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MARTIN LUTHER KING'S CHICAGO CAMPAIGN--

AN EXPERIMENT IN PARADOX

A Research Paper

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Master of Arts

in History


by

Susie Helen Coleman


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To the Graduate Council:

I am submitting herewith a Research Paper written by Susie Helen Coleman entitled "Martin Luther King's Chicago Campaign--An Experiment in Paradox." I recommend that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in History.


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Dean of the Graduate School

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when the Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King came to Selma, Alabama in March, 1965 to organize and lead the now famous 55-mile "March to Montgomery" to protest discriminatory voter registration practices by the state of Alabama. As mentioned as those found in the march, the support he received from the nation was overwhelming. The Selma march was the culminating point of the civil rights movement in the South, a movement which had been given initial impetus in 1955 by a successful 382-day boycott of buses in Montgomery, Alabama. The Alabama boycott resulted in the 1956 Supreme Court decision banning segregation in public transportation. The goal of the movement was social equality as the goal and nonviolent activities (boycotts, boycotts, and marches) as the method, the movement gained momentum in all of the Southern states and was responsible for the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The Act banned discrimination in all public accommodations and authorized the suspension of federal funds where states used them in discriminatory fashion. There appears to have been prevalent throughout the South the belief that Selma was the testing and proving ground for Southern racial bigotry and the place where the "train-bus" weapon which would surely bring

MARTIN LUTHER KING'S CHICAGO CAMPAIGN-- the Selma AN EXPERIMENT IN PARADOX

When the Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King came to Selma, Alabama in March, 1965 to organize and lead the now historic fifty-mile "March to Montgomery" to protest discriminatory voter registration practices by the state officials there, the support he received from the nation was overwhelming. The Selma march was the culminating point of the civil rights movement in the South, a movement which had been given initial impetus in 1955 by a successful 382-day boycott of buses in Montgomery, Alabama. This famous boycott resulted in the 1956 Supreme Court decision banning segregation in public transportation. With racial equality as the goal and nonviolent activities (sit-ins, boycotts, and marches) as the method, the movement gained momentum in all of the Southern states and was largely responsible for the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The Act banned discrimination in all public accommodations and authorized the suspension of federal funds where states used them in discriminatory fashion.

In 1965 there appears to have been prevalent throughout the nation the belief that Selma was the testing and measuring ground for Southern racial bigotry and the place for forging an invincible weapon which would surely bring

equality for the Negro in the American South. Thus, worldwide support and attention were focused upon the Selma march. I want to follow Dr. King's campaign in the North, pre-

One year later, the civil rights movement had shifted to the North. Dr. King had brought his nonviolent methods to the northern ghettos, where it was discovered that racial inequalities, while making themselves manifest in a different way, were just as pronounced as those found in the South. In some instances, racial hatred in the North appeared to surpass that of the South. The culminating point of the Northern campaign was to be a march through the all-white neighborhood of Cicero (considered the "Selma of the North") in suburban Chicago to protest the discriminatory housing practices in that city.

Basically, the two theatres of the rights movement, in the South and in the North, had been conducted along the same guidelines; yet, there seemingly was one conspicuous difference--the nation-wide support that had been characteristic of the struggle for equality in the South was almost totally lacking in the North. The planned Cicero march, in dire contrast to the Selma march, was fervently discouraged, thus, disclosing a paradox which greatly affected the results of the rights movement in the North.

In this paper, then, I shall, first of all, try to determine whether such a dichotomy did exist by reviewing the Selma march and the extent to which it received many

nationwide support by examining the various groups, core individuals, etc., who contributed to it in some way. Next, I shall follow Dr. King's campaign in the North, presenting the support and/or opposition he received there, especially in relation to the planned Cicero march. Finally, from the chronological coverage of the Northern campaign, I shall attempt to assess its success or failure in achieving its goals.

The instigating factor which set off the explosive chain of events in Selma was one which the majority of Americans take for granted--the constitutional right to vote. In addition to the failure of Alabama officials to comply with the right of suffrage, a number of incidents occurred which resulted in a nationwide censure of the bigotry of the South unequalled since the Civil War.

Selma is a city in central Alabama of 29,500 people--14,400 whites, 15,100 Negroes. Its voting rolls in 1965, however, were 99 per cent white and 1 per cent Negro.¹ Those Negroes who did attempt to register were required to pass a ridiculously difficult qualification test. In 1961, following appeals from Negroes protesting the discriminatory practice, the federal government filed its first voting-rights suit;² but court processes were slow, and Selma Negroes remained unregistered. Any attempts at organized protest were speedily quelled by Sheriff James Clark, who led a mounted posse of deputy volunteers, many

of whom were Ku Klux Klansmen.³ Selma was also the core of a five-county area where Negroes were in the majority, but few were registered voters. Consequently, it was chosen by Dr. King as a natural target and starting point for the 1965 Negro vote drive.⁴ Upon his arrival in mid-January, King received an introductory example of white sentiment for Negroes in Selma as he was slapped by a white supremacist when he requested a room in the city's elegant Hotel Albert.⁵

Dr. King inaugurated his program immediately by leading hundreds of demonstrators in marches to the county courthouse. The purpose of these marches was twofold: to register eligible Negroes to vote and to rivet national attention on the obstacles to voting in the region.⁶ The attempts to register were largely abortive, but the abusive manner in which the demonstrators were treated by Sheriff Clark and his posse succeeded in drawing the attention of the country toward Selma. By mid-February, more than 3,300 people, Dr. King included, had been arrested.⁷

A turning point in the campaign came on February 18 when a Negro man was shot by a state trooper in neighboring Marion county during a voter registration demonstration there. His death eight days later prompted King's call for a massive protest march from Selma to Montgomery.⁸ The first march took place on Sunday, March 7, but the marchers had no more than begun when they were brutally assaulted

by Sheriff Clark and his mounted deputies. The use of red billy clubs and tear gas on the nonviolent marchers caused shock waves to reverberate around the country.⁹ Dr. King issued an order for a new march to be held on the ninth, and called on the nation's clergy to join it. The response was phenomenal. In city after city, white clergymen dropped what they were doing and headed for Selma. In all, more than 400 ministers, priests, rabbis, and lay leaders arrived in Selma to participate in the Selma march.¹⁰

The second march, while void of the violence of the first, was thwarted nevertheless by a federal court order enjoining the demonstration.¹¹ On that same night, an event occurred which prompted the call for a third march, and the magnitude of the incident was such that there was little possibility of this one not being successfully executed. On that night, the Rev. James Reeb, one of the ministers who had come down from Boston was fatally beaten by white racists as he was leaving a restaurant in Selma. The death of Rev. Reeb set off a chain reaction which resulted in a mass march composed of representatives from nearly all phases of American life, and from hundreds of cities in nearly all the states. Many who did not take part in the march held protest marches in their areas, or sent their protests in the form of telegrams both to President Johnson and to the Governor of Alabama.¹² The reason for these protests was not only the death of Rev. Reeb, but

they were also directed at the violence and racial hatred in the South in general. To the rest of the nation, Selma had become the symbol of the South; the South, in like manner, had become recognized as the bastion of bigotry, racism, and segregationism in the United States.

Having secured from Federal District Judge Frank Johnson a court order permitting the march and enjoining state officials from interfering with it,¹³ the heterogeneous group of marchers began to organize themselves. In the meantime, an enormous shower of protests had been flowing into Washington. The President, whose initial reaction to the situation in Selma had been somewhat meliorative (he pledged to get a voting-rights message to Congress "shortly")¹⁴ was more or less forced to act. He first held a three hour conference with the Governor of Alabama in which he warned that the violence in Selma must cease;¹⁵ he then publicly denounced the recent outrages in Selma in a speech which he terminated with the words "we shall overcome."¹⁶ Step number three was an intensified drive for the passage of a sweeping new voting rights bill, and finally he issued the order for some 3,000 federal troops to protect the marchers.¹⁷

Thus, in compliance with the federal order which had limited the number of marchers to 300 along most of the highway,¹⁸ and ostensibly with the blessings of the nation, the marchers embarked on March 21 on the historic fifty-four

mile, five-day march from Selma to the Alabama capitol in Montgomery. They were joined at the outskirts of that city by thousands of Negroes and whites from all parts of the country who had come to evidence their support of the Negro cause in the South by taking part in the ultimate stage of the procession.

Who were these people who had so willingly given of their time, money, and energy to come, (in some cases from clear across the country) to champion the Southern Civil Rights cause? Perhaps at this point it will be feasible to examine the list of diverse groups and individuals whose sympathy for the plight of the Negro in the South prompted them to take part in the Selma march. While it would be impossible to mention all of the participants, since there were some 25,000 of them,¹⁹ this analysis will be limited to the most prominent ones.

Highly numerous among the marchers were religious personages, of all faiths, who had come from virtually everywhere. From New York came Bishop John Wesley Lord of the Methodist Church; from Washington came Monsignor George L. Gingas of the Roman Catholic Archdiocese, and also Rabbi Richard G. Hirsch of the Union of American Hebrew Congregations. The National Council of Churches sent eleven representatives and urged more of its members to go.²⁰ From Chicago came more than one hundred persons representing the Church Federation of Greater Chicago, as well as

numerous representatives from individual churches.²¹ Always prominent in the active ranks were a number of nuns, some fifty of whom had come from St. Louis.²² The Church of Christ, Presbyterians, Episcopalians, Disciples of Christ, Lutherans--all of these denominations, and more were represented with delegations from Detroit, Cleveland, Los Angeles, Indianapolis, Houston, and Florida.²³ Cardinal Spellman set up a fund of \$10,000 for the purpose of sending more nuns and priests to join the marchers.²⁴ Thus, from this analysis, it is evident that religious interests were well represented in the march.

Representative of the educational interests of the nation were a number of prominent educators. Many who did not attend themselves sanctioned the absences of students and other colleagues for the purpose of participating in the march. The Dean of Yale University was present along with several members of the faculty. Twenty of the nation's leading professors of American history came down to join the marchers. These included C. Vann Woodward, Richard Hofstadter, John Hope Franklin, E. B. Smith, Thomas Bonner, and James W. Silver.²⁵ The spokesman for the group of distinguished historians was Dr. Walter Johnson of the University of Chicago who stated, "We believe the march will open the floodgate of freedom that will . . . end the economic, social, and political backwardness of the American South."²⁶ Mario Savio, representing the Free Speech

Movement at the University of California Berkeley, was also a participant,²⁷ as was Charles Cogen, International President of the American Federation of Teachers. ~~acting~~ Organized labor displayed its support as AFL-CIO President George Meany sent a special commission to dramatize labor's backing for the protest against racial discrimination. It is interesting to note that Meany's action in this instance contrasted with the AFL-CIO's aloofness from the 1963 March on Washington.²⁸ There were also present representatives from the United Mine Workers, and the International Ladies Garment Union. ~~Council President~~ Medical assistance for the marchers was provided by doctors and nurses who had taken leaves of absence from their practices and stations to render any necessary aid. Among these were three white doctors who had flown from New York at their own expense, and also there were some nurses from New York whose fares had been paid by the Medical Committee for Human Rights. This Committee had been formed "to give a sense of medical presence to the civil rights movement."²⁹ A huge aluminum mobile hospital, equipped for everything from X-rays to minor surgery, was lent by the International Ladies Garment Union. The National Council of Churches contributed a health mobile and thirteen ~~body~~,³⁰ ambulances.³⁰ In addition, there were a total of forty-two doctors and nurses from the Alabama Medical Association.³¹ Hence, the march was not lacking in support and assistance

from the cadres of medicine.³⁸ The number of
 Various top ranking officials from a number of the
 states were found among the marchers, many of them acting
 as co-leaders with Dr. King. Governor Nelson Rockefeller
 of New York, unable to attend himself, sent his executive
 assistant Alexander Aldrich, and the chairman of the State
 Civil Rights Committee George Fowler to exemplify that
 state's support of the civil rights' cause. Said Governor
 Rockefeller: "I have the most profound sympathy and
 respect for the purposes of the historic mission."³² Mayor
 Robert Wagner of New York City sent City Council President
 Screvane, Manhattan Borough President Motby, and Human
 Rights Commissioner Lowell to represent the city. All
 three of these were among the leaders of the march.³³ A
 total of ten wives of United States Congressmen, including
 Mrs. Paul Douglas, wife of the Illinois senator, came South
 to lend their support to the movement.³⁴ Mrs. Harold
 Ickes, wife of the former Secretary of the Interior, was a
 participant also. ⁴⁰

There to represent President Johnson was Leroy
 Collins, director of the Federal Communications Relation
 Service.³⁵ John M. Doar, who headed the Civil Rights
 Division of the Justice Department, represented that body,³⁶
 while Benjamin R. Epstein, national director of the Anti-
 Defamation League, was illustrative of that organization's
 support.³⁷ Also, sharing a position of leadership was the

U. N. Undersecretary Dr. Ralph Bunche.³⁸ The number of personalities from the entertainment field who displayed their support of the march in some way was tremendous. for The galaxy of famous performers who came from New York and California to put on a show in Alabama for the weary New marchers included Leonard Bernstein, Mahalia Jackson, Tony Bennett, Billy Eckstein, Sammy Davis, Jr., Harry Belafonte, Dick Gregory, Gary Merrill, and many others just as well-known. After the show, many of them joined the marchers for the remainder of the journey.³⁹

As was foresaid, the preceding was merely a sampling of the thousands upon thousands of people who had come from all over the country to join the Negro in his protest for equality in the South. Their ranks were composed of people from every walk of life--from the clergy to the beatniks, and from famous entertainment personalities to ordinary Americans, both Negro and white. On the forefront throughout the march was a one-legged man from Saginaw, Michigan, as well as a blind man from Atlanta.⁴⁰ They had all come for the ultimate purpose of destroying bigotry and promoting brotherhood in the South.

In addition to those who lent support to the march by their presence, there were equally as many more who illustrated their support vicariously, yet no less effectively. In Detroit, Michigan, Governor George Romney led 10,000 citizens in a protest march against the denial of

voting rights to Negroes in Alabama.⁴¹ The state of Michigan also considered filing a suit in the Supreme Court to reduce Alabama's Congressional representation for denying Negroes the right to vote. This consideration was whole-heartedly supported by Governor Rockefeller of New York.⁴² The President of the International Longshoremen and Warehouses proposed instigating a boycott against Alabama.⁴³ In addition, marches in support of the Selma March were held in nearly all of the major cities in the United States, with similar ones being staged as far away as Canada and Guam.⁴⁴ Still others voiced their sentiments on the issue in telegrams to the Governor of Alabama.

Thus, the nation-supported Selma march, which had begun on March 21, terminated four days later on the steps of the capitol building in Montgomery, Alabama. Though the marchers were halted short of their goal of presenting a petition to the Governor, who refused to meet with the leaders,⁴⁵ they had succeeded in executing a protest demonstration unequalled in the history of the Negro revolt. The march had set in motion the wheels of legislative activity which culminated in the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. This Act, which provided that literacy tests be suspended as a qualification for registering to vote, and that federal examiners be sent in to register Negroes,⁴⁶ gave to the Negro the very thing for which Dr. King had amassed his nonviolent forces in Selma.

There was no doubt that Dr. King had outmaneuvered and outfought the State of Alabama. He had again shown his mastery over the methods and arts of modern psychopolitical warfare⁴⁷ by using the Selma campaign as a lever to move public opinion and the national government in his chosen direction. He had called upon the nation for aid and, as has been shown, the nation responded. To reiterate, the Civil Rights movement in the South had been little short of universally supported, and because it was, its success can be but little disputed--as evidenced by the fact that by May, 1967, some 900,000 Negroes had been newly registered to vote in the South.⁴⁸ Now, the big question that loomed before Dr. King and his corps of civil rights workers was whether a similar campaign would be successful in the North. Early in 1966, no doubt inspired by the success of the Southern campaign, Dr. King again amassed his nonviolent forces as he transferred the thrusts of the civil rights movement to the urban North.

The shift in the focus of civil rights efforts from the South to the North wasn't as abrupt as it is here intimated; for some time there had been a growing concern over the less than ideal racial situations which were characteristic of the large Northern cities. Indicative of the existing status of civil rights in the North was a letter written by a man from Cambridge, Massachusetts during the Selma campaign as a kind of response to the

proposal by the heads of several Northern states of letter in penalizing Alabama for its voting practices. The letter read as follows: and was becoming more concerned about con-

Self interest has made it easy for the Northern states--or some of them--to forget that the voting provision of the 14th Amendment applied to them as well as to Alabama and Mississippi. Though the exclusions which prevail in the North are not in general, outright exclusions . . . it nonetheless would be appropriate for any state . . . demanding penalties on those states that deny Negroes the suffrage to put its own principles in practice before pressing charges against others.⁴⁹

Still another early indication of conditions in the North was brought out in a statement by a civil rights leader in New York who said, "New York should attend to its own civil rights program rather than speeding 'symbolic representation' to Selma, Alabama."⁵⁰ In St. Louis a Negro minister told a group of white marchers, who were demonstrating in support of the Selma protest, that the way they acted toward a Negro moving into their neighborhoods was more important than whether they marched for Selma. "I hope," said the minister, "the involvement shown here today is a symbol of things to come."⁵¹ From these brief examples emerge a preliminary sign that there was possibly a need for some racial realignment in the North, too.

Up to this point in time, Dr. King had labored almost entirely in the South against open segregation, and as has been shown, with no little success--the 1963 demonstrations in Birmingham had spurred the Civil Rights Act of 1964; Selma was the catalyst which brought about

the 1965 Voting Rights Act--thus concluding one chapter in his fight for Negro equality. In the meantime, he had become aware of and was becoming more concerned about conditions north of the Mason-Dixon line. In early 1964 he had been invited to New York by Mayor Wagner for a kind of "goodwill tour," but he was advised by the Negro leaders there to stay out of New York, as the Mayor was just trying to use him as a cover for his own inactivity.⁵² The reaction to Dr. King's proposed visit to New York was a sign of the dissatisfaction on the part of the Negroes in that city. During the spring and early summer of 1965, he visited many Northern cities, where he was duly welcomed by mayors and other officials who praised the progress of Southern Negroes. Yet when issues were raised concerning local conditions, it was another story--he found the attitude in the North toward civil rights legislation quite disappointing.⁵³ Here, he found racial exclusion to be more subtle and rarely undergirded by law. In the South it had been direct and flagrant and sustained by local and state law.⁵⁴ Here, it was of the de facto variety, where any civil rights measures that were passed were feebly enforced amid unlimited political machinations.

Dr. King's first real venture out of the South was to riot-torn Watts in August, 1965, where he attempted to render any aid possible. The reception given him by the Negroes there was a direct slap in the face, as he was

greeted with statements like, "Martin Luther WHO?", "Get out of here Dr. King! We don't need you," and, "they're just sending another nigger down here to tell us what we need."⁵⁵ The episode convinced him, however, of two things. First, that the elimination of Northern ghettos must be the primary target of any rights movement in that region; and secondly, that here, he would have to contend with and somehow build a workable rapport with hundreds of people to whom the violence of Black Nationalism appealed more than did his traditional nonviolent philosophy. It also convinced him of the magnitude of the task which lay before him and his nonviolent corps.

King soon concluded that the best way to set his nonviolent theories in motion was to enter a Northern ghetto. The big problem was to choose exactly the right city, and by September, 1965, he had chosen what he felt to be that city--Chicago. It was picked roughly by the same formula that had led him to Birmingham and Selma.⁵⁶

Chicago may well have been the most highly segregated city in the United States.⁵⁷ There were more than a million Negroes in Chicago (there are more in Cook County than in the whole state of Mississippi, and more in one or two of the settlements than in Montgomery or Selma) comprising one-third of the city's population.⁵⁸ In 1950, 52.9 per cent of the Negroes lived in census tracts in which 97.5 per cent or more of the population were Negro,

whereas 84.1 per cent of the white population lived in census tracts containing less than one per cent Negroes.⁵⁹ These statistics had changed little, if any, in 1965, as the bulk of the Negro population remained jammed into two malignant ghettos in Chicago's South and West Sides. Unemployment ran rampant; the renting of dilapidated housing went unchecked; and inferior public schools, which were segregated de facto, were of no concern to city and state officials. Of the approximate one million Negroes in Chicago, there were only about three in effective policy-making positions in the city government who could be expected to respond to the needs of the black population. Two of these were independent aldermen in the city council and one a member of the board of education.⁶⁰ Taking all of these facts into consideration, Dr. King designated Chicago as the ideal target for opening the civil rights campaign in the North. Referring to the city as the "Capitol of segregation in North," he stated, "If we can break the backbone of discrimination in Chicago, we can do it in all of the cities of this country."⁶¹ He wasn't deceived, however, by any illusions of easy victories, as is evidenced by remarks he made prior to his departure for Chicago:

The future is more complex. Slums with hundreds of thousands of living units are not eradicated as easily as lunch counters or buses are integrated. Jobs are harder to create than voting rolls.⁶²

He opened his preliminary Northern campaign on July 24, 1965 with a whirlwind tour of Chicago to get support for a march on City Hall to be held the following Monday. He had come at the request of Al Raby, leader of the combined civil rights groups in the city, who had been heading demonstrations for the ousting of the School Superintendent on charges of condoning school segregation.⁶³ On the appointed day, he led a march that was considered the biggest civil rights demonstration in Chicago history. Varying sources placed the number of marchers as being somewhere between eight and twenty thousand people,⁶⁵ whereas other demonstrations at their greatest reached only one thousand and that on one occasion only. Before returning to his home in Atlanta, Dr. King promised that if this effort failed, he would return with some 200,000 marchers next time.⁶⁴ Though the march was numerically a success, it proved to be of little consequence otherwise, for there was no change made in the operation of the two schools.⁶⁷ List of evils that were manifest in the ghetto.

In September of 1965 he dispatched one of his top aides, Rev. James Bevel, to survey the situation in Chicago and to start recruiting supporters for the pending escalation of the Northern campaign. In late January, 1966, King himself arrived to establish himself in the city. During the preceding months, he had come to the conclusion that, in order to be effective, the broad

striking area proposed initially would have to be limited somewhat; thus, by the time of his arrival, the focus of the project had been narrowed from the whole of Chicago's ghettos to the West Side area. The reasons for focusing on this area were evident--300,000 of Chicago's Negroes were jammed into 800 square blocks of run down houses (mostly flats) for which they paid twenty dollars more than whites living in better houses.⁶⁵ Twenty years ago, all the neighborhoods that make up the West Side ghetto, which civil rights workers refer to as "a part of Mississippi that got away,"⁶⁶ were inhabited by Jews. In the 1950's Southern Negroes, making their first trips North, began to arrive in large numbers. By 1960, the last of the whites had left and the West Side had become one vast slum. Six years later there had been no improvement in the ghetto; in fact, the housing was in even worse condition, and the rate of unemployment so great that one out of every three persons was receiving assistance.⁶⁷ These were only two of a long list of evils that were manifest in the ghetto.

The general plan for the Chicago campaign was to be as follows: the last of January, all of February, and part of March would be spent in recruiting support and helpers; spot demonstrations against specific targets--rent strikes, picket lines, boycotts of stores and products--would begin in March; by May, the workers would be ready for massive action.⁶⁸ One of the first advances made by

Dr. King was the forced take-over of a slum building with the intention of using the rent money to pay for repairs.⁶⁹ This action was fervently denounced by the landlord and by numerous city officials, and was subsequently ordered illegal by the court. Though he was forced to surrender the building, King's primary maneuver had ended somewhat victoriously, for the owner of the building was hauled into court and instructed to correct the housing code violation within a month or go to jail.⁷² In addition, an investigation of building code violations in some 15,000 dwellings was ordered by Mayor Daley, who was trying to ward off the proposed marches.⁷⁰

Another significant step was taken by the movement in organizing a tentative Tenants' Union. This organization, which later expanded, was formed to carry on collective rent strikes. Also created and put into force during the first months of the Chicago drive was a department known as Operation Breadbasket, whose primary aim was the securing of more and better jobs for Negroes by calling on the Negro community to support only those businesses that gave a fair share of jobs to Negroes. The department succeeded in completing negotiations with three major industries: milk, soft drink, and chain grocery stores.⁷¹ Four of the companies involved concluded reasonable agreements only after short "don't buy" demonstrations; seven other companies were able to make the

requested changes across the conference table, without by necessitating a boycott. For the most part, the first several months of the drive were relatively quiet, and somewhat victorious, even though the victories were of actually minor ones.

In mid-June Dr. King took a short leave of absence in order to visit his family, and ended up assuming leadership of a rights movement in Mississippi, following the sniper-shooting of its initial leader, James Meredith.⁷² Then, in early July, a development arose which not only added to the obstacles in the path of the Chicago campaign, but also had a dubious effect on the civil rights movement as a whole--the rise of the "black power" movement. Accredited with bringing the "black power" cry into the Negro movement was Stokely Carmichael, who first brought the "Black Power" cry into the Negro movement during the march in Mississippi.⁷³ Soon afterwards, he was elected to head the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), a somewhat militantly-oriented, student group that had heretofore adhered (not without some friction) to the basic tenets of the Movement.⁷⁴ The advocates of the new Black Power theme adopted the premise that the old goal of integration was no longer relevant to Negroes; that if all the restaurants and hotels in the nation were integrated, 99.9 per cent of the ghetto dwellers couldn't afford to go to them.⁷⁵ They also promoted

the belief that a black man ought to hit back when hit by a white man, thus repudiating the doctrine of nonviolence that had heretofore served as the dominant strategy in civil rights demonstrations. The latter issue, that of violence versus nonviolence, caused a visible rupture in the unity of the Movement, for it forced the groups involved to align themselves either in support of or in opposition to the new militant creed.

Actually the emergence of the Black Power advocates was but the climax of a split that had been in the making for quite some time. There had been some evidence of dissatisfaction within the Movement during the Alabama demonstrations of 1965; dissatisfaction of the young people with the "hopelessly paternalistic and middle class Dr. King."⁷⁶ They accused King and his organization of rushing into a community, raising a flurry of headlines in the press, and then fading away once the momentum had subsided, having done nothing to develop local leadership.⁷⁷ In addition, the rebuff Dr. King had received in Watts was proof that conventional methods of working toward Negro equality were being challenged by vastly different ones. Further proof of the growing dissension within the civil rights movement was the fact that shortly after he arrived in Chicago and outlined his plans for the city, the relationship between the established civil rights groups there and his group had become tenuous, if not cool.⁷⁸

They found the latter's aims too vague, and they questioned whether the techniques that had proven useful in the South could be applied to a great sprawling urban center in the North. He repeatedly emphasized the use of

Thus, the Black Power development had brought out into the open differences and divisions that had been fomenting in the preceding months. In the ensuing aligning of organizations, the Congress of Racial Equality (whose leader described nonviolence as a "dying philosophy" that can no longer "be sold to the black people")⁷⁹ endorsed the Black Power group. The other three groups, the Urban League, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, denounced the slogan because of its connotation of violence which they felt would hinder the civil rights efforts. Dr. King said of the slogan, "It was only with the coming of the term 'black power' that these problems in the civil rights movement came into being."⁸⁰ Regardless of the causes, the split in the Movement definitely placed additional obstacles in the path of success of the Chicago campaign. King's campaign somewhat.

Upon his return to Chicago in July, Dr. King decided that the time had come for some "massive action" to invigorate the Chicago effort. Already two months behind schedule, on July 10, he organized and held a freedom rally of some 50,000 people to whom he related his specific goals.

The gist of these goals was embodied in a twelve-page list of demands, which he attached to the door of City Hall⁸⁴ (emulating his namesake), that covered areas from education to employment.⁸¹ He repeatedly emphasized the use of nonviolence in accomplishing these goals, being perhaps prodded into doing so by the presence of conspicuous groups of young militants in the crowd. Mayor Daley completely ignored the list of grievances and two days later riots⁸⁵ broke out on the West Side after the police had shut off fire hydrants which neighborhood children had turned on to get relief from the summer heat. There followed three successive nights of violence which resulted in two deaths, eighty-three wounded, and four hundred three arrests.⁸² Dr. King went to the riot-torn area the first night in an attempt to "spread the nonviolent word"⁸³ but his efforts were in vain and he gave up after the first try. It was only after the National Guard had been called in that peace was restored. Mayor Daley's reaction to this turn of events was to have ten portable swimming pools installed in the West Side area in the hope of deflecting similar incidents and also of deactivating King's campaign somewhat.

Up to now, Mayor Daley's name has been mentioned several times, but no attempt has been made to relate exactly the degree of influence he wielded over the city of Chicago; hence, the extent to which that influence affected the Chicago campaign. To this point the discussion turns

directly. Suffice it to say that Mayor Richard Daley was one of the most powerful political bosses in the country,⁸⁴ who directed and controlled the politics of Chicago with an iron hand. His maintenance of Negro support was accomplished through "Uncle Tom" aldermen who secured for him ninety per cent of the Negro vote in 1963.⁸⁵ Of the ten Negro aldermen on the city council, seven were of the latter variety, being commonly derided as Daley's "Dummies." One of these, Ralph H. Metcalfe, publicly opposed the coming of Dr. King to Chicago, saying, "This is no hick town. The leaders can handle the situation. We have inadequate leadership here. Dr. King's campaign is unnecessary."⁸⁶ There were, of course, thousands of other Negroes in the city of Chicago, but with the exception of the three referred to earlier, they wouldn't dare challenge the system. Many of them, especially those in city-owned housing, were afraid to oppose the Daley machine's intimidation.⁸⁷ Thus, he was virtually master in Chicago. Dr. King had never confronted anyone like Mayor Daley. In the South there had been the bully-type villains, such as Sheriff Clark in Selma, but Daley didn't fit the pattern at all; in fact, Daley had publicly welcomed him to Chicago. He had made a point also of granting small concessions since King's arrival--the investigation of houses in the ghetto, the placement of the swimming pools in the West Side area, ordering a program for rodent control--the

ulterior motive of which was to water down King's plans.

The concessions, however, failed even to touch upon the causes of the Negro discontent; the lack of employment, the dilapidated housing, the segregated schools. In short, the absolute incapability and/or unwillingness of the city's political structure to respond to the Negro need for social and economic justice and for adequate political representation was at the root of the problem. Mayor Daley, the one man who could have ameliorated the situation, chose not to. In him was the embodiment of the major difference between the promoters of racial discrimination in the North and those in the South, the latter being outspoken and demonstrative of their sentiments whereas, in the North, they are subtle, non-committal, unostensible in their support of it. As was foresaid, Dr. King had never come up against anyone like Mayor Daley, and the Chicago campaign was in some ways, a test of strength between the two men.

July marked the seventh month of the Chicago campaign, but except for a few minor successes, conditions remained unchanged since Dr. King's arrival. None of the major goals had been accomplished. Following the riots, King found that the people were somewhat tensed and eager to demonstrate; therefore, he decided that this was the time to amass all of his resources and make a grand strike that would draw public attention to the cause. In order

to do this, he needed an effective catalyst. In Selma, the catalyst had been voting rights; in Chicago, he was decided upon one that was as openly discriminatory to the Negroes in Chicago as voting practices had been to those in Selma--open housing. His staff had sent "testing teams" of Negro and white workers into segregated city areas to examine real estate practices. They found that there were always open listings for whites, but nothing for Negroes, thus confirming the existence of discriminatory practices.⁸⁹ Further investigation disclosed that only one area outside of the Chicago University area was integrated.⁹⁰ The strategy, then, was to be a series of marches through the nearby segregated communities.⁹² This was

On July 31, hundreds of Dr. King's supporters (King himself had left to fulfill an engagement in Atlanta) marched through the Gage Park area, a settlement inhabited primarily by eastern European immigrants. They were met by the unveiled, outright hatred of the inhabitants, who yelled various obscenities at them, hurled rocks and bricks, and turned over and burned many of their cars, despite questionable efforts by the police to protect them.⁹¹ Arriving back in Chicago the next day, King charged the police with being lax in protecting the marchers. On August 5, he led another march through the same community, and immediately he was struck by the intensity of the racism that existed there. The mobs did a repeat

performance of their actions during the previous march, only this time with more ferocity, if possible. This was unlike anything King had encountered in the South. In the South, he had often made his point by creating a situation where his massed supporters confronted the police and rash action by the police then aroused dismay and sympathy across the nation. Here, the only rash action by the police was directed toward keeping the marchers from being literally torn to pieces by the hate-incensed populace. King said of the experience, "I have seen many demonstrations in the South, but I have never seen any so hostile and so hateful as I have seen here today. I think the people of Mississippi ought to come to Chicago to learn how to hate."⁹² This was quite an admission coming from a veteran of civil rights battlegrounds. *... touched off a chain of violence that ended*

As far as arousing public sentiment was concerned, the only responses to the events had so far been negative or not forthcoming. Grumblings of discontent were coming from various Northern liberals who had approved civil rights campaigns in the distant South,⁹³ but who apparently felt that the North didn't need them. The only word from Washington was that President Johnson had pushed through Congress a measure providing for swimming pools to be installed in the ghetto of New York.⁹⁴ *... Negro sentiments were*

In the meantime, three more marches through all-white neighborhoods had been carried out with very much the

same results. Still King felt that he had not been able to create enough tension or apply enough pressure to bring about the desired result. It was at this time that he chose his master target for the Chicago campaign; he had chosen the Selma march as the focal point of his Alabama campaign. Likewise, a march through the all-white suburb of Cicero would be the climax of the Chicago campaign. This suburb was chosen because, to civil rights workers, Cicero, Illinois is the symbol of Northern discrimination--a Selma without the Southern drawl. Cicero has a population of 70,000 people, again, primarily of eastern European heritage. Though nearly 15,000 Negroes work there, not one Negro lived there.⁹⁵ In 1951, the attempt made by a Negro bus driver and his family to move into the suburb touched off a chain of violence that ended only after some 4,000 National Guardsmen had been dispatched to the area.⁹⁶ The bus driver was at first manhandled by the police when he tried to enter his apartment; then mobs of angry whites broke into the apartment, threw the furniture out of the window, reduced the inside of the apartment to shambles, and set fire to the discarded furniture and the apartment.⁹⁷ Since that time Negro house-hunters had considered Cicero off-limits. The reputation of the city as far as its anti-Negro sentiments were concerned had been renewed, however, when a seventeen year old Negro boy was beaten to death by four white youths while

he was seeking summer employment there in June, 1965.⁹⁸ The people of Cicero were virtually obsessed by racial hatred, and evidently believed themselves justified in using any means whatsoever in keeping their suburb all-white. Lew Alcindor, nationally known basketball player, said of Cicero, "The South is in Montgomery, Alabama, but the South is also in Cicero, Illinois."⁹⁹

Dr. King evidently shared the latter's view, for on August 8 the plans were announced for the proposed march through Cicero. Implicit in the announcement was the hope that it would activate nationwide interest and would solicit mass support for the ghetto Negroes of the North just as the Selma march had done for the disfranchised Negroes of the South. Immediately a flurry of responses began to flow into the civil rights camp--not responses of support, however, but pleas from various officials and religious leaders to cancel the march because of the certainty of violence it would incur. Archbishop John P. Cody of the Chicago diocese, who had openly lauded the Selma march, now pleaded for the cancellation of the projected Cicero march.¹⁰⁰ Cook County Sheriff Richard Ogilvie, in trying to dissuade the marchers, warned that a march through Cicero would make the previous marches in Chicago "look like a tea party."¹⁰¹ So great was the local opposition to the proposed march that Ross Beatty, president of the Real Estate Board, sent a telegram to Dr. King (who was

attending an SCLC Conference in Jackson, Mississippi) inviting him to a conference, called by the Chicago Conference on Religion and Race, to try to reach an agreement.¹⁰² The march was postponed, pending the outcome of the negotiations. After a ten-hour discussion between rights leaders and city officials, however, no satisfactory agreement could be reached and King again announced plans for the Cicero march, this one to be held on Sunday, August 28.

Still, the national sanction and nationwide support were not forthcoming; still, the only responses received were of the negative variety. Other than the civil rights groups and a few Catholic nuns and clergy (who had participated in the earlier demonstrations) there were no pledges of outside support.

Where were all of those people who had so gallantly taken upon themselves the struggle of the Negro in his quest for equality in the South? Where were the doctors and the educators? The actors and the senators' wives? Where all of the well-wishers? The United Auto Workers which had been represented in the Selma march, urged the King organization to end the demonstrations.¹⁰³ Many Northerners who trumpeted their support of civil rights drives in the South now blamed Dr. King for the agitation in their own backyards.¹⁰⁴ From the White House, Vice-President Humphrey asked a halt in the protests with the remark, "People are sick and tired of violence."¹⁰⁵ Was

there not a dichotomy or paradox of some sort inherent in this incident when compared to the similar incident in Selma? Both had been intended as the culminating points of previous weeks of demonstrations, and both had had as their objectives the securing of a basic right. Yet, the one in Selma had received nationwide attention and support, while the one planned for Cicero had received, for the most part, nothing but opposition. Was being denied the right to live in a certain neighborhood because of one's color less important than being denied the right to vote because of one's color? If not, what was the key differentiating factor that influenced the response to the two incidents? Could it have been the fact that Selma was in the South--that traditional stronghold of bigotry and racial hatred--and Cicero was in the North? If this was true, as the preceding information certainly implies, then there did indeed exist a dichotomy between the civil rights movement in the South and in the North. Before drawing any definite conclusions, however, let us return to the main story and conclude Dr. King's Chicago campaign.

To repeat, from the time that King announced plans for the intended march, he was constantly being pressured to abandon the plan. The residents of Cicero had made it clear that they would oppose any "invasion" into their neighborhoods. Said one woman, "Didn't we show them the last time? (referring to the 1951 incident) It's all right

for them to work here, but we won't have them shoved down our throats."¹⁰⁶ Still, leaders held to their original plans. To the fervent pleas of the religious leaders for cancellation of the march, the Rev. James Bevel, one of King's top aides, countered with the plea, "don't abandon us now; but stand with us."¹⁰⁷ The tension continued to build; the National Guard was alerted. Finally, realizing that a march through Cicero might lead to disaster, civic officials were forced to the negotiating table in a series of conferences that lasted until August 26. On that day, the two sides concluded an agreement which prompted King to defer existing plans for the march on the strength of the new accord.¹⁰⁸

The threatened Cicero march had brought to the conference table representatives of the Chicago Commission on Human Relations, the Chicago Real Estate Board, Chicago Housing Authority, Cook County Department of Public Aid, Chicago Mortgage Bankers Association and the Chicago Department of Urban Renewal.¹⁰⁹ Never before had there occasioned an assemblage of this calibre. That fact alone could, no doubt, be interpreted as something of a victory for the rights forces. The agreement reached between the above Chicago organizations and Dr. King's SCLC was a ten-point compilation of the initial demands made by the ghetto-dwellers. Among the most significant of the provisions was: (1) a pledge by the Chicago Housing Authority

to improve the character of public housing and to initiate a leasing program that would place families in the best available housing regardless of the racial composition of a neighborhood;¹¹⁰ (2) a pledge by the Department of Urban Renewal to search out the best housing available for the poorest ghetto Negroes; (3) a pledge by the Chicago Commission on Human Relations to renew its attack on brokers who were guilty of violating the city's three-year open-housing ordinance;¹¹¹ and (4) the pledge by the Chicago Real Estate board (the archfoe of all previous anti-bias campaigns) to support the principle of open-housing. In the same breath, the Real Estate Board announced that it would continue its legal attack on Illinois Governor Otto Kerner's state executive order banning discriminations in real estate listings.¹¹² Also there was established the goal of at least one per cent Negro occupancy in all seventy-five Chicago communities by April 30, 1967, including Cicero.

The agreement was hailed as epochal in the area of open-housing and was acclaimed by some as Dr. King's first real victory outside the South. Even Mayor Daley was quoted as saying of the agreement, "There has been genuine progress."¹¹³ Here, it is necessary to relate that the Mayor's efforts in helping to bring about the conference were not motivated solely by the fear of violence nor the desire to promote open-housing. The latter considerations

were overshadowed by a two-pronged political threat--one from the white community, the other from the Negroes. The appearance of an increasing number of "Get Rid-of-Daley" placards in the normally "safe" ethnic wards had heightened the prospect of a white backlash in those areas. Daley attempted to counter this threat by getting a court order limiting the size of the marches to 500, the number to one a day, and the time to daylight hours.¹¹⁴ On the basis of that action, he feared a backlash in normally democratic Negro precincts. Being entrapped somewhat in a political cross-fire, he, consequently, was more receptive to the idea of negotiations. Regardless of Daley's motives for promoting the conference, the agreement it produced was considered record-breaking. Dr. King called the agreement "one of the most significant programs ever conceived," and added, "We've come a long, long way; we've crossed the Red Sea right here in Chicago."¹¹⁵ His concession to the agreement had been to suspend the Cicero march until city officials had had time to put their pledges into action.

Though heartily accepted by King and his SCLC, the agreement was vigorously denounced by Chester Robinson, who headed the West Side Organization, as a sellout and a betrayal of poor ghetto Negroes. Said Robinson,

"This agreement is a lot of words that give us nothing specific we can understand. We want it to say; apartments should be painted once a year; community people should have community jobs. We're sick and tired of middle-class people telling us what we want. And we're gonna march in Cicero on Sunday."¹¹⁶

Robinson was backed in his views by two other organizations: the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) and the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE). Robinson was later dissuaded by Dr. King from marching into Cicero on the promise that a committee would be created to consider his recommendation. Still, the idea was not abandoned, for then Robert Lucas, head of CORE, assumed responsibility for executing the march. Pleas from Dr. King to cancel the march were to no avail, demonstrating, once again, the latter's complete lack of influence over the new Black-Power advocates. Thus, on September 4, the long planned and twice-cancelled march through Cicero took place. But it was a vastly different spectacle from the great climactical event it was originally planned to be. Instead of the 3,000 followers Dr. King had planned to lead, there were only about 200 marchers, mainly members of SNCC and CORE. In place of the hymn-singing marchers who largely ignored insults from hecklers, characteristic of the nonviolent demonstrations, were militant young people who exchanged a continuous barrage of desultory remarks with the on-lookers. In fact, these marchers had even practiced retaliatory tactics to use in case they were attacked,¹¹⁷ indicating a clear break with the old line methods. Actually, the presence of the National Guard troops and the hate-incensed mobs on the sideline were the only similar results of this march and the one that had

been envisioned earlier by Dr. King. *violence, settle for*

The Cicero march had its historic aspect, nevertheless; it was the first time Negroes had marched into Cicero and marched out again. For the most part, however, the march had very little effect principally because it lacked the magnetism of King's leadership. It marked the end, generally speaking, of the demonstrative phase of the Chicago campaign that King had initiated. He announced soon afterwards that the Chicago Movement would turn its main efforts to politics, and that a drive to register and educate Negro voters in Chicago would be the goal. The voter registration campaign was to be organized like the ones in the South, but without the marches.¹¹⁸ He left Chicago soon after this announcement, taking a leave of absence to write a book, leaving one of his top aides in charge of the latest campaign. *some kind of an agreement.*¹¹⁹

To restate, the Cicero march was to have been the crowning point of Dr. King's civil rights drive in the North. It was to be the activating move of an eight-month old campaign whose major goals remained unfulfilled. In this march he was to have utilized the same direct action technique--exposing racism, drawing public attention to it, thus gaining public support in helping to defeat it--that had proven so effective in the South. Why then did he disengage short of Cicero? Why did he after building up the expectations of his followers to the point where they

were willing to risk the certainty of violence, settle for an ambiguous agreement that, if executed, would scarcely touch the poorest of the ghetto dwellers? Inextricably linked with these questions is another very important one: was the Chicago campaign a failure? And, from the answer to the latter question can be ascertained a definite reply to the question posed earlier in this paper concerning the dichotomy between the civil rights movement in the South and that in the North.

In answer to the first two questions, theories which range from bribery to just plain fear have been offered as reasons for King's abandoning of his grand thrust in the Chicago campaign. In addition, there have been those who charged that he had merely used Cicero as a pawn; that he never intended to march there at all, but used the threat of a march in order to get some kind of an agreement.¹¹⁹ To a man who had exposed himself to violence and injury hundreds of times before, the theory of fear as a deterrent to his course of action seems improbable. The suggestion of bribery is no less an improbability. King had stopped short of Cicero for reasons he felt to be valid and, judging from statements he made to his followers after concluding the agreement and cancelling the march, the realization that the march would have been in vain was in first place among those reasons. He told Chicago supporters, "Let's face the fact, most of us are going to be

living in the ghetto five to ten years from now
morally we ought to have freedom now. But it all doesn't
come now. That's a sad fact of life you have to live
with."¹²⁰ This admission, that there are limits to moral
power is a key to understanding his decision concerning
Cicero, and the context of the entire rights cause in
Chicago. Implicit in the shift from South to North had
been the belief that the tactics used to produce legal
gains in the South could be used to secure economic gains
in the North. The gist of that tactic was to appeal to
the moral conscience of the nation, and as is evidenced
by the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the
Voting Rights Act of 1965, the tactic had proven effective--
in the South. The obvious lack of public sympathy, and
the conspicuous signs of irritation from former supporters
when the Cicero march was announced, convinced King that
the tactic wouldn't work in Chicago. Ironically, northern
civil rights leaders had voiced this belief all along.
Said Roy Wilkins, executive director of the NAACP, "Any
Chicagoan could have advised Dr. King that the Selma
technique was not suited to the Windy City."¹²¹ Thus, to
state briefly, King's reason for deferring the Cicero march
was because he was actually aware of the lack of public
support, both physical and moral, that was essential for
the march to be successful.

The next question, which is a highly controversial

one, has evoked a variety of responses: Was Dr. King's Chicago campaign a failure? Many who thought that the most important thing that could happen in America in 1966 would be for him to succeed in Chicago, now consider the entire Chicago effort a failure and a great tragedy.¹²² This group, no doubt, includes those people who labor under the illusion that discrimination and racism in the North are more flexible and more susceptible to corrective influence than they are in the South. He has been scorned for his failure to bring reforms to the West Side Ghetto, and it is true that conditions in the ghetto today remain much as they were in 1966. In all fairness, however, at least half of the blame for this situation belongs to the ghetto dwellers and the city. These people, by their failure to act against the Daley Machine, were actually lending aid and comfort to their own undoing.

Still if the Chicago campaign is judged solely on the basis of the attainment of its major goals, then one would be forced to say that it fell short of victory. Even the highly touted "Summit Agreement," which was to open so many doors to the ghetto Negroes in housing, jobs, etc., had not produced much as of April, 1968. Dr. King, no doubt, had this fact in mind when he wrote a few days before his death, "Not a single basic cause of the 1966 and '67 riots has been corrected."¹²⁴ The Chicago campaign was not, however, a total failure. In fact, its major

accomplishment tends to counteract the failures it encountered, and to merit it worthwhile for this reason alone. The major achievement of the campaign was that it exposed for the first time on a grand scale the intransigent racial hatred and the degree to which segregation exists in Northern cities. It also exposed the hypocrisy manifest in the support and encouragement given Southern Negroes by Northerners when Negroes in Northern cities are waging the same war for equality but without their aid.

By 1966 repeated outbreaks of violence in the Northern cities had begun to raise questions throughout the nation. Was there something fundamentally unsound with race relations in the North? Dr. King's campaign, in using Chicago as a model, cleared up the questions by disclosing both conditions and attitudes conducive to violent outbreaks. Then, there were those, and I daresay they were the majority of people living outside the North, who still believed that the Negro in the North wasn't hampered by discrimination and segregation as he was in the South. Concurrent with this belief was the view of the white Northerner as the traditional supporter of Negro equality. King himself admitted that for a long time he had believed that the majority of Americans were interested in racial justice; that it was only Southern whites and a few Northerners who were not. After the Chicago campaign, however, he dishearteningly changed his mind, believing that

only a very small number of white Americans were interested in it.¹²⁵ The populace need no longer labor under erroneous or doubtful conceptions, for thanks to the Chicago campaign of Martin Luther King, the existence of racism and bigotry in the North to a degree heretofore unsuspected by many, has now been verified.

Finally, did there exist a dichotomy between the civil rights campaign in the South as compared to that in the North? I feel justified, by the evidence gathered from reviewing both campaigns, in stating that such a dichotomy did exist. Being cognizant of the different circumstances which were present in each case, I still feel justified in my conclusion. The campaign in the South was nationally supported and acclaimed; the one in the North received no such support and was, in fact, in many cases discouraged. The campaign in the South prompted action by the President and the Congress which resulted in the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965; the campaign in the North, because of its lack of support, produced no major legislation, and in fact, because of the inclusion of one of the major provisions for which the northern rights workers were appealing (open housing), a proposed bill failed in the Congress.¹²⁶ The Northerners, as has been shown, literally poured support into the rights movement in the South, but when the movement shifted to aid the Negroes in their area, no aid was forthcoming. The

entire atmosphere surrounding the Northern campaign seemed to have been one of "civil rights is something the nation will help the Southern Negroes to get, but it causes too much trouble to try to get them for Northern Negroes" or as one white Chicago woman put it, "The Northern niggers were satisfied till those troublemakers from the South came."¹²⁷ Her statement was representative of Northerners who had long held the view that the civil rights movement was a Northern-based operation that was dedicated to the proposition of assuring equality to Negroes--in the South--and was not to be used in their own territory. It was a paradox of this sort that characterized the Northern campaign; and attested, without a doubt, to the existence of a pronounced dichotomy between the Northern and Southern rights' drives.

It is necessary to state here that the purpose of this paper is not to condemn the North, nor to provide the South with an excuse for harboring racism and discrimination, by using the argument that they exist in the North, too. From the evidence that has been presented, however, it is easy to see that the North can no longer condemn the South as the bastion of racial hatred and bigotry and usurper of the rights of Negroes.

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20 New York Times, March 9, 1965, p. 1.
21 Ibid., p. 23.

FOOTNOTES

- 1 "The Central Point," Time, March 19, 1965, p. 23.
- 2 Ibid.
- 3 Ibid.
- 4 "It Looks Like a Hot Summer--With Selma the Beginning," U. S. News and World Report, March 22, 1965, p. 33.
- 5 Paul Good, "Beyond the Bridge," Reporter, April 8, 1965, p. 24.
- 6 "Boomerang in 'Neverland'," Senior Scholastic, March 25, 1965, p. 17.
- 7 "Speedup Ordered," Senior Scholastic, February 18, 1965, p. 34.
- 8 Good, p. 24.
- 9 "Selma: Beatings Start the Savage Season," Life, March 19, 1965, p. 31.
- 10 "An American Tragedy," Newsweek, March 22, 1965, p. 20.
- 11 Martin Luther King, "Behind the Selma March," Saturday Review, April 3, 1965, p. 57.
- 12 "The Central Point," p. 27.
- 13 New York Times, March 18, 1965, p. 1.
- 14 "An American Tragedy," p. 20.
- 15 New York Times, March 14, 1965, p. 1.
- 16 "From President Johnson's Address to Congress on Civil Rights," Senior Scholastic, April 1, 1965, p. 9.
- 17 "Electric Charge," Time, March 26, 1965, p. 19.
- 18 "Rally--And Tragedy," Senior Scholastic, April 8, 1965, p. 18.
- 19 "Protest on Route 80," Time, April 2, 1965, p. 21.

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- 21 Ibid., p. 23.
- 22 Ibid.
- 23 Ibid.
- 24 New York Times, March 21, 1965, p. 7.
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- 27 New York Times, March 9, 1965, p. 76.
- 28 New York Times, March 20, 1965, p. 12.
- 29 New York Times, March 8, 1965, p. 1.
- 30 New York Times, March 22, 1965, p. 27.
- 31 Ibid.
- 32 New York Times, March 20, 1965, p. 1.
- 33 New York Times, March 9, 1965, p. 1.
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- 39 New York Times, March 23, 1965, p. 33.
- 40 "Road From Selma--Hope and Death," Newsweek, April 5, 1965, p. 23.
- 41 "The Real America," Saturday Review, April 10, 1965, p. 59.
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- 43 Ibid.
- 44 Ibid.

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- 50 New York Times, March 22, 1965, p. 26.
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- 63 New York Times, July 25, 1965, p. 39.
- 64 New York Times, July 27, 1965, p. 18.
- 65 "King Takes to the Slums," Economist, February 5, 1966, p. 509.

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68 "Gamble in the Ghetto," p. 24.

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70 Cook, p. 177.

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74 This term refers to the collective efforts of the five nationally organized civil rights groups, which are: the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP); The Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC); the National Urban League; the Congress for Racial Equality (CORE); and the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC).

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