

**AN ORDEAL BY FIRE: A HISTORY OF THE
FOURTEENTH TENNESSEE VOLUNTEER INFANTRY
REGIMENT**

1862-1865

CHARLES WALLACE CROSS

AN ORDEAL BY FIRE:
A HISTORY OF THE FOURTEENTH TENNESSEE
VOLUNTEER INFANTRY REGIMENT

A Thesis
Presented to
the Graduate Council of
Austin Peay State University


In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of History

by
Charles Wallace Cross


August 1975

To the Graduate Council:

I am submitting herewith a Thesis written by Charles Wallace Cross entitled "An Ordeal by Fire: A History of the Fourteenth Tennessee Volunteer Infantry Regiment." I recommend that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts, with a major in History.



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We have read this thesis and
recommend its acceptance:


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AN ORDEAL BY FIRE:
A HISTORY OF THE FOURTEENTH TENNESSEE
VOLUNTEER INFANTRY REGIMENT

An Abstract
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ABSTRACT

This is a historical narrative of the Fourteenth Tennessee Volunteer Infantry Regiment which was formed in May 1861 after the first call of Governor Isham G. Harris for volunteers for the Confederate Army. This regiment consisted of companies from the city of Clarksville, Montgomery County, Stewart County and Robinson County.

From Clarksville the regiment was moved into West Virginia and was commanded by both Robert E. Lee and Thomas J. (Stonewall) Jackson in the Cheat Mountain, Bath and Romney Campaigns. The regiment then was ordered to Richmond, Virginia, where it took part in the Battle of Seven Pines. Thereafter it was incorporated into what was to become the famous Army of Northern Virginia. It was put under the command of General J. J. Archer, along with the Seventh and First Tennessee Regiments, the Nineteenth Alabama Regiment, and the Fifth Alabama Battalion. This brigade became known as Archer's Tennessee Brigade.

The Brigade was with Lee through the entire war and the remnants of it lay down their arms with him at Appomatox. It had the place of honor in Pickett's famous infantry charge on the third day of Gettysburg. It was one of the first regiments to reach the stone wall on Cemetery Ridge. Its battle flag was captured inside the works. This regiment was in thirty-three major battles and twice as many minor skirmishes.

This narrative ends after the Battle of Gettysburg because of the lack of written records.

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A PRAYER AND A TRIBUTE

by Evalyn Castleberry Cook

Give us their courage to stand alone,
Facing majorities massed to fight;
Give us their candor to ever own
Faiths and convictions we hold are right.

Give us their honor to meet our foes,
Dealing as fairly with them as friends;
Give us their loyalty, such as knows
Pledged allegiance never ends.

Give us their chivalry, born again;
Give their forgiveness, whole and free;
Give us their truth toward the world of men,
Give us their reverence, Lord, for thee;

Give us their power to rebegin,
Building our future upon their past;
Give us their valor to lose or win,
Prayerfully, proudly, unchanged at last;

Give us nobility great as theirs,
Hearts of Confederate tempered worth;
Give us the heritage due their heirs,
Scions forever of Southern birth.¹

¹Evalyn Castleberry Cook, "A Prayer and a Tribute," The Confederate Veteran, Vol. 28, No. 12 (December 1921), p. 465.

DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to the four men whom I feel have had the greatest influence on my life. To my father, Charles W. Cross, Sr., who is the best friend I ever had. He has stood by me in my darkest hours. I am also indebted to Mr. Marion Sadler, who gave me the idea for this thesis topic and who is one of the most versatile and intelligent human beings I have ever known. To Mr. John H. Bailey, whose kindness, patience and understanding have no limits, I am grateful, as I am to Charles M. Barrett, who has been a dear friend. We have spent many enjoyable hours in conversation together.

FOREWORD

To the historian, the past is forever. It continually reaches forward and touches our space in time. History is not just a study of the past; it is how we in our time view the past. There are many different facets to history--social and intellectual, economic, political and military--and all of these are important. It is up to the historian, however, to place the emphasis where he thinks it should be. What interests me the most is how men react to and handle the tumultuous upheavals that occur in their lives. Whether they be mental, spiritual or physical, violent forces in the past seem to have a strangely magnetic pull on the present.

When I told a contemporary of mine that Montgomery County probably furnished the Confederacy with more soldiers than any other county in the South, he made the remark that they must have been insane, and that under no circumstances would he have participated in the Civil War, or in any war for that matter. This attitude is perhaps indicative of the way many Americans feel today. Maybe this is the right attitude. I, myself, share this distaste for war. The question I ask is, is this attitude or frame of mind a modern-day cop-out? Do we lack the innate quality of conviction to make a stand for what we believe is right? Or is conviction something that has failed to touch us out of the past? In my opinion, life is not worth living if longevity is our only goal.

The men of the Fourteenth Tennessee Infantry Regiment, who are the topic of this thesis, exemplify these qualities of courage and conviction. A way of life was more important to them than life itself. Whether they were right or wrong is not important here. What is important is that they had the courage to make a stand for what they believed was right. What is even more important is the manner in which they faced and dealt with the traumatic events that shaped their lives. Whether they were villains or heroes, sane or insane, is left up to the reader. This is their story.

CHAPTER I

CALLING UP A REGIMENT

In no county in Tennessee in the early days of 1861 was the war spirit higher than in the border county of Montgomery. Married men and single, old men and boys hastened to enlist after the fall of Sumter and offered their services to the governor. The number of volunteers, more than two thousand, exceeded the entire white population subject to military duty. It is doubtful if this can be said of any other county in the state or in the South.¹

Clarksville, Tennessee enjoyed prosperity as a southern river town until 1861. The turnpikes and the rivers provided transportation for iron products, tobacco, and for products of lumber, grain and woolen mills on the Red River. Pork products from numerous slaughter houses found a ready market in New Orleans. The agrarian economy flourished in the lush valleys and fertile soil of Middle Tennessee.

This was a typical, close-knit Southern community. There was a blend of Southern and Midwestern influences, with a remnant of frontier feeling. Social activities involved the entire community in picnics, fairs, and church events. Horse-racing and breeding produced a large number of talented equestrians. Many of these would find their way into the Confederate cavalry.

¹ Judge C.W. Tyler, "Patriotism in a Tennessee County," The Confederate Veteran, Vol. 6, No. 3 (March 1898), p. 125.

Gallantry was a key word of the era. A code of chivalry produced enthusiasm for any good cause. Patriotic feeling found many forms of expression including parades, bands, and the turning out of local militia.

A hidden threat to this river town's prosperity at the confluence of the Red and Cumberland Rivers was the gathering cloud of civil strife. Neither this community nor the nation had any realistic concept of war. North and South came to the battlefield instead of the conference table to settle their disagreements in April 1861. On May 17, 1861, Tennessee Governor Isham G. Harris issued the first call for volunteers. The Montgomery Countians responded enthusiastically, as many companies formed under community leaders.

Eleven of the companies from the area formed the Fourteenth Tennessee Volunteer Infantry Regiment. They were: Company A, Clarksville--W.A. Forbes, Captain; Company B, Montgomery County--M.G. Gholson, Captain; Company C, Robertson County--Wash Lowe, Captain; Company D, Stewart County--H.C. Buckner, Captain; Company E, Stewart County--Clay Roberts, Captain; Company F, Stewart County--W.E. Lowe, Captain; Company G, Montgomery County--Isaac Brunson, Captain; Company H, Clarksville, Tennessee--F.S. Beaumont, Captain; Company I, Robertson County--W.P. Simmons, Captain; Company K, Montgomery County--J.E. Lockert, Captain; Company L, Montgomery County--E. Hewitt, Captain.²

There were about one thousand men in the eleven companies who went to the Clarksville area fairgrounds, which became "Camp Duncan."

²Tyler, p. 125.

The organization was completed with the selection of the following field and staff officers: W.A. Forbes, Colonel; M.G. Gholson, Lieutenant Colonel; N. Brandon, Major; W.W. Thompson, Adjutant; Dr. J.R. Johnson, Surgeon; Dr. John Martin, Assistant Surgeon; Major John Gorham, Quartermaster; Captain Frank Green, Commissary; R.J. Goosetree, Assistant Commissary; Dr. J.M. Pirtle, Chaplain.³

The one abundant resource the South had was spirit. We who live in another space in time cannot realize what secession meant to these men. It meant the preservation of a way of life, and even more, it meant freedom from what they considered to be tyranny in a union which they feared would destroy what was sacred to them. This feeling is exemplified in the presentation of a Confederate flag by a Miss E. Poor to Captain Hewitt's Company L, Fourteenth Tennessee Regiment at Camp Duncan. The rhetoric and ritual of the flag ceremony came from the patriotic fervor of the community and was an expression of the enthusiasm of the regiment.

Everything has been done, consistent with honor, to avert this great calamity, which tends to destruction, and depriving us of friends near and dear to us. But all compromises have been rejected. We will now sail under the banner of a Southern Confederacy--and as long as your arm has strength to uphold this banner, let it float triumphantly wherever it is unfurled, and as you see it wave, may it stimulate you on the field of battle and urge you on to action.⁴

³Tyler, p. 125.

⁴Author unidentified, "Presentation of a Flag," from a newspaper article in a Civil War notebook, written May 16, 1861. It was copied with the permission of the owner, Mrs. Mildred Glenn of Clarksville, Tennessee.

The regiment remained at Camp Duncan for about two weeks, then moved about ten miles farther out on the L & N Railroad in search of a better supply of water. At a point known as Camp Quarles, near Hampton's Springs (now Hampton's Station),⁵ they remained several weeks in training until the regiment was ordered to Nashville. At Camp Quarles the unit received its arms, which were only old muskets which had been changed from flint to percussion locks. They were the only weapons to be had and the men received them without complaint.⁶ The men were given good, tough training by Colonel Forbes and Adjutant Thompson, which enabled them to be commendably efficient in the hard times to come under Lee, Jackson, and A.P. Hill.⁷

During this training period, the Tennessee State Legislature submitted the question of secession from the Union to the people of the state. The volunteers were included in the vote and presumably many cast their votes for secession.⁸

What might appear to the reader a paradox to the attitude of Southern valor was the character of Mr. John Hurst. He became involved in the secession controversy when his friend William Smith helped him

⁵R.T. Mockbee, "Historical Sketch of the Fourteenth Tennessee Regiment of Infantry--C.S.A. 1861-1865" (personal experiences of R.T. Mockbee who was in the Fourteenth Tennessee Regiment during the Civil War), written 1912, p. 1. This sketch was used with the permission of the Museum of Southern History, Richmond, Virginia.

⁶John Barrien Lindsley, ed., The Military Annals of Tennessee--Confederate (Nashville: J.M. Lindsley and Company, 1896), p. 323.

⁷Mockbee, p. 3.

⁸Ibid.

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find a job at Frank Beaumont's hardware store in Clarksville. Hurst tells how he wound up in the Confederate Army:

By this time all the talk was about the South going to war--April 1, 1861. The war fever had struck the country, and everybody was talking about joining the Confederate Army. All was excitement, but I did not get much enthused. Mr. Beaumont began to raise a company and he had gotten almost enough men, but I had said nothing to him about joining. One day he said he expected to close the store, and if I would join his company he would pay me a hundred dollars a year more salary than I was getting at his store. So I joined him and went into the Confederate Army, with the same determined spirit that I had in everything . . .⁹

His was Company H of the Fourteenth Tennessee Regiment. Hurst's comments make an interesting contrast to the narration of this paper. Though Hurst appears to have a mercenary attitude, some hidden force in his make-up caused him to go through the entire war, even after receiving several wounds.

About June, the Fourteenth Tennessee Regiment was ordered to go to Nashville. However, they left behind their first casualty, a Mr. Frank Smith of Captain Brunson's D Company, who was suffering from dysentery which, along with measles, had troubled a number of men at Camp Quarles.

Mr. Smith returned to his home on the Dotsonville Road, in what is now the Woodlawn Community, to convalesce. He had just about recovered when he ate some fresh honey, brought to him by a neighbor, which unfortunately did not aid him in his recovery. Mr. Frank Smith

⁹ John Hurst, "A Little Sketch of My Life" (personal experiences of Mr. John Hurst who was in the Fourteenth Tennessee Regiment during the Civil War), written in July 1927, p. 8. This brief sketch was used with the permission of the owner, Mrs. Evelyn Hunter of Clarksville, Tennessee.

shortly thereafter succumbed to the diarrhea.¹⁰ There is a note of irony in the death of Frank Smith. Bullets, canister, and grape shot were not the only things that claimed the lives of men at war.

The Fourteenth Tennessee remained in Virginia during the entire war. Its ranks were dreadfully thinned. Its battle flag was riddled with bullets and captured at Gettysburg after the color-bearer had been shot down. It is now among the archives at Washington. The regiment went out eleven hundred strong in 1861; it returned a mere skeleton in 1865.¹¹

¹⁰William Shelton, Private interview held in Clarksville, Tennessee, July 1974.

¹¹Tyler, p. 125.

CHAPTER II

TO THE VIRGINIA MOUNTAINS: JUNE 1861 TO SEPTEMBER 1862

About June 1, 1861, Governor I.G. Harris ordered the First Regiment (Colonel Maney commanding), the Seventh Regiment (Colonel Hatton commanding), and the Fourteenth Regiment (Colonel Forbes commanding) to report to Brigadier General S.R. Anderson at Nashville, Tennessee. As soon as tents, arms, etc. could be supplied, which took several weeks, they were ordered to go by rail to Knoxville, Tennessee. The government at Richmond requested Governor Harris to protect the railroad from Knoxville to Bristol until all organized troops in the South could pass through to Manassas, Virginia.¹

About the fifteenth of July all of the Confederate troops that had been ordered for duty had passed on to Virginia, and as soon as General Anderson could get transportation the Fourteenth was taken on to Lynchburg. But before they could get transportation to Manassas the battle of the twenty-first of July had been fought and won by the Confederates. Then in a few days they were ordered to report to General R.E. Lee at Staunton, Virginia, and proceeded to Millboro by rail. As soon as transportation for camp equipment could be obtained, they started on the march for Valley Mountain.²

¹General William McComb, "Tennesseans in the Mountain Campaign," The Confederate Veteran, Vol. 22, No. 5 (May 1914), p. 210.

²Ibid.

Probably the reason the Fourteenth and other Tennessee regiments were ordered to Virginia was that the Confederate military thought the Battle of First Manassas might be the only major battle fought in the war. Both North and South had the idea that the war would be short, with an immediate victory.

Soon after they reached Valley Mountain, Governor Harris sent a paymaster and paid them in Tennessee money for the time from their enlistment until they were transferred to the regular Confederate service. This incident is mentioned because it is not well known that the State of Tennessee took care of the boys for several months after they enlisted to protect their rights.³

A more personal account of the early period is given by Sergeant R.T. Mockbee:

When the Regiment reached Nashville they were ordered to proceed at once to Virginia, to the great delight of the men, most of whom feared that the great impending battle would be fought, Southern independence gained and the war ended without the Regiment having an opportunity to fire a gun.⁴

The men felt justified in their fear when the news arrived that a great victory had been won at Manassas. After a few days at Bristol, Tennessee, the Fourteenth moved by rail to Staunton, Virginia,

. . . where we disembarked and there for the first time many of the men looked upon the face and form of the man who was afterwards to take his place among the greatest military leaders the world ever produced: Gen'l. R.E. Lee.⁵

³McComb, p. 210.

⁴Mockbee, p. 3.

⁵Ibid.

General Lee had been assigned to the command of the department of what was known as North West Virginia, and he wasted no time in reorganizing the troops. The First, Seventh and Fourteenth Tennessee Regiments were placed in a brigade under Brigadier General Samuel Anderson of Nashville, who had seen duty as a colonel in the war with Mexico. The brigade was assigned to General William Loring's division.

The army continued by rail to Valley Mountain, and from there started its march on one of the hottest August days ever experienced by the men. The road leading up the mountain by easy grades led through a section with no water. The exhausted men drained their canteens before they reached the top, and the marchers who had started in regular military order in columns were now scattered along the road for miles. Many of them fell out in the shade of roadside trees. Once water was reached, it was all the officers and more thoughtful men could do to restrain the thirsty men from drinking too much. In spite of the warnings, many became sick. When the command reached Huntersville, the army went into camp to allow for regrouping and reorganization, and a supply depot was formed for the further advance of the army.⁶

Camp life for the Fourteenth was not all drills and hard work. Horseplay among the men, card-playing--even some gambling, and whatever forms of fun could be devised by the men, occupied their free time. Sergeant R.T. Mockbee (Company B) gives a vivid description of the imaginative ways men entertained themselves:

⁵Mockbee, pp. 3-4.

⁶Ibid.

There was in most of the companies one or more who played on the violin, and at night could be heard the notes of the fiddle, and the call of the prompter, as the mazes of a "Cotillion" were gone through or the old "Virginia Reel" for a variation. The Lady partner in the dance was distinguished by a handkerchief (not always white) tied round the right arm. In those "Stag Dances" the men conducted themselves with all the grace of a "Chesterfield" toward their so-called lady partners, which was returned by the "Ladies" going through with all the delightful curtsys and graceful movements as the figures of the dance were called; that many of the boys remembered as having been taught by "Dan Grodeon" and "Col. Bob Searcy" in various neighborhoods in Montgomery and adjoining counties of Middle Tennessee, where they had taught the young people how to "Trip the light-fantastic toe."⁷

One of the informal organizations of the regiment was the Glee Club, which was organized in 1861 and existed without a break until the close of the war. None of the Glee Club members was killed. This club often became invited guests in the homes along the line of march and near camps, amid the mountains and valleys of West Virginia, as well as in the mansions of East Virginia. "The echo of those soul stirring and pathetic airs must yet be ringing among the hills and valleys of 'Old Virginia' for once heard, they could never be forgotten." Among the members were Dr. Daniel F. Wright, Surgeon, with his flute, from Company A; June Kimble with violin; Crittendon Kelley, leader in song; George Rice, leader; "the three famous Jackson boys, Richard (Dick), Rit and Daniel Tucker."⁸

The regiment's first Christmas was spent at Strasburg, Virginia. They must have carried the Christmas spirit with them from Middle

⁷Mockbee, pp. 3-4.

⁸June Kimble, Letter prepared in response to request for information about the Fourteenth Tennessee Regiment, used by permission of the Museum of Southern History, Richmond, Virginia.

Tennessee to Strasburg. There was Apple Jack, buckets of egg nog, and even turkey, brought in by the foragers.

Life in camp occasionally bordered on the hilarious. The men loved the "old war horse" General Sam Anderson; he was usually a stern disciplinarian, but he had his human side:

When the brigade went into camp, after the Cheat Mountain Campaign in 1861, Gen. Lee commanding, issued . . . orders to the troops, positively forbidding . . . depredations on the people. . . . An old reb of Manney's 1st Tenn. Regt. being hungry for fresh meat went out alone to spy the land . . . the paramount issue was to him meat and fresh meat at that. No one was a witness to his departure, but three thousand were eyewitnesses of his return. About 10 o'clock in the morning of the day a solitary sheep appeared upon the mountain top running at full speed and in plain view of all the valley below: Naturally everyone was on the alert, curious to know and guessing what moving power was behind that gentle lamb. . . . The figure of a man hove in sight from over the crest of the mountain, and at full speed, also evidently in pursuit . . . for a time it was an even race . . . as the lamb headed at an angle away from camp, excitement grew in intensity. Three thousand hungry men, all longing for fresh meat, became frenzied . . . the sheep turns, at an angle he comes toward camp. My, what noise and confusion disturbs that hitherto peaceful valley. . . . Down the mountain side they came. Boys, old reb is gaining, shouts one, answered by three thousand throats with a rebel yell. Gen. Anderson, peacefully snoozing upon his cot in his tent, is suddenly aroused from his dreams. He steps to the front in shirt sleeves and socked feet. Only a glance is necessary to discover the cause. Indignation seizes him. An outrage of authority in his very presence, orders flagrantly disobeyed in his teeth. He rushes out into the open, wildly gesticulating, shouting "everybody stop that man, arrest the scoundrel, bring him to me. I'll teach the villain a lesson he'll never forget, arrest him, arrest him." The sheep turns his course again, down the mountain they come, old reb still gaining, excitement, noise, and confusion supreme. Look at 'em, they are heading right straight for Gen. Anderson's tent . . . they are passing in seventy-five yards of the very seat of military authority and in insolent defiance. It was too much for the old hero of fox chasing proclivities and memories, suddenly rushing headlong into the fray, again gesticulating and shouting, "Catch him, G-d D--n him, catch him," . . . "don't let him get away." Forgetting the dignity of his position, laying aside authority, like the good old sportsman that he was, he was in at the finish and at the death. It was said that next morning

there was found a hind-quarter of hot baked mutton on the General's breakfast table and no questions asked. It is certain that no man in the brigade was courtmartialed, shot or packed a rail for violation of orders . . .⁹

In the latter part of the fall, the Fourteenth, with the rest of Loring's command, went into winter quarters around Huntersville. The members of the Fourteenth busied themselves at once with the construction of log cabins complete with chimneys of sticks and mud. The cracks of the cabins were lined with pine boards and the roofs were also of pine construction. The health of the men had greatly improved by now. They were beginning to receive shipments of clothing and provisions from loved ones and friends back home. The Civil War soldier, unlike the modern soldier, was dependent for his personal needs on those at home. First Lieutenant J.W. Howard of Company G sent this typical list to his family of things he needed:

one pr heavy lined boots, number tens
 one pr jeans pants, lined
 two pr drawers
 four pr socks
 two knit woolen shirts
 one pr buck gloves
 four quires of large letter paper, four packages of good envelopes.¹⁰

Once the rainy season had ended, the weather was delightful. The army foragers were able to get a large amount of foodstuffs from the nearby farmers, which made eating a luxury rather than an ordeal. The happy thoughts of spending winter in these comfortable surroundings were

⁹Kimble.

¹⁰Lieutenant I.W. Howard, Letter to his brother who lived near Clarksville, written on August 10 and 23, 1861. Used with the permission of the owner, Mr. Ike Howard, who is the grandson of Lieutenant I.W. Howard.

short-lived when orders came to move at once. Their destination was the Shenandoah Valley.¹¹

As prospects of a short war diminished, the drudgery and hardships of a protracted field campaign made themselves felt. Virginia heat and incessant rain combined with cold autumn nights to make everyone miserable. Supplies rarely arrived on schedule, due to poor roads and long distances. A moving army frequently outdistanced its tents and supplies; men slept in the rain with only a blanket for protection. This led to more complications. Pestilence and disease began to take up the march with the men, in the form of measles, mumps, typhoid, and other communicable ailments.

A letter of Lieutenant J.W. Mallory of Clarksville in September 1861 notes some of the efforts made to try to alleviate suffering:

I . . . met with some of the "Vice Presidents of the Soldiers Christian Association of the 14th Regt." . . . The members are of two kinds. Those having made a profession of Religion are denominated active, and those desiring it, are called associate. The objects of the association are evidently good--being to see that the wants of each member (as far as in our power) are supplied; and also that their moral and Spiritual conduct are made better. . . . The sickness in our Regt. has been increasing. Typhoid fever and chills are getting to be common. No deaths since getting to Big Springs from our Regt. 3 men are very low with T. fever. One in our Co. Mr. Williamson . . . I think his case is rather doubtful.¹²

In the latter part of September he wrote that the health of the regiment had further deteriorated. Colds were common, typhoid increasing. The

¹¹Lieutenant J.W. Mallory, Company L, Fourteenth Tennessee Regiment, Letters to his friend, Miss Serepta Jordan, in Clarksville, written from July 1861 to January 1862. Quotation cited from a letter of September 27, 1861, used with the permission of the owner, Mrs. Mildred Glenn.

¹²Ibid.

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medical department of the Fourteenth was terribly inefficient and added to the already bad state of affairs. Those in charge of handling this department had proven themselves to be totally inept. One of the surgeons was replaced for consuming whiskey that was to be used for the sick.¹³

The first exposure to combat the Fourteenth Tennessee had was the Cheat Mountain Campaign, a frustrating and indecisive encounter, accented by torrential downpours and impassable roads in the mountains of West Virginia. Here in the mountains the realities and drudgeries of war were brought home to the men. The feeling of an adventurous campaign had now evaporated.

In September 1861 General Loring's Division, including the Fourteenth, reported to Lee for duty. Loring's Division was composed of Anderson's and Donelson's Tennessee Brigades, Gilham's Virginia Brigade of infantry, Captain W.H.F. Lee's cavalry company of Virginia, and Captain Alexander's cavalry company of Tennessee. On the tenth of September the command was ordered to march. General McComb gives an excellent description of the action, in which he took part as a lieutenant:

After the first day the command separated. Our Brigade crossed Cheat Mountain by a stock trail, most of the time single file. We arrived at the turnpike west of Cheat Mountain fortifications about sunrise on the morning of September 12. General Loring arrived at the rear of Grantz's fortifications about the same time and had the remainder of his command in position for action. Our instructions were that, when our troops on the east side of Cheat Mountain commenced firing, we were to charge the fortification in the rear from the west. General Loring was to charge Grantz when he heard our firing. The plan was an admirable one. General Reynolds had no

¹³McComb, p. 210.

intimation that we were in his rear. The sun was about an hour high when we captured a civil engineer from Federal headquarters, and he was very much surprised.

The command on the east side of the mountain never fired a shot. It was impossible to communicate with them. So the expedition was a complete failure, although well planned and, up to this point, a complete success. I never heard why the attack was not made on the east side of the mountain.¹⁴

The next action that the Fourteenth saw was the abortive Romney Campaign. On December 26 they were ordered to Winchester, where Loring's Division was put under the command of General Thomas J. (Stonewall) Jackson.

On December 31, they were ordered to move in the direction of Ungoe's Store. The roads were nearly impassable. The movement was slow in the mud and darkness fell before they reached the store. Loring ordered a halt to rest the teams and men. When Loring reported to Jackson what he had done, Jackson ordered Loring to proceed to Ungoe's Store because he wanted to start for Bath Springs early in the morning. This enraged Loring. General McComb describes the subsequent scene:

. . . he dashed through the camp, ordering everything back in the wagons at once. Part of the bread was half cooked and the rest was in dough. Consequently the boys got no supper, and the teams very little. But we obeyed orders and prized and shoved wagons from that time until after day the next morning, and did not advance three hundred yards. Then, after General Jackson took in the situation on the next morning, he ordered us in bivouac and to cook two day's rations. This was our first acquaintance with General Jackson, and, unnecessary to say, we were not very favorably impressed.¹⁵

The weather grew extremely cold. Surprisingly, the Federals offered little resistance at Bath Springs, and retreated. General

¹⁴McComb, p. 210.

¹⁵Ibid.

Anderson's Brigade followed the withdrawing Federal Cavalry until dark. It was so cold "that the boys had to form circles and keep moving to keep their feet from freezing." The Federals fell back across the Potomac, and Loring, Anderson and Jackson differed in opinion as to whether they should ford the Potomac on that cold night.

Jackson ordered Anderson's Brigade, including the Fourteenth, to construct a pontoon across the river. General McComb's description shows the rigors of a winter campaign:

The snow was six or eight inches deep and the weather very cold. In a little while many of the boys' hands became so sore that they could scarcely clasp the ax handles. So we had to keep sending fresh details.¹⁶

The bridge was never used. Jackson moved his army back to Romney because it was rumored that Federal troops had occupied it. At Romney, they discovered that the Union forces had gone. The Fourteenth went to guard a bridge over the Potomac just out of Romney. General Loring complained to the War Department about the circumstances at Romney, and Loring's Division was ordered back to Winchester. Jackson was not included in this correspondence, and when he became aware of what had happened he resigned his commission. The War Department, fortunately, refused to accept Jackson's resignation.

In the end, Loring was sent west and Sam Anderson announced he would retire from service. At Fredericksburg, the brigade was reorganized to include the First, Seventh and Fourteenth Tennessee Regiments, plus Captain Braxton's artillery from Fredericksburg.¹⁷

¹⁶McComb, p. 210.

¹⁷Ibid.

CHAPTER III

THE SUMMER OF '62: THE PENINSULA CAMPAIGN

Seven Pines
May 31, 1862

On April 1, the Fourteenth was ordered to Yorktown, Virginia. They were to join General Joseph E. Johnston's command. The regiment was in camp around Yorktown only a short time when it became necessary for it to reorganize because the men had enlisted for only twelve months. The following field officers were elected: Colonel, W.A. Forbes; Lieutenant Colonel, Y.A. Harrell; Major, William McComb. The company officers remained the same. At this time the Federal commander, General McClellan, sent troops supported by gunboats up the York River in an attempt to close the Richmond Road. The Federals landed at a point on the Pamunkey River known as Red House. The Fourteenth, along with Hood's Texas Brigade, was rushed in to meet the Federal advance. The two armies locked horns at a place called West Point, near the Richmond Road. June Kimble, Captain, Company A, recalls the encounter:

This was our first introduction to the gunboats. We had learned to regard them as formidable, most destructive as engines of war, and to be dreaded.

The writer remembers well upon that day the profound bow or rather squat made with military precision by the 14th Tenn. Regt., when the first shell passed over our heads, true, it was two or three hundred feet high and aimed at troops on the high hills, a mile to our rear, nevertheless, it commanded our respect.¹

¹Kimble.

After a heavy skirmish, the Federals were thrown back to the river, the Richmond Road was kept open, and the Fourteenth shielded General Johnston's rear to the Chickahominy River. Once the Fourteenth had reached the defenses around Richmond, General Anderson resigned his command of the brigade and Colonel Robert Hatton was promoted to Brigadier General and given the command.

The Fourteenth then went into camp in sight of the city of Richmond and waited with the rest of Johnston's army for McClellan's advance on the Confederate capitol. McClellan, following Johnston's army from Yorktown to Richmond, traveled up the Peninsula between the York and James Rivers, and because of the position of his army, he was then forced into a strategic blunder.

McClellan would be unable to attack Johnston's army which was located on the south side of the Chickahominy, or advance on Richmond, without leaving his base of supplies unprotected. The Federal supply line ran from White House, which was located to the north of the Chickahominy on the Pamunkey branch of the York River, to West Point, located on the York proper. McClellan was forced to divide his army, allowing a river and marshy terrain to separate the two wings of the force. When the Federals moved two corps across the Chickahominy, Johnston attempted to hit them with everything he had at a place called Seven Pines.

On the other hand, Johnston had his problem: how to crush the two Federal corps that had crossed to the south side of the Chickahominy without leaving Richmond open to attack from McClellan's other three corps which were still on the north side of the river. Johnston's skill

and the position of the two exposed Federal corps made such an attack possible. Due to the weakness of the blow struck by the Confederates, however, Johnston was unable to carry out his full intention.

The Tennessee Brigade, composed of the First, Seventh and Fourteenth Regiments under the command of General Robert Hatton, was ordered, on the thirtieth of May, to cook rations and make preparations to move. At sundown, the drums began to tap, every man moved into line, and the brigade began to move, with Colonel Turney and the First Tennessee in the lead. When the column reached the Plank Road leading to Seven Pines, it was commanded to halt and the men were allowed to stand at parade rest. General Hatton turned to the men and made a short speech which reveals the spirit, conviction and dedication of these men to their cause:

Boys, before the dawn of another day, we will be engaged in deadly conflict with the enemy. We are the only representatives of the gallant little commonwealth of Tennessee upon the soil of Virginia. I appeal to you as Tennesseans. Show yourselves worthy sons of a noble ancestry. Just in our rear is the capitol city of the Confederacy. Around our capitol city has been gathered a vandal horde of Yankees. Their object, their aim, their purpose is to plunder and pillage our capitol. Shall it be sacked?²

The courage and fortitude with which these men met the challenge of battle is shown by their response to the question put to them by General Hatton. "No, never!" And every boy snatched off his hat, caught up the refrain, and made the air ring with the shout of "No, never!"³ The

²H.T. Childs, "The Battle of Seven Pines," The Confederate Veteran, Vol. 24, No. 1 (January 1917), p. 19.

³Ibid.

Tennessee Brigade was then called into the line of march. When the morning of May 31 came, they had not yet come in contact with the enemy. All morning long, the Union and Confederate Armies were maneuvering for position. Around one in the afternoon, the brigade was resting, with their arms stacked in the middle of the Plank Road. Every man was seated near his gun. General Hatton rode to the head of the line, where he saw Colonel Turney was seated on a fence. Hatton dismounted his horse and took a seat beside Turney. Colonel Turney, who was an old Democrat, told Hatton, a Whig, that when it came to alien suffrage, he was a know-nothing. It is interesting that in the midst of preparation for battle in a civil war, these two men still thought in the political terms of a united nation. Just then, a courier rode up calling for General Hatton. Hatton jumped onto his saddle, yelling, "Here I am." The courier told Hatton that Johnston wanted either the Tennessee Brigade or Hampton's Legion to occupy a particular place in line, depending on who was able to get there first. The courier told Hatton, "'General, I have come for you. I want you to beat Hampton.' General Hatton replied, 'I will beat Hampton.' Turning to his men, he commanded, 'Take arms! By the right flank, double-quick!'"⁴ The Tennessee Brigade then moved toward Seven Pines.

As they passed along the road at double time, Jefferson Davis and his cabinet passed by them. Every man took off his hat and gave a wild rebel yell as a salute to their president. On they moved, nearer and nearer to the sound of clashing arms. They were halted at a little

⁴Childs, p. 19.

red school house by the side of the road. General Johnston could be seen just beyond the house, mounted on his horse, observing the enemy. Johnston turned to Hatton and inquired what was his command. Hatton answered, "Tennessee Brigade, Sir." Johnston gave Hatton the order to take them in, and Hatton turned to the men and gave the command to load. As the command was passed by the company officers down the line, the rattle of steel could be heard. Then a bomb exploded. The explosion knocked Johnston from his horse, severely wounding him. Johnston was never to command an army in Virginia again. The command was given to the brilliant Robert E. Lee.

The next command given by Hatton was to "fix bayonets." Again the clash of steel could be heard. Every man knew what this command meant. There would be no holds barred nor quarter given in the sanguine melee that was to come. Then the command to move was given, "guide center." The Tennessee Brigade pressed forward, three regiments moving in perfect battle line with the red flag of the rebellion waving defiantly above them. The bayonets could be seen glistening before the setting sun. Above and around them grapeshot and canister were falling like hail. The roar of the Union guns could now be heard as they belched forth death and destruction, plowing up the ground in all directions; but the grey line was never struck.

After the brigade had moved a hundred yards or so, the First Tennessee, under Colonel Turney, changed its direction from the west to the north. The Seventh and the Fourteenth Regiments, under General Hatton, kept going west. The fighting was brief, but fierce, and the Tennessee Brigade suffered heavy casualties. General Hatton was killed

while leading the Seventh and the Fourteenth Regiments against the Federal lines. The loss of Hatton was a heavy blow to the Tennessee Brigade. Many of the men cried openly when they realized that the gallant Hatton would never lead them in battle again.⁵

After the Battle of Seven Pines, General R.E. Lee was given command of the Confederate Army. He then proceeded to organize the Southern forces into what was known as the Army of Northern Virginia. Colonel J.J. Archer of the Fourth Texas Brigade was promoted to Brigadier General and placed in command of what was Hatton's Tennessee Brigade, which was now composed of the Fifth Alabama Battalion, the Nineteenth Georgia Regiment, the First, Seventh and Fourteenth Tennessee Regiments. This brigade was known as Archer's Tennessee Brigade. They became a part of A.P. Hill's Light Division. Now the Fourteenth was a part of what was to become the famed Army of Northern Virginia.

The Seven Days

When the Seven Days Battle opened around Richmond on June 26, 1862, A.P. Hill's Division was the first to cross the Chickahominy at Meadow Bridge and strike McClellan's right flank, under the command of Fitz John Porter, at Mechanicsville. Archer marched his Tennessee Brigade of 1,228 men through Mechanicsville and formed a line of battle up the Mechanicsville Turnpike. The left flank of the brigade was directed by the line of the turnpike. The Nineteenth Georgia was under the command of Lieutenant Colonel T.C. Johnson. The First Tennessee, under the command of J.C. Shackelford, was on the right, supported by the Fifth Alabama Battalion and the Seventh Tennessee Regiment. The

⁵Robert W. Barnwell, "The Battle of Seven Pines," The Confederate Veteran, Vol. 36, No. 2 (February 1928), p. 58.

Fourteenth Tennessee Regiment, under Colonel W.A. Forbes, was separated from the brigade during this movement. They did not rejoin the main body until night. The brigade pressed on to Beaver Dam Creek, under heavy fire from the Union artillery emplacements, which were well entrenched on the opposite side of the creek. Night found both armies facing each other. At dawn, it was discovered that the Federals had abandoned their fortifications.

McClellan now put the bulk of his army across the Chickahominy River, leaving a portion on the north side. Lee struck the part of the Federal Army that was left in the Battle of Gaines Mill. This fight has also been called the Battle of Cold Harbor.

On May 27, at Cold Harbor, Archer's Tennessee Brigade advanced on the enemy position in order to feel him out and attempt to ascertain the Federal strength. The brigade had chased the Federal forces from Mechanicsville to Cold Harbor where they overtook them. The Confederates were drawn up in line of battle on the edge of a field. On the opposite side of the field, located on a hill, was the left wing of Fitz John Porter's army. The Union Army was divided into three lines of battle: the first line at the foot of the hill, the second line on the middle of the hill, and the third line at the top. The lines were protected by log breastworks, stacked about waist high. The artillery crowned the apex of the hill, and a small stream circled its base.

In a diversionary action, Archer's Brigade was to charge the hill and capture it, if possible. This was an impossible task for one brigade to accomplish. The brigade was lying flat on the ground as a protection against Union sharpshooters. The command, "Attention," was

given and every man sprang to his feet. The command to move forward was then ordered and the brigade moved out at a double-quick pace. The officers kept telling the men not to hurry and to stay in line. It was a long way across the field and the officers knew that if the men moved too fast they would be exhausted by the time they reached the Federal lines. As Archer's Brigade moved closer to the three Union lines of battle, the entire hill turned into a blazing inferno. Men began to fall as the Union guns opened up. Still the line moved on. The Federal tornado of fire was too great; the brigade was forced to fall back behind an old apple orchard.

The Federals were so intent in driving off the Tennesseans that they never noticed the advancing brigade of Hood and his Texans. Hood's brigade struck the Federals before they knew what had happened. It was probably not intended or even thought that Archer's Brigade would capture Porter's army by itself. The objective of the plan was for Archer and his men to draw the Federals' attention to themselves so that they would not see the real danger. Just to the right of Archer's Brigade, in a clump of woods, were Hood and his Texans. They were hidden from the sight of the enemy, waiting for the right moment to strike. Just as the Tennessee Brigade was driven back, the Texans made their perfectly timed charge. Some of Archer's men went back with them. Archer's Tennessee Brigade never received the credit that it deserved for its performance at Gaines Mill. The Tennessee Brigade deserves a large share of the credit for driving the Union forces from the hill. Archer's Brigade

did an excellent job of diverting the Union's attention to them alone.⁶

The Fourteenth was among the group from Archer's Brigade who returned to the hill with Hood's charge. John Hurst was there: "We were first driven back but were ordered on again and, but for my old friend and messmate, Ralph Cardin, I am afraid I would have declined to go. He said, 'Let's go if it kills us all,' and so we did."⁷ This time the grey line did not falter. The Confederates swept the hill and went over the top, driving the Federals before them.

T.H. Benton, who was a member of Company C, Fourteenth Tennessee Regiment, described the action:

I was one of the boys to cross the mill race. We crossed the race and . . . formed our battle line just under the hill. From there we charged the enemy, gained their works, and captured six pieces of artillery. Our color bearer in the charge planted his colors on the cannon. His name was Taylor. He was tendered a nice saber for his bravery, but declined to accept it. In the first charge the enemy repulsed us and got one of our wounded boys, Dick Pike, and carried him to their field hospital. General McClellan came around and said to Dick that he didn't think the "Johnnies" could drive him from that position. In the next charge we carried everything before us, capturing the artillery. Our company lost heavily.⁸

The morning of the twenty-eighth of June was spent in burying the dead and caring for the wounded.

⁶W.F. Fulton, "Archer's Brigade at Cold Harbor," The Confederate Veteran, Vol. 31, No. 8 (August 1923), p. 300.

⁷Hurst, p. 9.

⁸T.H. Benton, "A Tennessee Private in Virginia," The Confederate Veteran, Vol. 15, No. 11 (November 1907), p. 507.

The retreating Federal forces left behind camp equipment and stores and other accoutrements. In fact, the Federals left behind thousands of small arms. The result of this was that the members of the Fourteenth Tennessee were able to obtain the more modern and efficient Springfield and Enfield rifles for their use, instead of the old smooth bore muskets they had used so well.⁹

The Fourteenth Tennessee, along with the rest of Hill's Light Division, was held in reserve until the Battle of Frayser's Farm on the thirtieth of June. The morning of June thirtieth gave every promise of being a bright, sunny day. The Southerners were confident that by nightfall they would have destroyed McClellan's army.

Lee ordered General A.P. Hill to take temporary command of his own and Longstreet's Division, as Longstreet had not yet appeared. Hill ascertained that the enemy must be moving down the Willis Church Road. He had only to move in an easterly direction to meet the Federals. He quickly formed a line of battle with Longstreet's Division leading the way. Hill's Light Division was placed in immediate reserve. Longstreet came shortly afterwards and was ordered by Lee to take command of the field. The strategy of the Confederates was to trap McClellan's army by forming a triangle around it and then moving in for the kill. Hostilities opened between the two armies about 3:30 in the afternoon. Lee received word that the head of McClellan's column was moving over Malvern Hill; this meant that the Federals were about to escape the

⁹ Mockbee, page 23.

triangular trap that Lee and Jackson had set for them. There had been no word all day from Jackson, whose corps was to form one side of the trap. Lee had no idea where Jackson was, and decided to move without him. If Lee didn't attack at once, any chance of stopping McClellan's army would be gone. He had only two divisions on hand to attack a Federal force of unknown size. Not only had he not heard from Jackson, but he had no word of General Huger's Division. Lee reluctantly ordered an attack. McClellan's army was sprawled across the Charles City Road and west of the Willis Church Road. The two roads formed an obtuse angle. This angle was bisected by the Long Bridge Road on either side of which Longstreet was advancing. The property over which the two armies fought was known as Glendale, or Frayser's Farm. Lee gave orders for Longstreet's Division to advance on the Federals at once. Longstreet's men made contact with the Federals about five in the afternoon. The fighting was brutal. The Confederate troops, at first, made progress, but by sunset McClellan's forces had fought them to a stalemate and threatened to flank both sides of their lines. As a last resort, the Light Division of A.P. Hill was called in to try to hold the ground already won. "Forgetful of the slaughter of Mechanicsville and unmindful of their frightful losses at Gaines Mill, Hill's regiments moved forward at the order of command. Archer was to the right supporting Kemper and Branch, with Pickett on his right."¹⁰

The Fourteenth was sent to the aid of R.H. Anderson's Brigade under the command of Colonel Micah Jenkins, and Anderson was temporarily

¹⁰Douglas Southall Freeman, Robert E. Lee (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1934), p. 189.

in command of Longstreet's Division. The two regiments became hotly engaged with the army of Fitz John Porter. A maddening ferocity seized the men on both sides. Much of the fighting was hand-to-hand with bayonets. Skulls were crushed by rifle butts. The Southern and Northern locking in a death grip, laid down and died together on that fearful evening.¹¹ McClellan's forces were driven from the field. In this violent encounter, the Fourteenth Tennessee captured several pieces of artillery. Here, at Frayser's Farm, the men of the Fourteenth received their baptism in hand-to-hand combat. This would be only one of many times that they would face such an ordeal.

When night fell, the South had won the field, but McClellan's army was allowed to escape the trap which Lee had set. If the tardy Jackson and Huger had reached their respective destinations on time, the outcome might have been vastly different:

Frayser's Farm was one of the great lost opportunities in Confederate Military History. It was the bitterest disappointment Lee had ever sustained, and one that he could not conceal. Many times thereafter he was to discover a weak point in his adversary's line or a mistake in his antagonist's plan, but never again was he to find the enemy in full retreat across his front. Victories in the field were to be registered, but two years of open campaign were not to produce another situation where envelopement seemed possible. He had only that one day for a Cannae, and the army was not ready for it.¹²

Malvern Hill
July 1, 1862

On July first, the Confederate army was once again united in a pursuit of McClellan's army that everyone felt was hopeless. Lee's

¹¹Freeman, p. 187.

¹²Ibid., p. 199.

disappointment at the outcome of the previous day was apparent to all.

McClellan was well-entrenched on the heights of Malvern Hill. Jackson's, Magruder's and Huger's Divisions were held in reserve. They had done their part the day before and were too fatigued to be put into action unless it was necessary.¹³ The Fourteenth was held in reserve all that day, but they were constantly under fire from the Federal guns on Malvern Hill. Many of the men felt this was more nerve-wracking than being in actual combat. Lee's attack on McClellan at Malvern Hill failed. McClellan escaped under the cover of his gunboats and, ". . . though McClellan had been forced to abandon his lines under the very shadows of Richmond's spires, and had been struck hard and often, he had escaped the destruction Lee had planned for him."¹⁴ The Fourteenth was then ordered back to Richmond. Thus the bloody Seven Days was over.

An extra of the Clarksville Chronicle, dated Saturday, July 22, 1862, contains the casualties of the Fourteenth Tennessee in the Seven Days Battles, June 26 to July 2, and of Seven Pines:

Company A--R.D. Duke and J.M. Hatton were killed and nine were wounded. Names of the wounded are given in every instance.
Company B--W.J. Martin killed and eighteen wounded.
Company C--Jos. Gambol, J.M. Jones, B.F. Anderson, James and Titus Powell killed and thirteen wounded. Of the wounded, Richard Pike and Wm. Erwin died.
Company D--Capt. C.L. Martin, Johnathan Cherry and W.E. Largin were killed and nine wounded.
Company E--Lt. Grice, Joseph Burns and F. Warford were killed and four were wounded.
Company F--R.T. Brooks was killed and fourteen wounded.
Company G--Dallas Booth killed and of the twelve wounded, T.H. Collins and Wm. Hamilton died.

¹³Freeman, p. 202.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 219.

Company H--C.C. Tilley and W.H. Reagan were killed and thirteen were wounded. T.M. Broadus, . . . had died. Of the severely wounded was the esteemed and faithful veteran of today, Capt. J.J. Crusman.

Company I--W.T. Baber and Richard Chandler were killed and seven wounded.

Company K--J.W. Gunn was killed and fourteen were wounded. G.A. Tompkins died soon afterward.

The circular contains an error in naming a nonexistent Company L. Under that letter, J.H. Slaughter is reported killed and the names of eight are listed as wounded. The closing note reports that General R.J. Hatton was killed and that Adjutant R.C. Bell was mortally wounded.¹⁵

Cedar Mountain
August 9, 1862

With McClellan still at Morrison Landing on the James River, Lee learned that a Federal force had occupied Fredericksburg. Lee suspected that the Union troops, occupying Fredericksburg, were under the command of General Burnside who, it was thought, had been sent to join General Pope, who was then advancing on the Virginia Central Railroad. "The only way safely to ignore the force at Fredericksburg, and at the same time to protect the railroad against raids, would be to send Jackson enough men for a speedy and successful blow at Pope."¹⁶

Jackson, learning that a part of Pope's troops were moving south in advance of the main army, decided to attack at once. On the afternoon of August 9, the Confederates found Pope's vanguard on Cedar Run Creek in an area ominously known as Slaughter Mountain. He attacked the

¹⁵The Clarksville Chronicle of July 22, 1862, given to The Confederate Veteran by Miss Blanch Lewis. Vol. 4, No. 8 (August 1896), p. 263.

¹⁶Freeman, p. 270.

Federals, and after suffering a temporary setback, drove the Union forces from the field. His casualties were 1,276.¹⁷

After a short stay in Richmond the Light Division was ordered to join George Stonewall Jackson at Gordonsville. In late July, 1862, Hill's Division became part of Jackson's Second Corps, "Army of Northern Virginia." Shortly after this, Jackson moved across the Rapidan River to meet the advance of his old adversary of the Valley Campaign, General N.P. Banks.

Early on the morning of August 9, Archer and his brigade marched from Orange Court House toward the battlefield. They arrived near the point where Jackson's Division was already fighting. The brigade formed in line of battle to the left of Branch's Brigade. Branch's men began to advance before Archer's Brigade had formed its battle line. The First Tennessee, Nineteenth Georgia Regiment, Fifth Alabama Battalion, and Seventh Tennessee moved out immediately. The Fourteenth Tennessee had been in the rear. It was to overtake the rest of the brigade as quickly as possible. Archer's Brigade overtook a regiment of Branch's Brigade and became entangled with his men. Archer halted them in order to re-form his lines. Just then, Colonel Forbes and the Fourteenth came up and took their position in line. The brigade then received orders from General Hill to advance. The brigade advanced to the edge of a wood where they were fired upon by the Union guns located in another clump of woods beyond a wheat field. As the brigade pressed forward, they encountered a terrific fire from the enemy, who was well-concealed

¹⁷Freeman, p. 272.

in the woods. The brigade lost nineteen men killed and one hundred sixteen wounded. The Tennesseans entered the wood and, while passing through it, became intermingled with the left wing of Pender's North Carolina Brigade. Archer and Pender decided to lead the two brigades as one--Archer commanding the left and Pender the right.¹⁸ As they moved through a wheat field, they ran into a large Federal column. The brigade opened fire. The entire Union force was either killed or captured. On the far side of the field, behind a fence, was another line of Union troops. The order "Charge" was given and the grey line swarmed over the fence in hot pursuit of the scattered Federal line.¹⁹ The brigade captured Brigadier General Prince and the majority of his command. Among the losses of the Fourteenth was Lieutenant Colonel George Harrell, who was mortally wounded and later died at Charlottesville, Virginia. August tenth was spent burying the dead and caring for the wounded. The Fourteenth, along with the rest of Jackson's command, moved across the Rapidan on the night of the tenth and went into camp at Orange Court House.²⁰

¹⁸Lamont, et. al., The War of the Rebellion: Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Vol. 12, Part 2 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1893), pp. 218-219.

¹⁹H.T. Childs, "Cedar Run Battle as I Saw It," The Confederate Veteran, Vol. 28, No. 1 (January 1920), p. 24.

²⁰Ibid.

CHAPTER IV

THRUST--COUNTER THRUST: SECOND MANASSAS TO ANTIETAM, AUGUST 28-SEPTEMBER 20, 1862

Lee, hoping to rejoin Jackson at Manassas as soon as possible, moved to within twenty miles on August 28. He hoped to join up with Jackson the next day. Once the Army of Northern Virginia was united, Lee planned to hit Pope and drive him back to Washington before Pope's army could be reinforced by McClellan. He wanted to reach Jackson before Pope did for fear that Jackson's army would be destroyed. After driving the Union forces out of Thoroughfare Gap, which was the only obstacle separating him and Jackson, Lee moved his army through the Gap and towards Jackson. On August 25, Jackson had moved his army across the Rapahannock above Warrenton Springs, where the main body of Pope's army was gathering to prevent Lee from crossing the river. Jackson silently moved his men around Pope's army. On the evening of the 26th, Jackson reached Bristoe Station on the Orange and Alexandria Railroad. Now Jackson was between Pope and Washington City. At Bristoe Station and Manassas Junction, Pope's entire supply depot was taken by Jackson. Sergeant R.T. Mockbee of B Company describes the capture of Pope's supply depot:

Great commissary, quartermaster, and ordinance stores were captured at Bristoe and Manassas Junction where Archer's Brigade spent the day of August 20 in resting; feasting meanwhile from the many good things found in the well filled stores the men spent most of their time filling haversacks with all they would hold, and that night, the "Light Division" marched

off by the light of the burning trains and warehouses containing many thousands of dollars worth of stores which we had no means of removing.¹

Jackson, on hearing that there were barrels of whiskey in the Union stores, ordered them to be broken open and the contents poured out. He apparently was afraid that many of the men would consume the alcohol and not be fit for combat.²

On the morning of the twenty-sixth, Hill's Light Division was placed in a position left of the depot at Manassas Junction. Archer's Brigade was ordered to chase some retreating Union artillery. After about half a mile, they ran into the Federal infantry, which took up a position near a hospital. Jackson ordered up a battery and the Tennessee Brigade was to act as an auxillary to that battery. The Federals were put to flight, retreating toward the railroad bridge at Bull Run. Archer's Brigade was right on their heels. Soon the brigade was engaged with the enemy, who had made a stand on the opposite side of the tracks near the railroad bridge. After about a half hour of fighting, the Federals retreated with Archer's Brigade in pursuit. After about half a mile, the Tennesseans were ordered to halt their pursuit and take up a position on a hill commanding the bridge. They remained there for some time and then were ordered to return to the junction. The regiments of Archer's Brigade were as follows: First Tennessee--Colonel Peter Turney; Seventh Tennessee--Major S.G. Shepard; Fourteenth

¹Mockbee, pp. 24-25.

²W.F. Fulton, "Incidents at Second Manassas," The Confederate Veteran, Vol. 31, No. 12 (December 1923), p. 451.

Tennessee--Colonel W.A. Forbes; Nineteenth Georgia--Captain F.M. Johnston; and Fifth Alabama Battalion--Captain Thomas Bush.

On August 28, 1862, the Tennessee Brigade marched past Centerville on the Warrenton Turnpike to Bull Run. The brigade was formed parallel to the railroad cut. Branch's Brigade was in their rear and Field's Brigade was on their right. There were two batteries about three hundred yards to their front. At 5:00 P.M. the fighting started. Archer moved his brigade to support the batteries. They came under a heavy fire from Federal batteries to their left and front. At twilight, Hill's Division moved to their right and occupied the railroad cut in the woods.

The following morning, Archer's men, along with Braxton's Battery, were positioned on a hill on the extreme left of the division. Archer sent skirmishers out to his front and left flank. While occupying the hill, the brigade was never seriously engaged. Around 3:00 P.M. Archer was ordered by General Hill to move to the right so the right flank of the brigade would rest on a road which crossed the railroad at right angles. They stayed there in supporting distance of the remainder of the division. About 4:00 P.M., during an interval of the fighting, General Pender requested that Archer's Brigade relieve him. With Hill's consent, his brigade filed into the railroad cut.

Just as the Tennesseans began to file into the cut, the Federals were seen moving up the railroad cut on their left and advancing into the woods. Once the cut was occupied, the order was given to fire. The fire was answered immediately with an assault on their entire front. Archer's Brigade was the only outfit occupying the railroad cut at this

time, but they were able to withstand the Union assaults until help came. After the arrival of fresh troops, the Confederates launched an attack of their own and drove the enemy back several hundred yards. Then they returned to their position in the railroad cut. No sooner had they filed back in the cut than fresh Federal forces launched another attack. Once again, the Confederates held their ground. Then they counter-attacked, which drove the Federals back. In the second charge, many of Archer's men were out of ammunition and were forced to make the charge with empty rifles. Archer later stated that he did not average over two cartridges to the man. The Blue Coats then attacked for the third time and were again repelled by the Southerners. Archer's Brigade charged the enemy for a third time, driving them back with their bayonets and empty rifles. Archer's Brigade suffered heavily.

At nightfall, the Confederates resumed their position with a heavy picket line in front to guard against a surprise attack. Their ammunition was replenished during the night by taking cartridge boxes off the dead Union soldiers who had fallen that day in battle. The next morning, on August thirtieth, they changed placed with Early's Brigade, which had occupied a position to their left on the previous evening. Archer relieved Early's pickets with one hundred thirty men of his own, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel N.J. George of the First Tennessee Regiment. The firing between the Confederate pickets and the Union skirmishers was heavy and continuous. The firing was necessary in order to hold the ground then occupied. The Confederates on Archer's extreme right had become heavily engaged, and Archer was ordered by Hill to move at once to their support. But before the Tennesseans could move,

their pickets were driven in and the Federals launched a vigorous attack on Archer's front. After about ten minutes of heavy fighting, the Tennessee Brigade counter-attacked and drove the Federals back into the woods. Smith's Regiment of Early's Brigade was the only one to support Archer in this advance. Early ordered Smith back and the First Tennessee returned with him. After obtaining a fresh supply of ammunition from the dead Yankees, they resumed their original position. About 5:00 P.M., General Pender ordered a general advance. Archer advanced along with Pender's Brigade, which was to his right. They moved through a wood into an open field. Just beyond, the Yankee line of battle was formed. The Tennesseans entered the field about three hundred yards, and slightly to their left was posted a Federal battery of six guns. The Tennessee Brigade moved about one hundred fifty yards, then swung to their left and charged the battery. They were exposed to the fire of two other Federal batteries besides the constant fire of the battery they were charging and its supporting infantry. The brigade never faltered in its charge on the Union battery. The Federals stood their ground until the Tennesseans were within seventy-five yards of them; then they retreated, leaving three pieces of artillery behind. Pender's Brigade overtook and captured the other three pieces of artillery. Archer's Brigade pushed on against the Federal infantry, who were still putting up a weak opposition in the wood.

By the time Archer's men entered the wood, the Federals had retreated out of sight. The brigade halted to re-form its lines; Pender was still to their right. The two brigades moved on together to the Lewis house, where they encountered a body of Federal infantry whose

numbers could not be determined because of the darkness. The Yankees were quickly driven from the field. A large Union hospital was discovered, and there a number of prisoners were taken. Archer, in his report, singled out Private F.M. Barnes of Company A, Fourteenth Tennessee Regiment, who seized the colors from the hands of the wounded color bearer and carried them gallantly through the battle. The Fourteenth Tennessee also lost its commander, Colonel W.A. Forbes, who was mortally wounded in the last charge of August thirtieth.³

Battles have their humor, as seen in this account by Theodore Hartman of Company A, Fourteenth Tennessee infantry Regiment:

What is here set down occurred on the last day of the Second Battle of Manassas. With other comrades of my company . . . I was on picket duty covering the front of our regiment. We were stationed in the edge of some woods just across a railroad embankment, upon which no ties or rails had ever been placed. Our position was on the extreme left of our army, and we were engaged in sharp shooting with the enemy's pickets, some fifty or sixty yards away in the same body of timber. . . . On resuming my watch my next tree comrade (Cornelius Mehigan, now living in Clarksville, Tenn.) said to me: "Some D--- Bluecoat has found my position and shot at me several times but I can't locate him." "I will help you find him." I lay down so as to get a better view under the branches, saying: "Mehigan, stick your head out and draw his fire, and I will watch for your enemy." "No, I'll be d--- if I do," he answered. I then told him to put his cap on the end of his gun and let it show at the side of the tree: "and if he 'bites' at it, I may be able to locate him." He did so, and the fellow "bit" all right. He was behind a tree just large enough to cover him when he stood erect, but in stooping over to shoot, he exposed a portion of his body most servicable in a sitting position. As he deliberately rested his gun against the tree and proceeded to draw a bead on Mehigan's cap, I trained my rifle on the exposed portion of his anatomy aforesaid and sent a bullet through it. He dropped his gun and made a record jump both for height and distance, and lit running. Comrade Mehigan shouted: "Begorrah, you gave him a sixty-day furlough! He will have to eat off the mantel for a while."⁴

³Lamont, pp. 700-702.

⁴Theodore Hartman, "With Jackson at Second Manassas," The Confederate Veteran, Vol. 24, No. 12 (December 1916), p. 557.

Sharpsburg

After the Battle of Second Manassas, Lee reasoned that his next move should be to the north into Maryland, and possibly into Pennsylvania because he felt that the enemy could be drawn away from the Washington defenses. Once in Maryland, Lee hoped to harrass and possibly destroy the Army of the Potomac. He also hoped the farmers of Virginia would be able to harvest their crops without interruption from the Union troops. An invasion of Maryland could also possibly benefit the South, since there was thought to be much pro-Southern sentiment in Maryland. The Confederate Army was underfed and in rags. About a third of the men didn't have shoes. The rich and fertile valleys of Maryland and its well-stored cities offered Lee an opportunity to feed and clothe his vagabond army.

On September third, Lee ordered the army to move into Maryland. He entered Maryland east of the mountains because this would be considered a direct threat to Washington and Baltimore. The army crossed the Potomac into Maryland at White's Ford on the fifth and sixth of September. Lee established his first headquarters at Frederick, Maryland.

While making his dispositions, Lee learned that McClellan had replaced Pope as the Federal commander. To Lee, this was not good news because he regarded McClellan as the ablest of the Federal generals.

At Frederick, Lee was still unable to supply his army adequately. The food supply in the area was being quickly exhausted. Lee's line of communication via Culpepper Court House was open to attack from

Washington. Lee decided to move west to Hagerstown and change his line of communication. This new line would run down through the Shenandoah Valley close to Martinsburg and Harper's Ferry, both of which were occupied by Federal troops.

The decision was then made to split the army, sending Jackson's Corps to drive the Federals out of Martinsburg and Harper's Ferry. Lee felt that the Union garrison at Harper's Ferry could be captured along with the post. And to accomplish this, he must close all exits leading to Harper's Ferry. This could be done by sending three commands moving simultaneously on Harper's Ferry, one being sent from Loudoun Heights, the second from Maryland Heights, and the third from the rear of Harper's Ferry on Bolivar Heights. Lee sent the division of Brigadier General John G. Walker to occupy Loudoun Heights. McClaw's and Anderson's Divisions of Longstreet's Corps were sent to take the Maryland Heights. Lee ordered the whole left wing of Jackson's army to march on the rear of Harper's Ferry and cut off the retreat of the Federal garrison. The main body of the army was to move on Hagerstown and then to Harrisburg, while the detached columns carried out their mission. Lee reckoned that McClellan would be overly cautious and not make a move for three or four weeks. By then, Lee planned to be on the Susquehanna. As soon as Harper's Ferry was captured, the army could re-group at Hagerstown and then move into Pennsylvania. The details of Lee's plan were all covered in Special Orders No. 191, issued on September ninth. A copy of these orders was lost and supposedly found by the Federals. McClellan, having knowledge of Lee's plans, moved much quicker than expected. McClellan's sudden and unexpected movement

almost spelled disaster for the Army of Northern Virginia. Lee's entire plan had been disrupted. With his army divided, Lee would have to reconcentrate his forces as soon as possible or his army would be destroyed. McClaw's Division was in danger of being overtaken by the Federals who were pouring through Crompton's Gap. The enemy now had a direct route to Sharpsburg, where Lee had hoped to recross back into Virginia. Lee decided to make a stand against McClellan at Sharpsburg, Maryland, on the Antietam Creek. Harper's Ferry by direct road was only twelve miles away. If Jackson could take Harper's Ferry by September fifteenth, he could possibly join Lee in time to meet McClellan. He also hoped that McClaw's Division could wriggle its way out of its predicament and re-join him at Sharpsburg. Thus, the army could be reunited on the north side of the Potomac and possibly resume its original plan.

On the afternoon of September fifteenth, Lee learned of Jackson's capture of the Federal garrison at Harper's Ferry. Now Lee's mind was made up; he would make a stand against McClellan at Sharpsburg, and hope Jackson could reach him in time. Lee's ghost of an army took its position on the high ground around Sharpsburg between Antietam Creek and the Potomac. This way, he could defend against an attack from across the creek and cover the fords of the Potomac. But success relied upon whether Jackson, McClaw, A.P. Hill, and Anderson could get there on time.⁵ The Fourteenth Tennessee was ordered to Leesburg, Virginia, and on September fifth they crossed the Potomac at White's

⁵Freeman, pp. 350-383.

Ford. After entering Maryland, their first night's supper was of green corn roasted on fires made from the rails of the fences that surrounded the fields. On September sixth they moved into Frederick, Maryland, and remained there until September tenth. They then recrossed the Potomac with the rest of Hill's Light Division and marched on Martinsburg. As the Confederates approached Martinsburg, the Federal garrison retreated to Harper's Ferry. Jackson followed the retreating Federals and reached Harper's Ferry on the afternoon of the thirteenth. September fourteenth was spent in getting into communication with McClaw on Maryland Heights and Walker on Loudoun Heights. The Federals' main line of defense was located on Bolivar Heights. The Federal command consisted of seventy-three pieces of artillery and eleven thousand troops. Hill's Division was to attack the enemy's main works after the artillery ceased firing. Archer's Brigade was just getting ready to attack the main line of defense when the Federals displayed the white flag. The Tennesseans marched into the works with Hill in the lead. Eleven thousand Federals were taken prisoner along with seventy-three pieces of artillery and a great amount of stores. Jackson left Hill to oversee the surrender while he and the rest of the Confederate column hastened to Lee's beleaguered army at Sharpsburg.

The Fourteenth Tennessee spent September sixteenth on guard duty, guarding the vast quantity of stores captured. R.T. Mockbee tells us that most of the men spent the time enhancing the contents of their haversacks with the captured Union goodies. On the night of September sixteenth, they received orders to march to Sharpsburg the next morning. Early on the morning of the seventeenth, Archer's Brigade streamed

across Bolivar Heights. Except for the Confederate battle flags, they might have been mistaken for Union troops, for they were completely clothed in blue. The line of march led to Sharpsburg. The roar of artillery told the men of Hill's Division that their comrades were engaged in a bitter struggle with McClellan's army, which outnumbered Lee's three to one. At a double-quick pace, they moved out on a forced march of eighteen miles. As they moved down the dusty road, they left a trail of discarded blue coats. They crossed the Potomac and headed forward to the heights overlooking the Antietam Valley.⁶

By two o'clock on the afternoon of the seventeenth, the condition of Lee's army was extremely critical. The Federals had made no new attack since McClaw's Division, which had arrived late in the morning and occupied a position just left of the center. O.H. Hill's battered column was trying to hold the center. A part of Longstreet's Division was already out of ammunition and was holding the position of its lines with two pieces of artillery. Lee had never known a day of suspense and danger like this before. Crisis piled upon crisis. Lee had hoped to flank the Federal right with a counter-attack, but Jackson informed him that the position of the Federal artillery made this impossible. The odds that confronted the Confederate right and Longstreet's men were more than overwhelming. It appeared that this part of the line could not hold much longer. The Union left was concentrating heavily on the Confederate right. Most of the men were near collapse. They were fighting like robots, in a daze. Entire regiments had been decimated and were being commanded by subordinate officers. Ammunition was

⁶Mockbee, pp. 29-30.

running low and had to be taken from the bodies of the Federal dead. The concentration at the Confederate right grew more intense. Time and again, McClellan hammered away at the Southern center. The Army of Northern Virginia had never known defeat, but it appeared that it was about to get the first bitter taste of that agony.

About 2:30 in the afternoon, Lee received word that A.P. Hill's men were just an hour and a half away. They had been on the road since 7:30 that morning. The question was, could the Confederate army hold out until they got there? The roar of the Union guns gave an ominous reply. The atmosphere grew tenser by the minute, and at three o'clock the anticipated Federal attack broke. On came the Federal troops, disregarding their own losses. They struck the Confederate right with a furious force. The Southern line bent, almost broke, and then shifted. The weary Rebel troops slowly and begrudgingly began to give ground. The day was lost unless the four brigades of A.P. Hill could reach Lee in time. For Lee's army to retreat would prove to be fatal, but it might be inevitable. The center was being hard-pressed, and the right was almost doubled up. A Union victory appeared almost certain. The battlefield was chaos and confusion. The North continued to hammer away at the thin, stubborn Confederate line. The Federal concentration on the Southern right was overpowering. It was now just a matter of minutes before the Southern right would be swept aside by the immense wave of the Northern forces.

Just as all seemed lost, one of Lee's subordinates saw a line of men streaming down the heights. Lee asked what flag they were flying. After a long moment, Lieutenant John Ramsey replied that they were the

men of A.P. Hill's Division.⁷ Hill was approaching at a right angle to the Federal advance. A less astute general might not have perceived the crucial situation, but luckily for Lee, Hill did. Hill led his men straight to the critical point of the Northern advance. The attack of Hill was late, but it struck with an explosive force. Archer's men were hurled against a Federal column. The Tennesseans raised a defiant rebel yell and swept forward without halting, recapturing McIntosh's battery of guns. They continued their assault against the now-retreating Federal troops.⁸

Once Hill's Division had reached the heights overlooking Antietam Creek, they could hear the "Hip, Hip, Hurrah" of the Northern forces which told them that their comrades were being driven back by Burnside's fifteen thousand men. Hill's Division consisted of only three thousand men. From his vantage point, Hill immediately realized that Lee's right flank was being turned back by Burnside's overwhelming forces who had already taken the road to Shepardstown. Hill directed his force to the critical point of the Federal movement. Hill's Division swept Burnside's troops from the Shepardstown road and recaptured a Confederate battery that had been taken earlier.⁹ They followed the Federals across a freshly plowed field to a stone fence, behind which was a large Federal force. The Yankees immediately retreated, leaving the rock fence for the Tennesseans to use as a

⁷Freeman, pp. 402 and 408.

⁸Mockbee, p. 30.

⁹Mockbee, "Why Sharpsburg Was a Drawn Battle," The Confederate Veteran, Vol. 16, No. 4 (April 1908), p. 160.

breastwork. The Tennessee marksmen picked off the Northern troops by the dozens until they were out of range of their guns. The Union artillery was forced to limber up their cannons and head for the rear to prevent being captured by Archer's men. Burnside then called to McClellan for reinforcements, but McClellan said that he had not a man to spare. He told Burnside that if he could not hold the ground with the men he had to retreat to the bridge and hold it at all cost. There is a strong possibility that if Lee had had a few more fresh troops which he could have thrown into the battle at other points, McClellan's entire army might have been routed, not just Burnside's Division.¹⁰

The Northern troops fell back to Antietam Creek under the cover of the artillery, which had been well-placed on the opposite side of the creek. A.P. Hill's skeleton division, not exceeding three thousand men, drove Burnside's command of fifteen thousand from the field, even after a forced march of eighteen miles. They held the field until the night of September nineteenth, when Lee ordered his army back across the Potomac.¹¹

As darkness fell over this dreadful place, the dead were everywhere. The lanterns of the ambulance corps on both sides flickered like lightning bugs on a summer night. Of the thirty-six thousand men that Lee had been able to put into action that day, ten thousand were now casualties. McClellan did not resume the attack the following day, but

¹⁰Felix Motlow, "Campaigns in Northern Virginia," The Confederate Veteran, Vol. 2, No. 10 (October 1894), p. 310.

¹¹Mockbee, "Historical Sketch," p. 31.

Lee's plans for an offensive into Maryland and Pennsylvania had been completely stymied. His army was too weak and short of supplies. On the night of September nineteenth, the Army of Northern Virginia retired across the Potomac into Virginia. Thus, Lee's first venture into Union territory had ended in failure.¹²

On the morning of September twentieth, Archer's Brigade waded the Potomac and headed in the direction of Martinsburg, Virginia. They went into camp, but were immediately ordered back in the direction of the Potomac. McClellan, after Antietam, had been ordered to pursue Lee as quickly as possible. Under the fire of his artillery, he attempted to move some of his brigades across the Potomac. Lee, believing that McClellan intended to put his entire army across the Potomac, ordered Longstreet's Corps to countermarch with the intention of bottling McClellan in again. Jackson, who was in charge of the rear guard, sent A.P. Hill's Division to attack the Federals before too many crossed the river. The Confederates drove the Yankee troops back into the Potomac, despite the fire of the Federal artillery, without using a single cannon. The Tennessee marksmen again picked off the blue coats as they struggled back across the Potomac. The surface of the river was blackened with the bodies of the Union dead. The Yankees lost three thousand (killed and drowned) while two hundred of them had been taken prisoner. The Confederate loss was thirty one killed and two hundred thirty one wounded.¹³

¹²Freeman, pp. 402 and 408.

¹³Motlow, "Campaigns," Vol. 2, No. 10 (October 1894), p. 310.

CHAPTER V

OH, BLOODY FREDERICKSBURG,
DECEMBER 13, 1862

"It is well that war is so terrible
We should grow too fond of it!"

Robert E. Lee¹

After driving the Federals back across the Potomac, the Fourteenth was ordered to make camp between Winchester and Harper's Ferry, where the regiment enjoyed a badly needed rest. Their ranks were strengthened by the recovery of many sick and wounded men. Part of this time was spent in destroying the tracks of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad: the most direct line between Washington City and the West. During this period, Archer's Brigade was sent to stop a Federal advance through Snicker's Gap at a place called Castleman's Ferry on the Shenandoah River. Here the Tennessee Brigade repulsed the Federals, driving them back through the gap. This battle was fought on November 6, 1862. The remainder of the time was spent in rest and relaxation.²

On November seventh, the Lincoln government removed General McClellan as commander of the Army of the Potomac and replaced him with Major General Ambrose E. Burnside. Lee reasoned that the next Federal move would be on Richmond by way of Fredericksburg. Lee's calculations of the Federal intentions were precisely correct.

¹Freeman, p. 462.

²Mockbee, "Historical Sketch," pp. 31-32.

The Army of Northern Virginia occupied the heights around the little town of Fredericksburg. After extensive plans and preparations had been made, there was nothing to do but wait for Burnside to make his move. Jackson's Corps, which had been operating in the Shenandoah Valley, was ordered to Fredericksburg at once. On November 28, Jackson reached Fredericksburg and was ordered to take up a position on the Richmond and Fredericksburg Railroad in the vicinity of Guiney's Station where he could easily move to support Longstreet.

On the morning of December 11, the Federals were observed making their first preparations to move towards the Rappahannock. Due to the heavy fog that permeated the area, visibility was less than one hundred yards. Burnside's plan was to lay pontoon bridges at three points across the river. The Confederates contested the crossing stubbornly and it was not until late on the evening of December 12 that the Northern host of 125,000 men secured the opposite bank and occupied the town of Fredericksburg. Lee, with an army of some 78,000 men, was well-entrenched in the heights above the town. A.P. Hill's Light Division, along with the rest of Jackson's Corps, made up the right flank of the Confederate line of defense. Lee was well-prepared for the Federal attack.³

When the fog began to lift on the cold morning of December 13, the Federals struck where Lee had dared hope they would. The attack came at Lee's strongest point, and the result was disaster for the Northern army.

³Freeman, pp. 431-444.

On the morning of the twelfth, A.P. Hill was ordered to move his division in relief of General Hood at Hamilton's Crossing. Taliferro was ordered to take a position in the rear of A.P. Hill.⁴ Hill's front line consisted of two regiments of Brockenbrough's Brigade, and the brigades of Generals Archer, Lane and Pender. His extreme right rested on the road leading from Hamilton's Crossing to the Port Royal Road, and his left was within a short distance of Deep Creek. There were batteries placed on the left and the right to cover Hill's line of defense. The battle line of the Light Division covered one and one-half miles. Hood's Division was on their left.

Around ten on Saturday morning, December 13, as the fog began to lift, the Northern forces were discovered massing for an attack on the low ground between Hill's Division and the river. The Federal line extended far to the left in the direction of Fredericksburg. They were massed in three lines, with their reserve strength lying behind the Port Royal Road. Their lines moved forward to the attack, with six batteries on their left and four on their right. Stuart's Horse Artillery, under the command of Major Pelham, halted their advance for over an hour. Pelham skillfully dueled and out-maneuvered the Union artillery for an hour or more until Stuart finally ordered him to retreat.⁵ This order had to be given three times before Pelham finally withdrew. Lee had watched this duel with great admiration from his position on Lee's Hill. As soon as Pelham's Battery had ceased firing, the Union batteries opened up a blistering fire that raked the entire length of Hill's line

⁴Lamont, p. 630.

⁵Ibid., p. 645.

of defense. This artillery bombardment lasted for about an hour. There was no reply from Hill's artillery or any other part of Jackson's Corps, by order of General Jackson. He did not want to show his hand, and in not replying to the Federal artillery, he beguiled them into thinking there would be little resistance on his part of the line. The Confederate strength lay in the center at a point known as Marye's Heights: a part of the line that was banked by a high stone retaining wall. Here were located the men of Longstreet's Division. Burnside's battle plan was to strike the Confederate right and their left center at Marye's Heights, which was a Confederate strong point. This position would have to be taken if Burnside's plan was to be successful. When the Southerners did not respond to the Union artillery, this must have reaffirmed the belief that Marye's Heights would be taken.⁶

Receiving no reply from the Confederate side, the Federals resumed their attack. Their batteries once again opened up to cover the Northern advance. Once the Northern lines had come within a point-blank range, the reticent Confederate batteries opened fire into the advancing Northern columns. Despite the devastating fire from the Rebel guns, the Federals continued their advance. Lane's Brigade was the first to feel the weight of the enemy's numbers. The Federals, recoiling from Lane's front, shifted their attack to Lane's right and tried to penetrate a gap between Lane and Archer.⁷ Archer, seeing that the Federals were attempting to move into the open area between him and Lane, sent word to General Gregg that he was going to move his brigade

⁶Lamont, p. 646.

⁷Ibid.

into the gap to prevent the Federals from outflanking him. Archer ordered the Fifth Alabama Battalion to move to his left because he feared Gregg's Brigade would be late in reinforcing him. When the Federals at his front advanced to the railroad, the Tennesseans opened fire. The Union forces suffered heavy losses. The Federals fell back behind the railroad cut, where they kept up a desultory fire upon Archer's front. In the meantime, a Federal column had entered a wood to Archer's left, and had succeeded in moving around his flank and attacking the Nineteenth Georgia and the Fourteenth Tennessee Regiments in the rear and flank. These regiments were forced to fall back, leaving about one hundred sixty prisoners in enemy hands.⁸

The Fourteenth Tennessee, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel James W. Lockert, discovered that a Federal column was advancing to their left under cover of the woods. Lockert ordered the regiment to open fire on the advancing Union column. He then discovered that the Nineteenth Georgia Regiment, which was located on his left, was giving way to the Federal advance. He assumed that their supply of ammunition, like his own, was exhausted. A few moments later, Lieutenant George B. Hutcheson of Company C informed him that the enemy was in their rear. The Fourteenth Tennessee held their position until another Federal line was seen advancing from the pines on their left. Lockert ordered them to retreat to an open field at their rear, where they reformed their lines and replenished their ammunition supply. Then they returned to

⁸ Lamont, p. 657.

their original position. The Federals had already been driven back by a North Carolina Brigade.⁹

In Archer's report of the Battle of Fredericksburg, he states that his officers and men acted with gallantry and bravery in carrying out their duties. He especially cited Lieutenant Z.G. Gunn from the Fourteenth Tennessee Infantry Regiment, who lost his life in the most gallant discharge of his duty.¹⁰

During the battle, Lee had no idea of what had gone wrong with Jackson's part of the line. Reports had told him that the Federals had broken through the brigades of Lane and Archer on the right, and the fighting was savage. Another column had made its way up the ravine of Deep Run and stricken the left of Pender's Brigade. Then there was such a ferocious sound that could be heard above the roar of the artillery: it was the rebel yell. The Confederates had counter-attacked and were driving the Federals from the wood. The Confederate right had been restored. It was nearly seven o'clock when the final Federal assault was repulsed with great loss. It was not until late that night that Lee learned what had happened on A.P. Hill's front. The areas between Lane and Archer were a bit of marshy ground that Hill had thought impassible and had not protected. Archer's Brigade had been on the left of this space and Lane's on the right. Discovering the weak point, the Federals had poured through. Two regiments on Archer's left and Lane's Brigade had been forced back. Archer tenaciously resisted.

⁹Lamont, p. 661.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 657.

This action on Hill's front, in which the Fourteenth Tennessee took part, had cost Lee over three thousand casualties. Even though it ended without disaster, it had not been altogether satisfactory. In the battle of Fredericksburg, the Army of the Potomac had lost 12,653 men, while Lee's losses were 5,309. Many of these had superficial wounds.¹¹

Much to Lee's chagrin, Burnside did not resume the offensive. During the late hours of the fifteenth and early hours of the sixteenth, Burnside removed his troops from Lee's front. A south wind, accompanied by a heavy rain, concealed the Federal withdrawal from Lee's army. The Federals suffered heavily as far as the battle went. But it did not go far enough to suit Lee. Nothing was really accomplished and not a foot of ground gained. The North could easily replace the men that were lost. Now the contest would have to be resumed at another time and another place.

After the withdrawal of the Northern forces, the Fourteenth Tennessee, along with the rest of Archer's Brigade, went into winter quarters at Guiney's Station. There they were provided with warm and comfortable cabins which even had functional chimneys.

In January of 1863, the Confederate War Department ordered that each of the three Tennessee regiments select one man from every company to return to Tennessee, in hopes of soliciting new recruits for their commands. The Fourteenth Tennessee Regiment's recruiting was almost impossible, due to the fact that Union forces had been in control of Clarksville and the surrounding area since the fall of Fort Donelson.¹²

¹¹Freeman, pp. 461-464.

¹²Mockbee, "Historical Sketch," pp. 35-36.

Due to the presence of Federal troops, many men must have been afraid to leave their families alone for fear that they might be punished in their absence. Those who could be persuaded to join the Confederate Army preferred to join the Army of Tennessee, under the command of General Braxton Bragg, because it operated closer to their homes.

CHAPTER VI

THE HIGH NOON OF THE CONFEDERACY: CHANCELLORSVILLE TO GETTYSBURG, MAY 1, 1863-JULY 15, 1863

On January 25, 1863, General Burnside was relieved of his command and was replaced by General Joseph Hooker, who was a corps commander, supposedly of tough fighting qualities. Hooker began to issue bellicose orders and brag that he would soon annihilate Lee's army.

In mid-February, Lee split his army, sending Fitz Lee's Cavalry to the Shenandoah. Pickett's Division was moved below Richmond to protect the coast. Hood's Division soon followed Pickett's, and Longstreet was sent along to assume the new coastal command. This reduced Lee's forces to 58,000 men, and it was assumed that Hooker had an excess of 130,000 men.

On Wednesday, April 29, 1863, it was discovered that Hooker's massive army was crossing the Rappahannock River. There was no doubt that Hooker was planning a huge flank attack on Lee's army. In an effort to prevent Stuart's Cavalry from being cut off from the main body of the army, Lee sent Dick Anderson's Division to block the Federal column bivouaced in a scrubby area known as the Wilderness in the vicinity of a house and some outbuildings known as Chancellorsville. Lee now swung the main body of his army around to meet Hooker in the rugged terrain called the Wilderness. Jackson was sent to support Anderson and by May first he was on the skirmish line. The two armies faced one another in terrain that was blinding to both. Hooker had

maneuvered Lee out of his impregnable position at Fredericksburg. Jackson felt that Hooker's left flank would not permit attack. He was puzzled over a means of getting at the enemy. Lee and Jackson both realized that the small Confederate Army of some 50,000 could not storm the Federal position. Lee decided to send Jackson around the Federal right in an effort to outflank Hooker's army. This was Jackson's greatest hour, and it was to be his last. Stuart's Cavalry was to cover Jackson's movements. Now it was up to Jackson to find suitable passage for his men and artillery. A local resident named Wellford showed Jackson a route by which he could move his army. Jackson was to take his whole corps on this flanking movement, leaving Lee only the divisions of Anderson and McClaw to face Hooker's front.¹ Early on the morning of May second, Jackson's Corps began its march, leaving Lee with less than 15,000 troops. Everything depended on "Stonewall's" ability to strike Hooker's right flank in time.

The Fourteenth Tennessee, with the rest of Archer's Brigade, accompanied Hill's Division and Jackson's Corps from Hamilton's Crossing to Chancellorsville. When, at eight on the morning of May first, they reached a point some four miles from Chancellorsville, they found Major General R.H. Anderson's Division fortifying against the Federal forces. A line of battle was formed: Rhodes in advance, Hill supporting, and Colston in reserve. The enemy was forced back to Chancellorsville. Here the Federals were in a position of great strength, but darkness fell

¹Burke Davis, The Gray Fox (New York: Rinehart and Company, 1956), pp. 177-190.

before the Confederates could ascertain the exact strength of the Federal position. The Confederate advance was halted, and they formed a line of battle at right angles to the Plank Road, extending to the right to Mine Road, and to the left in the direction of Catherine Furnace. Here the Confederate Army made camp on the night of May first. The next morning, Archer's Brigade relieved Iverson's Brigade of Rhode's Division. One hour later, Archer received orders to withdraw from his position on Plank Road and follow the other divisions which were using the Wellford Furnace Road. Archer received information that part of the Confederate wagon train was under attack by the Federals. He hurried his brigade to Wellford Furnace to aid the besieged Confederate wagons. Upon arriving at the furnace, he found that the Federal attack had been repulsed by Lieutenant Colonel J. Thompson Brown of the artillery and some infantry, among which were Companies L and H of the Fourteenth Tennessee Regiment, commanded by Captain W.S. Moore. Archer's Brigade did not rejoin Hill's Division until late that night,² thus missing Jackson's famous flanking attack on Hooker's right late that same afternoon.

Stonewall Jackson caught the unsuspecting right wing of Hooker's army cooking their rations late in the afternoon of May 2, 1863. Jackson's surprise-attack completely routed Hooker's right wing, driving it from its position. This flanking maneuver immortalized Jackson in the annals of military history as one of the greatest military strategists of his time.

² John Hurst, "Archer's Brigade at Chancellorsville," The Confederate Veteran, Vol. 7 (1899), p. 261.

Captain Moore, with Companies L and H of the Fourteenth Tennessee under his command, had been left on picket duty in front of Chancellorsville when Archer's Brigade moved off. He was later relieved by Major General Anderson's troops. He was trying to overtake Archer's Brigade when he heard firing in his rear. Several officers rode up informing him that some Confederate supply wagons were under attack. Although he was without orders from his superiors, he rushed his men back to support the beleaguered wagons, reporting to Colonel Brown on the artillery. He formed a line of battle with the Twenty-third Georgia, which was on guard at that point. He found this regiment in a confused condition. He was able to rally this force, and hotly contested the enemy for over twenty minutes while the wagon train made its escape. Moore remained long enough to give them an hour and a half's head start; they were able to escape with the loss of only one caisson. He rejoined the Fourteenth Tennessee Regiment before it halted for the night.

Archer's Brigade bivouaced the night of May second on the Plank Road; the brigade was halted to guard against the approach of Averill's Cavalry, a Federal command of some 3,500 horses. At twelve o'clock that night, he was ordered three miles down the Plank Road. Here the brigade filed to the right and moved to a perpendicular position about six hundred yards from the road. There, it found General McGowan's Brigade in a line of battle running from east to west. Archer formed his brigade to the right of McGowan. The line was formed a short time before daybreak, Sunday, May third, and skirmishers were thrown out in front.

From this point on May third, Archer's Brigade did its first real fighting in the battle of Chancellorsville. The Eleventh Federal Army Corps, commanded by Major General O.O. Howard, had been crushed and scattered six or eight hours before Archer's Brigade reached that part of the field. Jackson had been wounded several hours before Archer's arrival and had been carried back to the field hospital several miles west of Chancellorsville, where Dr. McGuire had amputated Jackson's left arm at the shoulder soon after midnight.

At sunrise on Sunday, May third, Archer's Brigade moved to the attack. The Federal Third Army Corps, under the command of Major General Daniel E. Sickles, was evacuating its position. Archer pressed the retreating Federals so closely that he captured four pieces of artillery and one hundred prisoners. Two separate assaults by the Tennesseans on strong Federal positions failed, and Archer was forced to retire. The Confederate artillery moved in and occupied an elevated position at Hazel Grove. Three regiments of Dole's Brigade, under the command of Colonel John T. Mercer, came upon Archer's left, and the troops of Major General R.H. Anderson joined his right. General Lee rode up and ordered Archer, along with three regiments of Dole's Brigade, to press the attack. They advanced some four to five hundred yards, and halted so that Dole could distribute ammunition to his men. Contrary to orders from Stuart, who was now in command of Jackson's Corps, Archer moved slowly forward and came to the ascending hill in front of Chancellorsville. This put them in full view and range of the enemy's cannon, which opened fire on the advancing line. During this advance, Archer became lost from his own brigade. He was able to rejoin

it a short time later. Archer feared that in his absence his brigade had been forced back, but was relieved to find that his little regiments had moved forward and driven the enemy from the trenches around the Chancellor house.

Archer, assuming command of his brigade, once again pressed the attack and became hotly engaged. Out-numbered five to one, Archer succeeded in capturing a battery of four guns. This gallant attack by the Tennesseans secured a key enemy position which enabled the Confederate artillery to silence a twenty-nine-gun Federal battery that had inflicted devastating damage on the Confederate lines. From this position, the Confederate cannons were also able to deliver an effective fire on the Federal left.

After securing the hill, the Tennesseans struck the Federal right, driving the Federals before them. This ended the action for the Fourteenth Tennessee and Archer's Brigade at Chancellorsville. Archer reported his losses at fourteen killed and three hundred seventeen wounded. Out of fourteen hundred men that Archer led into battle, he suffered twenty-five percent losses. Of these, the Fourteenth Tennessee Regiment's losses were seven killed, fifty-six wounded, three missing. Among the list of the dead in the Fourteenth Tennessee was Captain W.W. Thompson. The commander of the Fourteenth Tennessee Regiment, Colonel William McComb, suffered severe wounds during this engagement.³

To Lee, the Confederate victory over Hooker's army at Chancellorsville was the supreme moment of the war, but the triumph had been a costly one. Lee had lost his right arm. He received the news of

³Hurst, p. 262.

the death of Lieutenant General Thomas J. (Stonewall) Jackson, who had died on May 10 from pneumonia after the amputation of his left arm.

After his defeat at Chancellorsville, Hooker retreated back across the Rappahannock River, where he took a strong position. This forced Lee to resume his old position at Fredericksburg. Archer's Brigade resumed its original place in the Confederate line of defense. Hill's Division remained at Fredericksburg until it was ordered to follow Lee, who was already in the Shenandoah Valley with Longstreet's and Ewell's Corps.

Gettysburg: Three Days in Pennsylvania

Oh Lord Give me the strength and
Courage to stand by my convictions
As I endure this ordeal by fire
For I know the worst is yet to come.⁴

After Chancellorsville, Lee's main concern was a replacement for Stonewall Jackson as commander of the Second Corps. This was one of the most crucial periods of Lee's military career. He was now in the process of completely reorganizing the Army of Northern Virginia. The success of this reorganization remained to be seen at Gettysburg.

Lee proposed the reorganization of his army into three corps. General R.S. Ewell would command Jackson's old Second Corps, General A.P. Hill was appointed to command the new Third Corps, and General James Longstreet would retain the command of the First Corps. Archer's Brigade, including the Fourteenth Tennessee, was in Heth's Division, in Hill's Corps.

⁴Charles Wallace Cross, original verse, 1975.

The reorganization affected all three arms of the service. It mixed new units with old, broke up many long-standing friendships, and placed many veteran regiments under commanders who were unacquainted with the men and the methods of Lee. The infantry was as disciplined and intrepid as ever, but many of its officers were inexperienced and nervous under their new responsibilities.

Longstreet had undergone a change of attitude since his return from the coast which would have ominous consequences for Lee's future plans. Longstreet's taste of independent command had greatly increased his opinion of himself. Jackson's death had also increased his feeling of self-importance. The most telling loss of all was the loss of Jackson's discipline, daring and speed. Such was Lee's dilemma as he made preparations to invade the North.⁵

Lee was of the opinion that if he could obtain sufficient troops and draw the Army of the Potomac away from the Rappahannock River, he would go on the offensive and enter Pennsylvania. He did not want to fight on the Rappahannock, where he could not follow up his victory. He hesitated to take his army into war-torn counties around Washington, reasoning that the enemy could withdraw within the defenses of that city, as Pope had done earlier. Lee felt that his army could not be properly fed in Virginia, whereas in Pennsylvania it could be. He planned to move into the rich Pennsylvania valleys, drawing the Federals after him. He hoped this would clear Virginia of Union troops and break up their plans for the summer. He had reason to believe that this move would

⁵Douglas Freeman, R.E. Lee: A Biography, Vol. 3 (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons), pp. 8-17.

cause the North to withdraw the troops that were threatening the South Atlantic coasts, and alleviate the pressure on the Southern railroads. An invasion of the North might enhance the peace movement which was now gathering strength in the East. Above all else, Lee knew that he must invade the North in order to feed and supply his army.⁶ On the morning of June third, Lee set his army in motion. The most difficult campaign of the war for the Army of Northern Virginia was about to begin.

In the latter part of June, it was learned that General Joseph Hooker had been replaced as commander of the Army of the Potomac by General George Meade, a corps commander at Chancellorsville.

On June thirtieth, Lee received news from A.P. Hill that a brigade of North Carolinians, under Pettigrew, had moved into Gettysburg during the day, looking for shoes. They had brushed with the Federal cavalry, and beyond the town they had plainly heard the drums of the enemy.⁷

Gettysburg The First Day

A.P. Hill's Corps had been camped at Cashtown, Pennsylvania, and on the morning of July first they proceeded to Gettysburg. At this time, Gettysburg was held by Buford's Division of Federal cavalry, with their pickets well out on the Cashtown road. Archer's Brigade led the advance of Heth's Division, which was at the head of A.P. Hill's Corps. Archer's Brigade soon came into contact with some of Buford's dismounted

⁶Freeman, Biography, pp. 18-19.

⁷Davis, pp. 221-222.

cavalry and drove them back into Gettysburg. About ten in the morning, the Confederates were within sight of the town. They had driven Buford's Cavalry into Seminary Grove when a Federal battery unlimbered its guns and opened fire on Archer's advancing line.⁸ The Tennesseans, giving a rebel yell, charged across Willoughby's Run toward the Federal battery. As they entered a dense wheat field, they ran into an advance column of General Reynold's Division, which poured a killing fire into their ranks. In the meantime, Buford's Cavalry had fallen on Archer's rear. The fighting was heavy, with both sides suffering many casualties. The Tennesseans, loading and firing in the cover of the wheat stand, poured a fire into the enemy's ranks, causing the death of General Reynolds. During the melee, Archer and about two hundred of his men were cut off from the main body of the brigade and subsequently captured. No members of the Fourteenth were included. They were taken prisoner by a brigade of Reynold's Division known as the infamous "Iron Brigade." The remainder of Archer's Brigade was driven back across Willoughby Run, where they re-formed their battle line and waited for the rest of Heth's Division to come up. Colonel B.D. Fry of the Thirteenth Alabama Regiment assumed command of the brigade.

Heth had notified Lee earlier of Archer's encounter with Buford's Cavalry, and Lee then sent word to Heth not to bring on a general engagement. Why Heth pressed the battle in disobedience of Lee's orders, against such heavy odds, is a mystery. Archer's encounter with Buford's and Reynolds' Divisions was an accident, but it developed into

⁸Mockbee, "Historical Sketch," p. 41.

the battle known as Gettysburg. It was Archer's Brigade that fired the first shot at Gettysburg, and as it will be seen, they were to have the dubious honor of firing the last.

Heth rested his men and made preparations to attack with his entire division. Hill directed Pender to support him. Heth's Division was now out of range and there was only sporadic artillery fire to be heard. Lee, surveying the situation, wanted to avoid a major battle if possible. He was uncertain of the strength of the forces opposing him and was still hesitant to order an attack because only a portion of his army had reached Gettysburg. About 3:00 P.M., there was Federal movement north of Gettysburg and Hill's Corps became engaged with the enemy. Rhode's Division, of Ewell's Corps, marching under orders to join Lee at Gettysburg, hit the Federals who were engaged with Hill on their right flank. Rhodes was mixing it up pretty well with the Union troops. Heth sent a message to Lee informing him of Rhode's predicament and suggesting an attack, but Lee refused because Longstreet's Corps had not yet arrived.

Now the situation changed: Early's Division of Ewell's Corps came up and struck the Federal right. Lee now reversed his decision. He ordered Heth's Division to attack and Pender was brought up in support. Heth's brigades swept eastward, Pender's troops joined him, and the two divisions roared over Willoughby's Run. Rhodes and Early swept everything before them. The Federals were totally routed and retreated to the ridges south and east of Gettysburg, where they took up a defensive position.⁹

⁹Freeman, Lee, pp. 68-78.

The Confederate failure to dislodge the Federals from the ridges south and east of Gettysburg before Meade could concentrate his entire army there spelled doom for Lee's invading army. Lee predicted correctly that these ridges were where Meade planned to make his stand. The inexperience of the recently reorganized Confederate Army manifested itself at Gettysburg. The procrastination and ineptness of many of its commanders was also evident. The vacillating Ewell delayed too long and was unable to take Cemetery Ridge on the first day. Cemetery Ridge was the key to capturing the high ground which the Union Army was beginning to occupy. This, coupled with Longstreet's obstinacy and procrastination in support of his own plan of battle, totally disrupted Lee's plans.

Once the Federals had been driven to the ridges, Hill's Corps was sent to the rear to recuperate.

Gettysburg The Second Day

Archer's Brigade and the Fourteenth Tennessee did not participate in the second day's battle at Gettysburg. They were held in reserve and given a rest, as was Hill's entire corps.

Early on the morning of July second, Lee ascertained that Cemetery Hill could still be taken because the two defeated Federal corps which occupied the ridge had not been reinforced during the night. Lee planned to use Longstreet's divisions for this task, but the slow-moving Longstreet had not yet arrived. Longstreet's delay caused golden minutes to slip away. Once Longstreet did arrive, he renewed his argument of the previous day for a turning movement to get between the enemy and Washington. Lee once again rejected this plan, as he had done the day before.

As Longstreet argued and Lee waited for his strung-out divisions to file in, the Federals were in the process of reinforcing their positions on Cemetery Ridge. Precious time had been lost. What once had seemed an easy movement had now turned into a difficult task. Once the Confederate attack came, it was too little, too late.

Gettysburg The Third Day

On the morning of July third, Lee had enough troops on hand to dislodge Meade's army from the ridges around Gettysburg. Stuart's wandering cavalry, whose absence had caused many problems the first day, was now on hand.

Because the morale was still superb, a lot of ground had been taken, favorable artillery positions had been secured, and reinforcements had arrived. Lee decided to renew the battle on the third day. He ordered Ewell to attack at daylight and the artillery to cover his advance. Lee informed Longstreet that he was to support Ewell in the assault, but Longstreet delayed still, arguing for his plan of a maneuver to the right. Lee once again rejected Longstreet's plan, telling him that he intended to attack Meade's army where it stood with three divisions of Longstreet's Corps: Hood, McClaw, and Pickett. Longstreet continued to oppose Lee's plan. Lee, realizing Longstreet's lack of confidence, revised his plan. He had planned to assault the Federal right but now shifted the emphasis to the center of the Federal defense. He left Hood's and McClaw's Divisions where they were and substituted Heth's Division, two brigades of Pender's, and the fresh division of General Pickett. This was to be the attacking column.¹⁰

¹⁰Freeman, Lee, pp. 68-78.

Heth's Division was now commanded by Pettigrew, Heth having been wounded on the first day. Early on the morning of July third, Lee moved Heth's Division to the right and formed a line on Seminary Ridge. This was opposite and about a mile from the center of Cemetery Ridge, where the enemy was strongly fortified, with the artillery covering their front. There was an open plain with a slight incline to the foot of Cemetery Ridge extending from Seminary Ridge with no obstructions except three fences. For about four hours this area must have been under the scrutiny of every man in Heth's Division, each man knowing what the ominous silence that pervaded the field meant.¹¹

June Kimble, an orderly sergeant of Company A, Fourteenth Tennessee Regiment, describes this moment:

. . . I walked out alone to the edge of the open, some fifty yards in advance of the line then lying in the timber, and there deliberately surveyed the field from Round Top Mountain on our right to the suburbs and spires of Gettysburg on the left. I sought to locate a point on Cemetery Ridge about which our brigade and regiment would strike the enemy, provided our advance was made in a straight line. Realizing just what was before me and the brave boys with me and at one of the most serious moments in life, I asked aloud the question: "June Kimble, are you going to do your duty today?" The audible answer was "I'll do it, so help me God." I turned and walked back to the line. "How does it look, June?" said Lieutenant Waters. I replied, "Boys, if we have to go, it will be hot for us, and we will have to do our best." When I responded to my own question as to doing my duty, a change of feeling immediately took possession of me; all dread even passed away and from that moment to the close of that disastrous struggle I retained my nerve, and my action was as calm and deliberate as if upon dress parade. It was different from all other experiences, many and various, in my four years of unbroken service.¹²

¹¹Kimble, "Tennesseans at Gettysburg--the Retreat," The Confederate Veteran, Vol. 18, No. 10, p. 460.

¹²Ibid.

About 1:00 P.M. a solitary cannon-shot was heard far off to the right to Archer's Brigade. The shot was fired by Longstreet's command. Instantly every Confederate battery opened fire and the Federal batteries quickly answered the rebel guns. The third and last day of the Battle of Gettysburg had begun. Following the signal gun there was an artillery duel which the troops said was unequal to any they had ever known. Men went deaf from the roar of the mighty cannonade. The roar and crash of five hundred booming cannons, the screaming of bursting shells, and the swish and crashing of solid shot brought forth pandemonium on both sides of the field.¹³ June Kimble says,

The very earth shook as from a mighty quake. So intense were its vibrations that loose grass, leaves and twigs arose from six to eight inches above the ground, hovered and quivered as birds about to drop until the mighty roar ceased.¹⁴

The bombardment stopped almost as quickly as it had begun.

There was another lull; every man in the Fourteenth Tennessee and Heth's Division drew a sigh of relief. Then the command, "Attention" rang out clearly all along the line and 14,000 men instantly sprang to their feet. Pickett's three brigades, with Pettigrew commanding, were ordered, "Dress to the left"; Heth's six brigades, with Pettigrew commanding, were ordered to "Dress to the right." Archer's Brigade was located near the center and it was to be the guiding brigade of the assaulting column, an honor that many of the men could have done without. The order was then given to fix bayonets, and the rattle of steel could

¹³Kimble, p. 460.

¹⁴Ibid.

be heard down the line. The men knew what this command meant: if they made it to the Federal lines, the fighting would be hand-to-hand. The order to move forward was given and 14,000 men moved onto the open field. All that could be heard was the tramping of the seasoned veterans with steady nerve and determined purpose. As the gray line moved across, as if on parade, the enemy's long-range artillery opened up. Gaps were torn in the line from the Federal guns, only to close as the line moved steadily forward. The Confederates reached the first fence and quickly toppled it with the points of their bayonets. The gray column reached the second fence, which was easily swept aside. Then the third obstacle appeared: a heavy slab fence which was too strong to be quickly pushed down.¹⁵ Here the Confederates were forced to climb over the fence. There was much confusion and much of the column became broken and disorganized. As the Confederates scaled the fence they became ready targets for the Federal sharpshooters. The Federal bullets peppered the slab fence and claimed many lives. Once they had crossed the fence, the column was re-formed and the gray line resolutely pressed on as if on parade. Segreant Kimble describes this magnificent line of men:

It was here that I again sprang in advance, looked up and down the line, and became an eyewitness to the most vivid and stupendous battle scene doubtless that ever fell to mortal. As far as I could see this same line seemed to move as steady as it did from the start.¹⁶

Now the Confederate column was in range and the Union guns set about their bloody work; canister and grape spewed forth from the

¹⁵Kimble, p. 460.

¹⁶Ibid.

Federal batteries and tore gaping holes in the gray line. Flags went down, only to be picked up again and the ranks closed. The line was growing smaller with every step, but on came the red flag of the rebellion.

The Fourteenth Tennessee Regiment lost three color-bearers before the crest of the stone fence was reached. The names of those men deserve to appear here. They are Thomas Davidson, Company A, Columbus Horn, Company G, and Powell, a colored corporal of Company C.¹⁷

The Pickett-Pettigrew-Trimble assault of July third approached the Federal works in a well-dressed line. The critical fighting moved from the Confederate right to the left and was without cohesion. Pickett's battle was waning as Pettigrew's began, and Pettigrew, who was commanding Heth's Division, had shot his wad when Trimble's greatest effort began. The impression has been left that only Armistead's men stormed the works. This does not agree with the events of the battle. Three of Pettigrew's and both of Trimble's Brigades actually struck the Northerners further in advance and nearer the summit than Pickett's because of the configuration of the Federal line. The Pettigrew-Trimble advance, in which Archer's Brigade and the Fourteenth Tennessee took part, was as splended and as magnificent in every respect as the advance of Pickett's Virginians. In appearance, Pettigrew's line seemed twice as long as Pickett's. As Pettigrew's assaulting column came into line with Pickett's, it made the advancing column some three-quarters of a mile long. When the Federals first saw the advancing Pettigrew, he was nearly a half-mile to the left and rear of Pickett. A storm of shells

¹⁷Kimble, p. 460.

virtually wiped out the two left brigades of Mayo and Davis, but Pettigrew's old brigade and the remnants of Archer's Brigade, under the command of Colonel B.D. Fry, tenaciously pressed on not far behind the left of Pickett's line. Pettigrew's column had to travel much further than Pickett's and were forced to move diagonally across the field in order to reach their destination. The terrain which Pettigrew crossed was not as undulating as the ground which Pickett moved over, and though Pickett had very little cover, Pettigrew had none at all. Pettigrew was especially exposed to the Federal's batteries located in the cemetery and to Ziegler's Woods, which poured in an oblique fire. The first fire from these batteries shook the troops as if they were struck by lightning. They halted momentarily, closed up their ranks, and moved forward, leaving the fallen behind. As they reached the Emmitsburg Road, they were given no relief from the Federal bullets and canister. They came directly under the fire of the bluecoats behind the stone wall on the crest of Cemetery Ridge.

The tough old Alabaman, Colonel B.D. Fry (better known to his men as "Old Nicaragua") commanded Archer's Alabamans and Tennesseans who had survived the first day's battle. There had been apprehension from the beginning because of the gap between Pickett's and Pettigrew's Divisions; however, this gap was skillfully closed by Fry and Pettigrew. As Archer's Brigade, under Fry, moved up the slope, they suffered staggering losses. Garnett's Brigade was to Fry's right, and to his left was Pettigrew's own brigade, under Colonel James K. Marshall. The time taken to climb Cemetery Hill must have seemed interminable to Archer's Brigade, but as Fry led the Tennesseans to the crest,

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accompanied by Marshall's Brigade, the Confederates let out a rebel yell that chilled the hot July afternoon and stormed the wall. As the Virginians and Tennesseans crossed the wall, a Virginia lieutenant and a Tennessee captain shook hands. As Fry's Tennesseans climbed over the wall, following the commands of Kemper and Armistead, the brigades of Marshall and Davis rushed past and struck the wall ahead.¹⁸ Colonel Fry fell with his fifth wound before he reached the wall, but cheered Archer's Brigade on as it clambered into the Federal works.¹⁹

For five or ten minutes Archer's Brigade fought stubbornly to hold its ground and prayed that help would come, but it never did.²⁰ Federal reinforcements poured in and the Tennesseans had to yield the ground they had gained. They knew the Battle of Gettysburg was over, and many members of the Fourteenth Tennessee Regiment chose to die or be captured rather than give up the ground they had fought to win.

The battle flag of the Fourteenth Tennessee Regiment was captured inside the Federal works by Sergeant Major William B. Hinks, U.S.A., of the Fourteenth Connecticut Volunteers. This was the first Confederate battle flag captured inside the Union fortifications.²¹

The Fourteenth Tennessee could count three hundred sixty five bayonets when it went into the first day's fighting at Gettysburg. That day's fighting left it with only sixty men, under the command of Captain

¹⁸Mockbee, "Historical Sketch," p. 44.

¹⁹Glenn Tucker, High Tide at Gettysburg (New York: Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc, 1958), pp. 367-369.

²⁰George R. Stewart, Pickett's Charge (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin Company, 1959), p. 203.

²¹Kimble, p. 461.

L.B. Phillips. All but three of these fell in the assault on Cemetery Ridge.²²

This by no means indicates that the Fourteenth Tennessee Regiment was dissolved after Gettysburg. There were possibly many sick, wounded, or straggling soldiers who did not take part in the engagement at Gettysburg. Many of the ones wounded on the first day, not severely perhaps, did not take part in the battle on the third day. Of the three (so-called) survivors of this regiment who made it through the Battle of Gettysburg, two of them left a written testament to this fact. They were Sergeant June Kimble and Second Sergeant R.T. Mockbee of B Company, and the third survivor is not known. The accounts of these two men provide much of the written history of the Fourteenth. Both of them have been used extensively in writings about the regiment. Somehow, the regiment was glued back together, and followed Lee all the way to Appomatox. After the repulse on Cemetery Ridge, Sergeant June Kimble says that he made his way back to the Confederate lines and was able to find the remnants of the Fourteenth Tennessee Regiment, which consisted of about one hundred men. The regiment was reorganized under the command of Captain J.M. Dale of Company C and Lieutenant Charles Mitchell of Company H.²³

Lee's attempt to dislodge Meade's army from the ridges around Gettysburg had failed. Many of the Confederates asked themselves the question, "What if Jackson had been there," but battles are not won on

²²Lamont, "Report of Major Theodore G. Ellis, Fourteenth Connecticut Volunteers," Official Records, Series 1, Vol. 27, pp. 466-468.

²³Tucker, p. 369.

"ifs." On the night of July fourth, in a blinding rainstorm, Lee's army limped back towards Virginia, with Fitz Lee's Cavalry and Heth's Division covering the retreat.

The Falling Waters Incident

On the night of July third there was little sleep or rest for the wearied, battered veterans of Lee's army. The morning of July fourth broke brightly and it was plain to see the look of determination and defiance on the face of every Confederate standing behind the guns of Alexander's Artillery. There was a renewed faith and blind confidence in their leader, Robert E. Lee. The men clad in gray rags were not whipped, as they stood in the sweltering heat of that July day and hoped that the Yankees would attack. Every soldier, down to the last private, wondered why the blue-bellies did not come on. They knew that their stamina and innate Southern courage, which had so many times snatched victory from the jaws of defeat, were still with them.

On July fourth, Lee's army began its retreat to Hagerstown, Maryland. Longstreet and Ewell followed the retreat on the right, with A.P. Hill's Corps on the left. The rear guard was composed of Heth's Division and Fitz Lee's Cavalry.

The Union Cavalry attempted to penetrate this line of march with the objective of capturing Heth's entire division. But Fitz Lee's excellent cavalry intervened time and again, and drove the Federal horsemen off and kept the way open for Heth's Division.

Lee's retreating columns reached Hagerstown on the eighth of July. Here Lee concentrated his forces and waited for Meade to come.

Once again Lee offered battle, but Meade declined. About July twelfth, Lee again began his retreat, with Heth's Division once again acting as his rear guard. On the morning of July fourteenth, the members of the Fourteenth Tennessee Regiment found themselves covering the road to the pontoon bridge at Falling Waters on the Potomac.

As the regiment rested, a body of cavalry was seen riding through the heavy timber about three or four hundred yards to their front. They assumed it was a part of Stuart's Cavalry, since he had been operating in the area. No pickets had been put out, and the members of the Fourteenth were not concerned about these horsemen. Generals Pettigrew and Heth were standing on the road discussing the situation. Two members of the Fourteenth Tennessee--June Kimble and Billy Daniels--were sitting on a dirt mound to the left of the road, some ten feet from Heth and Pettigrew. The men of Archer's Brigade were lounging on the ground, many of them asleep. Suddenly, a body of horsemen came into the road in a sweeping trot. They unfurled their pennants, drew their sabers, and broke into a gallop. Daniels and Kimble leaped from the mound on which they were sitting and yelled to their comrades, "Look out boys; the Yanks are on us." Instantly, the members of Archer's Brigade grabbed their guns and sprang to their feet. General Heth quickly rode to the rear and General Pettigrew, on foot, backed to the head of Company A, Fourteenth Tennessee, and yelled, "Stand your ground boys." The sharp crack of pistols rang out from the head of the enemy column, and General Pettigrew fell to the ground dead, the first victim. Simultaneously a quick volley from the aroused veterans emptied the saddles of the leader and his nearest horsemen.

The force of the charge could not be checked, as the Federals rode head-long into disorganized Confederates. A fierce, bloody, hand-to-hand struggle followed and quickly, all was over. Kimble learned from one of the wounded that Major Weber was the commander of these eighty six men of the Fourth Michigan Cavalry of Kilpatrick's Division. Out of the eighty six Union cavalry, only three escaped. The fight lasted just three minutes.

Kilpatrick had discovered the weakness of the remnants of Heth's Division, and immediately began preparations for attack. He overlapped both wings of the small, eight-hundred-man Confederate force with his division of some ten thousand. The Confederates were ordered to retire to the bridge, and they moved quickly. Soon the enemy appeared, and the fighting began. The pontoon bridges lay some two and one-half miles from where the Confederates started. The enemy cavalry pressed every inch of the retreat, and many Southerners fell by the wayside, exhausted. It was shoot, run, and load, with no let-up.

About thirty members of the Fourteenth agreed to stay together, including June Kimble and Lieutenant Jim Howard. They crossed the bridge as it swung loose from the Maryland shore.²⁴ Kimble describes the way they felt before the crossing:

But before we reached that bridge, when our knees began to tremble and hope was pinning on its wings for a farewell flight, a cannon roared and a shell exploded among the charging columns, another and another, by order of A.P. Hill. Did you ever hear sweet music when you happened to be very tired, somewhat anxious, and just a little bit scared? Talk about your Harps of a thousand strings; there was more melody in the roar of that old gun and the pow of that beautiful

²⁴Kimble, p. 461.

shell than all the hand organs and Jew's-harps in the world put together. It was mesmeric, soothing, exhilarating, inspiring, a nerve restorer.²⁵

On July fifteenth, Lee's army moved in the direction of Winchester, Virginia, and then on to Culpepper. The Fourteenth Tennessee, along with the rest of Archer's Brigade, once again made up the rear guard of Lee's army. They were sporadically engaged with General Custer's Cavalry, and on several occasions Custer's horsemen suffered severe losses at the hands of the Tennesseans.

Archer's Brigade had been greatly reduced and some of its companies were now without commanding officers. They were integrated with Brockenbrough's Brigade of Virginians, under the command of Brigadier General H.H. Walker, and remained under his command until May 6, 1864, when Walker was severely wounded in the Wilderness Campaign.

Lee's army crossed the Rappahannock River and took up a position on the south of the Rapidan River. The Fourteenth Tennessee Regiment went into camp near Orange Court House.²⁶

²⁵ Kimble, pp. 461-462.

²⁶ Ibid.

EPILOGUE

The Fourteenth Tennessee Infantry Regiment continued in existence throughout the rest of the war. They fought with Lee at the Wilderness, Spotsylvania Court House, Cold Harbor, and suffered the ordeal in the trenches at Petersburg. What was left of this grand old regiment surrendered with Lee at Appomatox.

The success or failure of every historical narrative depends on the primary material available at the time of the writing. After Gettysburg there is little written about the Fourteenth Tennessee, and the material available was not enough to continue an effective narrative. There are many reasons for this. If someone had written on this regiment earlier there possibly would have been more material available. Letters, documents, and diaries are lost as time moves on; witnesses die and memories grow dim.

After Gettysburg, the Confederate army was in a state of deterioration. Its ranks had grown thin and supplies were short. Men had more important things to worry about and to do than to keep diaries, write letters, or even to keep accurate records. Many of the Confederate Army records from the Wilderness to Appomatox were lost or destroyed. Because of the lack of resources I have decided to end the history of this regiment here.

It is known that the Fourteenth was in the last battle of the war on April 1, 1865. They retreated with Lee to Appomatox Court House, where they lay down their arms on April 9, 1865. They were in thirty-

three pitched battles and twice as many minor ones. The Fourteenth testified to its devotion to the cause it served by its deeds of valor and the blood of its slain. Its heroic dead lie buried on all the great battlefields of Virginia, Maryland and Pennsylvania.

The men of the Fourteenth Tennessee Infantry Regiment were like men in wars before and since in that they were guided by a force beyond their control. They were like pawns on a chess-board, each one expendable if it was necessary. It sometimes seems like the ends of historical events are written before they ever begin. Men become actors in a play whose end was already written before they began to play out their roles. One could look back and see the outcome of the Civil War before it ever began. It is easy for us, with hindsight, to look back more than one hundred years and see what men too close to the scene could have no way of knowing.

As history moves on, man has never learned that war is a bad way to settle his differences. Vanity is a judge in war, and Vengeance becomes the executioner. Because man is caught up in forces that pass through his time, and because he has no control over some events, the only way to judge him is by how he stands up to the situation. In many cases he cannot judge whether his cause is right or wrong. The important thing is whether he truly believes in it and has the courage to speak up for what he thinks is right.

Using this courage and belief as a measure, the men of the Fourteenth Tennessee Infantry Regiment might be said to have measured up to all that could be expected of them.

THE GODS OF THE COPYBOOK
HEADINGS

Rudyard Kipling

As I pass through my incarnations in every age and race,
I make my proper prostrations to the Gods of the Market-Place.
Peering through reverent fingers I watch them flourish and fall,
And the Gods of the Copybook Headings, I notice, outlast them all.

We were living in trees when they met us. They showed us each in turn
That Water would certainly wet us, as Fire would certainly burn;
But we found them lacking in Uplift, Vision and Breadth of Mind,
So we left them to teach the Gorillas while we followed the March of
Mankind.

We moved as the Spirit listed. They never altered their pace.
Being neither cloud nor wind-borne like the Gods of the Market-Place;
But they always caught up with our progress, and presently word would
come

That a tribe had been wiped off its icefield, or the lights had gone
out in Rome.

When the Cambrian measures were forming, They promised perpetual peace.
They swore, if we gave them our weapons, that the wars of the tribes
would cease.

But when we disarmed They sold us and delivered us bound to our foe,
And the Gods of the Copybook Headings said: "Stick to the Devil
you know."

On the first Feminian Sandstones we were promised the Fuller Life
(Which started by loving our neighbor and ended by loving his wife)
Till our women had no more children and the men lost reason and faith.
And the Gods of the Copybook Headings said: "The Wages of Sin is Death."

In the Carboniferous Epoch we were promised abundance for all,
By robbing selected Peter to pay Collective Paul;
But, though we had plenty of money, there was nothing our money could
buy,
And the Gods of the Copybook Headings said: "If you don't work you die."

Then the Gods of the Market tumbled, and their smooth-tongued wizards
withdrew,
And the hearts of the meanest were humbled and began to believe it was
true
That All is not Gold that Glitters, and Two and Two make Four--
And the Gods of the Copybook Headings limped up to explain it once more.

.....

As it will be in the future, it was at the birth of Man--
There are only four things certain since Social Progress began--
That the Dog returns to his Vomit and the Sow returns to her Mire,
And the burnt Fool's bandaged finger goes wabbling back to the fire;
And that after this is accomplished, and the brave new world begins
When all men are paid for existing and no man must pay for his sins,
As surely as Water will wet us, as surely as Fire will burn,
The Gods of the Copybook Headings with terror and slaughter return!

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