A POLITICAL STUDY OF DEVELOPMENTS IN RHODESIA SINCE WORLD WAR II

LINDA FRIES HAMPTON

A POLITICAL STUDY OF DEVELOPMENTS IN RHODESIA SINCE WORLD WAR II

An Abstract Presented to the Graduate Council of Austin Peay State University

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Master of Arts

by

Linda Fries Hampton

July 1969

ABSTRACT

The writer became interested in the country of Rhodesia while an undergraduate at Asbury College in Wilmore, Kentucky. Many informative hours were spent in listening to speakers--particularly Dr. Philip Stine who was an undergraduate at that time--who had lived in Rhodesia as missionaries or as children of missionaries. Their tales ignited the spark of interest which has enabled the writer to do research on this subject. The writer is sure, however, that this study will reveal views contrary to those of the speakers to which she listened. The ensuing years have brought about a change in her views on the present situation in this lovely, untamed country.

This thesis is a study of the political development of Rhodesia from the time of Cecil Rhodes--after whom Rhodesia was named, through the time of the Central African Federation, and concluding with the government of Ian Smith.

The writer's main interest is the secession of Rhodesia in 1965 from the British Empire; the motivation of Ian Smith and the other secessionist leaders; the economic factors involved; and the relations with the Union of South Africa and Portugal. A POLITICAL STUDY OF DEVELOPMENTS

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WORLD WAR II

A Thesis

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July 1969

To the Graduate Council:

I am submitting herewith a <u>Thesis</u> written by Linda Fries Hampton entitled "A Study of Rhodesia from the Founding By Cecil Rhodes to the Present Government of Ian Smith." I recommend that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts, with a major in history.


We have read this thesis and recommend its acceptance:

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Accepted for the Council: the Graduate Scho



This map may be found in the article by John Davenport, "This Thing Has Done Us a Lot of Good," <u>Fortune</u>, LXXIV (November, 1966), p. 74.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The writer wishes to express her appreciation and thanks to Dr. Wentworth Morris of the Department of History, Austin Peay State University for his invaluable counsel and advice. Gratefulness is also extended to Dr. Preston Hubbard and to Dr. Milton Henry for being part of her Graduate Council.

The writer also wishes to thank her husband for his help in ways too numerous to mention. Without his understanding and assistance this paper would not have been possible.

INTRODUCTION

Rhodesia is a small nation in southeastern Africa. It has approximately 150,000 square miles, about the size of our state of Montana. This small country has had a turbulent history from the time that the white man first appeared on the scene.

This paper will trace the progress of Rhodesia from Cecil Rhodes to Ian Smith. The writer is mainly concerned with the Rhodesia of the 1960's but the first chapter is devoted to the influence and ambitions of Rhodes, after whom Rhodesia was named. Also included, is the position and aid given to Rhodesia by the Union of South Africa after Ian Smith made a unilateral declaration of independence for Rhodesia on November 11, 1965.

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CHAPTER I

STEP ONE: RHODES' DREAM AND CONQUEST

Four score and one year ago (1888) Cecil Rhodes set into motion a plan that in recent years has caused much dissension between the whites and the blacks of Rhodesia. However, we cannot lay the blame on Cecil John Rhodes (1853-1902). Had it not been Cecil Rhodes it would have surely been someone else in a few years or even a decade later. Africa was an untamed region--a challenge to the white man-undeveloped riches that made the white man's eyes sparkle and his actions unpredictable and, many times, ruthless.

Cecil Rhodes had been a very sickly child--tuberculosis¹--and had left England in 1870 to join his brother in South Africa. He thought the climate would cure his sickness. The same year Rhodes arrived in South Africa, diamonds were discovered on the land of a farm called Dutoitspan, where searching was far easier than in the river beds of previous locations--1867 diamonds were found near the river Orange by some children; then in 1869 diamonds were found in the river bed of the Vaal.² So

¹Franklin Parker, <u>African Development and Education</u> <u>in Southern Rhodesia</u> (Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 1960), p. 22.

²André Maurois, <u>Cecil Rhodes</u> (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1953), p. 18.

began the scramble for diamonds! Rhodes joined the trek to the fields and made much money--from selling ice cream to the miners as well as from digging for diamonds. Soon, Rhodes was a wealthy man and also a healthy man due to the climate of South Africa.³

At Kimberley he advanced his interest by buying the land that other prospectors were selling because they thought the diamonds had all been mined--the yellow diamondbearing ground was becoming blue so many thought that this indicated a lack of further diamonds.⁴ By the time he was eighteen and a half he was looking after claims valued at £5000. He was young but he was energetic and serious. His greatest ambition was to be wealthy but not for the sake of material gains but for the power and influence it would give him. His one thought was to extend British influence and control to the land which was rapidly becoming his home.

While becoming an important man in South Africa he decided to return to England in order to continue his studies and become a polished and well-rounded person. He realized that his many months in the mining fields had made him a

³Elizabeth B. Thompson, <u>Africa--Past and Present</u> (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1966), pp. 179-180.

⁴A. J. Wills, <u>History of Central Africa</u> (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 127.

coarse and an abrupt mannered man. In 1873, he entered Oriel College, Oxford.⁵ He continued to study at Oxford until he finally received his B.A. in 1881. He interrupted his studies many times to return to South Africa to look after his business affairs or in order to restore his health which was troublesome in the English climate.⁶ His affairs in Africa at this time has been summed up by Parker:

By that time he had entered politics as a member of the Cape Parliament, had amalgamated the diamond industry at Kimberley, and had won over his partners to the idea of using the fabulous wealth of the De Beers Consolidated Mining Company in the enormous scheme of developing the north on behalf of Britain.

Rhodes became interested in the territory that later bore his name because he wanted to unite the Sudan with the South and have one giant red empire shown on the map which would indicate to the world that Britain's influence had been extended over all of this area in Africa. The writer will refer to this territory hereafter as Rhodesia, even though it was not offically named Rhodesia until 1895.

Rhodesia had met the white man before the coming of Rhodes. In 1859 a small group of missionaries led by Dr. Robert Moffat set out for the Inyati Valley. They

> 5<u>Ibid</u>. 6_{Maurois}, pp. 42-50. 7_{Parker}, p. 23.

were welcomed by the king, Mzilikazi, an old friend of Dr. Moffat. Mzilikazi had come to this territory several years earlier from South Africa.⁸

Mzilikazi was the king of the Matabele tribe, warriors and pastoralists, who resided in the southwestern section of Rhodesia. The other tribe was the Mashona. sedentary and tillers of the land--this was actually a collection of weaker tribes. who had been defeated and mastered by the Matabele. The Mashona resided in the northeastern section of Rhodesia. (Map--page 11) This welcome by Mzilikazi to Dr. Moffat led to the establishment of the first mission to the Matabele by the London Missionary Society in 1861. A second mission was established at Hope Fountain in 1875;⁹ however, none of these missions established ever had the desired effect upon the Matabeles. They went about in their pagan ways but still retained the friendship of Dr. Moffat. Mzilikazi trusted Moffat but he tried to avoid contact with other white men with the exception of a few white hunters and traders. As Franklin Parker stated: ". . . Mzilikazi feared that the coming of European missionaries and their families would be the opening wedge for European penetration."10

⁸Judith Todd, <u>Rhodesia</u> (Bristol, England: MacGibbon & Kee, Ltd., 1966), pp. 15-16. 9Wills, p. 64. ¹⁰Parker, p. 22.

It was not the missionaries that caused the influx of Europeans into the area but the discovery of gold by Henry Harley, a hunter, in Mashonaland in 1868. Since Mzilikazi died a year later, the problem was inherited by his son and heir, Lobengula.¹¹

Lobengula gave the first concession of mining rights in the Tati area to the extreme southwest of Matabeleland in 1869 to Sir John Swinburne who represented the London and Limpopo Company. Several companies besides this one were formed to work the gold in the area, though without much success until the railway reached this region. In 1887, Lobengula issued a commission to Sam Edwards, Sir John Swinburne's manager, that read as follows:

As the laws of my country are not suitable for the government of Europeans . . I, Lobengula, . . . hereby authorize you . . . with power . . . to make by proclamation all such laws and regulations as you may consider expedient and necessary for the peace, order, and good government of the Tati district . . . and to represent me in all matters occurring in the said district. . . . 12

This concession, as was the case in Madras, Bombay, and Calcutta, was necessary because of the contrast in the two cultures. Lobengula had a loose local administration whereas the Europeans were accustomed to a tighter control of laws and protections against crimes and the settlement of

¹²Philip Mason, <u>The Birth of a Dilemma</u> (London: Oxford University Press, 1958), (p. 113) quoted this from C. 5237.

^{11&}lt;u>Ibid</u>., pp. 22, 37.

disputes. Of course, this concession led to the loss of sovereignty but, at the time, it seemed to be the only way out of a delicate situation.

The British were not the only ones to be casting a greedy eye upon this wealthy land of gold. The Portuguese, Germans, and Boers were looking upon this land, too. Lobengula hated the Portuguese, distrusted the Germans, and feared the Boers. He knew that he could not win against the whites and he also had a domestic turmoil on his hands. The Matzaha--warriors--were begging him to let them kill the white men in their territory. The Portuguese were moving inland from the east while the Germans were moving from the west.¹³ The Transvaalers, taking advantage of a Tswana uprising, were moving in to occupy land around the source of the Limpopo. In 1882, they established two independent republics of Stellaland and Goshen. When Paul Kruger was elected president of the Transvaal in 1883 he recognized these two republics.¹⁴

From henceforth, one sees the conflict between Kruger and Rhodes. Kruger's ambition was to create a united white South Africa under Boer control while Rhodes' aim was to create a powerful British Empire from the Cape

¹³<u>Ibid</u>., pp. 121-122. See also, Parker, p. 25; and, Wills, p. 133. ¹⁴Wills, p. 129.

to Cairo. The following account is how Oliver and Fage described Rhodes' dream:

He envisaged a federation of South Africa, where Boer, Briton, and even conceivably the Bantu might achieve the closest harmony. Such a federation would be self-governing but would maintain a strong connexion with Britain and the British Empire, the extension of which Rhodes once described as his only religion. Kruger, then, represented a seventeenthcentury Afrikaner ethos making belated attempts to adapt itself to new circumstances; Rhodes was the local embodiment of the new capitalist imperialism of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, which in South Africa had a predominantly British colouring.¹⁵

Rhodes met Kruger for the first time during the Bechuanaland negotiations. Rhodes considered this territory ". . . as the Suez Canal of the trade of the country, and as the key to its road to the interior."¹⁶ Rhodes wanted to make this a joint effort with Kruger that could be ruled independently from Britain but with allegiance to Britain. Kruger refused the idea because he saw a threat to Boer freedom. Also, Kruger was playing his own game. In 1887 he sent Pieter Grobler to Lobengula's court where he got a treaty of alliance signed between the Matabeles and the Boers and provided a permanent Boer representation at Lobengula's court. It also ". . . bound him to help the Boers with troops whenever requested, to extradite offenders,

¹⁵Roland Oliver and J. D. Fage, <u>A Short History of</u> <u>Africa</u> (Baltimore: Penguin Books Inc., 1962), pp. 192-193. ¹⁶Wills, p. 131.

to accept a resident Consul, and, most serious of all, to allow anyone with a pass from the President of the Republic to hunt or trade in his country."¹⁷ Later, Lobengula said he had misunderstood the treaty and that he thought he was simply renewing the old treaty of Mzilikazi which was a treaty of general friendship. The Boers had claimed that the old treaty had been lost. Rhodes had John Moffat who at this time was Assistant Commissioner for Bechuanaland, and an old friend of the chief's, explain the treaty to Lobengula. Lobengula declared the treaty invalid.¹⁸ Then, on February 11, 1888, Lobengula signed a treaty known as the Moffat Treaty providing

• • • for peace and amity between Her Majesty and the Matabele, and that Lobengula would 'refrain from entering into any correspondence or treaty with any foreign state or Power to sell, alienate or cede . • • the whole or any part of the • • • country under his chieftainship without the previous knowledge and sanction of Her Majesty's High Commissioner for South Africa.'19

Thus, the Germans, Portuguese, and Afrikaners were warned not to try and come into this territory--the British would back up Lobengula in order to get any foreigners, other than British, out of the territory.

¹⁸Ibid., pp. 117-121. See also, Wills, pp. 131-134; and, Parker, pp. 24-25.

¹⁹Mason (p. 120) has taken this quote from <u>Africa</u> (South), No. 369. (This is a series printed for the use of the Colonial Office and can be seen in the Colonial Office Library.)

^{17&}lt;sub>Mason</sub>, p. 119.


In October, 1888 the Rudd Concession was signed between the Matabele and Britain. This assured Lobengula that Britain would stop further intervention and that Lobengula and his people would receive a big gift for letting the British dig for gold in Rhodesia. This concession ". . . gave exclusive mining rights to the Rhodes' interests in return for rifles, ammunition, an annual sum of \$57,600, and a gunboat on the Zambezi River."²⁰ The promise of a gunboat was later turned into ± 500 cash.²¹ Soon, Lobengula came to regret this concession. Now, the blacks and whites were moving further apart.

Rhodes formed the British South Africa Company in 1888 which received the power in developing the concession but ". . . restricted the company to protect the rights of the Africans in the matter of their land, their common laws, their religions, and their customs."²²

From then on it was just a matter of moving in and taking over though there was still fighting and bloodshed involved. A pioneer column of two hundred moved into Mashonaland on September 12, 1890 and raised the flag at Fort Salisbury. These men were between the ages of

> ²⁰Parker, p. 26. ²¹Todd, p. 17. ²²Parker, p. 26.

twenty-five and thirty and were selected from two thousand volunteers. They represented a wide variety--varying in education, trades, nationalities, and background. They were to receive \$1.85 per day en route. 3.000 acres on arrival, and the right to stake fifteen gold claims. This would mean adventure and a challenge to these men. Rhodes was not sure how Lobengula would accept this trek so he sent Dr. Jameson to speak with him in April, 1890. Dr. Jameson said that if it were necessary they were prepared to fight their way into the region. Over the objections of his people, Lobengula promised that they would not attack. So, the first settlement was established in Rhodesia. Fort Salisbury was in Mashonaland though this territory was recognized as being under the rule of the Matabeles. The Mashona accepted white occupation because they were use to military domination and they feared the Matabele more than the whites. The whites needed the Mashona to work for them but being self-sufficient they refused to do so until a hut tax of \$2.40 was put on them. This they could not afford since the men kept their several wives and children in different huts. Another source of friction occurred from Matabele raids upon the Mashona. Two occurred in 1892. The whites resented this because when the raids took place the Mashonas fled to the hills and then the whites were minus their labor force.



- 1 South West Africa
- 2 Bechuanaland
- 3 Union of South Africa (Republic of South Africa)
- 4 Mozambique
- 5 Southern Rhodesia (Rhodesia)
- 6 Northern Rhodesia (Zambia)
- 7 Nyasaland (Malawi)
- 8 Lake Nyasa



Salisbury - capital of Rhodesia; largest city; founded on September 12, 1890 by pioneer column.

Bulawayo - capital of the Matabeles; today it is the second largest city in Rhodesia.

Rhodes and Jameson felt that war was inevitable. The incident occurred July, 1893 when a group of Mashonas had stolen five hundred yards of telegraph wire. They were forced to pay a fine which they paid in cattle belonging to Lobengula. Lobengula sent a force to punish the Mashona culprits but his Matabele warriors also took European cattle and molested some of the farms. Angry messages were exchanged and when Lobengula could no longer control his warriors, raids and murders were made upon isolated farms. The whites retaliated and won since they had machine guns and the warriors had only spears.²³

Lobengula fled the capital of Matabeleland, Bulawayo, in October, 1893. He was going northward toward the Zambezi River--probably to settle between the Gwaai and Shangani rivers where the grounds of the royal herds were located. (Map--Page 11) In his last council meeting, held north of the Shangani River in Matabeleland, ²⁴ before his death on January 23, 1894 he reportedly said:

The white men will never leave us in peace while we have gold in our land. Take all my gold and give it to the white men. Tell them they have beaten my regiments, killed my people, burned my kraals, and captured my cattle. Tell them I want peace.²⁵

²⁴Wills, pp. 150-151. Also, Mason, pp. 178-182.

²⁵Parker (p. 31) quoted this from Sarah Gertrude Millin, <u>Rhodes</u> (London: Chatto & Windus, 1952), p. 197. See also, Todd, p. 16.

^{23&}lt;sub>Ibid</sub>., pp. 27-31.

In 1895, many of the pioneers were persuaded to take part in the Jameson raid into the Transvaal. Rhodes wanted to replace Kruger's government by an Uitlander regime. The Uitlanders were Britishers that went into the Transvaal because of the mining industry. The Boer government, now largely composed of educated Netherlanders, professed to insist that the Uitlanders accept their Afrikaner "ideals" before gaining any political rights.²⁶ The following account shows the differences between the two cultures:

Afrikaners . . . people of peasant origin, speaking the dialect called the 'taal,' . . . determined to stick to a pastoral way of life, their faith the Calvinism of the seventeenth century, a people reading only the Bible, of which they believed every word to be divinely dictated, a people bitterly opposed to any change; a people of the saddle, the rifle, and the open air, with a high belief in God, a high sense of hospitality, honour and the moral law, strict in observance of their code, rigid and unbending. Facing them was the shifting, greedy, kaleidoscopic world of the mining camp, of men out to make their fortunes quickly, men with no god but gold, men of a new world which had lived through the Age of Reason, heard the worship of the Goddess of Reason, had seen the coming of machines. The Uitlanders were hampered at every turn by restrictions that were usually obsolete and often corrupt, denied any say in the government, not only of the Republic but even of the city of their creation, a city growing swiftly into a roaring cosmopolis, a city of gold mines, banks, saloons, gambling-dens, yet a city that was still treated by its rulers as a dorp in the veld in which certain undesirable aliens had come to live.27

²⁶Oliver and Fage, pp. 193-194.

27_{Mason}, p. 111.

Rhodes believed that a Uitlander regime would be more agreeable with his designs for South Africa. This raid was unsuccessful and the captured pioneers were sent to England for trial. This raid ruined Rhodes politically.²⁸ Rhodesia, without any police force since the Jameson Raid had recruited the majority of them, was subject to Matabele uprisings. Troops came from South Africa and soon stopped the uprisings of 1896. Rhodes went personally to talk to the Matabele and listened to their grievances, promised them fair treatment, and secured their surrender.²⁹ In the words of Parker:

This was his finest hour. Rhodes stopped the rebellion, saved Rhodesia, and reinstated BSA Company shares abroad. The Matabele had also won some concessions. But the whites were now the masters. Rhodesia was theirs. They intended to stay.³⁰

²⁸Oliver and Fage, p. 194.
²⁹Parker, pp. 34-35. See also, Mason, pp. 193-194.
³⁰Parker, p. 35.

CHAPTER II

STEP TWO: THE FUTILE ATTEMPTS TO

SAVE THE FEDERATION

Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia were protectorates of Great Britain until the granting of their independence in 1964. Nyasaland was established as a protectorate in 1891³¹ while Northern Rhodesia gained that status in 1924.³²

Since the founding of Rhodesia,³³ it has passed through four distinct phases of constitutional development-from 1890 to 1900 it was an occupied country; from 1900 to 1923 the British South Africa Chartered Company directly ruled it; from 1923 to 1953 it was under a responsible government; and, from 1953 to 1963 it was part of the Central Africa Federation. In 1923 the people had to vote whether they were to become part of the Union of South Africa or whether they would set up a responsible government--a government which must be approved by Parliament and which will be responsible to and can be dissolved by Parliament. The vote was granted to any British subjects

³²David C. Mulford, <u>Zambia</u> (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 4.

³³Southern Rhodesia has been known as Rhodesia since Northern Rhodesia changed its name to Zambia upon gaining its independence in 1964.

³¹Wills, p. 110.

of any race with an income of £200--the vote was 8,774 to 5,989 in favor of responsible government.³⁴

Southern Rhodesia had been almost completely selfgoverning since 1923 with its own parliament and prime minister. This, the vote for greater independence within the British colonial administration, and the refusal to join the Union of South Africa, was the first step toward the future federation--even though it was thirty years away from being a reality.³⁵

As early as 1945, when the Central African Council was formed, attempts were being made to join the territories together. Both Sir Roy Welensky, leader of the white unofficial members in the Northern Rhodesian Legislative Council and Sir Godfrey Huggins, Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia, supported this council. However, since it had no legislative powers it proved to be unsatisfactory.

Then, in 1949 there were discussions concerning the joining of Nyasaland and the Rhodesias in a Central African Federation. The discussion was led by Sir Godfrey, Roy Welensky, and representatives from Nyasaland. Nothing constructive came from this meeting. In fact, since the

 $^{^{34}}$ Todd, p. 40; New York <u>Times</u>, November 7, 1923 (for vote); and, Wills, p. 247 (on who could vote).

^{35&}quot;African Federation," The Atlantic Monthly, CXCI (April, 1953), p. 20.

whites refused to include the blacks in this unofficial conference, it did much to undermine the confidence of the black political leaders in the proposed federation. Another meeting was called in 1951 with a few important general matters agreed upon but otherwise little headway was made. The British Government in June, 1951, issued an official paper on the structure for a federal government. It would include a six-man cabinet and a unicameral legislature of thirty-five members--seventeen from Southern Rhodesia, eleven from Northern Rhodesia, and seven from Nyasaland.

A series of conferences and debates took place in which the Africans said they wished to have nothing to do with the federation. They continually refused to attend any conferences held in London. The Africans said they were already under white domination in their own country and feared that white supremacy would increase if a federation were formed.

³⁶"Africa: The Middle Way," <u>Newsweek</u>, XLI (April 20, 1953), p. 52.

^{37&}quot;Federation Leaders," Life, XXXIV (May 4, 1953), p. 158. (Colored refers to those of mixed birth.)

stood firmly against it. The vote for federation also passed in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland but not without reservations on the behalf of some from both races.³⁸

Federation was accepted by Southern Rhodesian whites for economic reasons; by Northern Rhodesian whites . . . for political reasons, because it reduced the chances of Northern Rhodesia's becoming an all-black African state; and by whites in Nyasaland for both economic and political reasons. It was welcomed by Southern Rhodesian Africans because it seemed to lessen the danger of Southern Rhodesian links with South Africa; and it met with a lukewarm, and in many cases downright hostile, reception from Africans in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland because they felt that to join Southern Rhodesia brought them nearer to South Africa and its policies.³⁹

One item, for which the revised plan called, was to provide safeguards for African land rights and at least six of the thirty-five member legislature must be black Africans; after all, this interracial partnership was to be between 175,000 white Africans and 6,000,000 black Africans. All three nations had reservations toward this federation. In Southern Rhodesia, the white Africans contended that they must retain strict supremacy while the Northern Rhodesian blacks feared that this federation would end any hope of real self-government. The Nyasaland bush-village natives

³⁸Alzada Comstock, "British Africa," <u>Current History</u>, XXV (July, 1953), pp. 25-26. Also, Kenneth Kirkwood, "British Central Africa: Politics Under Federation," <u>The Annals</u>, CCXCVIII (March, 1955), pp. 133-136.

³⁹David M. Cole, "Black States or Partnership?" <u>The Atlantic Monthly</u>, CCIII (April, 1959), p. 7.

thought that the white settlers were trying to cut them off from the protection of Queen Elizabeth II--Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia were protectorates and had voluntarily placed themselves under the protection of the United Kingdom.⁴⁰ One can understand that white man's need for supremacy when one looks at the population of the three territories--Southern Rhodesia had 140,000 whites of European stock and 1,500,000 blacks; Northern Rhodesia consisted of 40,000 whites and 1,500,000 blacks--twice as large in area as Southern Rhodesia; finally, the smallest in area and nearly one fourth of which is Lake Nyasa, is Nyasaland which had a small white population of 4,000 whites and 2,250,000 blacks.⁴¹

In order to safeguard the blacks an African Affairs Board was established. It would consist of a chairman and one white and black from each of the territories. This board would have the power to demand that the United Kingdom Government and Parliament had to rule on any legislation that might involve discrimination between the whites and blacks to the disadvantage of the latter.⁴²

⁴⁰ "Africa: The Middle Way," p. 52. Also see, "African Federation," pp. 21-22. ⁴¹ "African Federation," p. 20. ⁴² Ibid., p. 21. There were also economic advantages to this federation. The communications and interstate transportation could be integrated and many bureaus and administrative and executive functions could be consolidated. Nyasaland would be able to supply the labor to be used in the Rhodesias--

The greatest single contribution this protectorate can make to her own and the whole area's prosperity will be the regular annual flow southwards and westwards of surplus native labor to meet the needs of the growing industries of the two Rhodesias.⁴³

Besides the labor resource Nyasaland also produced tea, cotton, tobacco and soybeans. Too, this country supplied most of the fresh fish in this region since nearly a quarter of the country was Lake Nyasa. Northern Rhodesia's important mineral resources were copper, zinc, lead, and cobalt ores; generally, these had large production units-copper would be the economic mainstay of the Federation. Southern Rhodesia's mineral resources included gold, mica, chrome, asbestos, silver, coal, iron, pyrites, limestone, and tungsten. Other important resources were tobacco--in 1952 their export of this product, the most important one, valued \$250,000,000--and huge herds of cattle, sheep and pigs. Southern Rhodesia had greater European population

43<u>Ibid</u>., p. 20.

because Britain had permitted more extensive development of the vast mineral and other resources. 44

On August 1, 1953 the Order in Council was signed by Queen Elizabeth II to set up the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland.⁴⁵ A Governor-General was at the head of the structure but the substances of power laid within the limits of the Prime Minister and the Federal Executive of six chosen from the Federal Assembly--these were all white Africans. The other structures of government were a Federal Assembly, which has been discussed, a Federal Supreme Court, and a Federal Public Service.⁴⁶

In September, 1953 Sir Godfrey Huggins was sworn in at Salisbury, Southern Rhodesia, as interim Prime Minister of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Sir Godfrey, a surgeon, had come from Britain thirty years previously for a rest and decided to stay. For the last twenty years he had been Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia.⁴⁷ In December 1953, an election was held to elect a Prime Minister. Huggins was victorious

⁴⁴<u>Ibid</u>., and "Rear-Guard Action in Africa," <u>Business</u> Week, February 21, 1953, p. 166.

⁴⁵Keith Irvine, "The Central African Federation," <u>Current History</u>, XXX (May, 1956), pp. 285-292.

47"New States," <u>Time</u>, LXII (september 21, 1954), p. 40.

⁴⁶Kirkwood, "British Central Africa: Politics Under Federation," p. 136.

in this election. The seats in the first Parliament were distributed as follows: twenty-four Federalists--Huggins' party, one Confederate and one Independent. The plan of Huggins was to follow Rhodes' idea of equal rights for all civilized men but he said that ". . . a color bar is still necessary in primitive Africa, but gradually they hope to remove it, as the Negroes 'come of age,'"⁴⁸

The whites in Cental Africa had the tendency to divide on two issues: "the acceptance or otherwise of the Crown and the 'British connection,' and the control and regulation of relations between whites and Africans in Africa."⁴⁹ A minority of the whites that kept close ties with South Africa--Afrikaans-speaking--were opposed to any external interference on behalf of the blacks and were traditionally segregationists; however, there was an important minority of these that were liberals and non-racialists. The majority of whites were Englishspeaking and were divided between those of British South African origin and those directly from the United Kingdom.

⁴⁸"Victory for Partnership," <u>Time</u>, LXII (December 28, 1953), p. 24.

⁴⁹Kirkwood, "British Central Africa: Politics Under Federation," p. 131.

In general, they wanted to keep close ties with Britain but opposed any interference with the native policy. They also wanted to recognize the differences between the blacks and whites and a significant minority supported a policy of apartheid--Boer word meaning segregation.⁵⁰

All was not going well in the Federation! As early as 1955 Nyasaland's moderate African Minister of Parliament, Manoah Chirwa, was saying that it was a "Black state" and should be out of the Federation. He was supported in this demand by the Nyasaland African National Congress and Mr. Van Eeden, a M. P. who represented the Afrikaaner view in the Federation. Mr. Van Eeden said they were an economic liability and should be turned back to the Colonial Office.⁵¹

Many racial problems beset the Federation. First of all the blacks were permitted only six members in the Federal Parliament to represent them--two from each territory. Also, there were voting restrictions placed upon them. In Nyasaland only the nine thousand European and Asians could vote, while in Northern Rhodesia the voting qualification was dependent upon a yearly income of \$672, the ability to read and write English, and the

50 Ibid.

⁵¹Irvine, "The Central African Federation," p. 290.

acquisition of British citizenship, which required a fee. In Southern Rhodesia the situation was similar although being more of an agricultural area the Africans were less politically awakened--they already had the status of citizens. One way that the white minority had been able to limit the racial trouble was by refusing to permit Negro leaders to leave their respective areas to confer with other Negro leaders in other areas. Also, Negroes from South Africa were prohibited to immigrate into the Federation.

The copper strike in 1955 was another major racial and social conflict which hurt all three parties involved-the companies, the white unions, and the black strikers. The strike occurred because the yearly average earnings of a white underground worker was 6,272 while the yearly average earnings of a black underground worker was 392. When the strike was over, two months later, the black worker had to return to work at the same wages as before. About a quarter of the men were discharged because other men had been hired to replace them during the strike.⁵²

Another sore spot was the expenditure on health, housing, and education. In education, the amount spent on white and black children was approximately the same;

52<u>Ibid.</u>, pp. 287-290.

however, there were nearly three hundred black children to every white child. The same comparison can be made in health and housing.

Other racial tension occurred because of rigid censorship upon films, radio programs, and literature, refusal to allow Negroes to enter the armed forces, and segregation and/or restrictions in restaurants, on railroads, buses, and public post offices.⁵³

Tension, however, is not confined to that existing between the different racial communities; it also exists inside them. On the African side tribal feuds from the old days are often carried over into modern life, while on the European side new feuds have been initiated.⁵⁴

The severest feud among the white Africans occurred between Sir Roy Welensky, Prime Minister of the Federation from 1956 until its end in 1963, and Mr. Garfield Todd, Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia from 1953 until 1958. Mr. Todd was more pro-black than most and this dissatisfied the majority of white leaders.⁵⁵ He had made some headway in his determination to help the Negro. He won grudging approval from his party, United Rhodesia Party, on certain voting privileges for 6,000 Negroes. These in order to

⁵⁴Keith Irvine, "Perspective on Central Africa," <u>Current History</u>, XXXIV (June, 1958), p. 331.

55 Ibid.

^{53&}lt;sub>Ibid</sub>., pp. 290-291.

qualify, had to have an education equivalent to our high school sophomore or a monthly income of fifty-six dollars.⁵⁶ In the five years as Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia, Todd became something of a saint to the 92 per cent of the population--Negroes--because of his fight to advance their political rights.⁵⁷ While Mr. Todd was on vacation in 1958, Sir Roy persuaded Mr. Todd's cabinet to resign.

The immediate cause of the crisis occurred when Todd announced his intention of advancing the basic wages of the black workers. The remoter cause was the conflict between the Rhodesian Selection Trust and the Anglo-American Corporation of South Africa. The Rhodesian Selection Trust was an Anglo-American concern that favored American theories of management and production while the Anglo-American Corporation of South Africa was controlled by Harry Oppenheimer who followed more of the South African industrial conduct. Todd supported the RST while Welensky supported the AACSA. Black Africans, Americans, and Britishers supported Todd while South Africans and white Central Africans supported Welensky.

57"Sad Day," Time, LXXI (February 24, 1958), p. 27.

⁵⁶"Who's a Liberal?" <u>Time</u>, LXXI (January 27, 1958), pp. 26, 29.

Sir Edgar Whitehead was called back from the Federation's Washington office to replace Mr. Todd, a former missionary, as prime minister. However, Mr. Todd was too valuable to lose because of his influence with overseas investors and the Negroes, so he was appointed Southern Rhodesian Minister of Labor and Social Welfare. The crisis, therefore, was arrested but not resolved.⁵⁸

Sir Edgar Whitehead was an Oxford-educated moderate. He was not a Member of Farliament so he would only be able to serve as prime minister for four months unless he won a seat as M. P. His party decided to run him in the election in a suburb of Bulawayo, Hillside. His opponent, Jack Pain of the Dominion Party surprised the United Federal Party of Whitehead by winning 692 votes to the Federal Party's 604 votes.⁵⁹ Whitehead immediately dissolved parliament and called for new general elections for June, 1958.⁶⁰ Whitehead won the general election but his party lost many of the seats in the Southern Rhodesian Parliament

⁵⁸Irvine, "Perspective on Central Africa," p. 332. See also, Todd, pp. 51-63.

 $^{^{59}\}mathrm{The}$ Dominion Party supported a policy of stricter white supremacy.

^{60&}quot;Upset North of the Limpopo," <u>Time</u>, LXXI (April 28, 1958), p. 32.

to the Dominion Party--it now had thirteen seats to the United Federal's seventeen seats.⁶¹

In the Federation, the second election of its history took place in November, 1958.⁶² This, on the surface, was to have been a favor for the Negroes--their representation had been increased from six to twelve when the Legislative Assembly was increased from thirty-five to fifty-nine members.

To qualify for the general roll to elect all candidates, including Europeans, a voter had to have an income of \$148 a month, and few blacks came near to making even a third of that. A new special roll for black candidates requires only \$35 a month, but special voters could choose only Africans, and these were to be elected only by a combination of the two rolls.⁶³

Welensky won and his party gained forty-six out of the fifty-nine seats. Nine seats were obtained by the Dominion Party which received 35 per cent of the vote.⁶⁴

From February to March, 1959, riots occurred in the Federation. Fifty were killed, many injured, and numerous people were arrested. This opposition was led

61 "A Winter's Tale," <u>Time</u>, LXXI (June 16, 1958), p. 27.

62 The first vote was in December, 1953 when Sir Godfrey was elected to office. In 1956, Huggins resigned and Sir Roy, Deputy Prime Minister, replaced him.

63"The White Knight," <u>Time</u>, LXXII (November 24, 1958), pp. 29, 31.

64_{Ibid}., p. 31.

by Dr. Hastings Banda, leader of the African National Congress of Nyasaland, who insisted that Nyasaland pull out of the Federation and have a majority-rule. He then said he would join Tanganyika and Kenya in order to set up a "black republic,"⁶⁵ Banda was arrested March 3,⁶⁶ along with 249 other nationalist leaders. In Northern Rhodesia, the Zambia African Congress was closed down and its leaders were arrested. The Congress chief, Kenneth Kaunda, who split with Banda, demanded "one-man, one-vote" but wanted to get this right by use of nonviolence.⁶⁷

Southern Rhodesia had educated more black Africans than any of the other territories--in fact, it had the highest literacy rate south of the Sahara. In spite of this, not a single black African was in the Southern Rhodesian legislature and none were in the Civil Service. The whites of Southern Rhodesia were afraid that if any were let into legislative or important positions then soon they would demand more rights. Of course, since Southern Rhodesia dominated the Federal Assembly and

⁶⁵"Africa--The Black and the White," <u>Newsweek</u>, LIII (March 9, 1959), p. 42.

⁶⁶The Nyasaland African National Congress was charged with major responsibility. Dr. Banda was imprisoned from March, 1959 until April, 1960.

^{67&}quot;The Roots of Terror," <u>Newsweek</u>, LIII (March 16, 1959), p. 42; and, "The Dream Crumbles," <u>Newsweek</u>, LIII March 23, 1959), p. 47.

Cabinet, their policies hindered the advancement of blacks in important and political positions in the other two territories.⁶⁸

Perhaps the major cause for failure of the Federation could be laid at the feet of the white Southern Rhodesians because of their racial biases and restrictions.

The Federation can be broken down into three periods:

1) From 1953 to 1957 - period of growing African disillusionment. A proposal had been made to increase the size of the assembly and to make certain changes in the system of representation. The African Affairs Board objected strongly but was overruled by the British government. It was probably this decision that caused the African and pro-African to distrust the federal concept.

2) From 1957 to 1960 - active and sometimes violent opposition was felt, starting in Nyasaland. In 1960, the Monckton Commission was set up by Britain to review the Federation and to make recommendations. It stated, in October of 1960, that dissolution would be undesirable but that the individual territories should be given the right to secede. This was the beginning of the end of the Federation!

⁶⁸N. M. Shamuyarira, "The Coming Showdown in Central Africa," <u>Foreign Affairs</u>, XXXIX (January, 1961), pp. 294-296.

3) From 1960 to 1963 - on December 31, 1963, the Federation ceased to exist.⁶⁹ Banda attended a mock funeral in Blantyre, Nyasaland to celebrate its ending. Sir Roy Welensky retired to his farm near Salisbury in order to write his memoirs.⁷⁰

In December 1962, Britain gave Nyasaland permission to secede. Dr. Banda and his Malawi Congress Party--his other party had been banned in 1959--headed this break and got an internally self-governing constitution in 1963. It gained its independence on July 5, 1964 and was renamed Malawi.⁷¹

In Northern Rhodesia the break was a little more complex. There, one sees conflicts between the two tribal organizations of Harry Nkumbula, African National Congress, and Kenneth Kaunda, United National Independence Party. It was not until there was a coalition between the two that success was achieved. The U. N. I. P. won sweeping victories in Northern Rhodesia's first elections in 1963. It attained internal self-government in January, 1964 and became an independent nation on October 24, 1964. It

⁶⁹F. M. G. Willson, "The Rhodesias and Nyasaland," <u>Current History</u>, XLVI (March, 1964), pp. 152-153.

⁷⁰New York <u>Times</u>, January 1 and 2, 1964.

⁷¹Ibid., July 6, 1964 and Willson, "The Rhodesias and Nyasaland," p. 153.

was renamed Zambia.⁷² Kenneth Kaunda was sworn in as President on October 25, 1964.⁷³

Southern Rhodesia's situation was much more complicated than that of the other territories. It remained an European dominated government with black influence increasing but outside of the governmental framework. In 1961, Sir Edgar Whitehead negotiated a new constitution and franchise but the black African refused to participate in the first general election held under it in December, 1962. In this election he wanted to repeal the Land Apportionment Act and to make segregation in public places illegal. Without the black support, he was defeated and replaced by Winston Field, of the Rhodesia Front Party.⁷⁴ Field resigned on April 13, 1964 and was replaced by Ian Smith, Minister of the Treasure, on April 14, 1964. Ian Smith was the fourth Prime Minister in seven years and by far the most racially minded.⁷⁵

A major problem of disunity in Southern Rhodesia was between two Negroes, Joshua Nkomo and Ndabaningi Sithole. Nkomo had mass support in his organization

⁷²Willson, "The Rhodesias and Nyasaland," pp. 154-155.
⁷³New York <u>Times</u>, October 2, 1964.
⁷⁴Willson, "The Rhodesias and Nyasaland," pp. 154-155.
⁷⁵New York <u>Times</u>, April 13 and 14, 1964.

called the People's Caretaker Council and Sithole was the choice of many Negro intellectuals in his party of the Zimbabwe African National Union.⁷⁶

Southern Rhodesia pressed for independence but was refused since Britain's policy of granting independence was based upon majority-rule--only two states had been granted independence in violation of this principle.⁷⁷

Economically speaking, the Federation was successful to a great extent. It attracted considerable outside investment; weathered the world slump in copper prices; began to diversify its economy; and, completed the world's largest hydroelectric plant on the Zambezi River.⁷⁸ Communications, health, and educational social services were expanded at a rate which would not have been possible without federation; furthermore, custom tariffs on manufactured goods were lowered. Also, the blacks' income was raised from £35 in 1953 to £43 by 1957.⁷⁹

⁷⁸The Kariba Dam project cost nearly \$660,000,000.

⁷⁶The blacks want to change the name of Rhodesia to Zimbabwe if they ever get majority-rule. Zimbabwe is the name of a thousand year old ruins of a civilization of master artisans who apparently traded with places as far away as China.

⁷⁷Willson, "The Rhodesias and Nyasaland," pp. 154-155. (See footnote #95 concerning majority-rule.)

⁷⁹David M. Cole, "Black State or Partnership?" p. 76; and N. M. Shamuyarira, "The Coming Showdown in Central Africa," p. 295.

As of March, 1964, the only link maintained was the Central African Airways to be continued as a three-territory governmental organization. The two Rhodesias agreed jointly to handle the airways and the Kariba Dam.⁸⁰

• • • there are enough economic factors entangling the territories • • • but without a basis of common political sympathy on the primary issue of majority rule, the prospect of a new federation is a cloud far smaller than a man's hand.

⁸⁰Willson, "The Rhodesias and Nyasaland," p. 180. ⁸¹Ibid.

CHAPTER III

STEP THREE: UNILATERAL DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE

The quest for Rhodesian independence started as early as November, 1963 when Prime Minister Field sent an emissary to London with the mission of demanding independence for Rhodesia. As was pointed out to Sir Alex Douglas-Home, the Prime Minister of Great Britain, why would it be fair to grant independence to backward and insolvent Nyasaland and withhold it from the well-developed country of Rhodesia, which had been self-governing since 1923?

In Parliament, they said they would have to discuss the problem with other Commonwealth nations--never before had Britain consulted them about her problems. This would include such personages as President Nkrumah of Ghana, Dr. Banda of Nyasaland, Mr. Kenyatta of Kenya--ones that Rhodesia knew would never vote for Rhodesian independence under white domination since these were blacks who had fought for their freedom from the whites.

Rhodesia was feeling very anti-British and wondering what it could do. Many Rhodesians favored joining with South Africa but South Africa no longer wanted Rhodesia in her union. This would have meant twelve more blacks for every white. Neither could the whites compromise with the blacks since the blacks now demanded full power. The world seemed to be against Rhodesia.⁸²

On April 13, 1964 Field resigned as Prime Minister after saying that he had been requested to do so in order to make way for someone else who perhaps would move things along a little more quicker than he. That someone was Ian Smith, Deputy Prime Minister and Treasury Minister. Ian Smith was a former RAF pilot and the first Rhodesian born Prime Minister. His cabinet was made up of ardent segregationists.

Smith announced that he would continue to seek independence but if cirucmstances forced him to do so he might have to take other measures. The British were afraid that this would lead to another possible "Boston Tea Party" held in Salisbury⁸³--the "Salisbury Tea Party?"

However, Smith was not likely to carry out his threat since his Rhodesia Front party only held a fiveseat majority in the sixty-five seat Parliament--he would probably have been unable to get enough support. Other reasons would be that Britain paid high prices for Rhodesia's

⁸²Elspeth Huxley, "No Flowers for Welensky's Baby," <u>National Review</u>, XVI (January 28, 1964), p. 66.

⁸³"Another Tea Party," <u>Newsweek</u>, LXIII (April 27, 1964), p. 54. Also see, "Tougher Line in Africa," <u>U. S. News & World Report</u>, LVI (April 27, 1964), pp. 15-16.

mainstay product of tobacco and loss of this product's market would be economically damaging. Independence could also be costly in terms of a possible economic boycott. Neither could he count on active support from South Africa--Verwoerd had too many problems of his own.⁸⁴

The black African leaders under Joshua Nkomo reacted violently to Smith's announcement. Nkomo demanded British intervention but was quickly silenced by being "whisked away by plane to a remote detention center in dense bush and lion country in the southeast corner of the colony."⁸⁵ When the blacks heard of his arrest they rioted in their towns. However, this did not deter Smith from his proposed policy.

In May, 1964, Garfield Todd, a former Prime Minister, visited the United Nations asking them to do something about the situation. He told the delegation that the white man had held on to the power in Africa when it should be the black African in power.

Todd also surprised the people by announcing that he had joined Africa's largest black African political party--People's Caretaker Council. This, along with his request for United Nations intervention, surprised the

85 "Another Tea Party," p. 54.

⁸⁴ "New Range Boss," <u>Time</u>, LXXXIII (April 24, 1964 pp. 35-36.

delegation because he was white and also a former Prime Minister.⁸⁶ Why this should surprise them the writer of this paper does not understand. After all, Todd was a former missionary and very pro-black while he was Prime Minister--that was why he was requested to resign!⁸⁷ The United Nations delegation voted nineteen to zero and requested that Britain give majority-rule to the blacks.⁸⁸

When Ian Smith and his "cowboy government"⁸⁹ announced its future policy in 1964 of seeking Rhodesian independence under its existing regime it put external pressures on Britain to intervene. Prime Minister Douglas-Home invited Ian Smith to go to London for talks but this invitation was temporarily turned down because of Smith's irritation at not being permitted a seat at the Commonwealth's Prime Ministers' Conference that had been held in July. There was no way of forcing Smith to attend this conference since all officials in Rhodesia except the High Commissioner--this was purely a diplomatic

⁸⁶"Black and White," <u>Newsweek</u>, LXIII (May 11, 1964), p. 47.

⁸⁷Mr. Todd was arrested in October, 1965 and sentenced to remain on his ranch, 250 miles from Salisbury, for a year. "The Desparate Mission," <u>Time</u>, LXXXVI (October, 29, 1965), p. 31.

88"Black and White," pp. 47-48.

⁸⁹They are called this because his party consisted mostly of ranchers. "New Range Boss," p. 35.

position--were Rhodesians. Britain had no police force or troops in Rhodesia--these, too, were made up of Rhodesians. The only way for Britain forcefully to take over Rhodesia was to land troops in Zambia and then cross the Zambesi River. Britain did not want to take this line of action.⁹⁰ However, Smith did attend a conference in September and seemed to have changed his mind, at least temporarily, over independence without British consent. He even agreed with Sir Alex that independence should be based on black consent, too. While Smith was taking a moderate stand in London his government in Salisbury was taking an even stricter white supremacy stand than before--raising financial qualifications which would disfranchise more blacks.⁹¹

Sir Roy Welensky, who had been writing his memoirs since the end of the Federation ten months before, decided to run for a seat in Parliament from the white Arundel constituency of Salisbury. He had always taken a moderate stand on the racial situation and favored a policy of attaining gradual multiracial society. He felt that he could defeat Clifford Dupont, the Deputy Prime Minister. However, this

^{90&}quot;Rhodesia," The Atlantic Monthly, CCXIV (September, 1964), p. 19.

^{91&}quot;Defused," <u>Newsweek</u>, LXIV (September 12, 1964), p. 56.

was not the case--Dupont defeated Sir Roy by a vote of 1,076 to 633. This seemed to prove that a majority of the whites were supporting Smith's policies of complete white rule in Rhodesia.⁹²

Ian Smith was progressing well towards declaring unilateral independence--U. D. I.--when Harold Wilson was chosen as Prime Minister of Britain. Wilson believed that Smith was getting out of hand so he gave a warning to the people hoping they would block Smith. He said on the broadcast by the BBC's African news service:

• • • that a unilateral declaration of independence would be 'treasonable • • • an open act of defiance and rebellion.' What's more, said Wilson, the economic consequences of such an act 'would be disastrous.' Implicit in this statement was the threat that Britain, currently a main consumer of Rhodesia's tobacco and beef, would cease its purchases if Rhodesia declared independence.⁹³

On November 5, Smith held a referendum in order to see what the people would choose to do on the question of their independence. Those qualified to vote were 90,000 whites and 10,000 blacks. Smith also said he would get the opinion of the other 3,690,000 blacks by calling together the 622 tribal chiefs and headmen.

^{92&}quot;Sir Roy's Last Throw," <u>Newsweek</u>, LXIV (October 12, 1964), p. 56.

^{93&}quot;Two Tough Men," <u>Newsweek</u>, LXIV (November 9, 1964), p. 51.

For five solid days the chiefs listened to official promises of increased pay, paid tribute to their importance, cursed Rhodesia's suppressed black nationalist parties as 'wild dogs and hyenas,' and occasionally inquired why the Queen hadn't come down from London. At the end of it all they learned they had just voted 622 to 0 'to cut the strings that tie us to Britain.'94

Harold Wilson delivered a final ultimatum to Smith and to the press so that the people would get the message. In this ultimatum he stated that only the British government and the Parliament could grant independence and if Smith went ahead with his plan that Rhodesia would be ousted from the Commonwealth and that they would lose their British citizenship.⁹⁵ After this announcement, Smith said that he would not take the November 5 election returns as permission to declare unilateral independence but would use the returns in order to negotiate for independence peacefully. So, for a while, Smith meekly succumbed to the pressures put on by another strong man, Harold Wilson.⁹⁶

Meanwhile, in Rhodesia, things were not going well for the blacks. There were tactics planned by the whites

^{94&}quot;Christmas Postponed," <u>Time</u>, LXXXIV (November 6, 1964), p. 28.

⁹⁵The only two nations ever granted independence without majority-rule by Great Britain were South Africa and Zanzibar. Robert E. Hughes, "Powder Keg in Rhodesia: I," The Christian Century, LXXXII (February 17, 1965), p. 208.

^{96&}quot;Christmas Postponed," p. 28 and "Two Tough Men," pp. 51-52.

to destroy African nationalism. These included such things as an "African nationalist" (black) stoning the house of a black moderate parliamentarian--it turned out to be a white policeman in disguise; and, leaflets were being dropped supposedly by black nationalists threatening the chiefs with death after the blacks took over the government--these were being printed by the white government press.⁹⁷ As the saying goes, "all's fair in love and war!"

Blacks were also losing some of their former privileges as Smith was preparing for total white supremacy. During October, over 3,000 blacks were arrested in Salisbury, though this was not printed in the locally suppressed news. Blacks were also being resegregated in the public facilities in Bulawayo; and, in Salisbury, the restaurants, all but two, were resegregated while schools had halted integration.⁹⁸

Things were not even going well with the internal balance for some of the white Africans either. For the first seven months of 1964 things were looking rather bleak. Uncertainty and the sharp rise in the cost of living caused an average of a thousand a month to emigrate from Rhodesia to South Africa, England, or other countries that

⁹⁷Russell W. Howe, "Rebellion in Rhodesia?" <u>The</u> <u>New Republic</u>, CLI (November 14, 1964), p. 13; and, Russell W. Howe, "Rebellion Brews in Rhodesia," <u>The Reporter</u>, XXXII (June 3, 1965), p. 26.

^{98&}lt;sub>Ibid</sub>.

they considered to be more desirable than Rhodesia in its present condition. Rhodesia also declined in capital investments, the construction of new buildings, and the development of new companies. It was the common belief of the white African that once independence was established then confidence and economic security would be restored.99

More restrictions were being placed on certain white Africans who were actively supporting the blacks believing in majority rule. The only daily newspaper banned was the <u>Daily News</u> which supported black nationalism. Two editors of other newspapers were arrested and put on trial for printing material that the government believed would hurt their cause. In a way, this may have been a bad move because by restricting freedom of the press many whites, who previously had not really publicly expressed disapproval, became upset. When this censorship of the press occurred the Rhodesian Guild of Journalists and forty-eight of the fifty professors at the University of Rhodesia and Nyasaland protested that this was the first step in making the news media an instrument for government propaganda.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁹Hughes, "Powder Keg in Rhodesia: I," p. 208.

¹⁰⁰ Most of Smith's white support came from ". . . a small stratum of rich, not very literate tobacco farmers and a horde of poor whites." What white opposition remained came from ". . . big money, . . . university and to more recent emigrants from England. . . ." Howe, "Rebellion in Rhodesia?" p. 13.

About the only major institution not restricted for a long time was the Christian church. However, this came to an end when it began publicly to support the blacks and to hold public prayer meetings for the blacks on this issue. Eventually, some churchmen were deported and this caused the other church leaders and missionaries to participate in peaceful marches and demonstrations in support of the deported missionaries.¹⁰¹

By May 7, 1965, Smith's party of Rhodesian Front was firmly in control of the Assembly. Smith soundly defeated his opponent, David Butler, and gained control of all fifty white seats in the sixty-five member Assembly--fifteen were reserved to represent the blacks.¹⁰² The National People's Party gained ten of the remaining fifteen seats with the other five going to independents. The new opposition leader was Josiah Gondo. There were two voting rolls: "A" roll had the requirements of an income of \$2,000 a year and a literacy test--2,256 blacks registered on this roll; and, "B" roll had the requirements of an income of \$355 a year and a primary school education--10,623 blacks and one white registered--the average black income is less than \$300.¹⁰³

102"Bust or Black?" <u>Time</u>, LXXXV (May 14, 1965), p. 40. 103_{Howe}, "Rebellion Brews in Rhodesia," p. 26.

¹⁰¹Robert E. Hughes, "Powder Keg in Rhodesia: II," <u>The Christian Century</u>, LXXXII (February 24, 1965), pp. 240-242.

As U. D. I. approached, feelings were running high in Rhodesia and Britain. Ian Smith went to London to discuss any possible way of gaining independence. The same demands were made: Smith demanded white rule while Wilson demanded majority-rule (black). Smith told a London press conference before leaving:

We believe the dangers attached to doing nothing are worse than the dangers attached to U. D. I. If we have to get out of our country, we would rather go out fighting than crawling on our hands and knees.¹⁰⁴

Smith did offer to compromise with Wilson on the following points: Smith was willing to add a senate of twelve chiefs to the Rhodesian legislature but, of course, the chiefs supported Smith; Smith said he would grant the franchise to a million more blacks but he would not increase their representation in the Federal Assembly which stands at fifteen out of sixty-five seats; and, Smith said he would sign a treaty guaranteeing the sanctity of their present constitution which would give them control of the government--in about 100 years. Needless to say, Wilson would not accept this compromise.¹⁰⁵

105"The Desperate Mission," p. 31.

¹⁰⁴"White Hot," <u>Time</u>, LXXXVI (October 22, 1965), p. 40. See also, "Rhodesia: The Rebel Fever Rises," <u>Newsweek</u>, LXVI (October 25, 1965), p. 43.

In Rhodesia, the Tobacco Trade Association and the Chamber of Commerce warned that U. D. I. would bring catastrophe to the nation by forcing Britain to place the economic sanctions that had been threatened--cutting off Rhodesia tobacco purchases, freezing sterling reserves, refusing to recognize Rhodesian passports, ejection from the Commonwealth and its tariff protection, and trade boycotts or embargoes.¹⁰⁶ There were others, though, who were getting impatient with Smith for not declaring U. D. I. They said it was coming soon so why wait any longer. These were men more radical than Smith and they would replace him if he did not take drastic measures.¹⁰⁷ With this being the major viewpoint in Rhodesia, no wonder Smith would not compromise in London.

Wilson, too, had to be careful how far he carried his warning on sanctions because he did not want to hurt the blacks in Rhodesia or Zambia. Zambia could definitely be hurt if Rhodesia placed sanctions upon it. Rhodesia controlled the main source of electric power from the Karibe Dam and supplied all of the coal that Zambia needed

¹⁰⁶ "White Hot," p. 40; "Right Around the Corner," <u>Time</u>, LXXXVI (October 15, 1965), p. 43; and, "Africa on the Verge," <u>The Nation</u>, CCI (October 25, 1965), p. 261.

^{107&}quot;Not Since 1776," <u>Newsweek</u>, LXVI (October 18, 1965), p. 66.

to power the copper mines. Rhodesia also controlled Zambia's main rail link to the sea. 108

Wilson was gaining much support world-wide as was indicated by the United Nations vote of 107 to 2 in support of a resolution "calling upon Britain to 'take all steps necessary' to prevent or end the threatened Rhodesian rebellion."¹⁰⁹ Britain did not vote because of it being a constitutional problem of the United Kingdom. Britain "said" the United Nations had no right to intervene but this was only a necessary technical move--Britain actually welcomed United Nations support. The only two nations supporting Rhodesia were South Africa and Portugal-they both faced similar problems with the blacks in Africa.¹¹⁰

The latter part of October, 1964, Harold Wilson flew to Salisbury in order to talk with Smith. He was trying to see if the rapidly approaching U. D. I. could somehow be avoided. A three-man Joint Royal Commission was agreed upon but when Wilson explained it in London, Smith said that was not what they agreed upon in Salisbury. Smith said this commission would see if the people wanted

> 108 "Right Around the Corner," p. 43. 109 "Africa on the Verge," p. 261.

¹¹⁰Ibid. (Portugal has the two colonies of Angola and Mozambique.)

independence based upon their present constitution but Wilson said he wanted the commission to draw up a new constitution and present it for approval of both whites and blacks--Britain would retain the power to veto any action taken by the commission. So--no commission!¹¹¹ Feelings were too bitter between the whites and blacks and to compromise at that late date was not only improbable but also impossible.

Smith immediately placed government controls on all imports--this was supposedly to halt a buying panic that was rapidly depleting the hard-currency reserves. A nationwide state of emergency was declared giving massive powers to Smith's regime. Such powers included censorship or closing down of newspapers and magazines, the banning of public gatherings or private travel, and the closing down of bars and beer halls. Also, "any police officer may, without warrant, arrest and detain any person of whom he has reason to believe there are grounds which would justify his detention."¹¹²

On November 10, 1965 Smith forced the British Governor, Sir Humphrey Gibbs, to sign over his powers to

¹¹¹ "Britain Gropes for Ways to Dissolve an Empire," <u>Business Week</u>, October 30, 1965, p. 27; and, "Opening and Closing the Door," <u>Time</u>, LXXXVI (November 12, 1965), p. 39.

^{112&}quot;Opening and Closing the Door," p. 39. See also, "Crying 'Wolf,'" <u>Newsweek</u>, LXVI (November 15, 1965), p. 62.

the Cabinet in case he was no longer able to function. This was just to get him out of office before declaring independence.

Rhodesia assumed its sovereign independence on November 11, 1965. At 1:15 p. m. Smith went on radio and said:

In the lives of most nations, there comes a moment when a stand had to be made for principles. . . We Rhodesians have rejected the philosophy of appeasement. I believe that we are a courageous people and history has cast us in a heroic role.¹¹³

After U. D. I. was announced the United Nations General Assembly voted 102 to 2 to condemn it--again, South Africa and Portugal voted to support Rhodesia. The Security Council called for diplomatic boycott.

Rhodesia was unusually calm for just declaring independence. However, the liquor stores sold out of champagne two hours after the proclamation.

Smith immediately took some protective measures to safeguard his country. Imports, exports and foreign travel were rigidly controlled. No foreign exchange could be bought or sold. Local newspapers were placed under strict censorship and all white males of fifty-five or under could be called immediately, if necessary, into the territorial reserve. To protect Rhodesia from invasion from Zambia,

^{113&}quot;The White Rebels," <u>Time</u>, LXXXVI (November 19, 1965), p. 44.

Smith ordered troops to dig in along the Zambezi River. Kaunda, President of Zambia, fearing an invasion from Rhodesia, did the same.¹¹⁴

A popular joke in Rhodesia about this time was: "Why are the British like ripe bananas?" "Because they are yellow, crooked and turning black."¹¹⁵

Albert J. Meyers of the <u>U. S. News & World Report</u> was in downtown Salisbury fifteen minutes after Rhodesia's U. D. I. This is what a white Rhodesian said to him:

Well, what do you think now, Yank? You Americans did it in 1776, and now we've done it. We will make it all right, don't you worry. We are now the buffer state between black Africa and white Africa, and we are going to stay that way.116

¹¹⁴ <u>Ibid.</u>, pp. 44-45. Also see, "Independence Day?" Newsweek, <u>LXVI</u> (November 22, 1965), pp. 50, 52.

115"The Defiance of Sir Humphrey," <u>Time</u>, LXXXVI (November 26, 1965), p. 37.

116 "Tough Time--But We'll Make It!" U. S. News & World Report, LIX (November 22, 1965), p. 45.

CHAPTER IV

THE AFTERMATH OF U. D. I.: EMBARGOES AND FOREIGN AID

One cannot say that the unilateral declaration of independence (U. D. I.) did not hurt Rhodesia but neither can one say that Britain brought Rhodesia to its knees. Rhodesia has "illegally" been an independent nation for forty-four months.

In the previous chapter, one read of Sir Humphrey Gibbs being relieved of his duties as governor. However, Sir Humphrey did not give up his position that easily. He refused to be fired even though the telephone wires were cut, honor guards withdrawn, servants left, and the chauffeur had the audacity to take his Rolls-Royce from him! Of course, Ian Smith did not let this minor detail deter him in his plans. Not all whites were pleased with Smith's U. D. I. but the majority were pleased even though they did not completely understand the financial difficulties that could arise. To Britain, Sir Humphrey's unwelcome presence in Rhodesia meant hope for peacefully causing Smith's regime to topple by political pressures and economic sanctions.¹¹⁷

^{117&}quot;In Rhodesia, A Crisis Spills Over. . .," Life, LIX (December 10, 1965), p. 46A; and, "The Defiance of Sir Humphrey," <u>Time</u>, LXXXVI (November 26, 1965), p. 37.

There were a few incidents of destruction being done by the blacks--such as a few bombs being set off, and buses, schools, and a mail train being stoned--but, on the whole, none were effective.¹¹⁸

British Prime Minister Wilson faced many problems, externally and internally, over the Rhodesian question. The United Nations, in the Assembly of which the non-whites held a majority, was demanding the use of force in bring Rhodesia to its knees. Wilson appealed to them to give him a chance of ending the Smith regime by sanctions. Wilson did continue to place more and more sanctions on Rhodesia.¹¹⁹ Britain banned imports of asbestos--\$30 million export in 1964, copper, lithium, chrome, iron, steel and meat. That made the embargo 95 per cent complete. Wilson halted interest payments, dividends and pensions from Britain to Rhodesian residents--\$25 million in 1964. Britain also outlawed Rhodesian independence stamps as British postage.¹²⁰

Eventually, Wilson was forced to place an embargo on oil, which he had not wanted to do in fear of retaliation from Rhodesian sanctions on Zambia. The United States

118"In Defiance of Sir Humphrey," p. 37.

119_{Henry} Brandon, "The Future of Rhodesia," <u>Saturday</u> <u>Review</u>, XLVIII (December 25, 1965), p. 9.

120"Some Planes Arrive," <u>Time</u>, LXXXVI (December 10, 1965), p. 40.

promised to support Wilson; Smith immediatedly placed an embargo on the oil being sent to Zambia which had to go by rail from the coast, through Rhodesia and then on to Zambia. Most of the nations aided Britain on their oil sanctions but South Africa and Portugal did not.¹²¹ Portugal said it would not place embargoes on Rhodesia because: "This is obviously an internal affair between Britain and Rhodesia. If tankers arrive in Mozambique with oil for Rhodesia, Portuguese authorities will not interfere."¹²² Britain started the airlift of oil to Zambia with the United States and Canadian aid. The oil lift would not be an easy matter though, because Tanzania demanded that civilians, and not military, personnel be used.¹²³

Other problems faced by Wilson was the demand of President Kaunda of Zambia to send in troops in case Rhodesia should cut off the electrical power from the Kariba Dam--the main-cut off point was in Rhodesia. Britain hesitated to comply with this demand but Kaunda was being badgered by Egypt and Ghana to accept their troops--Kaunda did not want their aid. In order to keep other countries out

121 "And Now for Oil," <u>Time</u>, LXXXVI (December 22, 1965), p. 40. Also see, "Adding Fuel," <u>Newsweek</u>, LXVI (December 27, 1965), p. 41.

122"And Now for Oil," p. 40.

123"Of Oil and Scotch," <u>Time</u>, LXXXVI (December 31, 1965), p. 23.

of Zambia, Wilson sent a token force. A squadron of RAF fighters and a battalion of the Royal Scots were sent to Lusaka, Zambia. Kaunda accepted the fighters since Zambia only had ten airplanes of its own but rejected the troops unless they would go directly to the Kariba Dam. Wilson finally consented to let them be stationed at the Dam but later Kaunda pulled all of the troops away from the Dam in order to make sure that an unintentional act would not be the spark to ignite a war between the two countries. Ian Smith was glad that Britain sent a security force to Zambia because he believed this would alleviate the trouble and keep other African troops from interfering.¹²⁴

Wilson's internal problem was the fear of disunity between the Labor Government and the Conservative party. However, with Wilson's skillful manoeuvering, he was able to halt trouble. Laborite leftists, who had often been pacifists, were openly attacking Wilson for not sending in troops. The reason behind this attitude was that eventually, they said, troops would have to be sent in and it would be better to do so immediately rather than wait until events got out of their grasp. On the other hand, the Conservative Right "condemned the Prime Minister

^{124&}quot;In Rhodesia, A Crisis Spills Over. ...," p. 46A; "The Future of Rhodesia," p. 9; and, "Some Planes Arrive," p. 40.

for embarking on a crusade to which he had no right, for Britain possesses only the 'outdated legalistic right of suppressing rebellion. : "125

The Organization for African Unity was trying to pressure Wilson into dealing harshly with Rhodesia. At a 34-member meeting in December, 1965 they said that Wilson had until December 15 to crush the white regime. This did not compel Wilson to use force, so, on December 15 Tanzania led the move to break diplomatic relations with Britain. Soon, eight other nations followed but Ghana was the only Commonwealth member to cut off diplomatic relations. Wilson reacted gracefully by saying that Britain "would not automatically cut off aid to Commonwealth countries that fled the fold."¹²⁶

The first effects of the sanctions were showing by the end of November, 1965. In order to compensate for import duties that were lost, Rhodesia raised taxes on domestic beer, whisky, and tobacco.¹²⁷ Even as the oil embargo was hurting Zambia--they were taking all precautions to conserve it--Smith told the Rhodesians that there was no

125"The Future of Rhodesia," p. 9.

^{126&}quot;Adding Fuel," p. 34. Also see, "And Now for Oil," pp. 22, 27.

^{127&}quot;Money and the Flag," <u>Time</u>, LXXXVI (November 26, 1965), p. 97.

need to cancel their holiday trips in order to save fuel. Rhodesia had approximately a six month supply in reserve. The only thing rationed at this jolly time was Scotch whisky--Smith's austerity tax had increased the price to \$5.46.¹²⁸ The government rationing of gasoline and diesel fuel began on December 28, 1965. Gasoline ration for private cars in Rhodesia was three to five gallons a week, while in Zambia it was four gallons a month. A few weeks later, the rationing in Rhodesia was down to one gallon a week for small cars and two gallons a week for large cars.¹²⁹

Even though the sanctions threatened greatly to hurt the country by placing tobacco on the embargo list, Rhodesia went ahead and planted tobacco hoping to find new markets. Too, it was one way of keeping the confidence of the people in the government. Despite all the measures taken to undercut the Rhodesian pounds, its hard currency reserves actually increased by \$2,240,000 in late November. However, South African banks had temporarily stopped trading in Rhodesian pounds because of the uncertainty

^{128&}lt;sub>Ibid</sub>.; "The Defiance of Sir Humphrey," p. 37; and "Of Oil and Scotch," p. 23.

^{129&}quot;As U. S. and Britain Begin Oil Squeeze," U. S. <u>News & World Report</u>, LX (January 10, 1966), pp. 6, 62. "One Kind Word," <u>Newsweek</u>, LXVII (January 10, 1966), p. 29; and, "Some Questions for a Friend," <u>Time</u>, LXXXVII (January 21, 1966), p. 25.

of its keeping its value.130 Neither South Africa nor Portugal was supplying the immediate aid that Rhodesia had expected nor had they recognized the Smith regime. Both countries were afraid of British pressure and possible naval blockade of Southern Africa.

For many months it seemed that the question was-who will collapse first, Rhodesia or Zambia? Both needed each other and neither wanted to cut off commercial relations with each other. Rhodesia needed Zambia because it was its biggest export market. Zambia needed Rhodesia for transport and supply sources but Rhodesia feared that with United States and Great Britain's help, Zambia might find other means of transport and supply sources. Zambia's greatest danger lay in its loss of its copper production --4/5's of its tax revenue and 90 per cent of its exports. In order to maintain it, Zambia needed coal which it got at the Wankie Coal Mines in Rhodesia. Rhodesia raised the cost from \$8.40 a ton to \$22.40, but withdrew it shortly. With Zambia buying coal from other countries, including South Africa and Portugal, it cost five or six times more than at normal cost in Rhodesia.

^{130 &}quot;Money and the Flag," p. 97; and, "The Defiance of Sir Humphrey," p. 37.

Another serious problem would be getting the copper out of Zambia if Rhodesia cut off the rail links to the ports of Beira and Laurenço Marques, Mozambique--Rhodesia already had cut off oil supplies by rail. Nearly all of the copper export went through Rhodesia at a cost of \$38 a ton. Several alternate plans were thought of but all at a cost of over \$100,000,000--these plans were from air lifts to the improving of railroads, and highways through countries of Malawi, Tanzania, Mozambique and Angola. Even these alternate routes could take care of only enough tonage to keep Zambia's "head above the water." There was always the ever-present threat of the power cut-off at the Kariba Dam--only a minor portion of power could be gotten from the Congo.¹³¹

Perhaps Rhodesia would have collapsed had it not been for an oil leak through South Africa and Mozambique. At first, Rhodesia had received very little aid from these two African nations but in February, 1966 it was reported that a small portion of their required 120,000 gallons a day was being trucked in from South Africa and a smaller portion was being shipped in by rail from Mozambique. They were, at that time, receiving 35,000 to 40,000 gallons a day. Rhodesia had seized the trucks from British Petroleum

^{131 &}quot;End of the Road for Whites in Rhodesia?" U. S. News & World Report, LX (January 17, 1966), pp. 52-54.

and Shell subsidiaries in Rhodesia. These trucks were repainted gray and blue or yellow and black. White Rhodesians drove to secret points in South Africa, filled up and headed home, unloaded and then returned to South Africa. One driver reported that the drivers worked about 100 hours a week. South Africa furnished a few trucks to be used. In Mozambique, at the port of Beira, new oil storage tanks were being built beside the pipeline that runs into Rhodesia's largest refinery. Rhodesia's enemies knew that this oil shipment did not mean that Rhodesia's problems were over but it did mean that it would take much longer to cause the downfall of this "illegal" regime -- it still has not fallen, to the enemies' dismay.132

An amusing incident, for a reader but not for Rhodesia, occurred in early 1966. The writer would like to relate this story to the reader in order to show the secrecy involved behind the oil leak. This incident involved intrigue on the high seas in a very complicated affair in getting oil to Beira, Mozambique by "pirate tankers." Rhodesia and South African officials had gone to Greece to arrange for three tankers to make nine trips each to deliver 300,000 to 400,000 tons of oil--a year's

^{132 &}quot;The Great Oil Leak," <u>Newsweek</u>, LXVII (February 28, 1966), p. 46; and, "Disarray in Addis," Time, LXXXVII (March 11, 1966), p. 31.

supply. The deal was made with Vardinoyannis who was associated with two Greek trading companies--Seka, S. A. and Nima International. Oil for two of the ships was sold to Seka by the Continental Oil Company. The two ships, Manuela and Arietta Venizelos, were loaded at Bandar Mashur, Persia. The Manuela, with 14,000 tons of oil, was intercepted by the British off Mozambique to prevent it from reaching Beira--on April 9, 1966 the United Nations Security Council authorized the use of force, if necessary, to halt all oil from being secretly shipped to Rhodesia.

The intrigue involved with the Arietta Venizelos was like reading a "comic opera." A Greek shipping company, Venizelos, chartered the ship but grew worried about the deal, so the ship was sold to Varnikos, a Panamanian company. The company changed the ship's name to Ioanna V and routed it around Africa. There was a decree barring all Greek ships from delivering oil to Rhodesia, so the Greek government revoked the Ioanna's Greek registry. The ship was then re-registered as Panamanian, and flew a Panamanian flag. However, the Panamanian government also barred oil delivery to Rhodesia. The Ioanna's Panamanian registry Was revoked and the Ioanna did not deliver its cargo.¹³³

^{133&}quot;Masquerade at Sea Fails for Rhodesia," Business Week, April 16, 1966, pp. 41-42.

The Portuguese were afraid that Britain might land paratroopers at Beira in order to see that the Ioanna was not unloaded. The Smith government did not press the matter. As one man said condoningly: "It just didn't seem worth another international incident . . . and then, after all, if we'd taken the oil, we would have had to pay some enormous docking charges."¹³⁴

The third ship bought to deliver oil to Rhodesia was the Norwegian Bjortangen, renamed Nicos V--regrettably, no oil was delivered by this ship.

Since Rhodesia got a great deal of oil from South Africa, probably the main purpose behind this deal was to humiliate Britain, to prove that the United Nations could not enforce the oil embargo that they supported, and to boost Rhodesian morale. But, with the discovery of the deal and the force used to halt the shipments, it was more embarrassing and more of a set-back for Ian Smith.¹³⁵

Even the impact of Wilson's ban on tobacco did not hurt the Rhodesian tobacco farmers too much at the beginning. In April, 1966 an auction on tobacco was held as always. This time, though, it was shrouded in secrecy. Security guards were stationed at the main entrances, the other

135"Masquerade at Sea Fails for Rhodesia," pp. 41-42.

¹³⁴ John Davenport, "This Thing Has Done Us a Lot of Good," <u>Fortune</u>, LXXIV (November, 1966), p. 74.

being boarded over, and were carefully checking credentials. Only those that were buying tobacco could enter. Many of the buyers were representatives for "publicity-shy European buyers "-- any buyer was offered absolute secrecy. In order to sell the tobacco, Smith undercut the prices and offered a government subsidy so that the farmers would not lose too much and it would enable them to plant next year's crop. No one knew how well the sales went but observers believed it went fairly well since the hotels were filled with buyers from all over Western Europe and Asia. 136 Others estimated that only a quarter of it was sold.¹³⁷ Wilson assumed that the failure to sell Rhodesian tobacco would cause the collapse of the Rhodesian government since over a fourth of the Rhodesian export was from tobacco. However, it did not seem as though all nations were willing to go to other markets for their tobacco since they could buy it much cheaper in Rhodesia. Hence, the Smith government remained on its feet!

The clothing trade was hurt because of Rhodesia being unable to get imported cloth. Also, the auto dealers saw a sizeable decrease in sales of new and used cars even

^{136&}quot;The Tobacco Curtain," <u>Time</u>, LXXXVII (April 8, 1966), pp. 32-33; and, "Auction in Rhodesia," <u>Newsweek</u>, LXVII (April 11, 1966), pp. 52-53.

^{137&}quot;No-Progress Report," Newsweek, LXVIII (August 22, 1966), p. 69.

though the prices of used cars were reduced by \$50 on the average. Credit was also tight since the normal credit sources had been cut off in London. 138 Many factories closed down while quite a few were at nearly half production. The costs of essentials, while still available, were quite expensive--up to 20 per cent higher. Another drop in the market was property value--Pretoria, South Africa reported that 30,000 white Rhodesians had emigrated in the first ten months after U. D. I. and 32,000 had emigrated in the eighteen months prior to U. D. I.¹³⁹

Reports had been received from J. J. Wrathall, Minister of Finance, that in the first six months of 1966 imports ran to about \$112 million, a 32 per cent decline from 1965. The exports, other than tobacco, were off only 17 per cent compared to the previous year.¹⁴⁰

Another industry hurt, besides tobacco, was sugar. When Mr. Davenport, a member of Fortune's board of editors, visited Rhodesia after a year of "independence" he saw sugar refineries still in full operation but noticed a stock pile of it outside since most of it could not be sold.

140 Davenport, pp. 74, 79.

^{138 &}quot;Britain's Showdown in Africa: Where Sanctions Aren't Working," U. S. News & World Report, LX (April 18, 1966), p. 39.

¹³⁹Russell W. Howe, "The Commonwealth's Venture into Controversy," The New Republic, CLV (October 1, 1966), p. 9.

The land in the lowveld area near Mozambique had been used to raise sugar; now it was being used to raise winter wheat. This was not an easy job but as Mr. Davenport's guide determinedly stated: "The stuff may be a bit more expensive for us to grow than to import but if that is the way you want it, that is the way it is going to be."141

In May, 1966 three Rhodesians flew to London for talks with Wilson.

The discussions . . . were mainly on practical matters, such as an agenda for possible full-fledged negotiations and whether Rhodesia would be required to renounce its independence before any official conference could begin. Neither side was saying if any progress was being made.142

In late June and early July, 1966 talks were resumed in Rhodesia. The man given credit for getting these meetings underway was Dr. Hendrik Verwoerd, Prime Minister of South Africa. Dr. Verwoerd wanted to get these two nations in a discussion before the Security Council widened its powers to include South Africa in the embargoes. Dr. Verwoerd could force these two nations to talk because Britain and Rhodesia depended on South Africa in the financial field. These meetings were held between whites only.143 Though

141 Ibid., p. 80.

142"Mission to London," Time, LXXXVII (May 20, 1966), p. 46.

143_{N. M.} Shamuyarira, "The Salisbury Talks," The Nation, CCIII (July 4, 1966), pp. 5-6.

nothing constructive came out of the meetings, at least they got together and were not just going about their separate hostile paths. As Smith said: "The more one talks, the better one's chances of success."¹⁴⁴

Discussions were underway for the third time, since U. D. I. had been announced, in August, 1966. These discussions abruptly came to an end when Smith's Parliament published a bill giving even stricter control to the whites over the blacks. Wilson quickly recalled his negotiators. He had no choice with the September Commonwealth Conference only a few days away. Wilson had been under pressure from other Commonwealth countries to use force to put down Smith's regime. The demands had been louder particularly from Zambia--Kaunda threatened to withdraw from the Commonwealth if sterner measures were not used. So, if Wilson would have compromised with Rhodesia at that time it would have been disastrous. The headaches were not Smith's for he had the solid support of the white Rhodesians and had the black instigators under control as well as being able to survive the sanctions. The headaches were Wilson's for the Britishers were divided on the issue as well as having the blacks in Africa demanding pressures to be placed on South Africa for keeping Smith supplied with

^{144 &}quot;No-Progress Report," p. 69.

items which other countries refused to sell to him.145 These pressures included sanctions to be placed on South Africa. This, Britain could not afford to do. South Africa was Britain's most profitable market and was one of the largest overseas investments. To discontinue trade with South Africa would have destroyed the pound. Not only would sanctions have hurt Britain but the whole world. If sanctions were to be effective, gold would have to be placed on the list and then this would have caused disastrous effects on the currencies and commerce of other nations.¹⁴⁶

The Commonwealth Conference went badly for Wilson. Five African heads of states did not attend while President Nyerere of Tanzania did not even send a delegation. It appeared that the sole purpose of Prime Minister Margai of Sierra Leone was to deliver a two-hour tirade on Harold Wilson. Only four African Prime Ministers attended. Seventeen out of the twenty-two states attending wanted police action in Rhodesia -- Wilson would not agree. Wilson was able to prevent a walk out due to the economic advantages of the Commonwealth; however, the members were able

145"Off Again," <u>Newsweek</u>, LXVIII (September 5, 1966). p. 44.

146 Elspeth Huxley, "Seven Days' Humiliation," National Review, LVIII (October 4, 1966), p. 989.

to register the disgust and disagreement in the official conference communique.147

The most historic meeting between Smith and Wilson occurred aboard the <u>Tiger</u> in early December, 1966. Both parties flew to Gibraltar, boarded the <u>Tiger</u>, and sailed the Mediterranean off the Spanish coast. Both had been compelled to meet in order to seek some agreement. Britain, under pressure from the Commonwealth members, had promised to seek mandatory sanctions from the United Nations. These sanctions might ruin Rhodesia. However, in order to ruin Rhodesia co-operation would have to come from South Africa--it announced that "it would support Rhodesia to the hilt."¹⁴⁸

After two days, a document had been agreed upon that Smith had to submit to his cabinet. This agreement called for a new constitution that would give the franchise to more Africans and would eventually give them a majority in Parliament and apportioned seats so as no voting provisions could change them. Also, before the constitution Would be formerly adopted, a British Royal Commission

147"Something Burning," <u>Time</u>, LXXXVIII (September 16, 1966), p. 40. See also, "Yes, But How?" <u>Time</u>, LXXXVIII (September 23, 1966), p. 37; and, Russell W. Howe, "The Commonwealth's Venture into Controversy," p. 8.

^{148&}quot;A Dramatic Meeting," <u>Time</u>, LXXXVIII (December 9, 1966), p. 41. See also, "Riding the Tiger," <u>Newsweek</u>, LXVIII (December 12, 1966), pp. 54, 56; and, The [London] <u>Times</u>, December 3, 1966.

would canvass whites and blacks to see if it would be acceptable. This part of the document seemed agreeable to Smith but the next section proved to be the undoing of the whole document when Smith presented it to his cabinet a few hours after his meeting with Wilson: Wilson demanded that until independence arrived, Sir Humphrey Gibbs would actively resume his former role as governor. Ian Smith would continue as Prime Minister but the Rhodesian Parliament would be dissolved and the army and police would be responsible to Sir Humphrey. Smith was to have a new cabinet with half chosen from outside of his Rhodesian Front party and two members would be black. Also included in this four month interlude would be the release of political prisoners, censonship lifted, and normal political activity permitted. Needless to say, when Smith presented this to his cabinet on December 5, it was flatly turned down.

The main reason behind their refusal to accept the agreement was that Smith did not believe the new constitution would be accepted by the public since the public represented four million blacks as well as 225,000 whites. They were afraid that the four month's interim rule under Sir Humphrey would make the people unwilling to restore the

Due to Smith's moderate position taken aboard the Tiger many of his party felt that he "came perilously close to 'selling' Rhodesian independence for the sake of an agreement with Britain."¹⁵⁰ Others were angered because he would not show enthusiasm for the rightist desire of declaring Rhodesiana republic--this would sever all constitutional links with Britain. In order to show such opposition to Smith, Harry Moresby-White, a farmer, entered his name in the by-election against Smith in February, 1967.

Not only was Smith having problems with the right wing of his party, but also with the multiracialists, moderates, and businessmen. Since U. D. I. this group had been politically quiet, but with rejection of the Tiger document they began to speak out. Lord Malvern--former Prime Minister of the Central African Federation, Sir Godfrey Huggins--got 4,000 signatures on a petition requesting the renewal of discussions with Britain. Even South Africa was becoming disturbed over the possibility

^{149&}quot;Rhodesia: The Fight Goes On," <u>Newsweek</u>, LXVIII (December 19, 1966), p. 33; "Admission of Failure," <u>Time</u>, LXXXVIII (December 16, 1966), p. 36; and, John Hatch, "Rhodesia: Sanctions on Trial," <u>The Nation</u>, CCIV (February 6, 1967), pp. 166, 169. See also, The <u>London</u> <u>Times</u>, December 5 and 6, 1966.

^{150&}quot;The Deviationist," <u>Newsweek</u>, LXIX (February 6, 1967), p. 52.

of being drawn into a sanctions war with the other nations of the world.151

With Smith's decline of the document, Wilson had no other choice but to take his case before the United Nations requesting economic sanctions. These sanctions included tobacco, sugar, copper, iron ore, and other products that were of major importance to Rhodesia. Oil was not included in this list but Britain let it be known that it would not mind an amendment to this effect -- an amendment was made to add oil, motor vehicles, and aircraft. However, Britain did warn that it would not approve an oil embargo of South Africa.¹⁵² On December 16, 1966, the Security Council voted for mandatory sanctions against Rhodesia by a vote of eleven to zero--this was the first time any such action had ever been taken. Four members -- France, Russia, Mali, and Bulgaria--did not vote. South Africa and Portugal said that they would not honor the sanctions.153

The Security Council's action did cause changes in Rhodesia. The cost of living increased about 25 per cent

¹⁵¹ Ibid.

^{152&}quot;Rhodesia: The Fight Goes On," p. 41. See also, John Hatch, pp. 166, 169; and, "Southern Rhodesia and the United Nations: The U. S. Position," <u>Department of State</u> Bulletin, LVI (March 6, 1967), p. 374.

^{153 &}quot;Another Country for U. S. to 'Rescue'?" U. S. News & World Report, LXII (January 2, 1967), p. 28-29. See also, "Southern Rhodesia and the United Nations: The U. S. Position, " p. 373.

in six months, shop owners had to reduce on their imports of luxury items, there was a shortage on new and used cars and the Ford and British Motor Corporation auto plants closed down¹⁵⁴ due to the lack of assembly kits--German and Japanese vehicles replaced them. The Rhodesian oil refinery near Umtali also closed down. After the pipeline from Beira stopped pumping crude oil to the refinery, it had to ship the oil by rail from Mozambique or truck it in from South Africa. The Rover plant started turning out Japanese Isuzu trucks to replace British lories. The sugar industry was greatly damaged but the greatest industry hurt was tobacco. The 1967 tobacco auctions had only one customer, the government-financed Rhodesia Tobacco Corporation. This company purchased the tobacco at prices that would barely enable the farmers to meet the cost of raising it. In June, 1967, the Agriculture Minister, George Rudland, announced that the 1967 purchases would be cut by one third, far more than anyone had expected. He also said that about 600 of the 3,000 tobacco farmers would have to give up the growing of tobacco; and as many as 50,000 blacks would lose their jobs due to this reduction.

Though the sanctions hurt greatly in some districts, it aided in others. The farmers began to diversify their

¹⁵⁴ Smith reactivated these ". . . plants to produce new 1966 cars from a three-year-old supply of parts." "Final Break," <u>Time</u>, XCIII (June 27, 1969), p. 37.

crops so that they would no longer need to import soybeans and wheat. Also, the nations of South Africa, Angola, Mozambique and Malawi¹⁵⁵ were aiding in the export market and importing Rhodesian oil from South Africa and Mozambique. Since they were unable to spend their money abroad, private Rhodesian investors began to build new enterprises. Two hundred and forty new plants were built and old factories were enlarged and diversified. They started producing items such as plastics, tomato catsup, men's suits, paper clips, candy, hair tonic (called Zimba!) and, the most complicated, refrigerators. The refrigerators were assembled in a florescent sign factory in Salisbury.¹⁵⁶ However, as businessmen were pointing out, this was only "patchwork for economy," that had been developed; but the big companies depended on imports of steel products and other large items that the local efforts could not begin to supply. Many test

¹⁵⁵ Malawi was the only black African nation that openly refused to comply with the United Nations economic sanctions. President Banda said his nation depended on the earnings of Malawian workers in the mines and factories of South Africa and Rhodesia. In March, 1967, it was the first black African nation to sign a formal trade agreement with South Africa. "Heroes or Neros?" Time, LXXXIX (April 14, 1967), p. 46.

^{156 &}quot;An Inch or So of Pinch," Time, LXXXIX (April 14, 1967), p. 46; "Boycotted but Unbowed," <u>Newsweek</u>, LXIX (April 24, 1967), p. 49; "The Boycott Pinches," <u>Newsweek</u>, LXIX (June 26, 1967), p. 48; "While Salisbury Bustles," <u>Time</u>, LXXXIX (June 30, 1967), p. 68; "How Long Can Rhodesia Hold (States and States The Salisbury Point States and States Hold Out?" <u>Business Week</u>, July 22, 1967, pp. 46-52; and, "Success Story in Africa," <u>U. S. News & World Report</u>, LXIII (December 18, 1967), p. 74.

businessmen felt it was only a matter of months before they were in terrible trouble. Businessmen were forming into pressure groups in order to influence Smith. One group, the Forum, was trying to persuade Smith to renew talks with Britain.¹⁵⁷

The London Sunday Times did a series of articles entitled "The Sanctions Busters." These articles dealt with the many companies and the many countries that were purchasing articles from Rhodesia that had been placed on the embargo list. An example was the purchase of large quantities of chrome by Japan. When the British lodged the twenty-seventh complaint in six months, Japan said that the shipment bore South African certificates, therefore it must be from South Africa -- even though the British had stolen a sample and an analysis proved that it was Rhodesian chrome. The reason it bore South African certificates was that the British company of Turner and Newall realized that this embargo situation was coming up so it formed a South African subsidiary. Therefore, even though the shipment went by way of Mozambique, and not through South Africa at all, it still had a South African certificate. 158

157"How Long Can Rhodesia Hold Out?" p. 52. 158"The Sanctions Busters," <u>Time</u>, XC (September 8, 1967), p. 24.

In July, 1967 Harold Wilson sent Lord Alport, the 74 former High Commissioner to the Central African Federation, to Salisbury. No agreements on a settlement were reached.¹⁵⁹ Again, in November, 1967, shortly after the celebration of the second anniversary of U. D. I., Commonwealth Secretary George Thomson flew to Salisbury for discussions with Ian Smith. No progress was made, as one might assume, since Britain still insisted on their "six principles"160 before independence would be granted. However, many were wondering if each country was not beginning to want to compromise since each was hurting economically by the sanctions. Britain was losing about \$280 million a year and Rhodesia needed to attract foreign investments 🛸 in order to create the new jobs required to meet the needs of the unemployed blacks--not too many whites were

^{159&}quot;The 'Incredible' Envoy," <u>Newsweek</u>, LXX (July 3, 1967), p. 44. See also, The [London] <u>Times</u>, July 5, 7, and 10, 1967.

¹⁶⁰These principles are: 1) The principle and intention of unimpeded progress to majority rule, already enshrined in the 1961 constitution, would have to be maintained and guaranteed. 2) Guarantees against retrogressive amendment of the constitution. 3) Immediate improvement in the political status of the African population. 4) Progress toward ending racial discrimination. 5) The British Government would need to be satisfied that any basis proposed for independence was acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole. 6) The need to insure that, regardless of race, there is no oppression of majority by minority or of minority by majority. "Southern Rhodesia and the United Nations: The U. S. Position," p. 368.

affected due to unemployment caused by the economic sanctions.161

During November, 1967 legislation was passed by the Rhodesian Parliament giving local authorities permission to segregate such public facilities as parks, playgrounds, and swimming pools. The lone white opposition was voiced by M. P. Dr. Arhn Palley who declared: "This blows skyhigh the Rhodesian Front's claim that its policy is one of advancement by merit, irrespective of color or creed."¹⁶²

From October 9 to 13, 1968, the Mediterranean was the scene of another meeting between Wilson and Smith. This time the place was the H. M. S. <u>Fearless</u>--it was called "the last, last chance." The compelling reason for this meeting was the threat of permanently losing British market for Rhodesian tobacco if Rhodesia decided to declare itself a republic. Wilson had hoped by placing all the sanctions on Rhodesia, especially tobacco, that it would cause the downfall of Smith. This was not the case; in fact, it strengthened Smith's position in his own country by firmly uniting the whites behind him. Wilson's compelling reason Was also to restore trade because the economic sanctions had cost his government about \$500 million by October, 1968.

161 Peter Webb, "Champagne and Bigotry," Newsweek, LXX (November 20, 1967), p. 78. See also, The ELondonJ Times, November 9, 10, 11, 13, 1967.

162 Webb, "Champagne and Bigotry," p. 78.

Neither party was able to reach an agreement. How could they in the face of such odds? Smith would have had the whites in Rhodesia down on him if he had compromised--this was the case when the right wingers of his party thought that he nearly compromised on board the Tiger in December, 1966. Wilson could not compromise because he would have had the black African nations in the Commonwealth against him. The basic difference between these talks and the talks aboard the Tiger was that Britain did not insist that Rhodesia return to British dominion during a transitional term. One new project was that the British wanted educational levels of the Africans raised. The British would give up to \$12 million a year, matching Rhodesian grants, for this purpose.¹⁶³

After Smith returned to Rhodesia he said in his radio broadcast that

if Britain dropped a demand that Rhodesia accept the British Privy Council as the court of final appeal a settlement of the three-year-old Rhodesian independence issue might still be reached.¹⁶⁴

When Wilson returned home he was rebuked by a substantial segment of the Labor party for conceding too much to Ian Smith.

163"Last, Last Chance," <u>Time</u>, XCII (October 18, 1968), P. 32. See also, New York <u>Times</u>, October 10, 11, 14, 16, 1968. 1968; and The [London] Times, October 10, 11, 14, 1968.

164 New York Times, October 17, 1968.

The critics contended that the proposed protection of black African rights to be written into the constitution would not be worth anything in a government dominated

In the General Assembly of the United Nations a vote of ninety-two to two was taken on a resolution to refuse to recognize the independence of Rhodesia in any circumstances unless Rhodesia established majority-rule. Seventeen countries abstained --- United States and Britain being two-while Portugal and South Africa voted against the resolution.166

On November 7, 1968 the United Nations voted to adopt stronger sanctions against Rhodesia even if it included Portugal and South Africa. The vote was carried in the General Assembly by eighty-six to nine--the nine nations were Australia, Belgium, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, South Africa, Britain, and the United States.¹⁶⁷ Total mandatory sanctions have caused exporters to cut their prices to find markets and caused the costs of imported articles to rise.168

> 165_{New York Times}, October 23, 1968. 166_{New York Times}, October 26, 1968. 167_{New York Times}, November 7, 1968. 168_{New York Times}, January 24, 1969.

November 3 to 16, 1968 was the scene of further Rhodesian-British discussions. George Thomson, Commonwealth Affairs Secretary, flew to Rhodesia for several days of talks. While there, he spoke with Asian and colored representatives. The talks reached a deadlock and ended in failure. Smith said the only block to a settlement was British insistance on constitutional safeguards to protect the blacks. Mr. Thomson briefly left Rhodesia to visit Zambia and other East and Central African Commonwealth countries in order not to be present during the third anniversary celebration on November 11. The Sunday Mail poll showed that Rhodesians favored acceptance of Fearless proposals. Businessmen were urging settlement on the Fearless proposals; while Smith announced his plan to reach a settlement with Britain he was criticizing the businessmen's call for a settlement.¹⁶⁹

The United Nations, in a report on January 10, 1969, termed the sanctions on Rhodesia as ineffective because trade had remained quite substantial, especially with the aid of South Africa. However, as of March 5, 1969, Rhodesian import quota was cut back due to the shortage of foreign currency. Rhodesia did not attribute the shortage to the sanctions against her but to the 1968 drought and frost.

^{169&}lt;sub>The [London] <u>Times</u>, November 4, 5, 9, 15, 16, and 18, 1968; and, December 2, 13, and 14, 1968.</sub>

The cut was \$6.5 million. Quite a few items were removed as "essential imports" and locally manufactured items were substituted, 170

The latest figures available on export figures were released April 17, 1969. The year of 1968 was the toughest one since U. D. I. in 1965. However, the statistics showed that Rhodesia channelled about \$178 million of exports through the sanctions net and increased the gross national product by $5\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. These export figures are \$1 million less than in 1967 even though 12 per cent of the agricultural production was reduced due to frost and the reduced tobacco output. The figures showed a current deficit of about \$55 million but was almost offset by \$51 million in net capital flow.¹⁷¹

Rhodesian exports have declined by 40 per cent since the unilateral declaration of independence in 1965. Imports have dropped 18 per cent. The tobacco crop . . . has been worst hit. Crop yields are down 54 per cent.¹⁷²

Nevertheless, on June 24, Rhodesia did "win a round" when the United Nations Security Council rejected the Asian

170_{New York Times}, January 11 and March 6, 1969.

171 New York Times, April 18, 1969.

172"The Big Problems Facing Ian Smith," U. S. News & World Report, LXVII (July 7, 1969), p. 11.

and African demands for tighter economic sanctions and use of military force by Britain against the Smith regime.173

As far as black terror was concerned there were a few incidents of this. One case occurred on the night of May 16, 1966 when Johannes and Johanna Viljoen were murdered at their farm home. This was done by the ZANU movement---Zimbabwe African National Union. The ZANU officials in Lusaka, Zambia admitted responsibility in the Killings: "For every one of our sons and daughters killed by the settlers, we shall kill settlers with compound interest."¹⁷⁴

Another incident took place in August, 1967 when approximately forty African infiltrators were discovered by the Rhodesian security patrol on the Wankie Game Reserve. This group was made up of Rhodesian and South African blacks who had been trained in some Communist country and had come into Rhodesia from Zambia with Russian and Czechoslavakian automatic weapons. By the end of the ensuing conflict, the insurgent force was estimated at about 200--twenty-four had been killed and twenty-six had been captured. The government forces, of which thousands were drawn into the conflict, lost six men--three whites and three blacks. South Africa sent four Alouette helicopters and many Army

174"The Terror?" <u>Newsweek</u>, LXVII (May 30, 1966), p. 52.

¹⁷³ Ibid.

paracommandos. These insurgents were reportedly headed for South Africa. 175

To the dismay of many nations, Rhodesia executed three Rhodesian blacks on March 6, 1968. There was no question of their guilt but Queen Elizabeth II had pardoned them. James Dhlamini and Victor Mlambo had murdered a white farmer in an ambush and Duly Shadrack had axed a native chief to death. At first, Smith and his government hesitated to hang them but then the high court ruled that the Smith regime was a <u>de facto</u> government. This meant that they had the sole power of decision and Britain had no voice in the matter. More executions were ordered but all except a few were commuted to life sentences. Perhaps Smith believed that strong repercussions would be felt if he went too far with his hangings:¹⁷⁶

With the hanging of the blacks, the Security Council on May 29, 1968 extended mandatory economic sanctions from the selected list of December 16, 1966 to include all trade

^{175&}quot;Tranquil No More," <u>Newsweek</u>, LXX (September 11, 1967), p 45; and, Albert J. Meyers, "Leave Us Alone to Solve Our Own Affairs," <u>U. S. News & World Report</u>, LXIII (December 18, 1967), p. 77.

^{176 &}quot;The Hanging of Hopes," <u>Time</u>, XLI (March 15, 1968), p. 29; "Triple Hanging," Newsweek, LXXI (March 18, 1968), p. 62; and, "A Little Mercy," <u>Time</u>, XLI (March 22, 1968), p. 34.

with Rhodesia. The United States strongly supported this resolution.177

On November 6, 1968, five blacks got life terms for crossing the border of Rhodesia with arms. They were the first to be sentenced since the court had been given the power of discretion in commuting sentences. Always before, this was a mandatory death sentence.178 Throughout the following months there were many others to be tried and convicted on this charge.

In February, 1969 Reverend Sithole was on trial charged with the hiring of assassins in order to kill Smith. He denied that he had anything to do with this charge. On February 12 Sithole was found guilty and given six years! imprisonment at hard labor.¹⁷⁹ He had been held in a retention camp several years prior to his trial in order to make sure he could not incite trouble.

There are two reasons why there had been little racial turmoil, especially in the cities. First of all, "the Rhodesian blacks are a patient, peace-loving people, strongly conservative and accustomed over decades to accept

177"Security Council Bans All Trade With Southern Rhodesia," Department of State Bulletin, LVIII (June 24, 1968), p. 847. 178_{New York Times}, November 7, 1968. 179_{New York Times}, February 4 and 13, 1969.

the white man's custodianship."180 Secondly, Ian Smith had put all of the black leaders in retention camps or prisons thereby forcing the remaining few to work underground, weak and leaderless. There were large numbers of informers in the black communities that reported any black movement. 181

The eve of the third anniversary marked the hauling down of the British flag for the last time--the honor was given to a black army sergeant. The next day the new Rhodesian flag--green and white striped--was raised. The same six-man color guard that lowered the British flag was used to raise the Rhodesian flag--one white and one black from the army, air force, and police.182 or shortly

During the January, 1969 Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference, George Thomson refused to renew the pledge demanding majority rule before granting independence. Thomson said that Britain must have a free hand in order to negotiate a settlement with Smith. The Africans took a more moderate view than they had at their last conference in September, 1966. This time they called for strengthening

181 Ibid. 182_{New York Times}, November 11 and 12, 1969.

¹⁸⁰ John Worrall, "Our Independence is Real: Says Ian Smith," New York Times Magazine, October 27, 1968, p. 52.

the economic sanctions but not for military intervention by the British. 183

Probably the most exciting election and happening in Rhodesia since U. D. I. in 1965 was the election held on June 20, 1969. In this election the voters had to decide on two questions: should Rhodesia declare itself a republic and should it promulgate a new constitution? The republican provision was supported by an overwhelming majority--55,000 to 21,000--6,634 blacks could vote ive of in this election. The constitution was accepted by an the only slightly smaller margin. 184 and wore stricans. How

The new constitution was the result arrived at by the Constitutional Commission which was formed shortly after U. D. I. in 1965. This commission favored a unitary system of government. They also recommended complete ass racial equality in the Legislative Assembly. The benefits they hope to gain by such a move are:

complete racial parity will tend to remove suspicion among Rhodesians of anyone of the main races or ethnic groups that they may be permanently dominated by one or more of the other main races or ethnic groups; and complete racial parity will keep the representatives of different races together in the Parliament.¹⁸⁵

183 New York Times, January 10, 1969.

184 New York Times, June 21, 1969; "Final Break," Time, XCIII (June 27, 1969), p. 37; and, "Road to Apartheid," Newsweek, LXXIII (June 30, 1969), p. 59.

185 Svetozar Pejovich, "Rhodesia Tomorrow," Vital Speeches, XXXV (March 15, 1969), p. 339.

The constitution, although drawn up by the Commission, was thus not yet in effect -- it had to be ratifited by the Legislative Asembly. It provided for a Legislative Assembly of eighty seats, to be allocated by having forty seats representing the whites, and twenty seats representing the blacks, and twenty seats for representatives elected under a qualified common roll. This would assure the whites that they would have control of the government for many years to come but it would also make it clear that the objective of complete racial equality would be obtained as soon as the majority of voters on the common roll were Africans. How soon this would be, would be a question of how soon the blacks would meet the franchise qualifications. Let one

The franchise qualifications are the same for all Rhodesians over twenty years of age. They are: 1) citizenship; and 2) the annual income of not less than £900; or 3) property valued at no less than £3,000; or 4) the annual income of no less than £600 plus four years of secondary education; or 5) appointment to the office of tribal chief or headman; or 6) serving as a member of a religious order which practices a vow of poverty.¹⁸⁶

A Senate would be added with the power to review and delay the passage of legislative measures.

It will consist of six chiefs elected by the provincial assemblies of tribal chiefs, six African members chosen by tribal and urban electoral colleges, twelve Europeans chosen by an electoral college, and seven members appointed by Head of the state.187

186_{Ibid}. 187 Ibid.

The Head of the State would have to be elected by both houses of the legislature. "He would perform duties of a conventional nature, that is similar to those discharged by the sovereign of Great Britain. "188

The way was now clear for the Rhodesian Parliament to debate the constitution. However, there were other problems to be solved first. Elections were again set for May, 1970, so it probably would be a year before the new constitution will go into effect. 189

In London, there were still hopes that Rhodesia would solve its troubles with Britain and return to its former status. Mr. Smith did not believe that this would happen. "I don't believe there is an earthly hope of talks. but one cannot stop people indulging in wishful thinking."190

188_{Ibid}.

¹⁸⁹New York Times, June 21, 1969. 190"The Big Problems Facing Ian Smith," p. 11.

CHAPTER V

THE UNFORESEEABLE FUTURE

Rhodesia was legally a British colony but had never been ruled by a British Government. Only external affairs and a veto on discriminatory legislation remained in the hands of the British Parliament. London appointed a governor with formal executive functions, but had no real authority in internal affairs.

Britain, for years, had been trying to get rid of colonies, as was shown by Malawi, because many were costing more to maintain than what Britain was receiving in return. Rhodesia, being Britain's last African colony, has not been as fortunate in breaking the ties that bind her to the United Kingdom. Wilson, unable to bring the situation to a peaceful end and receiving much criticism at home on being unable to end the Smith regime, has taken it to the United Nations. This way, the responsibility has been transferred from his shoulders to the United Nations and now, he can act as an agent.

Many have asked the question: Why is the United Nations taking action against a country which is at peace--while taking no such action against nations that Wage aggressive war? Rhodesia has not attacked any

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country nor has she talked of attacking one. Rhodesia, though, has been the one which has been aggressed upon. Raids by black Africans from Rhodesia, as well as other countries, have been made from such countries as Zambia, with the aid and blessings from Tanzania, China, Russia, Egypt, Ghana, and many other black radical and/or communist countries.

Rhodesia is not the country that has been printing articles or making radio broadcasts encouraging people to launch an attack and overthrow the existing government. Zambia, in a radio broadcast, has been reported as having encouraged: "They (i.e. the Rhodesian whites) are lice; destroy them; you know how."191

Whatever the white Rhodesians have done has been done entirely within their own country and contains no element of aggression upon any other country. As Dean Acheson, former Secretary of State under President Truman, pointed out: "The United Nations Charter provides unequivocally that the United Nations shall not intervene within the internal jurisdiction of any state.192 However, to be fair to the other side, one

192 "Another Country for U. S. to 'Rescue'?" p. 28.

¹⁹¹ Svetozar Pejovich (p. 339) quoted this from A. Williams, "Rhodesia--Land of the Fearful," <u>Houston</u> Post, April 6, 1966.

⁸⁹ must point out that the United Nations has recognized Rhodesia as coming under the provisions in Chapter XI of the charter--as a non-self-governing country. There is a counter-argument to this that says that Great Britain persistently denied this assumption, the United States consistently supported this denial, and that Great Britain continually lacked access to data for making relevant reports to the United Nations on Rhodesia. Also, even with Britain's right to veto any discriminatory legislation directed at the blacks, Britain did not use thisveto power over such legislation in the Rhodesian constitution of 1961.¹⁹³ So, though they had the right theoretically to interfere, factually they did not have this right.

The Security Council declared that Rhodesia was a threat to peace--whose peace? Rhodesia was not going to attack its neighbors, and Rhodesia's neighbors were certainly not militarily able to attack Rhodesia. If anyone attacked Rhodesia, it would be solely because of foreign aid to Rhodesia's neighbors.

The United Nations is against the Smith government because it is in the hands of the minority. However, when one looks at the make-up of the members of the United

^{193&}lt;sub>Charles B. Marshall, <u>Crisis Over Rhodesia</u> (Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1967), p. 69.</sub>

Nations, one sees that at least thirty-seven members have governments based upon minority rule and twenty-five are open to suspicion. Less than half of the members have governments based solely upon majority rule.194 Too, when one examines the history of turmoil within African countries, one will discover that Rhodesia, though ruled by a minority, is at least peaceful. In 1965 and 1966, Africa saw eight presidents and two prime ministers deposed and these African nations had many riots. 195 Not only in 1965 and 1966 has violence taken place in the majority-black--ruled countries but it has been happening throughout the nearly four years of peaceful rule by Smith. Even recently, two murders have occurred to two outstanding black African leaders.

At least the whites and blacks in Rhodesia can belong to any or even form a new political party. One must point out, nevertheless, that certain black political parties have been banned due to the threat of violently overthrowing the present government. There is no certainty that Ian Smith's Rhodesian Front party will be the leading white ruling party. He could easily be defeated by perhaps the Rhodesian National Party which is composed of

194 "Another Country for U. S. to 'Rescue'?" p. 29. 195 "Confident Rhodesians," The New Republic, CLV (September 17, 1966), pp. 15-16.

extreme rightists who believe that Smith is too moderate. This party is committed to no ties with Britain and have branded Smith as "a screaming, long haired liberal. "196 Fortunately, for all of Rhodesia, most of the whites do not feel this way about Smith, though they do believe in white domination especially since the stepped-up raids to Rhodesia by guerrillas trained in Tanzania and Algeria.197 Smith has had to fight all the way against this radical element so that apartheid would not be written into the new constitution. 198 One would see that if Smith were dislodged his place

would not be taken by a happy band of multiracial liberals singing hippie songs but by a definitely un-liberal gang who would deprive Africans of many rights and privileges they enjoy at present, and turn Rhodesia's feet towards, not away from, and apartheid. 199

One cannot say that all the members of the United Nations have a choice of political parties within their own countries, as does Rhodesia -- there are dictatorships in Russia, Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Ghana, Ethiopia, Egypt, Portugal, Indonesia, and many other countries.

196 "Days of Wine and Salmon," <u>Newsweek</u>, LXXII (July 1, 1968), p. 53.

197 Ibid.

198"Smith vs. the 'Hairies,'" Newsweek, LXXII (July 29, 1968), p. 40.

199 Elspeth Huxley, "The Emperor Wilson," National Review, XX (November 5, 1968), p. 1110.

The United Nations has placed economic sanctions upon Rhodesia in order to topple the Smith government. This, it has not done but it has succeeded in hurting greatly the very people who they are "trying" to protect by causing widespread unemployment among the blacks. As Elspeth Huxley wrote:

It is a fine objective . . . for the UN to set itself -- to bring economic ruin to a country inhabited by, as is so often pointed out, a handful of whites and nearly five million Africans. Out, if it succeeded, would go the big black baby with the few pints of white bathwater. Sanctions will not succeed in their objective, but they will succeed in making everything more difficult for everyone except the Chinese Communist, whose path of infiltration via the Tanzan railroad and other routes will be considerably smoothed.

Miss Huxley was blaming Wilson in his role of negotiator with Smith by saying that he had gone into atlan negotiations as a dictator and not as a negotiator. She believed that better surroundings, such as a conference se round table on dry land, should be found rather than having the negotiations on board a battleship. 201 Of the second course, now it is not even likely that a meeting will take place.

Many critics of the United States' position in backing Britain cannot understand why this country is doing so. As these critics ask: "Why should the United States

> 200 Ibid. 201 Ibid.

help Great Britain regain control over a colony which has declared its independence just as the United States declared its independence from Britain 190 years ago?"202 Representative Gross, Republican from Iowa, says that United States participation in the boycott is violating the United States Constitution because Congress, and not the President, has the right to regulate foreign commerce. People are asking why the United States boycotts friendly Rhodesia when many of their allies are still trading with North Vietnam?

The United States criticized Rhodesia for not setter declaring all people equal and for not giving all of the blacks the franchise. Did the United States give even all of the whites the franchise after their own Declaration of Independence?

At the onset of American independence the franchise was limited to a small portion of American adult white males, qualified on a basis of property and income. The Declaration did not enfranchise females or any non-whites whatever, elevate any Indians, or emancipate a single slave.

The first president in American history to be elected by the common man was Andrew Jackson in 1828. The Negro did not receive the franchise until after the Civil War when the Fifteenth Amendment was made part of the

> 202 "Another Country for U. S. to 'Rescue'?" p. 28. 203_{Marshall}, p. 64.

94 constitution in 1870, and even the "fairer sex" was unable to vote until the Nineteenth Amendment in 1920. Though illegal, there are still segregated schools and Negroes, in a few states, still have to meet certain voting requirements. However, it is not the writer's intent to debate the moral issue but simply to try and point out that the United States does not have any right to take a "holier than thou" stand--"those who live in glass houses should not throw stones."

Finally, the writer would like to emphasize that, though minority-ruled, the blacks in Rhodesia have a better way of life and higher standards of living in nearly all areas, than the blacks in their neighboring countries-with the exception of the Union of South Africa. The blacks have a higher literacy rate and more are in school than in any other African nation below the Sahara Desert. From 1947 to 1966 the number of black government-operated primary schools increased from six to seventy-seven while the secondary schools increased from one to seventeen. Expenditure on education in 1966 was 18.5 per cent of the budget, while in Zambia it was only 14.3 per cent.²⁰⁴

Rhodesia has more daily newspapers and more overall circulation--4 and 63,000 respectively--except the

²⁰⁴ Pejovich, p. 340.

Democratic Republic of the Congo which is six times larger in area and nearly four times larger in population than Rhodesia. As one would expect, with the development of the Kariba Dam, Rhodesia produces more KWH in electricity with the Democratic Republic of the Congo following and then, sharing the Kariba Dam, Zambia.²⁰⁵

From several articles that this writer has read, it seems to indicate that it is not 237,000 whites against 4,410,000 blacks but 237,000 whites against the blacks that are living in the cities and in the more populated, civilized areas -- the minority, not the majority, of blacks. The tribal chiefs give more support to Smith in his stand against the British government than they do to the black African nationalists. True, these chiefs are illiterate, primitive, and paid by the government, but the fact remains, they do not support black nationalism. This was proven when the 622 tribal chiefs and headmen supported Smith's proposal for U. D. I. in the November 5, 1964 election and again in February, 1965 when Wilson sent Arthur Bottomley, Commonwealth Relations Secretary, to Rhodesia. When Bottomley visited 600 chiefs and headmen at Domboshawa, they indicated their displeasure with Britain for dealing with "black

205L. Gray Cowan, <u>The Dilemmas of African</u> <u>Independence</u> (New York: Walker and Company, 1968), pp. 109-135. 96 nationalist politicians instead of 'the true leaders of the people, the chiefs.'²⁰⁶ Another chief said that Britain had interfered too long and that "We want our independence now--tonight, at 5 o'clock."²⁰⁷ Another amusing incident was when Batonka Chief Binga, at an elephant barbecue, said of the black nationalists, "you cannot change a brown cow into a white cow."²⁰⁸

The nations of the world should let the Rhodesians alone and let them work out their own problems. After all, a nation is not built in a day or even a few years-it takes many years and still perfection--if there is such a word when applied to a government--cannot be reached. Rhodesia, like the United States, would have to have the eventual goal of racial equality.

It can be argued that the proposed Constitution and the goal of eventual racial parity is merely a screen of smoke behind which the white minority in Rhodesia is trying to conceal its intention of permanent domination. If this were the case the ruling elite in Rhodesia would pay, sooner or later, for its shortsightedness. Thus, to accept this argument one would have to assume that white Rhodesians are an utterly unrealistic bunch of people.

206 "Independence at 5 o'clock?" <u>Time</u>, LXXXV (March 12, 1965), p. 26. 207<u>Ibid</u>. 208<u>Ibid</u>.

²⁰⁹Pejovich, p. 340.

The argument for a one man-one vote principle may be the desired and the idealistic way to rule a country, but it is rather an unrealistic principle in the light of the fact that many of the black Rhodesians--mainly the 2.5 million rural blacks--are not interested in politics or who rules them as long as they retain the privileges now given to them. Many do not understand the principles and concepts of this Western development. The type of "democracy" that is found in the United States is not necessarily the right type of government for all people. The United States was founded because people were escaping from oppressive governments; therefore, they were eager to have certain freedoms and rights in their new government. The development of the United States government has been unique. The people had been educated to take a responsible part, no matter how small, in the government. It is not this easy for the African nations -- to have the shackles removed and told, "now you are free, go and rule." It takes time; time that evidently the world is not willing to give to Rhodesia.

The way in which the world is proving that it is not willing to give this preciously needed time to Rhodesia is by the sanctions that has been placed upon her. Pejovich stated that the most likely reason for the sanctions is because

American and British politicans [sic] tend to think in terms of the aspirations of African politicians. They are not directly concerned with the welfare of the African masses who, unlike their leaders, are not possible future voters at the United Nations; and sometimes the Western politicians seem to think that it is expedient to retain the friendship of moderate leaders in African territories; while even the moderate leaders find it desirable to appease the racial emotions and resentments of the black people. If they did not, they could not survive, it is felt, against more extreme rivals, who feel that they cannot afford the entrenchment of a non-racial political equality, a reasonably achievable franchise available on equal terms for every literate and responsible Rhodesian whatever his color. 210

The question that is foremost in the minds of the world is: What will be the future of Rhodesia? This writer contends that their present government could succeed and that Rhodesia could be an outstanding example of racial equality in Africa. They could live harmoniously together if the outside world would let them alone.

It is not logical to conclude that the blacks would always remain on the lower echelon of the scale. After all, if the blacks were to be continually denied privileges, what chance would the 237,000 whites stand against the 4,410,000 blacks?

The blacks, first of all, must be trained to take responsibility in the Rhodesian government. At this time there are only a comparatively few qualified to do so.

²¹⁰ Pejovich (p. 340) quoted this from W. Hutt, Wi "The Rhodesian Columny," <u>New Individualist Review</u>, Winter 1968, p. 5.

If the government were to fall into the hands of the blacks at this time, one would undoubtedly see much turmoil between the black political parties. The main reason that the blacks have not achieved more privileges is that the two most popular parties--the outlawed Zimbabwe African People's Union and Zimbabwe African Nationalist Union--are continually at odds with each other.

The blacks must work together to achieve their goal of majority-rule. At the same time, though, they must not push out the whites. The whites and blacks must learn to govern together for the good of all Rhodesians. If the blacks do gain control, they will need the whites for the financial security that they represent. Rhodesia has become a wealthy nation--or was before the sanctions were placed against them--only because of the whites that have gone and invested in Rhodesia.

Pejovich said of Rhodesia's future:

It will depend on the extent of true determination of its rulers to carry out the experiment of complete racial parity, as well as on the willingness of other governments to let them do it.²¹¹

²¹¹ Pejovich, p. 341.

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APPENDIX A.

POPULATION STATISTICS OF THE FEDERATION

COUNTRY-AREA (sq. miles) YEAR WHITES NYASALAND - 37,000 1953 2,250,000 4,000 NORTHERN RHODESIA - 290,000 SOUTHERN RHODESIA - 150,000 1,500,000 40,000 140,000 2,580,000 6,700 2,110,000 66,000 2,290,000 178,000 NYASALAND 1958 NORTHERN RHODESIA SOUTHERN RHODESTA 2,870,000 8,600 2,110,000 73,000 2,300,000 193,000 NYASALAND 1959 NORTHERN RHODESIA SOUTHERN RHODESTA 2,870,000 8,600 2,400,000 74,000 2,900,000 221,000 1961 NYASALAND NORHTERN RHODESIA SOUTHERN RHODESIA 237,000 4.410.000 1968 RHODESIA (SOUTHERN) 1953 statistics - "African Federation," The Atlantic Monthly, CXCI (April, 1953), p. 21. 1958 statistics - Keith Irvine, "Perspective on Central Africa," <u>Current History</u>, XXXIV (June, 1958), p. 328. 1959 statistics - "Africa--The Black and the White," Newsweek, LIII (March 9, 1959), p. 42. 1961 statistics - Keith Irvine, "The Dissolving Federation," Current History, XLIII (December, 1962), p. 341.

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APPENDIX B.

OUTLINE OF OFFICES HELD

PRIME MINISTERS OF THE FEDERATION: Inters that the writer

- I. Sir Godfrey Huggins 1953-1956 (resigned)
- II. Sir Roy Welensky 1956-1963 (end of the Federation) ith the latters that

PRIME MINISTERS OF SOUTHERN RHODESIA:

- I. Sir Godfrey Huggins 1933-1953 (resigned to become PM of the Federation)
- II. Garfield Todd 1953-1957
 (forced out by political pressure)
- III. Sir Edgar Whitehead 1957-1962
 (was defeated in the December, 1962 election)
 - IV. Winston Field 1962-1964 (resigned on April 13, 1964)
 - V. Ian Smith April 14, 1964 -

APPENDIX C.

CORRESPONDENCES

The following pages are the letters that the writer mote to various men in order to receive information in connection with her thesis. Also included are the responses that the writer received in connection with the letters that

she wrote.

436 Oriole Circle Clarksville, Tennessee 37040 United States of America February 14, 1969

The Right Honorable Ian Smith Prime Minister of Rhodesia Salisbury, Rhodesia

Sir:

I am a student at the Austin Peay State University located in Clarksville, Tennessee, U.S.A. In August I am to receive my master's degree in history. I yet have my thesis to write. The topic I have chosen is "The Independence Movement in Rhodesia." In my thesis I plan to defend your government's position in this movement. Do [sic] to its being a relatively recent subject, there has not been a great deal of material made available--at least, not at our university.

The purpose of this letter is to inquire as to the availability of any material that has been printed with your own views presented. I shall be very grateful if you would send me any information that you feel would help me to present an accurate view of your policies dealing with the independence movement.

In closing, may I add, that I have written a letter to my Congressmen, representing Tennessee in the United States Senate and the House of Representatives, telling them of my desire to resume trade relations with Rhodesia. I believe our present stand is rather hypocritical. I believe President Nixon has stated that this is one topic he wishes to discuss with the British on his up-coming visit to Europe. It is my sincere desire that a progressive step will be taken to resume trade relations with Rhodesia.

Thank you very much for your time and any consideration that you may give to the above subject.

Respectfully yours,

Mrs. Linda Hampton

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PRINCIPAL PRIVATE SECRETARY TO THE PRIME MINISTER, SALISBURY.

26th February, 1969.

Mrs. L. Hampton, 436 Oriole Circle, Clarksville, Tennessee 37040, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

Dear Mrs. Hampton,

The Prime Minister has asked me to thank you for your letter of the 14th February, and to tell you that he has passed your request for information on Rhodesia to the Department of Information for their attention. You should be hearing from them shortly.

He appreciates your support and sends you his best wishes.

Yours sincerely,

A. Atallwood

R. Stallwood

(The writer received this reply on May 12, 1969)

436 Oriole Circle Clarksvill, Tennessee 37040

Ambassador of the Union of South Africa United Nations New York, New York

Dear Sir:

I am a student at the Austin Peay State University located in Clarksville, Tennessee. In August I am to receive my master's degree in history. I yet have my thesis to write. The topic I have chosen is "The Independence Movement in Rhodesia." In my thesis I plan to defend Ian Smith's position in this movement. Do to it being a relatively recent subject, there has not been a great deal of material made available -- at least, not at our university.

The purpose of this letter is to inquire as to the availability of any material that has been printed with Prime Minister Smith's own views presented. I wrote to Prime Minister Smith in February but I have not received a reply. I thought that perhaps my letter had not reached Rhodesia. Since your country is aiding Rhodesia I would appreciate any information that you could obtain for me or tell me how to go about receiving the above information.

Thank you very much for your time and any consideration that you may give to the above subject.

Respectfully yours, Linda Hampton

Mrs. Linda Hampton



PERMANENT SOUTH AFRICAN MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS 17TH FLOOR - 300 EAST 4210 STREET NEW YORK, N.Y. 10017

Ref.: 9/1/5

9th May 1969

Dear Madam,

With reference to your letter of 5th May, I would suggest that you write to the Rhodesian Information Office, 2852 McGill Terrace N.W., Washington D.C.20008.

Yours faithfully,

D.G. omterinchen

Minister

Mrs Linda Hampton 436 Oriole Circle Clarksville, Tennessee 37040

(The writer received this reply on May 12, 1969.)