachusetts because of the mob actions. He stated that he expected Parliament would never repeal the tea duty until a change of conduct was displayed. Dartmouth expressed his belief that the duty might have been for the Boston Tea Party. Dartmouth concluded by stating that he still hoped to see repeal take place.⁶⁷

Dartmouth wrote Hutchinson February 5, telling him to be ready to receive measures to be carried out to secure the ~~depen-~~ dency of Massachusetts. He also notified General Haldiman to be ready to receive orders to help secure the dependence of the Colonies.⁶⁸ Dartmouth's hope that the King's Cabinet could administer Boston's punishment was lost when the Attorney General submitted his report to the Secretary on February 11. While the acts carried out in Boston were considered high treason and the perpetrators guilty of "said treason," the Attorney General would not recommend that the accused be arrested under a warrant issued in England and be brought to England for trial. Instead, the Attorney General recommended that the accused be prosecuted

in ordinary course of justice in America.⁶⁹

During those first few days of February, the Cabinet met daily to consider what actions to take. Besides the arrest of radical leaders, it was suggested that the government in Boston be moved to another location less likely to be influenced by rebellious activity. When news came to the Cabinet that the American leaders would not have warrants issued against them, other measures had to be considered.

VII. British Coercive Measures

The Cabinet decided that if the leaders could not be punished, the only alternative was to punish the entire port. The Cabinet meeting held the 19th of February produced two recommendations. First, the Boston Port would be closed and the seat of government removed until the people gave due respect to imperial authority. Secondly, the constitution of Massachusetts would be altered.⁷⁰ The Cabinet also decided to submit these measures in the form of Bills to both Houses of Parliament. With this decision the Ministry increased the intensity of the coercion and also relinquished its control. The King's Ministry introduced the Boston Port Bill into Commons on March 14, 1774. The Bill received majority votes from both houses and was given the King's assent March 26, 1774.

Dartmouth wrote General Haldiman and Governor Hutchinson on March 9, informing them of the probable legislation to come from

Parliament concerning Boston. He alerted Haldiman to be ready to move troops to Boston to aid Hutchinson in carrying out the proposed Acts for closing the Boston Port and removing its government to another place. In his letter to Hutchinson, Dartmouth explained the Crown's lack of sole authority to carry out the intended punishment. Dartmouth's stated that he considered this unfortunate, probably underlying his feelings that the punishment could not be controlled. He did, however, relate to Hutchinson his belief that the Port's rights would be restored upon reparation to the East India Company for the destroyed tea. Dartmouth in no way hinted to Hutchinson that the latter would not be carrying out these measures for England.⁷¹

The news of the Boston Tea Party had created a stir in England. Great resentment toward the colonies was manifested in both private and public debate. Among the men calling for coercion was General Thomas Gage, commander of British forces in America, on leave in England since June, 1773. Gage talked to King George III on February 4, pledging his readiness to return to America to help carry out any coercive measure, should they be required. Gage related to the King his belief that four regiments would be sufficient to prevent any disturbance in Boston while the punishment was being conducted. George III was so impressed by Gage's remarks that he wrote Lord North urging him to talk to Gage to set his ideas on ways to handle Boston.⁷²

In reviewing the minutes of the Cabinet meeting, it is not

clear who suggested that Gage be sent back to America to enforce the Acts. The Cabinet meeting of February 19, does relate the intention to send a strong person to Boston to ensure success of the proposed Acts. The minutes of this meeting were recorded in John Pownall's hand.⁷³

In reviewing the correspondence of John Pownall of the preceding months, it is apparent that he was strongly in favor of Hutchinson's recall. In August, 1773, Pownall, as previously noted, had urged Dartmouth to recall Hutchinson. When Hutchinson asked for voluntary leave, Pownall had pressed Dartmouth and North to grant his request. In October, 1773, Pownall had written Lieutenant Governor Oliver, seeking information he might supply as to when Hutchinson would act on his previously granted leave. Dartmouth also wrote to Hutchinson in mid-October, probably at Pownall's urging, telling the Governor that the present time probably would be a good time to exercise his voluntary recall. It appears the recommendation to appoint Gage, therefore, did not come from Dartmouth, but from under secretary Pownall. The Cabinet recommended Gage be sent to America to reassume his command of British forces and also to assume the post of Governor of Massachusetts. This recommendation came from the Cabinet on March 31, and was quickly given Royal assent seven days later.⁷⁴

Dartmouth must have embraced the decision to send Gage as one that could possibly serve a two-fold purpose. Massachusetts had petitioned for the removal of Hutchinson. His replacement

with Gage, a man well respected in America for his services in the Colonies for seventeen years, would surely be looked upon as a conciliatory appointment. Gage, with his many years of experience in military leadership, could be counted on also to influence the better sort of people to reject the ideas of the radicals, therefore, encouraging the return of peace and good feelings between England and the Colonies. Gage sailed from Plymouth on April 16, and arrived in Boston Harbor on May 13. He carried with him the Act for closing the Port of Boston which was to be put into effect on June 1.

Dartmouth forwarded specific instructions to Gage on April 9, seven days before the General sailed. These instructions are tremendously important because they were the basis on which Gage was to plan his entire Colonial policy for more than ten months. The General was instructed to enlist the support of various Provincial leaders in executing the Act. Dartmouth expressed the hope of the King that no opposition would or could present itself to the carrying out of the Act. He stated, however, that if opposition occurred, Gage was to use his troops. Dartmouth was more specific, however, when he went further and stated that it was the King's command to avoid if at all possible, any use of troops. Dartmouth relayed the King's wish for Gage . . . "to quiet the minds of the people, to remove their prejudices and by mild and gentle persuasion to induce . . . submission. . . ." Dartmouth instructed Gage that the submission was to be full and absolute.⁷⁵ Dartmouth also

instructed Gage to remove the seat of government from Boston to Salem.

Next, Dartmouth turned to the means of punishing the leaders accused of leading the people in the criminal acts committed at Boston. Dartmouth related the failure of the Ministry to establish the legal basis to arrest and return to England for trial those accused of wrong doing. The General was instructed to seek criminal prosecutions in any case he felt indictment was probable. If, however, it appeared to the General that a conviction would be impossible, it would be better to avoid prosecution. Finally, Dartmouth told Gage that the instructions in no way set aside the powers of the Massachusetts Council. Gage was, however, to refuse to seat in Council those that might be elected in the next election who had openly opposed the enforcement of England's laws.⁷⁶ Dartmouth closed by exhorting Gage to obtain the feelings of the "principal" members of the Colony in order to determine what actions the General might take to receive their support.

These instructions point out several positions held by Dartmouth in regard to American Colonial policy. First, Dartmouth felt that four British regiments in Boston would be a sufficient number to prevail upon the inhabitants to remain docile. If any trouble did occur, Dartmouth felt this number of troops could repel any disorder. Second, Dartmouth believed that the opposition to Parliament's supremacy was supported by only an ill effected minority faction. Despite the warnings he had received from many

correspondents, he refused to believe that the majority of principal people in the Colonies would support the radical ideas of refusing to submit to Parliamentary law. Third, Dartmouth believed that if the radical leaders could be arrested and prosecuted, the opposition would be dealt a heavy blow. This feeling underlined his belief that the opposition faction was indeed small, with only a few radical leaders keeping the movement alive. Fourth, Dartmouth believed there was a distinction between Parliament's right to legislate and the exercise of that right. Dartmouth felt that the Colonies were motivated mostly by economic factors. He could not understand or believe that a constitutional issue had now become a growing problem. Finally, Dartmouth believed that coercive measures were needed to overthrow the radical leaders, restore respect for order, and give the good elements of the Colonies "encouragement" or "incentive" to speak up. The coercion need not end reconciliation but in fact might encourage it.

Dartmouth also wrote Hutchinson on April 9, informing him of Gage's appointment. Hutchinson was informed that his performance in office had the complete approval of the King. Dartmouth related that Gage's appointment was only temporary and that Hutchinson would be reinstated at a later date.⁷⁷ It is worth noting that this official letter probably belies the true feelings of Dartmouth, given the number of difficulties Hutchinson precipitated during his tenure as Governor.

If Dartmouth contemplated what amount of truth and worth he

could attribute in formulating his Colonial strategy to official correspondence from the Royal Governors, he must have struggled over Deputy Governor John Penn's explanation of his actions during the rejection of the tea. Penn related that he was unaware of the actions of those who resisted the landing of the tea until after the tea ship moved from port to return to England. If this was impossible for Dartmouth to believe, Penn's further comment must have shaken the Secretary. Penn confessed to believe that the importation of tea was a private matter, being carried out by a private company in which the British government had no concern.⁷⁸

If the British Ministry had ended the coercive legislation with the Boston Port Bill, reparation for the tea might have been extracted from Boston. As already pointed out, there had been a general feeling among the moderate elements that the tea should be paid for. However, the Ministry and Parliament did not wait to see what effect the Port Bill would produce.

In swift succession, Parliament passed three other measures that were aimed at punishing the entire Colony of Massachusetts. The first of these measures was the Massachusetts Government Act which altered the charter of Massachusetts. The Act called for the King to henceforth appoint the members of the Council, which had previously been chosen by the Assembly and the Governor. The Governor was also empowered to appoint judges, sheriffs and minor officials. The Act also called for the sheriff to select lists for jurors for trials instead of letting the inhabitants of the

Colony pick them. The last part of this Act also forbade more than one town meeting a year for the Colony.⁷⁹

The second Act, the Administration of Justice Act, allowed a person to be sent to England for trial if it was believed that an unprejudiced one could not be obtained in America. The third Act was the Quartering Act, which enabled Gage to quarter his troops at Massachusetts expense. These three Acts received Royal assent in late May, and were forwarded to Gage in early June. Gage received them on August 6.⁸⁰

Dartmouth expected the Acts to have no alienating effect upon the moderates. This belief was based upon his notion that the opposition was composed of only a "rabble faction" of men. The Ministry's strategy was therefore in place, and it could only wait to see what effect it would produce.

On May 4, General Haldimand wrote Dartmouth relaying to him the Acts that were carried out by the inhabitants of New York in rejecting the tea. One ship was boarded and her captain was persuaded to return to England. Haldimand related that another ship's tea met the same fate as the tea in Boston, the only difference being that the quantity was much smaller.⁸¹ This rebellious action of New York inspired no action by the British Ministry, therefore giving substance to the conjecture that Massachusetts was being made an example.

The reaction Dartmouth received to the first measure varied. Haldimand wrote in mid-May that many people in New York believed

that Boston would acknowledge its bad behavior, pay for the tea, and reestablish harmony. On June 1, Haldimand wrote even more optimistically by stating his belief that by making an example of Boston would cause the loyal people to speak their minds. On May 31, Governor William Franklin of New Jersey wrote Dartmouth. Franklin expressed his belief that, although the merchants of Philadelphia and New York were inclined to assist Boston in some degree, the general feeling was that they would not support a call for non-importation and exportation agreement. Deputy Governor John Penn, on May 31, wrote the Secretary informing him of the non-importation and exportation suggestion, stating, however, that no action had been taken to approve it.⁸²

From Massachusetts in late May came word from Hutchinson. He stated that there were many people ready to express their support for the Crown, and that when troops arrived they would do so. Official word from New York came from Lieutenant Governor Colden in early June. Colden related that the lower class had tried to excite the people over the punishment of Boston, but had met with little success. Colden related his belief that the merchants would never agree to non-importation although many had voiced their opposition to internal taxation by Parliament.⁸³

Dartmouth must have been somewhat encouraged by the initial official correspondence he received. But it must be pointed out that he was given a different point of view from other writers. On May 20, 1774, Joseph Ward wrote from Boston that the measures

adopted by Parliament would never succeed, and would ultimately cause the downfall of Britain. From Philadelphia, on May 30, came word from Joseph Reed. Reed advised Dartmouth that the Colonies would never allow Boston to struggle alone against Parliamentary supremacy. Reed advised the Secretary of the actions of the majority of Colonies in voicing their intended support to Boston until the Acts were repealed. On June 10, Reed wrote again informing Dartmouth that a plan had been proposed to hold a general Congress of all the Colonies to enact resolves in opposition to Parliamentary claim of taxation. Many were favoring a drawing up of a Bill of Rights. Reed also related plans to undertake ways to relieve the problems of Boston.⁸⁴

Obviously, Dartmouth chose to put his confidence in the reports submitted by his official correspondents. His letters to Gage June 3, sending the final three Massachusetts Acts, stated the Secretary's belief that Gage could quiet the Spirit of opposition by . . . "prudence on the one hand, and by firmness and resolution on the other. . . ."⁸⁵ Gage became Dartmouth's most important official correspondent during the last six months of 1774. The English Ministry was counting heavily on Gage to enact a change in New England Colonies. The King and his Ministers felt that Gage, by using tempered but firm action, could stem the radical movement.

General Gage had proclaimed to the King in February that order could be restored and kept with four regiments of troops.

He probably felt confident with that conjecture as he landed on May 17, and was treated with a military reception and banquet. The calmness of Boston could have also have caused him to possess some perplexing thoughts. Surely he wondered where the "rabble mob" was that was threatening law and order. Also perplexing must have been the presence of Samuel Adams, John Hancock, Benjamin Church, and all the other leaders of the faction at the banquet held in his honor.⁸⁶

VIII. Gage and Enforcement of the Acts

Gage wrote Dartmouth first on May 19 that the Act for closing the Port was already known. The General stated that Boston had sent word to each Colony asking them to stop all import and export until the Act was repealed. Gage told Dartmouth optimistically that he had information that Boston's request had received little encouragement. On May 31, Gage wrote Dartmouth from Boston, relating that while he has met with no resistance to opposing the Act, neither had he met with any support for the execution of it. Gage was certain that when troops arrived, many would come forth to side with his government.⁸⁷

Gage's letter to Dartmouth on June 26 summarized the General's failure to gain the support of a sufficient number of men to bring the Colony successfully under submission. Gage noted the necessity of dissolving the General Court because of members' unwillingness

to consider the matter payment for the tea. Gage explained that some gentlemen had come forward to offer their assistance but their number was small. Gage was probably referring to the one hundred and thirty men who volunteered to contribute a share in payment for tea. This same group made a try at recommending dissolution of the Committees of Correspondence. Their motions at several town meetings were quickly defeated. Gage ended the letter of the 26th by stating that regardless of what had taken place, the non-importation decree would never be accepted in New York or Philadelphia. Gage even suggested it would not be embraced in Massachusetts. He did relate that some sort of general congress had been proposed, and might succeed in being held.⁸⁸

Much transpired in Boston in the month of June to nullify any chance that Gage had of success. The Committee of Correspondence produced the "solemn league and Covenant," which was a pledge against receiving British goods. A call also went out to have a continental congress meet in the fall. The General Court that Gage had dissolved sent out a general call for a continental congress to meet in Philadelphia in September.⁸⁹

Gage tried to encourage men to speak openly in support of British Acts but only a few could be persuaded. The actions of the Provincial legislature in late June must have shown him that his only hope was to keep the opposition from spreading into the surrounding Colonies. On July 5, Gage wrote Dartmouth relating

the failure of several gentlemen to gain support at a town meeting to pay for the tea and dissolve the Committee of Correspondence. Dartmouth was also informed of the "Covenant" which was being circulated. Gage saw some hope in the fact that there was now some open opposition to the faction which might possibly prove successful. Given the amount of resistance, the great majority rejecting the payment for the tea, and the poor response Gage received from Royalists in Massachusetts, the General's optimism shown in his early letters to Dartmouth seems to have been without foundation.

Review of the correspondence sent to Dartmouth from other colonial figures during the summer and fall of 1774 shows the widening of the opposition, the response of other Colonies to the "Intolerable Acts," and resolve of the majority of the Colonies not to submit regardless of the consequences. From the Colony of Maryland came word of a meeting of delegates from several counties at which ten resolutions were drawn up, among which was a motion for non-importation and a call for general congress.⁹⁰

Joseph Reed wrote to Dartmouth on July 26 giving him information concerning a Provincial meeting held at Philadelphia on July 15 which passed several resolves supporting the opposition in Massachusetts. The resolves called the Coercive Acts unconstitutional, oppressive, and without justification. The resolves also called for a general congress in order that a general plan be formulated to seek relief. The resolves called for a non-importation agreement to be used until Great Britain acted favorably. The final resolve hinted that other action might take place if the general

Congress deemed it necessary. Reed's letter dated September 25 certainly provided Dartmouth with a picture of how great the resistance had grown. Reed related how the continental congress had met on the first of September, and was expected to propose a general non-importation agreement.⁹¹

From Virginia, in early June, came word from Governor Dunmore that Boston had called upon Virginia to support non-importation and also a general meeting of all the Colonies. Dunmore stated that those considerations were to be undertaken in early August when the entire House of Burgesses returned for session.⁹² Governor Wentworth of New Hampshire wrote on June 8, informing Dartmouth of the General Assembly's passage of a bill supporting the intention to help Boston. Wentworth related news of a call for a continental congress, and his dissolving of the Court.⁹³

Governor Franklin of New Jersey wrote Dartmouth on June 28, relating the resolves passed by the county of Essex supporting a meeting of deputies from each Colony to determine steps to be taken in consequence of the Acts passed by Parliament. On July 5, came word from the previously quiet Deputy-Governor John Penn. Penn was disturbed over the mood of the people concerning the punishment of Boston. Penn related that the spirit of the people in his Province as well as all over America was alarming. Penn stated that the general aim of America was to convene a general congress to ask for relief. Non-importation was suggested until the grievances were dealt with. From New York on July 6, Golden wrote that the Committee of Correspondence had selected five men

to represent New York at the general congress. On July 13, Wentworth informed Dartmouth that delegates had been appointed to meet with the other deputies in Pennsylvania in September.⁹⁴

On July 31, Lieutenant-Governor Bull wrote from Charleston, perhaps giving Dartmouth the most frank but bleak picture of just what was transpiring in America. Bull related how he had hoped that the Parliamentary measures would have ended the Boston disturbance. He explained how the Acts had brought a universal spirit of bad feelings toward Britain, and a great unity among the Colonies. Bull took particular pains to point out the "universal" spirit against taxation by the Parliament. Bull informed the Secretary that South Carolina had chosen its delegates to the General Congress to be held in September. Bull concluded by stating that the opposition was so great in all the Colonies that he had no doubt that the non-import or export decrees would carry easily.⁹⁵

It is interesting to note the change of the tone of the letters from the Governors during the summer and fall of 1774. Many had not even written to inform Dartmouth of any trouble. The ones that had written had painted an overly optimistic picture. By the time they did gather enough courage to transmit to Dartmouth facts about the actual spirit of the people, events were out of control. Lieutenant-Governor Colden best characterized the position of the government in America in his letter of August 2. He bemoaned to Dartmouth that the Government could not prevent the meeting of the Colonies, even though it was illegal.⁹⁶

General Gage's optimistic letters of early summer to Dartmouth

created hopeful expectations with the Secretary. He wrote Gage on July 6, expressing his satisfaction that events in Boston were not as bad as expected. Dartmouth also expressed his hope that no other Colonies undertook any actions to help Boston. He noted that only one, Virginia, had expressed interest in giving support.⁹⁷

Gage's optimism began to fade in late July. Writing Dartmouth on July 20, Gage informed the Secretary that the hoped for effect of the Port Act had not been gained. No great body of people had come forward to endorse the government's action. On July 21, Gage made an interesting conjecture at the end of his letter. He related that the Secretary had been led to believe that only a small faction of people opposed the British government. Gage stated that the faction was in fact very large and powerful.⁹⁸

On August 27, Gage informed Dartmouth of the general opposition to the government throughout the Province. He also stated that Connecticut would probably have to be opposed, although he hoped no other Colony would join the opposition. Gage then intimated that he might use troops to restore order in Worcester County. Gage closed by noting that the Massachusetts delegates had left the Province to attend the general congress, promising to unify all the Colonies in their cause against England.⁹⁹

Gage in late August realized his situation was worsening. He decided to move his government to Boston, probably in order to use his troops more effectively. He had previously thought of using his troops to restore order in Worcester. This idea was dropped when he was advised that regardless of military force, no courts

could be made to function in that county.¹⁰⁰

Gage did decide on making a move with his troops. He must have felt he needed to take some action to slow the opposition so that he could act. On September 1, he sent about 250 men to Charlestown to remove several hundred barrels of gunpowder from the Provincial powder house. The mission was accomplished with ease. But the British troop movement into the country was observed by the countryside. Rumor spread that day that the British troops were marching against Cambridge and Charlestown. In one day thousands of men assembled around the town of Boston, with many thousands more making their way toward the Port. Gage kept his troops inside the city and confrontation was avoided. Gage on September 3, as a result of his close confrontation, began to fortify Boston Neck. He ordered all men that could reinforce him to be sent from New York and Quebec. Gage's attempt to convene the Province's courts on September 6 ended in failure. Judges were forced to resign, and those who did take office were frightened into later resignation. Gage next saw his failure in dealing with the Province's General Assembly. He had called for elections to the Assembly and a subsequent meeting on October 5. His order to countermand his summons was ignored. And when he failed to arrive in Salem, the legislature formed themselves into the First Provincial Congress, creating a revolutionary government.¹⁰¹

Gage's correspondence to Dartmouth's other Ministry leaders turned decidedly pessimistic in mid-September. Gage wrote Hutchinson on September 17 suggesting that the late Acts of Parliament

be suspended for a time. Gage exhorted that England prepare for the worse. He suggested that for the King's peace to be defended and the Provinces subdued, a large force, bolstered with foreign troops, would be needed. To Dartmouth on September 20, Gage related his belief that all of New England needed to be conquered in order to restore order. Gage related the utter failure of the Acts, and stated his surprise to the rumored warm reception Massachusetts had gotten from the other Colonies.¹⁰² Enclosed in Gage's letter was a memo which contained the Suffolk resolutions. These resolves, passed on September 6, condemned the Parliament Acts, pledged allegiance to the acts of the continental congress, and called for a refrain from violence. These resolutions were to become the basis for agreement of the deputies meeting at Philadelphia.

On September 25, Gage informed Dartmouth that there was no way to execute the "late Acts." He also related to Dartmouth the acceptance of the continental congress of the Suffolk resolutions and a consensus of the Colonies to aid Boston. Gage's letter to Dartmouth in late October and early November were full of the General's opinion as to what steps the Ministry needed to take in order to secure dependence. On October 30, Dartmouth was informed by Gage that if force was to be used it should be a considerable one. Gage claimed that a small force would encourage resistance and not conquer it. On November 2, Gage told the Secretary that an army of "twenty thousand" strong will in the end save Great Britain both blood and treasure.¹⁰³ Gage made it plain in his

letters that he intended for the Ministry to make the final decision on steps to be taken. He admitted to Dartmouth that he had been overly cautious, but with good reason, not wanting to precipitate a conflict until ordered to do so.

Dartmouth had received a deluge of warnings from America. His unofficial colonial correspondents had never faltered in their written warnings of great opposition. Dartmouth could have accepted their warnings with reservations. However, he was now getting information from his official writers that rebellion was almost universal. The ultimate bad news had come from his commander in chief. Dartmouth must have known that the "rude rabble," the "mob," was now the majority of the people in America because the Secretary's commander had stated as much.

The reaction of the Cabinet to what was transpiring in America was to disregard totally the advice given to them by their commander. In fact, the Cabinet condemned Gage for his timidity and weakness. William Knox wrote Dartmouth on November 15, complaining of the reports from the General and referring to this action as weak. John Pownall wrote to Dartmouth on December 18, declaring astonishment at the manner in which Gage had written. Pownall told the Secretary that due to Gage's inactivity and timidity, steps were being taken to relieve him.¹⁰⁴

The Cabinet spent the latter part of December struggling to make a decision. Gage had suggested that retaliation be made in maximum force, or surrender at least for a time to America's demands. The Cabinet was still thinking in terms of four regiments

to quell the disturbance. Dartmouth had written to Gage on October 17, acknowledging the critical situation Gage faced and at the same time calling for the General to try to disarm the people of Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Rhode Island.¹⁰⁵ Dartmouth's idea to carry this out with the present troop force the General possessed must have seemed whimsical to Gage.

By late December, 1774, the Cabinet had decided to grant Gage some reinforcements, although his large request could in no way be met. During this same period, plans were being made by the Cabinet to introduce legislation to Parliament declaring Massachusetts to be in a state of rebellion. Next came a bill restricting the trade of New England and England. Finally, Parliament passed an act barring New England's ships from entering the Newfoundland fishing waters.¹⁰⁶

IX. The Policy that Precipitates Conflict

The actions taken by the Cabinet and Parliament in late December and early January characterize the policy the government had decided upon. England would not acquiesce from its previous plan of coercion. On January 4, 1775, Dartmouth issued a circular to all North American governors instructing them to make a concerted effort to prevent their colony from appointing delegates to the proposed Second Continental Congress, slated to meet in May, 1775. On January 26, 1775, Parliament refused to consider the

resolves submitted by the First Continental Congress, regarding the work as illegal, unjustified, and without merit.¹⁰⁷

Gage had been sent to America by Dartmouth with explicit instructions. Although much had changed since Gage sailed from England in April, 1774, those orders had not been substantially altered. In accordance with this policy, Gage had not ventured into precipitating any action that was not consistent with his instructions. The Ministry would have to send definitive instructions before he acted.

Dartmouth and the Cabinet finally settled on the measures to be taken in America. On January 25, 1775, Dartmouth told Hutchinson that "measures were now determined with respect to America. . . ." Dartmouth, with the Cabinet's approval, drafted the Ministry's plan of January 27, 1775. In his letter to Gage, Dartmouth acknowledged his own knowledge that the General was faced with open rebellion. Dartmouth, however, stated his belief that although the spirit of the people was alarming, . . . "yet . . . the outrages which had been committed were . . . merely the acts of a tumultuous rabble without any appearance of a general concert or with any head. . . ."¹⁰⁸

Dartmouth proceeded to admonish Gage for being too cautious, too defensive, too inactive. The Secretary called the General to "meet force with force." The Secretary acknowledged Gage's request for a large force of men, but rejected the idea as not being necessary. Dartmouth stated he felt the twenty thousand men Gage

requested was not warranted by the events that had subsequently taken place. The Secretary stated that a "... smaller force now, if put to the test, would be able to encounter them with greater probability of success. . . ."109

Dartmouth next gave Gage specific instructions. The principals of the Provincial Congress were to be arrested and imprisoned. This action could probably be carried out, he felt, without bloodshed. However, if it could not, it would be better to precipitate hostilities at the present than wait until the rebellion had grown even more.¹¹⁰ The general tone of Dartmouth's letter was a call for action. Gage must show England's resolve to stand firm, regardless of the consequences. Dartmouth's secret dispatch to Gage was forwarded aboard the H.M.S. Falcon, a duplicate copy also sent aboard the H.M.S. Nautilus.¹¹¹ Gage received the copy of the dispatch on April 14, 1775, the original draft arriving two days later.

Gage considered the secret dispatch as a direct change in his orders. He was now being ordered to use force, regardless of what it might precipitate. Gage had just been informed about a large store of food, guns, and ammunition being held in Concord. While a movement to Concord would not be as bold as the arresting of patriot leaders, it would be a chance to strike a decisive blow. Gage, therefore, chose a mission to Concord to put in effect his orders from Dartmouth.¹¹² The resistance he met at Lexington and subsequently at Concord in the early morning of April 19 was

to mark the beginning of a war between England and America to determine which country's ideals would prevail. The fatal blow had been struck.

Notes

- ¹ B. D. Bargar, Lord Dartmouth and the American Revolution (Columbia: The University of South Carolina Press, 1965), pp. 1-8.
- ² Bargar, Lord Dartmouth, pp. 15-23.
- ³ Bargar, Lord Dartmouth, p. 9.
- ⁴ Historical Manuscripts Commission, Eleventh Report, Appendix, Part V, Vol. I of The Manuscripts of the Earl of Dartmouth, introd. George Billias (London, 1887; rpt, Boston: Gregg Press, 1972), p. 331. Hereinafter cited as MSS of Dartmouth, Bargar, Lord Dartmouth, p. 22.
- ⁵ Denny DeBerdt to Dartmouth, July, August 6, December 3, 1765. Dr. John Fothergill to Dartmouth, August 29, 1765, Benjamin Hallowell to Dartmouth, December 6, 1765, Historical Manuscripts Commission, Fourteenth Report, Appendix, Part X, Vol. II of The Manuscripts of the Earl of Dartmouth: American Papers, introd. B. F. Stevens (London, 1895; rpt. Boston: Gregg Press, 1972), pp. 16-47. Hereinafter cited as MSS of Dartmouth.
- ⁶ MSS of Dartmouth, II, 33-36.
- ⁷ Dr. John Fothergill to Dartmouth, August 29, 1765, Samuel Garbett to Dartmouth, December 21, 1765, MSS of Dartmouth, II, 17-28.
- ⁸ MSS of Dartmouth, II, 20.
- ⁹ Bargar, Lord Dartmouth, pp. 26-27; MSS of Dartmouth II, 33.

- 10 Bargar, Lord Dartmouth, p. 28.
- 11 MSS of Dartmouth, II, 42; Bargar, Lord Dartmouth, p. 33.
- 12 Bargar, Lord Dartmouth, p. 42.
- 13 Bargar, Lord Dartmouth, pp. 44-54.
- 14 Bargar, Lord Dartmouth, pp. 56-57.
- 15 MSS of Dartmouth, II, 107.
- 16 K. G. Davies, ed., Transcripts 1772, Vol. V of Documents of the American Revolution, 1770-1783 (Colonial Office Series) (Dublin: Irish University Press, 1974), p. 118.
- 17 Davies, ed., Transcripts 1772, V, 163-64.
- 18 Davies, ed., Transcripts 1772, V, 173-74; MSS of Dartmouth, II, 91.
- 19 Bargar, Lord Dartmouth, p. 76.
- 20 Davies, ed., Transcripts 1772, V, 125-26; Bargar, Lord Dartmouth, p. 75.
- 21 Dartmouth to Governor Joseph Wanton, September 4, 1772, Davies ed., Transcripts 1772, V, 125-26; Bargar, Lord Dartmouth, p. 78.
- 22 John Richard Alden, General Gage in America (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1948), p. 189; MSS of Dartmouth, II, 127, 145, 150.
- 23 Davies, ed., Transcripts 1772, V, 205-06; K. G. Davies, ed., Transcripts 1775, Vol. VI of Documents of the American Revolution, 1770-1783 (Colonial Office Series) (Dublin: Irish University Press, 1974), pp. 39-44.

- 24 Davies ed., Transcripts 1773, VI, 42.
- 25 Davies, ed., Transcripts 1772, V, 238-39.
- 26 Davies, ed., Transcripts 1773, VI, 44-45.
- 27 Davies, ed., Transcripts 1773, VI, 95; MSS of Dartmouth, II, 146.
- 28 Petition and Remonstrance of House of Representatives of Massachusetts to the King, July 14, 1772, Davies, ed., Transcripts 1772, V, 142-44; Davies, ed., Transcripts 1773, VI, 100-02; Bargar, Lord Dartmouth, p. 83.
- 29 Bargar, Lord Dartmouth, p. 88.
- 30 Dartmouth to Benjamin Franklin, agent for House of Representatives of Massachusetts, June 2, 1773, Davies, ed., Transcripts 1773, VI, 152.
- 31 MSS of Dartmouth, II, 150, 156.
- 32 Dartmouth to Hutchinson, June 2, 1773, MSS of Dartmouth, II, 152-53.
- 33 MSS of Dartmouth, II, 158.
- 34 Frank Arthur Mumby, George III and the American Revolution: The Beginnings (London, 1924; rpt. New York: Kraus Reprint Company, 1970), p. 223, 305.
- 35 Davies, ed., Transcripts 1773, VI, 165-66.
- 36 Davies, ed., Transcripts 1773, VI, 166.
- 37 Mumby, George III, pp. 307-312.
- 38 Mumby, George III, p. 312; MSS of Dartmouth, II, 156.

³⁹ MSS of Dartmouth, I, 338; K. G. Davies, ed., Calendar 1772-1773, Vol. IV of Documents of The American Revolution, 1770-1783 (Colonial Office Series) (Dublin: Irish University Press, 1973), p. 363.

⁴⁰ Bargar, Lord Dartmouth, p. 90-91.

⁴¹ Mumby, George III, p. 313-15; Bargar, Lord Dartmouth, p. 91-92.

⁴² Mumby, George III, p. 317.

⁴³ Bargar, Lord Dartmouth, p. 95-96.

⁴⁴ Bargar, Lord Dartmouth, p. 96.

⁴⁵ Christopher Ward, The War of The Revolution, ed. John Richard Alden (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1952), I, 12-13; Alden, Gage In America, p. 197.

⁴⁶ Ward, p. 13.

⁴⁷ MSS of Dartmouth, I, 342-43; Mumby, George III, pp. 320-21.

⁴⁸ Mumby, George III, p. 322; Ward, p. 13.

⁴⁹ Bargar, Lord Dartmouth, p. 99, 101; Joseph Reed to Dartmouth, December 27, 1773, MSS of Dartmouth, I, 345.

⁵⁰ Mumby, George III, p. 320-21.

⁵¹ Davies, ed., Transcripts 1773, VI, 237-39.

⁵² Davies, ed., Transcripts 1773, VI, 240.

⁵³ Davies, ed., Transcripts 1773, VI, 248.

⁵⁴ Davies, ed., Transcripts 1773, VI, 243-49.

⁵⁵ Davies, ed., Transcripts 1773, VI, 249, 251.

⁵⁶ Davies, ed., Transcripts 1773, VI, 256-57.

- 57 Davies, ed., Transcripts 1773, VI, 265-66.
- 58 Davies, ed., Calendar 1772-1773, IV, 431.
- 59 K. G. Davies, ed., Transcripts 1774, Vol. VIII of Documents of the American Revolution, 1770-1783 (Colonial Office Series) (Dublin: Irish University Press, 1975), p. 23.
- 60 MSS of Dartmouth, II, 182.
- 61 MSS of Dartmouth, II, 183.
- 62 MSS of Dartmouth, I, 345-46.
- 63 Davies, ed., Transcripts 1774, VIII, 24.
- 64 K. G. Davies, ed., Calendar 1774-30 June 1775, Vol. VII of Documents of the American Revolution, 1770-1783 (Colonial Office Series) (Dublin: Irish University Press, 1974), p. 26.
- 65 Davies, ed., Calendar 1774-30 June 1775, VII, 29; Davies, ed., Transcripts 1774, VIII, 45-46.
- 66 Davies, ed., Transcripts 1774, VIII, 37-42.
- 67 MSS of Dartmouth, II, 197.
- 68 Davies, ed., Calendar 1774-30 June 1775, VII, 35-36.
- 69 Davies, ed., Transcripts 1774, VIII, 46-48.
- 70 MSS of Dartmouth, II, 198.
- 71 Davies, ed., Transcripts 1774, VIII, 60.
- 72 Alden, Gage in America, p. 200; Mumby, George III, p. 323.
- 73 MSS of Dartmouth, II, 198.
- 74 Lieut.-Governor Andrew Oliver to John Pownall, in reply to letter from Pownall October, 1773, Davies, ed., Calendar 1772-1773, IV, 422, 399; Alden, Gage in America, p. 202.

- 75 Davies, ed., Transcripts 1774, VIII, 87-88.
- 76 Davies, ed., Transcripts 1774, VIII, 88-89.
- 77 Davies, ed., Transcripts 1774, VIII, 90.
- 78 Davies, ed., Transcripts 1774, VIII, 103.
- 79 Alden, Gage in America, p. 210.
- 80 Alden, Gage in America, p. 210.
- 81 Davies, ed., Transcripts 1774, VIII, 107.
- 82 Davies, ed., Transcripts 1774, VIII, 112, 120, 118, 119.
- 83 Davies, ed., Transcripts 1774, VIII, 115, 121-22.
- 84 MSS of Dartmouth, II, 212, 353-54.
- 85 Davies, ed., Transcripts 1774, VIII, 123.
- 86 Thomas J. Fleming, Now We Are Enemies (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1960), p. 31.
- 87 Davies, ed., Transcripts 1774, VIII, 115-18.
- 88 Davies, ed., Transcripts 1774, VIII, 136-37; Alden, Gage in America, p. 207.
- 89 John Richard Alden, The American Revolution: 1775-1783 (New York: Harper and Row, 1954), p. 8.
- 90 MSS of Dartmouth, I, 358, 362.
- 91 MSS of Dartmouth, I, 358, 362.
- 92 Davies, ed., Transcripts 1774, VIII, 126.
- 93 Davies, ed., Transcripts 1774, VIII, 129.
- 94 Davies, ed., Transcripts 1774, VIII, 137, 139-40, 147-49.
- 95 Davies, ed., Transcripts 1774, VIII 153-54.
- 96 Davies, ed., Transcripts 1774, VIII, 155.

- 97 Davies, ed., Transcripts 1774, VIII, 143.
- 98 Davies, ed., Transcripts 1774, VIII, 150-52.
- 99 Davies, ed., Transcripts 1774, VIII, 163-66.
- 100 Alden, Gage in America, p. 213-14, 161.
- 101 Alden, Gage in America, p. 213-14, 216; Fleming, p. 38.
- 102 MSS of Dartmouth, II, 226; Davies, ed., Transcripts 1774, VIII, 197-08.
- 103 Davies, ed., Transcripts 1774, VIII, 201, 221-22.
- 104 MSS of Dartmouth, II, 233, 240.
- 105 Davies, ed., Transcripts 1774, VIII, 210-11.
- 106 Fleming, p. 51.
- 107 K. G. Davies, ed., Transcripts 1775 January to June, Vol. IX of Documents of the American Revolution, 1770-1783 (Colonial Office Series) (Dublin: Irish University Press, 1975), p. 24; Alden, Gage in America, p. 238.
- 108 Peter Orlando Hutchinson, ed., The Diary and Letters of the Excellency Thomas Hutchinson, Esq. (1884-86; rpt. New York; Burt Franklin, 1971), I, 362-631, Davies, ed., Transcripts 1775 January to June, IX, 37.
- 109 Davies, ed., Transcripts 1775 January to June, IX, 39.
- 110 Davies, ed., Transcripts 1775 January to June, IX, 39.
- 111 Alden, Gage in America, p. 239.
- 112 Fleming, p. 53.

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