# THE TREASON TRIAL OF IVA TOGURI, ALIAS TOKYO ROSE

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# THE TREASON TRIAL OF IVA TOGURI, ALIAS "TOKYO ROSE"

An Abstract
Presented to
the Graduate Council of
Austin Peay State University

In partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree

Master of Arts

by
Betty Glenn Kemp
August, 1977

#### ABSTRACT

In September, 1949, American-born Iva Toguri was sentenced to ten years in prison and fined \$10,000 for committing treason against the United States of America. According to the Department of Justice, Ms. Toguri aided the Japanese government, the declared enemy of the United States, by making radio broadcasts with the intent of undermining Allied troop morale during World War II.

The purpose of this paper is to divulge to the reader the circumstances surrounding her work for Radio Tokyo and her subsequent trial for treason. Background information is provided on Iva Toguri, along with a study of Japanese radio propaganda and its effects on Allied troops during World War II. Also included is a comparison of the attitudes held by World War II veterans and Vietnam veterans concerning Iva Toguri's wartime activities, her trial, and recent pardon.

Ms. Toguri did make broadcasts for Radio Tokyo during
World War II. The author does not seek to deny her broadcasting activities. However, the fairness of her trial for
treason is questionable. Because of her particular situation
in wartime Japan, and because of the obvious taint of racism
concerning the treatment of Ms. Toguri compared with other
Americans who worked at Radio Tokyo, this paper will seek to
prove her trial was a travesty of justice.

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To the Graduate Council:

I am submitting herewith a Thesis written by Betty Glenn Kemp entitled "The Treason Trial of Iva Toguri, alias 'Tokyo Rose.'" I recommend that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts, with a major in History.

We have read this thesis and recommend its acceptance:

Accepted for the Council:

William H. Ellis

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#### PREFACE

Racial prejudice in the United States is not an exclusively Southern characteristic. Those of Japanese ancestry encountered this early in the twentieth century, especially those living on the western coast of the United States. These unfortunates were forced to endure the same type of racial hatred for which the South had become so famous.

The Anti-Asian movement, or the "yellow peril," did not affect the Japanese at first because they were considered more flexible, obedient and civilized than other Orientals. <sup>1</sup> This sentiment had changed by the beginning of the twentieth century. Various laws were passed to restrict the civil liberties of all Orientals. A 1906 California school law decreed that Oriental children were to be taught separately. A 1913 Alien Land Law refused land purchases by "non-natives." Various anti-Oriental organizations sprang up. Some more influential of these organizations were the Native Sons of the Golden West, the League for the Exclusion of Orientals From California, and the Southern California Committee of the Thousand. <sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Margaret Boveri, Treason In the Twentieth Century (New York: G.P. Putnam & Sons, 1963), p. 170.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

Amid all this, Iva Toguri was born in Watts, a suburb of Los Angeles, California, on July 4, 1916. The daughter of Jun Toguri, a naturalized citizen of British Columbia, Ms. Toguri attended public schools in Calexico, San Diego and Compton, California. In 1939 she received a degree in zoology from the University of California at Los Angeles. Examination of Ms. Toguri's college transcript proves she was an above-average student in the study of languages. She took courses in Spanish, German and Greek. However, before leaving for Japan, she had to attend a Japanese language school for three months. Although a Nisei, a first generation American born Japanese, Ms. Toguri was not fluent in Japanese.

In 1941, Ms. Toguri's aunt became ill. Her mother, being bedridden, could not make the trip, so Iva Toguri sailed for Japan on July 5, 1941. The trip was planned in such haste that she was unable to apply for a passport;

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup>Louisville <u>Courier-Journal</u>, September 14, 1945, p. 10, col. 6.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup>Louisville <u>Courier-Journal</u>, September 8, 1947, p. 10, col. 1.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup>Louisville <u>Courier-Journal</u>, September 6, 1945, p. 2, col. 7.

<sup>6</sup>Louisville Courier-Journal, September 8, 1949, p. 10, col. 1. See the appendix for a copy of Ms. Toguri's college transcript.

<sup>7&</sup>lt;sub>Louisville Courier-Journal</sub>, September 8, 1949, p. 10 col. 1.

instead, she got a certificate of identification, since she planned to stay only six months. She applied for a passport from the United States Consulate in August of 1941, after arriving in Japan.  $^{8}$ 

In late November of 1941, Ms. Toguri telephoned her father concerning United States—Japanese relations. Mr. Toguri said the papers indicated no serious trouble and for her to do as she wished. 9 On December 1, 1941, Mr. Toguri cabled her to get aboard the Tatsu Maru. However, her clearance papers were processed too late through the Japanese Finance Committee, and she was unable to board the ship. This was the last ship out of Japan before hostilities broke out. Fearing reprisals by the Japanese government for harboring an American citizen, Ms. Toguri's aunt turned her out. She was denied a ration card, so she was forced to walk the streets until she landed a job. Thus began the career of Iva Toguri, alias "Tokyo Rose."

Does this sound like the story of a potential traitor?

If Ms. Toguri was loyal to Japan, why did she attempt to

leave? Was she an unfortunate, but loyal American citizen

<sup>8</sup>Ibid.

<sup>9&</sup>lt;sub>Ibid</sub>.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid; Bill Kurtis, "Tokyo Rose-Two Wars Later," WBBM-TV, Chicago, Illinois, November 4, 1969; Athens Banner-Herald, March 12, 1976, p.4, col. 1.

who got stuck in an impossible situation? Could something have happened to her in Japan to make her turn against her country? Some people believe this was a possibility.

At the Army's insistence, and against the wishes of the United States Navy and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, all people of Japanese descent who lived on the west coast were ordered to evacuate to relocation camps. <sup>11</sup> In 1942, Iva Toguri's mother died at the Gila River relocation camp, which was situated on an Indian reservation in Arizona. <sup>12</sup> Although the treatment of the Japanese was less harsh in the United States than in Canada, writer Morton Grodzins, in his book Americans Betrayed, claimed the treatment of Japanese in the United States was a factor in Ms. Toguri's decision to broadcast for the Japanese. <sup>13</sup> Later information given and action taken by Ms. Toguri severely weakens this claim.

Allan R. Bosworth, America's Concentration Camps (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1967), pp. 6-7.

Louisville Courier-Journal, September 8, 1949, p.10, col. 1., and Audrie Girdner and Anne Loftis, The Great Betrayal:

The Evacuation of the Japanese-Americans During World War II

(New York: The MacMillan Company, 1969), pp. 216-217.

Boveri, op. cit., pp. 171-173; Girdner and Loftis, op. cit., p. 424.

### Chapter I

According to <u>Time</u> magazine, there are four main fronts to modern war: military, diplomatic, economic, and the fourth--propagandistic. <sup>14</sup> What is propaganda and what is its function in warfare? Propaganda's chief purpose is "... to destroy the morale of the enemy's fighting forces, breaking the will to resist throughout the enemy's country, and the defensive aim of protecting one's own soldiers against enemy propaganda."

What then is treason? Treason is "... the betrayal of one's own country by waging war against it or by consciously and purposely acting to aid its enemies." A simple deduction allows us to conclude that the use of propaganda can be considered a treasonable act if used against one's own country. Before discussing the treason trial of Iva Toguri, let us survey the use and effects of Japanese radio propaganda on U.S. troops during World War II.

<sup>14&</sup>quot;Fourth Front: Propaganda," <u>Time</u>, Vol. 34 (October 9, 1939), pp. 64-65.

Warfare (New York: Random House, 1965), p. 16; Cyril Falls, The Second World War (London: Methuen & Company, LTD, 1948), p. 287.

of the English Language (Boston: American Heritage Dictionary Company, INc., 1969), p. 1367.

World War II saw the rise of radio as ". . . the biggest source of propaganda intake." <sup>17</sup> Japan first used radio for propaganda in the Manchurian crisis. In this defiance of the League of Nations, Japan used propaganda not only in the enemy's country, but also for influence in her own country. <sup>18</sup>

By 1936, Japanese radio was censored to allow only the information supplied by military and governmental propaganda agencies.

The Japanese government chose ten Japanese newspaper, radio, and film executives to serve as advisors to the Japanese Government Information Office.

Japanese propaganda was directed by the information board, which maintained links with the Foreign Ministry, the army and the navy. In 1943 this board was headed by Eiji Amau, who later lost his position after Japan lost Saipan; he was succeeded by Taketora Ogata.

Sadai Iguchi, a former diplomatic aide to the famous Japanese ambassador to the

<sup>17</sup> Paul Linebarger, <u>Psychological Warfare</u> (Washington, D.C.: Infantry Journal Press, 1948), p. 36 & E. Muller, "Waging War With Words," <u>Current History</u>, Vol. 50 (August, 1939), pp. 24-27.

Harwood Childs and John Whitton, <u>Propaganda By Short Wave</u> (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1942), p. 53.

J.C. Butow,  $\underline{\text{Togo}}$  and  $\underline{\text{the Coming of the War}}$  (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press,  $\underline{\text{1961}}$ ), p. 79.

<sup>20</sup> New York Times, June 24, 1943, p.6, col. 1.

 $<sup>^{21}</sup>$ New York <u>Times</u>, July 21, 1944, p.3, col. 7; New York <u>Times</u>, July 23, 1944, p. 17, col. 3.

United States, Nomura, was one of his most important section leaders. In his position as director of foreign propaganda, Iguchi replaced Tomakazu Hori.  $^{22}$ 

The procedure for Japanese radio propaganda, according to Tatsuji Nakayama, a Japanese communications executive, "... is to make your own people believe first, then to dupe the third powers and finally to catch the enemy himself." <sup>23</sup> In a more frank manner, Japanese General Tojo urged Japanese propagandists to "... begin attacks boldly with all your might."

Although a study of Japanese propaganda during World War II "... indicates that the Japanese propaganda planner did not possess an accurate picture of events and motivating forces in America and consequently much of their broadcasting efforts completely missed the intended mark," <sup>25</sup> They were still more aware of the power of radio than the Allies. <sup>26</sup>

 $<sup>22</sup>_{\hbox{\scriptsize New York}}$  <code>Times</code>, <code>December 19</code>, <code>1943</code>, <code>Sec. IV</code>, <code>p. 4</code>, <code>col. l.</code>

<sup>23&</sup>lt;sub>New York Times, March 26, 1944, p. 30, col. 2.</sub>

<sup>24</sup>New York Times, March 7, 1943, p. 28, col. 6.

<sup>25</sup>William E. Daugherty with Morris Janowitz, A Psychological Warfare Casebook (Baltimore, Maryland: The John Hopkins Press, 1958), p. 430.

Norman Corwin, "Radio and Morale: We are Still Behind the Enemy in Recognizing Radio's Power," Saturday Review of Literature, Vol. 25 (July 4, 1942), pp. 6-7.

In 1942 the Axis controlled seventy short-wave stations, while the United States maintained only twenty-three. 27 While the United States was still struggling to broadcast in basic foreign languages, the Japanese could speak dialects from Esperanto to Fukienese. 28 This is just one example of how much more advanced the Axis powers were in radio broadcasting.

Japanese radio propaganda reflected the influence of German Minister of Propaganda, Dr. Joseph Geobbels. The Japanese use of the racism theme was an idea of Dr. Goebbels.

Berlin, Rome and Tokyo often exchanged news and were quick to seize upon events throughout the world and to turn them into the uses of psychological warfare. They emphasized setbacks of the democracies and the division among and within democratic nations, spreading rumors designed to alarm, making capital alike of what the democratic people know as facts and what they might be induced to suspect. 30 In an attempt to undermine Allied friendliness and lower morale among troops, the Axis powers would follow the Nazi pattern:

S.J. Rundt, "Short Wave Artillery: Still Weaker Than the Enemy's," Nation, Vol. 155 (September 12, 1942), p. 210.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup>Ibid., p. 211.

New York Times, February 4, 1942, p. 3, col. 6; S.C. Menefee, "What Tokyo Tells the World," Christian Science Monitor Magazine, (December 19, 1942), p. 5; Ladislas Farago and others, Americans Organize to Win the War (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1942), p. 246.

<sup>30</sup> New York Times, September 5, 1942, p. 1, col. 4

search for areas of dispute between Allies and expound on them; make phony news flashes like the bombing of San Francisco; and, to keep the Allies' interest, mention soon-to-be announced prisoner lists. <sup>31</sup> The Axis propaganda motto was, "The shortest road to the conviciton of a people at war is political indoctrination." <sup>32</sup>

Was this motto put to wise use by the Japanese? Carlos Romulo, Resident Commissioner of the Phillippines after the war felt ". . . Japanese propaganda is the slyest ever." 33 Yet in another New York <u>Times</u> article, the writer felt that Japanese radio propaganda was ". . . ridiculous falsehoods that no sane Occidental could possibly believe." 34

How was the United States reacting to the Axis' attempts to influence the world in their favor? An Office of War Information, headed by Elmer Davis, a veteran newsman and radio reporter, was established by the government and used to counteract Axis propaganda. 35 An American radio show, "Lies From Tokyo," was also established to counteract the

<sup>31&</sup>lt;sub>New York Times</sub>, January 4, 1942, Sec. IV, P. 12, col. 6; "By the Ears," <u>Time</u>, Vol. 39 (January 26, 1942), pp. 51-53.

<sup>32</sup> Corwin, <u>loc. cit</u>.

New York Times, October 22, 1944, Sec. VI, p. 5, col. 3.

 $<sup>34</sup>_{\mbox{New York }}$  York  $\underline{\mbox{Times}}$ , December 19, 1943, Sec. IV, p.4, col. 1.

<sup>35&</sup>lt;sub>New York <u>Times</u>, November 19, 1943, p. 8, col. 5.</sub>

false information various Japanese propagandists were broadcasting. 36 Allied radio was also successful in jamming Axis broadcasts on the airwayes. 37

Eiji Amau, president of the Japanese Board of Information, criticized the "lowly attitude" of the Allies, "who do not hesitate to utilize any methods for the attainment of their objectives. The most skillful arts possessed by the United States and Britain are propaganda and trickery."

Dr. Wei-Tao-Ming, Chinese Ambassador to the United States, feared the Japanese would destroy Allied cooperation, but British Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, and Secretary of the Navy, Frank Knox, felt the fallacy of Japanese propaganda would be realized by the Allied people. <sup>39</sup> Some American citizens, like the writers H.L. McClinton and Archibald MacLeish, also feared the influence of Japanese propaganda. <sup>40</sup> MacLeish, Director of the Office of Facts and Figures felt, "The Japanese are seeking to create

<sup>36</sup> New York Times, October 1, 1944, Sec II, p. 5, col. 1.

<sup>37</sup> New York <u>Times</u>, April 26, 1942, Sec. VIII, p. 10, col. 6; New York <u>Times</u>, June 22, 1943, p. 3, col. 6.

<sup>38</sup> New York <u>Times</u>, December 27, 1943, p. 3, col. 2.

<sup>39&</sup>lt;sub>New York Times</sub>, July 8, 1943, p. 3, col. 5; New York Times, December 11, 1943, p. 4, col. 7; New York Times, July 28, 1944, p. 5, col. 6.

<sup>40&</sup>lt;sub>F</sub>. Morton, "Radio Propaganda New Style," <u>Theatre Arts</u>, Vol. 27 (February, 1943), pp. 95-102; New York <u>Times</u>, March 11, 1942, p. 11, col. 4.

political, racial, and social antagonism which would-should their plotting succeed-separate our people into hostile groups and render political cohesion and the successful prosecution of the war extremely difficult." <sup>41</sup> Senator Robert A. Taft took issue with MacLeish's statement. He felt if the government would put more emphasis on military success rather than on propaganda battles, the war would be over sooner. He felt the American people were not discouraged. <sup>42</sup>

Did Japanese radio propaganda have an effect upon American troops? There are incidents to be cited both pro and con. There were some incidents cited which revealed that the propaganda had a detrimental effect on American troops, but the majority of these were in the early stages of the war when it seemed as though Japan might rule the Pacific.

During the fall of Corregidor, Captain, Achille Tisdelle, a headquarters officer, observed that "... the damned Nips have got a new propaganda program that does not help our morale any. The men joke happily, but underneath they are disquieted. KZRH in Manila plays American songs to American soldiers on Bataan and Corregidor at 2145 hours every night.

<sup>41</sup> New York Times, March 11, 1942, p. 11, col. 4.

<sup>42&</sup>lt;sub>New York Times</sub>, May 3, 1942, p. 47, col. 6.

Theme song, 'Ships That Never Come In,' followed by popular records." 43 The strain of this situation itself did more toward lowering their morale than did the Japanese radio broadcasts. In the Doolittle raids over Tokyo, propaganda played an important part on the nerves of the people involved, but it obviously did not hamper their performance. Before Doolittle's raid on Tokyo, as his men were preparing for their famous attack, their ". . . confidence in the secrecy of their mission was shaken . . . when they heard a propaganda broadcast from Radio Tokyo: 'Reuters, British news agency, has announced that three American bombers have dropped bombs on Tokyo.'" 44 After the raid in Japan, only those who were near the bombed areas realized that Tokyo had been hit. Radio station JOAK had conveniently gone off the air, rather than tell the truth about the bombings. 45

One incident where the Japanese radio propaganda affected American combat troops had an almost humorous sidelight to it. During the baseball season when the Brooklyn team would fail to win, the Japanese radio announcer would say "dem bums" lost again. According to PFC Manuel Lopez,

<sup>43</sup> James H. and William M. Belote, Corregidor: The Saga Of a Fortress (New York: Harper and Row, 1967), p. 78.

John Toland, The Rising Sun (New York: Bantam Books, 1970), p. 349.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid., p. 352.

a Brooklyn soldier, ". . . it took strictest orders to keep Brooklynites from going out swinging." 46

Broadcasts of glorious Japanese victories and shattering Allied defeats appear to have been the most utilized propaganda idiom. "Anyone listening exclusively to Radio Tokyo could only conclude that Japan is winning the war... in one broadcast a commentator acutally expressed joy that the U.S. troops had invaded Luzon because, 'now the Japanese can annihilate them in large numbers.' "47

After the battle at Bougainville in the Solomon Islands, the Japanese victory claims were so boastful they broadcast that newspaper articles in the United States were actually doubting the existence of the Pacific Fleet. <sup>48</sup> After the second battle of the Solomons, Midway and the Coral Sea, the Japanese claimed to have crushed the hopes of the enemy completely. <sup>49</sup> After a successful American landing at Leyte Gulf, Japanese radio reported that the failure of American forces there caused much gloom back in the states. U.S. troop reaction to this broadcast was mere laughter.

<sup>46</sup> New York <u>Times</u>, October 20, 1966, p. 11, col. 8.

<sup>47</sup>R. Sherrod, "Two Weeks of Radio Tokyo," <u>Life</u>, Vol. 19 (February 18, 1945), p. 6.

<sup>48</sup> New York Times, November 19, 1943, p. 10, col. 4.

<sup>49&</sup>lt;sub>New York Times</sub>, August 9, 1942, Sec. IV, p. 5, col. 3; New York Times, September 1, 1942, p. 3, col. 3.

<sup>50</sup> New York Times, October 30, 1944, p. 3, col. 1.

As if these ridiculous victories were not enough, Japanese radio planned a comic strip study as a drive to crush the Allies. A reward was given for the best "hymn of hate" against the Allies. They also encouraged goading of American troops who would have to do without liquor, sugar and cigarettes at Christmas that year. 51

At Leyte Gulf, Japanese propaganda backfired. Radio Tokyo reported that Leyte Gulf was a great victory for Japan and all of Admiral Mitscher's carriers had been sunk, along with the remainder of Admiral Halsey's Third Fleet. Obviously, most Japanese officers knew these claims were exaggerated, but they did not know the extent of exaggeration. This had an important effect on the Japanese plan of operation.

After the tide turned in favor of the Allies, the Japanese made some moves to revise their propaganda program to meet ". . . with the war condition, which is gradually growing more acute." <sup>53</sup> They began to prepare the people for a longer war, yet still a final Japanese victory. Radio Tokyo broadcast, "Considering the fact that America is

New York Times, April 1, 1943, p. 10, col. 3: New York Times, March  $2\overline{5}$ , 1944, p. 6, col. 5; New York Times, December 13, 1944, p. 13, col. 2

Stanley L. Falk, <u>Decision</u> at <u>Leyte</u> (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1966), pp. 60-63.

<sup>53&</sup>lt;sub>New York Times</sub>, April 1, 1943, p. 4, col. 6.

exerting its full effort in the war, we Japanese people must not neglect our duties and must make our determination stronger than ever." <sup>54</sup> The broadcasts then pictured the American soldier as a tough, determined butcher. <sup>55</sup> This was a complete reversal of the earlier picture of the American soldier, who was seen as weak and cowardly.

The fact that U.S. troops enjoyed Japanese radio more than American radio proved upsetting to some American citizens, but the GI continued to enjoy Axis propaganda, especially the women propagandists.

56 Even at Guadalcanal, in 1943, the American troops listened to a Tokyo radio program called the "Zero Hour" which talked about the food they missed at home and the girls they left behind. The troops liked this program because it commiserated with them.

Because of this quality of propaganda, and/or entertainment being broadcast to U.S. troops, George Horne of the New York <u>Times</u>, urged a more dedicated effort to get American radio shows to American troops. He is quoted, "They (the American troops) do not want to hear a single program about

<sup>54&</sup>quot;Japanese First Words of President's Speech," <u>Victory</u>, Vol. 3 (September 15, 1942), p. 22.

 $<sup>55</sup>_{Russell}$  Brines, Until They Eat Stones (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Company, 1944), p. 299.

<sup>56</sup> New York <u>Times</u>, May 24, 1944, p. 5, col. 3; "Letters to the Times," New <u>York Times</u>, June 7, 1944, p. 18, col. 6.

<sup>57&</sup>lt;sub>New York Times</sub>, June 29, 1943, p. 8, col. 3.

There were some incidents, as at Corregidor, where

Japanese radio propaganda was noted as lowering morale, but
it was due mostly to the strain of the situation. Japanese
radio propaganda failed in its attempt to induce American
troops to believe they were fighting for the wrong side.

Generally, American troops discovered that Japanese idiom
". . . rang false and slang," and had little effect on them.

To summarize, the Japanese found unrewarding targets in the
American forces, and experience soon taught them that if
one could not be sure of hoodwinking the enemy, it was best
not to try.

60

Who were the Japanese radio propagandists during World War II? Many of them remain unknown, but several became as well known to American troops as the generals.

Mrs. Henry Topping, an American, became one of the

<sup>58&</sup>quot;Enemy Voices," <u>Time</u>, Vol. 44 (July 24, 1944), p. 51.

 $<sup>^{59}</sup>$ Qualter, op. cit., p. 116; New York Times, December 19, 1943, Sec. IV, p. 4, col. 1.

Carl Berger, A Psychological Operations Bibliography (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1960), p. 83; Terence H. Qualter, Propaganda and Psychological Warfare (New York: Random House, 1955), p. 116.

first well known Japanese propagandists. Mrs. Topping and her husband went to Japan in 1895 as missionaries. Mr. Topping died, but Mrs. Topping stayed in Japan, refusing an opportunity to return to the United States. She became secretary to Tokyohiko Kagawa, a Japanese Christian leader, and broadcast a program called "The Women's Hour." 61 Mrs. Topping, a lady about eighty years old, often reported the conditions of American prisoners of war, assuring the Allies that they were "... as comfortable and as happy as they could be away from home." 62 Mrs. Topping's son, Willard Topping, a Japanese language instructor for the U.S. Navy, denied the voice was his mother's because it sounded too young.

Various other Japanese radio propagandists were discovered, but little is know of them. A Miss Frances Hopkins had a program on Tokyo radio entitled, "The Light of the East." She was rumored to be an American, but American officials were unable to identify her. 64

In 1945, an American, Robert Don Chisholm, alias

<sup>61</sup> New York <u>Times</u>, August 4, 1943, p. 19, col. 4.

<sup>62&</sup>lt;sub>New York Times</sub>, February 2, 1944, p. 5, col. 4.

<sup>63&</sup>lt;sub>New York Times</sub>, August 4, 1943, p. 19, col. 4; New York Times, March 4, 1946, p. 7, col. 1.

<sup>64&</sup>lt;sub>New York Times</sub>, August 4, 1943, p. 19, col. 4.

American Lord Haw Haw of the Orient, was arrested and charged with collaborationist activities. Chisholm had broadcast for Japanese radio in Shanghai. <sup>65</sup> In that same year, General MacArthur seized Mark Lewis Streeter, an American who wrote scripts for Tokyo radio and Lilly Abeg, alias Sybille Abe, a native of Germany, who was rumored to be the real "Tokyo Rose." <sup>66</sup> From Tokyo, in another attempt to draw an Allied audience, the Japanese went so far as to employ Yoichi Hiraoka, a xylophonist who used to play in the United States. <sup>67</sup>

Of all the Japanese radio propagandists during World War II, none became more famous than "Tokyo Rose." The nickname, "Tokyo Rose" was a creation of American troops; there was never an announcer on Japanese radio who called herself "Tokyo Rose." 68 "Tokyo Rose," actually a composite of several female voices, became the favorite of American troops. Although her program dealt primarily with entertainment, her broadcasts had some basis in fact. "Tokyo Rose is sometimes uncomfortably close to the truth. Her

<sup>65&</sup>lt;sub>New York Times</sub>, November 1, 1945, p. 3, col. 6.

<sup>66</sup> New York Times, September 12, 1945, p. 1, col. 8.

<sup>67&</sup>quot;Enemy Voices," Time, Vol. 44 (July 24, 1944), p. 51.

<sup>68&</sup>quot;Peace of the Roses: Tokyo Rose," Newsweek, Vol. 26 (September 17, 1945), pp. 96-97.

broadcasts almost never exaggerate U.S. losses. She has built a reputation on accurate broadcasts." <sup>69</sup> It was suspected that there were as many as seven "Tokyo Roses." However, from these seven, the United States government discovered one to be an American citizen. Her name was Iva Ikuko Toguri D'Aquino.

<sup>69&</sup>quot;By Any Other Name: Tokyo Rose, Jap Propagandist Popular Among American Listeners," <u>Time</u>, Vol. 43 (April 10, 1944), p. 58.

### Chapter II

What exactly was broadcast by Iva Toguri that would constitute treason? This is a difficult question to answer since there were at least seven "Tokyo Roses." 70 This chapter will cover various broadcasts by the female announcer known to American GI's as "Tokyo Rose." By her own admission, some of these broadcasts were made by Ms. Toguri, others she vehemently denied.

One of the first American publications to mention a Japanese radio announcer called "Tokyo Rose" was <u>Time</u> magazine. The broadcaster called herself "Little Orphan Annie," never "Tokyo Rose." The nickname "Tokyo Rose" was a creation of American GI's.

What technique did "Tokyo Rose" use in her broadcasts?

Author Louis Snyder described her as a woman with a " . . .

silken bedroom voice, who played popular tunes interspersed

with a line of sexy chatter which convulsed American GI's."

72

One particular line she used to weaken morale ran like this:

"But the girl back home is drinking with some 4-F who's

Audrie Girdner and Anne Loftis, The Great Betrayal:

The Evacuation of the Japanese-Americans During World War II

(New York: The MacMillan Company, 1969), p. 424; Louisville

Courier-Journal, September 14, 1945, p. 10, col. 6.

<sup>71 &</sup>quot;Enemy Voices," <u>Time</u>, Vol. 44 (July 24, 1944), p. 51.

 $<sup>72</sup>_{Louis}$  Snyder, The War: A Concise History, 1939-1945 (New York: Julian Messner, Inc., 1960), p. 254.

rolling in easy money. Maybe they'll have supper too.

Mm-m-m-m, wouldn't a nice thick steak taste good now in some cafe? But you won't get any of that out here for a long time."

Her August 14, 1944 tape of the radio show, the "Zero Hour," is available at the National Archives in Washington, D.C. The broadcaster chatted with the audience, which she called her "favorite little family," and then played popular songs. She accused Allied troops of being "fighting orphans" and "boneheads of the Pacific." She played popular American songs like "My Resistance Is Low," "Now It Can Be Told," "Playmate" and then closed with "Goodbye Now." The "Zero Hour" show was followed by a male announcer who played more 74 American music.

Also available at the National Archives is a sound-track from a film done for the United States Army. On this recording, "Tokyo Rose" begins by announcing to the troops that she is "... ready for another vicious assault on your morale." She asked the troops if they were full of beer and belligerance before having a male proadcaster announce

Total See also: C.L. Sulzherger, The American Heritage Picture History of World War II (New York: American Publishing Company, Inc., 1966), p. 308.

August 14, 1944, (Washington, D.C.: The National Archives
Trust Fund Board).

American casualties. This "Tokyo Rose" called herself
"No. 1 Enemy" and then proceeded to tell a little of her
background: her birth, graduation from U.C.L.A. and how she
finally arrived at Radio Tokyo.

This apparently was the
voice of Iva Toguri,

"Tokyo Rose" was particularly active during the struggle for Guadalcanal. In one of her broadcasts, she described the marines on Guadalcanal under General Vandergrift as ". . . summer insects which have dropped into the fires by themselves." The marines there retaliated by making remarks about her virtue.

Time magazine reported an American victory on Guadalcanal on August 8, 1943. "Tokyo Rose" broadcast an American defeat. This time her information was authentic. It would be February, 1944, before the Americans could claim victory on Guadalcanal. Thowever, "Tokyo Rose" continued to broadcast a Japanese victory, although Japan managed to evacuate only 12,000 troops from the island. Over 15,000 Japanese were killed or missing, 9,000 died from disease, and 1,000 were taken prisoner.

<sup>75</sup> Ibid.

The Turning Point of the War (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, 1965), p. 105.

<sup>77&</sup>lt;sub>Samuel B. Griffith II, The Battle for Guadalcanal (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Co., 1963), pp. 66 & 71.</sub>

Ken Jones, <u>Destroyer</u> <u>Squadron 23: Combat Exploits of</u> <u>Arleigh Burke's Gallant Force</u> (<u>Philadelphia: Chilton Company</u>, 1959, p. 121.

In the battle of Leyte Gulf, Admiral J.B. Oldendorf commented concerning Japan's attack with an inferior force, "Never give a sucker a chance." This statement infuriated Tokyo and Admiral Oldendorf became a prime target in "Tokyo Rose's" broadcasts. She claimed American troops were pleading for help to fight against the Japanese. 79 After the successful American landing at Leyte, "Tokyo Rose" broadcast, "The American great naval defeat caused great gloom in New York when news was flashed around the Times Building in Times Square."

This somewhat damaged her credibility as a serious propagandist with American troops.

In October, 1944, in one of the battles of the Philippine Sea, "Tokyo Rose" broadcast that the Japanese Navy had rendered the United States Navy, under Admiral Halsey, insignificant. This had been reported five or six times before and was again untrue.

When the famed "Flying Tigers" were replaced by the Tenth Air Force, "Tokyo Rose" predicted an easy victory for Japan. Fortunately for the Allied cause, General C.L. Chennault and Colonel Robert Scott were able to make the

Samuel E. Morison, <u>Leyte</u>: <u>June 1944</u>-<u>January 1945</u> (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1958), pp. 202N & 296.

<sup>80</sup> New York <u>Times</u>, October 30, 1944, p. 3, col. 1.

Battles of the Philippine Sea (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1967), p. 147.

transition period easier than "Tokyo Rose" had hoped. 82

Colonel William Eareckson, of the Aleutian Campaign, conducted a personal battle with "Tokyo Rose" by broad-casting sarcastic remarks back to her over the radio. Once, when Colonel Eareckson flew home for a visit, "Tokyo Rose" reported he had been shot down at sea on January 13, 1943. He vowed to return and did to prove her wrong.

"Tokyo Rose's" information about the 509th Composite Group at Tinian, the Pacific island located between Guam and Saipan, was sparse. Japan had picked up only rumors of the activities of the ground crew of the 509th. "Tokyo Rose" reported they were training for " . . . America's last desperate resort: magic." 84 For several weeks before dropping the atomic bomb, Colonel Paul Tibbets of the 509th had been sending B-29's over Japan. As planned by Colonel Tibbets, the damage caused by these raids was so small, the Japanese did not return fire. "Tokyo Rose" broadcast to American GI's, "You are now reduced to small missions of three planes, and the bombs they drop are real duds."

<sup>82</sup> Edward Jablonski, <u>Tragic Victories</u> (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1971), p. 47.

<sup>83</sup>Brian Garfield, The Thousand Mile War: World War II in Alaska and the Aleutians (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1969), p. 157.

David Bergamini, <u>Japan's Imperial Conspiracy</u> (New York: William Morrow & Co., 1971), p. 50.

<sup>85</sup> Robert C. Batchelder, The Irreversible Decision: 1939-1950 (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin Company, 1962), p. 123.

Unknown to her, these missions were just practice runs, for one of these planes was the  $\underline{Enola}$   $\underline{Gay}$ .

After the atomic bombing of Hiroshima, "Tokyo Rose" broadcast that "... there had been a small raid by three airplanes on Hiroshima." <sup>86</sup> An hour later, with no explanation, the radio station announced that train service to Hiroshima had been discontinued.

"Tokyo Rose's" broadcasts, though often ridiculous, were often uncomfortably close to the truth. Several times she announced the date of a supposedly secret Allied mission. Her broadcasts seldom exaggerated American losses. One particular broadcast about American losses, made in August, 1943, went like this: "Well, you boys in Moresby, how did you like that ack-ack last night over Rabaul? Your communique didn't say anything about losing those two fortresses did they?" <sup>88</sup>

In December, 1941, when Admiral William Pye and Admiral M.F. Draemel decided not to send a relief force to Wake Island, many troops were angry and disappointed. The morale situation worsened when men at the Officer's Club, at Pearl

<sup>86</sup>Fletcher Knebel and Charles W. Bailey II, No High Ground (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1960), pp. 93 & 208.

<sup>87</sup> Ibid.

<sup>88&</sup>quot;By Any Other Name: Tokyo Rose, Jap Propagandists Popular Among American Listeners," <u>Time</u>, Vol. 43 (April 10, 1944), p. 58.

Harbor heard a "Tokyo Rose" broadcast taunt, "Where, oh where is the United States Navy?" 89

General Douglas MacArthur was often a victim of "Tokyo Rose's" radio insults. She threatened that MacArthur would be hanged in the Imperial Plaza in Tokyo after the ultimate Japanese victory. 90 MacArthur felt "Tokyo Rose" was especially effective on troop morale prior to the fall of Bataan because she repeatedly broadcast to the American and Filipino troops that Allied aid went to the European theatre of war first.

In some situations, of course, broadcasts like these could and did have a serious effect on troop morale. However, most GI's seemed to enjoy "Tokyo Rose" and other female 92 broadcasters working for Axis radio. The majority of U.S. troops found the Axis radio broadcasts had ". . . little if any bearing on morale, and as propaganda they were efficient only in the sense of being good entertainment. The consensus is that American fighting men are pretty impervious to propaganda. They will probably continue to listen to 'Tokyo Rose,' but no one at home need worry about that."

John Toland, <u>But Not In Shame: The Six Months After</u>
Pearl <u>Harbor</u> (New York: Random House, 1961), p. 103.

 $<sup>90</sup>_{\hbox{Douglas MacArthur,}}$  Reminiscences (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1964), p.  $\overline{143}$ .

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>91</sup>Ibid., p. 130.

<sup>92&</sup>lt;sub>New York Times</sub>, May 24, 1944, p. 5, col. 3.

<sup>93</sup> New York Times, March 27, 1944, p. 4, col. 2.

# Chapter III

The Domestic Subversion Desk, under General Douglas MacArthur, handled all information concerning any prisoner thought to be "Tokyo Rose." <sup>94</sup> In 1945, Iva Toguri "... fell right into the Allies' hands." <sup>95</sup> She was classified as a minor war criminal and placed under the custody of General Robert Eichelberger at Sugamo prison in Yokohoma. <sup>96</sup>

In October, 1946, Iva Toguri was relased from prison due to lack of evidence on the charge of dispensing subversive propaganda and because "Tokyo Rose" was a "... composite person with at least a dozen voices."

In 1947 Iva Toguri asked for a permit from the U.S. Consulate in Yokohoma to return to the United States. <sup>98</sup> A Gold Star mother, upon hearing of Ms. Toguri's request to

Douglas MacArthur and His General Staff, Reports of MacArthur (Washington, D.C.; U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966), p. 256.

Frances Miller, <u>History of World War II</u> (New York: The Publisher's Guild, 1945), p. 43 and New York <u>Times</u>, September 12, 1945, p. 1, col. 8.

<sup>96</sup> Robert L. Eichelberger, Our Jungle Road to Tokyo (New York: The Viking Press, 1950), p. 266; Courtney Whitney, MacArthur: His Rendezvous With History (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956), p. 281; Louisville Courier-Journal, November 7, 1947, p. 15, col. 6; New York Times, October 19, 1945, p. 2, col. 7.

New York <u>Times</u>, October 22, 1946, p. 14, col. 1 and Louisville <u>Courier-Journal</u>, November 7, 1947, p. 15, col. 6.

return to the United States, protested to radio announcer Walter Winchell. Winchell relayed this protest over the radio to the United States Attorney General, Thomas Clark. 99 Although this was the beginning of renewed public interest in the "Tokyo Rose" story, as early as 1945, a United States attorney, Charles H. Carr, had requested Iva Toguri be tried for treason. 100 Two years later the F.B.I. was still seeking the required two witnesses to indict her for treason. 101 At this point, Clark Lee and Harry Brundidge became involved in the Iva Toguri story.

When Tokyo was occupied by Allied forces, a Japanese newsman named Yamashita, helped Harry Brundidge and Clark Lee find Iva Toguri, alias "Tokyo Rose." Brundidge and Lee were two of the first reporters to interview Ms. Toguri. She disclosed to them she had worked for Radio Tokyo for \$6.60 a week because the alternative to propaganda broadcasting was work in a munitions factory. She had gone to Japan to visit her mother's sister and claimed to hate everything about Japan. She supported herself as a typist, which led to a job with the Japanese Broadcasting Corporation. Aided

<sup>99</sup>Diane Arbus, "Tokyo Rose Is Home," <u>Esquire</u>, Vol. 71
(May, 1969), pp. 168-69.

New York <u>Times</u>, September 14, 1945, p. 4, col. 1.

<sup>101</sup> New York Times, December 4, 1947, p. 19, col. 4.

<sup>102&</sup>lt;sub>John</sub> Toland, <u>The Rising Sun</u> (New York: Bantam Books, 1967), pp. 977-78.

by two captains, one Australian and one American, she agreed to make a daily fifteen-minute broadcast to Allied troops. 103

Mr. Brundidge offered her \$2,000 to publish her story, which he would ghost write, in <u>Cosmopolitan magazine</u>. The editor of <u>Cosmopolitan was astounded that Brundidge had negotiated a deal with a traitor. When he demanded an explanation, Brundidge turned his story over to Clark Lee. Lee submitted his own version of the story to the International News Service, which released it at once. 104</u>

In early 1948, Brundidge stated that he and Clark Lee had obtained a full confession from Iva Toguri. The Attorney General, Thomas Clark, heard of Brundidge's statement and sent him to Tokyo where Ms. Toguri was living in the peripheral area of the city.

After further investigation, Harry Brundidge and Clark Lee became the two witnesses the government needed to charge her with treason.

In August 1948, Attorney General Clark ordered the arrest of Iva Toguri and announced she would be brought from Japan to the United States

<sup>103</sup> Ibid.; New York Times, September 9, 1945, p. 16, col. 3; Harry T. Brundidge, "America's First Woman Traitor," American Mercury, Vol. 78 (January, 1954), pp. 37-41.

<sup>104</sup> John Toland, loc. cit.

<sup>105&</sup>quot;A Case Against Rose," Newsweek, Vol. 32 (August 30, 1948), p. 20; Louisville Courier-Journal, August 17, 1948, p. 2, col. 5

<sup>106
&</sup>quot;A Case Against Rose," Newsweek, Vol. 32 (August 30, 1948), p. 20.

to stand trial for treason, 107

The arrest must have seemed ironic to Ms. Toguri. She had been released from prison in 1946 and all charges against her were dropped. Earlier, on August 7, 1945, the Navy Department had awarded "Tokyo Rose" a citation for "... contributing greatly to the morale of American armed forces in the Pacific." 108 Unfortunately, they did not specify which Rose.

From the beginning, Ms. Toguri claimed her radio program dealt with musical recordings and had nothing to do with treason. Her comment concerning her upcoming trial was laced with stoicism: "I would just as soon go through with it and have it over. I have been in the air for three years not knowing my fate."

In 1948, thirty-two year old Iva Toguri began her battle against the charge of treason in a San Francisco federal court. <sup>110</sup> Wayne Collins was the lawyer who defended her against the charge of "... knowingly, intentionally, willfully, unlawfully, feloniously, traitorously, and treasonably," aiding the Japanese government.

<sup>107&</sup>lt;sub>New York Times</sub>, August 17, 1948, p. 1, col. 6; Lousiville <u>Courier-Journal</u>, August 17, 1948, p. 2, col. 5.

<sup>108
&</sup>quot;Peace of the Roses: Tokyo Roses," Newsweek, Vol. 26
(September 17, 1945), pp. 96-97.

<sup>109</sup> New York Times, August 17, 1948, p. 1, col. 6.

<sup>110&</sup>lt;sub>New York Times</sub>, August 17, 1948, p. 1, col. 6.

<sup>111</sup> New York Times, September 26, 1948, p. 40, col. 1.

Ms, Toguri denied having broadcast scripts "... with the intent of undermining the morale of American troops in the Pacific."

She claimed the scripts were written by an Australian and American officer; therefore, she assumed they were harmless for broadcast to Allied troops.

At the grand jury session in September, 1948, witnesses Clark Lee and Harry Brundidge were extremely critical of the American officer, Captain Wallace Ince, who helped Ms. Toguri learn the broadcasting business. The grand jury demanded an indictment for Captain Ince as well as for Ms. Toguri. When informed the captain was not under the jurisdiction of the court, the jury refused to indict Ms. Toguri. After the Justice Department assured the jury the captain would also be prosecuted, Ms. Toguri was indicted. Captain Ince's fate was to be promoted to the rank of major.

Defense attorney Collins asked for a dismissal of charges based on forty-five technical objections to the indictment. The court refused.  $^{115}$  Ms. Toguri was also refused bail and

<sup>112&</sup>lt;sub>New York Times</sub>, October 9, 1948, p. 5, col. 1.

<sup>113</sup> Ibid.

John Toland, The Rising Sun (New York: Bantam Books 1970), pp. 977-78. Although this statement was made, the Justice Department later claimed it had no jurisdiction over Captain Ince because he was military personnel. See the letter from the Justice Department in the Appendix.

<sup>115</sup> New York Times, October 19, 1948, p. 5, col. 1.

remained in custody, though not jail, for the duration of her trial. The court feared she might seek sanctuary in another country if allowed free. 116

During the months preceding the trial, the lawyers argued over the subpoenaing of prospective witnesses. In the final decision, only the prosecution was allowed to subpoena aliens. 117 The defense's request to subpoena aliens was denied, but they were allowed to take depositions from aliens at the government's expense. 118 The prosecution witnesses were flown to San Francisco by the federal government and given ten dollars a day while they testified. No money was available for the forty-three defense witnesses, so nineteen of them signed depositions in Japan and were questioned by the F.B.I. 119

An all-white jury was selected--six men and six women. 120 Several Negroes were turned down as acceptable jurors, but a World War II veteran was seated. 121 The trial opened in July, 1949. Wayne Collins, the defense lawyer, and Tom

<sup>116</sup> New York Times, October 15, 1948, p. 6, col. 7.

<sup>117</sup> New York <u>Times</u>, January 4, 1949, p. 14, col. 7.

<sup>118</sup> New York <u>Times</u>, March 15, 1949, p. 18, col. 1.

Diane Arbus, "Tokyo Rose Is Home," Esquire, Vol. 71 (May, 1969), pp. 168-69.

New York: G.P. Putnam & Sons, 1963), p. 173.

New York <u>Times</u>, July 6, 1949, p. 16, col. 2.

DeWolfe, the prosecuting attorney, presented the case before Judge Michael Roche. <sup>122</sup> Mr. Collins began by asking for a dismissal of the treason charges because Ms. Toguri was a Portuguese citizen due to her marriage to Felipe D'Aquino. <sup>123</sup> D'Aquino, an employee of the Domei News Agency and later an interpreter for U.S. occupation forces in Japan, married Ms. Toguri in 1945. <sup>124</sup> The court dismissed this request because the majority of her broadcasts were made before 1945. <sup>125</sup>

After all attempts for dismissal were refused, the trial, with its parade of witnesses, began. One of the first witnesses for the prosecution was Clark Lee, the news reporter who, with Harry Brundidge, had interviewed Ms. Toguri in Tokyo in September, 1945. In that interview, Lee claimed Ms. Toguri admitted writing her own radio scripts. She also admitted refusing to quit her job at Radio Tokyo although her husband requested she do so. According to Lee, Ms. Toguri was proud of her fame among Allied soldiers. She claimed to be the real "Tokyo Rose"

New York <u>Times</u>, July 8, 1949, p. 8, col. 3; New York <u>Times</u>, July 7, 1949, p. 14, col. 2 and New York <u>Times</u>, August 14, 1949, p. 33, col. 5.

<sup>123&</sup>lt;sub>New York Times</sub>, July 8, 1949, p. 8, col. 3.

Journal, August 17, 1948, p. 2, col. 5.

<sup>125</sup> Boveri, op. cit., p. 172.

after she learned of her famous nickname through Swiss channels.

Kenkichi Oki, a former Radio Tokyo employee, testified that Ms. Toguri was not forced to broadcast propaganda. 127 However, under cross-examination by the defense, Mr. Oki admitted he once stated Ms. Toguri had never broadcast news or commentary for Radio Tokyo. 128

Mr. Oki's credibility as a witness was questionable. He was a former United States citizen who renounced his citizenship. If Ms. Toguri had renounced her citizenship, she could not have been tried for treason in the United States. However, a more credible witness, Satoshi Nakamura, the master of ceremonies on the "Zero Hour" program, also testified that Ms. Toguri was not forced to work for Radio Tokyo.

The testimonies of two other prosecution witnesses were particularly interesting. Hiromu Yagi, a tourist bureau representative, testified against Ms. Toguri. Like the other witnesses, he claimed Ms. Toguri was not forced to broadcast for Radio Tokyo; however, Yagi later admitted to F.B.I. agent Frank Tillman that he was bribed and brought to

<sup>126&</sup>lt;sub>New York Times</sub>, July 15, 1949, p. 12, col. 4.

<sup>127&</sup>lt;sub>New York Times</sub>, July 19, 1949, p. 14, col. 4.

<sup>128</sup> New York Times, July 20, 1949, p. 12, col. 4.

<sup>129</sup> New York Times, August 9, 1949, p. 12, col. 6.

trial by the government and had testified falsely. Mr.
Tillman released this information while on the witness
stand for the prosecution. Although a government witness had
confessed to perjuring himself while on the witness stand,
Judge Roche failed to call a mistrial.

From the trial's beginning and against the defense's objections, the prosecution wanted to play reproductions of the "Zero Hour" broadcasts. 131 Defense objections were overruled and a recording of the "Zero Hour" program, supposedly made by Ms. Toguri, was played to the trial parti-At first the jury was not allowed to hear cipants. the recordings, but a few days later two recordings were admitted as evidence for the prosecution. The first recording, dated September 4, 1944, read, "The island of Saipan is mined with high explosives. You'll have forty-eight hours to clear the island. If you don't do it, you'll be blown sky high." The second recording, made in the spring of 1945, was much more personal in pature. "Wonder who your wives and girlfriends are out with tonight? Maybe a 4-F or somebody from a war plant, making a lot of money, while you are out fighting, knowing you can't succeed." 133

Louisville Courier-Journal, July 28, 1949, p. 14,

col. 3. 131<sub>New York <u>Times</u>, July 7, 1949, p. 14, col. 2.</sub>

<sup>132</sup> New York Times, July 30, 1949, p. 5, col. 4.

<sup>133</sup> New York Times, August 3, 1949, p. 12, col. 7.

According to available sources, only six actual recordings of "Tokyo Rose" broadcasts were available and the prosecution broke one of them. It was never proven that either recording presented at the trial was actually made by Ms. Toguri. She did not deny making the two broadcasts played to the jury, but neither was the recording which convicted her of treason.

On August 13, 1949, after presenting these recordings, the prosecution rested.

One of the first witnesses to testify for the defense was Colonel Shigetsugu Tsuneishi, the official in charge of prisoner of war broadcasts. According to Colonel Tsuneishi, the purpose of Japanese propaganda broadcasting was to "...promote psychological warfare on the troops and cause them to become tired and disgusted with the war." He felt the broadcasts made by Ms. Toguri appealed to the enemy, but were ineffective for propaganda purposes. 137

Colonel Tsuneishi further testified that if Ms. Toguri had refused to broadcast for the Japanese, she could have faced conscription into the army to do the broadcasts. George Mitsushio, a former Radio Tokyo official who had renounced his American citizenship, also claimed the "Zero Hour" program

<sup>134</sup> Diane Arbus, "Tokyo Rose Is Home," Esquire, Vol. 71 (May, 1969), pp. 168-69.

<sup>135</sup> New York Times, August 13, 1949, p. 4, col. 1.

<sup>136</sup> New York Times, July 12, 1949, p. 2, col. 2.

<sup>137</sup> New York Times, July 13, 1949, p. 11, col. 2.

<sup>138</sup> New York Times, July 14, 1949, p. 16, col. 3.

was broadcast solely for entertainment." 139

On July 26, Ms. Toguri took the stand in her own 140 defense. She claimed she was classified as an enemy agent in Japan and under constant surveillance by the Japanese Thought Police. 141 Because of her classification, few jobs were opened to her. For a while, she worked as a typist for the Domei News Service, then as a typist at the Danish Legation, and later as a typist for Radio Tokyo. When she began work at Radio Tokyo, a female English-speaking Japanese national was already broadcasting the "Zero Hour" Captain Charles Cousens, an Australian, who had program. been captured by the Japanese in Malaya, was responsible for the preparation of the scripts. When the Japanese national was taken ill, Captain Cousens chose Ms. Toguri to take her She claimed to have worked with Captain Cousens place. and an American prisoner of war, Captain Wallace Ince, and together they sought to make the broadcasts more entertaining

<sup>139&</sup>lt;sub>New York Times</sub>, July 22, 1949, p. 7, col. 2.

<sup>140</sup> New York Times, July 26, 1949, p. 18, col. 1.

<sup>141</sup>Diane Arbus, "Tokyo Rose Is Home," <u>Esquire</u>, Vol. 71 (May, 1969), pp. 168-69; Louisville <u>Courier-Journal</u>, (September 30, 1949, p. 1, col. 6.

<sup>142&</sup>lt;sub>Louisville Courier-Journal</sub>, September 30, 1949, p. 1, col. 6.

 $<sup>\</sup>frac{143}{\text{Elliot R. Thorpe, }} \underbrace{\frac{\text{East } \text{Wind}}{\text{Intelligence }}, \underbrace{\frac{\text{Rain: }}{\text{The Pacific}}, \frac{\text{Intimate}}{1939-49}}_{\text{(Boston: }} \underbrace{\frac{\text{Account of an Intelligence Officer in the Pacific}}{\text{Fambit Incorporated, 1969), pp. 224-27.}}}_{\text{Intimate of Pacific}}$ 

than propagandistic. 144 In their testimonies, Cousens and Ince both corroborated her statement of innocence, although they did not confide in her about their plans to sabotage the Japanese radio program. 145

Ms. Toguri claimed she hoodwinked the Japanese in her radio broadcasts and thus boosted the morale of Allied soldiers, rather than lowering it. She even visited the Bunka prisoner of war camp to distribute tobacco, fruit, and medicine to the prisoners there. 146 In return for her kindness to Allied prisoners of war, American soldiers brought her candy and flowers while she was in prison in 1945. 147 While there, Ms. Toguri claimed she was awarded a citation by the United States Navy for ". . . contributing greatly to the morale of our armed services in the Pacific area." When she was released from prison in October, 1946, the U.S. Army issued the following statement: "The Department of Justice no longer desires Iva Toguri be retained in custody. No prosecution contemplated at present." 149

<sup>144</sup> New York <u>Times</u>, July 26, 1949, p. 18, col. 1.

<sup>145</sup> New York Times, August 19, 1949, p. 10, col. 4.

New York Times, September 9, 1949, p. 12, col. 3; New York Times, September 10, 1949, p. 5. col. 3.

<sup>147&</sup>lt;sub>Boveri, op. cit., p. 171.</sub>

New York <u>Times</u>, Editorial, August 18, 1948, p. 24, col. 3.

<sup>149</sup> New York <u>Times</u>, July 27, 1949, p. 16, col. 7.

These two incidents did not correspond with the usual treatment accorded suspected traitors.

The defense made much out of the testimony of James Whitten. Whitten, a World War II veteran, claimed he heard Ms. Toguri broadcast while on Midway Island in 1942. The defense proved Ms. Toguri worked at Radio Tokyo from August 23, 1943, to September 26, 1945. This was further evidence there was more than one "Tokyo Rose."

In September, 1949, Felipe J. D'Aquino took the stand on his wife's behalf. D'Aquino, a co-worker of Ms. Toguri's while she was employed by the Domei News Service, was registered as a Portuguese national although he was born and reared in the Orient and was three-fourths Japanese. 152 He claimed his wife was forced to quit broadcasting in 1943 because she ". . rejoiced a little too publicly over an American naval victory." 153 A deposition from Tasuo Okado, a sergeant in the Japanese secret military police, supported D'Aquino's story. Okado claimed Ms. Toguri received a warning from the police because she constantly talked about Japan losing the war.

<sup>150</sup> New York Times, August 30, 1949, p. 12, col. 6.

<sup>151</sup> New York Times, July 9, 1949, p. 2, col. 8.

<sup>152&</sup>lt;sub>Louisville</sub> Courier-Journal, September 30, 1949, p. 1, col. 6.

<sup>153&</sup>lt;sub>New York <u>Times</u>, September 7, 1949, p. 10, col. 3.</sub>

<sup>154</sup> New York <u>Times</u>, September 3, 1949, p. 6, col. 2.

D'Aquino's testimony, the defense rested. 155

After twelve weeks, six thousand pages of testimony, and at a cost of over \$500,000, Iva Toguri's case went to the jury.

The jury deliberations remained deadlocked for four days.

Because deliberations took so long, most people assumed she would be found innocent. Many writers felt the trial itself was "... more journalistic than legalistic."

On the second day of deliberations, the jury reported it had failed to agree on a verdict. Judge Michael Roche's admonitions to the jury were explicit. He encouraged them to reach a unanimous decision by saying, "If you fail to reach an agreement, the case will be open and undecided, but it must be disposed of sometime. There appears no reason to believe that another trial would not be equally long and expensive to both sides, nor that the case could be tried better or more exhaustively than has been the case this time."

According to some jury members, these instructions

<sup>155</sup> New York <u>Times</u>, September 17, 1949, P. 3, col. 4.

Lousiville Courier-Journal, September 30, 1949, p. 1, col. 6

New York <u>Times</u>, September 27, 1949, p. 1, col. 6; New York <u>Times</u>, September 29, 1949, p. 21, col. 1.

<sup>158</sup> Thorpe, op. cit., p. 224.

<sup>159</sup> New York <u>Times</u>, September 28, 1949, p. 16, col. 3.

carried more weight in their decision than the trial evidence.

On September 30, 1949, the jury delivered their verdict --not guilty on seven charges, guilty on one--the sixth charge.

Ms. Toguri was found guilty of broadcasting programs to damage the morale of Allied troops in October, 1944, at the battle of Leyte Gulf.

She broadcast, "Orphans of the Pacific, you really are orphans now. How will you get home now that all your ships are lost?" 161 Interestingly enough, the one broadcast that convicted her and the one she denied making, was not available on a record, tape, or transcript.

Public reaction to the verdict was surprising, but jury reaction was puzzling. The jury refused to reveal how the polling went and foreman John Mann later admitted the jury wanted an acquittal.

Mr. Mann even apologized for the verdict.

Thus, the longest treason trial in American history was over. Yet the suffering and humiliation for Iva Toguri was not over. Ms. Toguri, who wore the same plaid suit everyday,

<sup>160&</sup>lt;sub>New York Times</sub>, September 30, 1949, p. 1. col. 2.

p. 1, col. 6; New York <u>Times</u>, October 7, 1949, p. 1, col. 2.

<sup>162&</sup>lt;sub>Diane Arbus, "Tokyo Rose Is Home," Esquire, Vol. 71</sub> (May, 1969), pp. 168-69.

Louisville Courier-Journal, September 30, 1949, p. 1, col. 6.

 $<sup>164</sup>_{\mbox{Diane}}$  Arbus, "Tokyo Rose Is Home," <u>Esquire</u>, Vol. 71 (May, 1969), pp. 168-69.

although she lost thirty pounds during the trial, was sentenced to ten years in prison and fined \$10,000.

Ms. Toguri served her sentence at the federal prison in Alderson, West Virginia.

Ms. Toguri was originally denied bail because the government could not extradite persons charged with treason and would be powerless to bring her back to the United States if she fled. In February, 1950, Ms. Toguri's lawyers sought to have her freed on \$50,000 bail. They were supported in their efforts by Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas. Supreme Court Justices are allowed to sign an order granting bail pending appeal action by a lower court or the Supreme Court itself. Again, Ms. Toguri's lawyers failed. Her conviction was upheld by the Ninth Circuit Court in San Fransisco. She was also denied a new hearing.

Ms. Toguri was released from prison in January, 1956,

Louisville Courier-Journal, October 7, 1949, Sec. II, p. 4, col. 3

Louisville Courier-Journal, October 16, 1949, p. 17, col. 1.

<sup>167&</sup>lt;sub>Louisville Courier-Journal</sub>, February 8, 1950, p. 3, col. 1.

p. 12, col. 6. See also: New York <u>Times</u>, February 8, 1950,

<sup>169</sup> New York <u>Times</u>, October 11, 1951, p. 18, col. 5.

<sup>170</sup> New York Times, December 18, 1951, p. 5, col. 3.

and allowed to live in the United States. Ms. Toguri felt "no repentance," and made plans to return to her husband in Japan.

As soon as Ms. Toguri was released from prison, the United States government started deportation proceedings against her, claiming she was an undesirable alien. The government was forced to drop deportation proceedings against her based on the Supreme Court case, Trop vs. Dulles. The government realized it was illogical for someone to be a treasonable citizen and an undesirable alien too.

There were other indications that the United States government apparently had a personal vendetta against Ms. Toguri. A large amount of money was spent on her trial. All attempts for dismissal, new hearings and bail requests were denied. She served more than half of her prison sentence and then faced deportation proceedings within days after her release. Also, two of her insurance policies were

<sup>172</sup> New York <u>Times</u>, January 29, 1956, p. 41, col. 2.

New York <u>Times</u>, January 28, 1956, p. 3, col. 6; New York <u>Times</u>, January 30, 1956, p. 24, col. 7; New York <u>Times</u>, March 14, 1956, p. 19, col. 5.

<sup>174</sup> New York Times, July 11, 1958, p. 3, col. 1.

<sup>175&</sup>lt;sub>Diane Arbus, "Tokyo Rose Is Home," Esquire, Vol. 71</sub> (May, 1969), pp. 168-69.

seized to pay her fine to the government. <sup>176</sup> As late as 1972, agents of the Nixon administration were still deducting part of her wages to collect the money she owed as a result of her original fine. <sup>177</sup>

The American public seemed much more forgiving. Soon after her release from prison, a radio operator in West Virginia offered her a job. 178 An American Legion Post in Ohio even requested she be forgiven for her propaganda 179 broadcasts.

Ms. Toguri did not return to Japan. She moved to Chicago with her father and works there in his import business today.

Her conviction meant enforced separation from her husband, Felipe D'Aquino. He was not allowed to live in the United States. The pair, although never divorced, have not seen each other for over twenty-six years. 181

In February, 1976, the Japanese-American Citizens League announced it was seeking a presidential pardon for Iva Toguri.

<sup>176</sup> New York Times, October 17, 1968, p. 20, col. 2.

<sup>177</sup>Athens <u>Banner-Herald</u>, March 12, 1976, p. 4, col. 1.

<sup>178</sup> New York Times, January 24, 1956, p. 10, col. 4.

<sup>179</sup> New York <u>Times</u>, February 16,1956, p. 58, col. 3.

New York <u>Times</u>, October 17, 1968, p. 20, col. 2; "Once Again, Tokyo Rose," <u>Newsweek</u>, Vol. 47 (January 16,1956), p. 26.

Paris Post-Intelligence, March 3, 1976, P. 17, col. 1.

The 30,000-member league claimed Ms. Toguri was the victim of postwar prejudice and was denied a fair trial.

Few Japanese-Americans supported her during her trial because they feared their loyalty would also be questioned. Edison Uno, a San Francisco State lecturer and a member of the national committee seeking her pardon, admits that many Japanese-Americans feel a sense of guilt concerning Ms. 183 The league's request for pardon was based Toguri. primarily upon the unusual trial procedures: The prosecution was allowed to subpoena witnesses from Japan and the defense was not. A prosecution witness admitted in open court he had been bribed to testify. Instead of declaring a mistrial, the judge urged the jury to convict. The foreman of the jury, John Mann, said years later he " . . . should have had a little bit more guts," and stuck to his original acquittal vote. Mann, now seventy-six years old, claims the jury was pressured into a guilty vote by the trial judge, Michael J. 185 Roche.

In November, 1976, Ms. Toguri journeyed to San Francisco and held a news conference on the steps of the San Francisco

Nashville-Tennessean, February 5, 1976, p. 66, col. 1.

<sup>183</sup> Ibid.

<sup>184</sup> Athens Banner-Herald, March 12, 1976, p. 4, col. 1.

Paris Post-Intelligence, March 13, 1976, p. 17, col. 1.

federal building where she had been tried in 1949. She went there to publicize a pardon petition she was mailing to the Justice Department. "I've lived on this merry-go-round for almost thirty years," she said, "and it's time to get off."

Besides the Japanese-American Citizens League, her pardon plea was supported by Senators-elect S. I. Hayakawa of California and Spark Matsunaga of Hawaii and many other sympathetic 187

On January 19, 1977, one day before leaving office,
President Gerald R. Ford issued a pardon to Iva Toguri.

The pardon, which did not profess innocence or return the
189
fines, restored her American citizenship.

<sup>186</sup> Newsweek, Vol. 88 (November 29, 1976), p. 53.

<sup>187</sup> Ibid.

<sup>188</sup> Walter Cronkite, CBS News, January 19, 1977.

<sup>189</sup> CBS's 60 Minutes, January 23, 1977.

## Chapter IV

Most people will agree that World War II was an emotional and popular war. The people of the United States supported the government's decision to declare war against the Axis powers. Congress itself passed a declaration of war with only one dissenting vote. This was not true of the Vietnam conflict. The unpopularity of the war in Vietnam caused much dissension in the United States during the 1960's. Events occurred during the Vietnam conflict which would not have been tolerated during World War II.

How do World War II veterans feel about the activities, trial and recent pardon of Iva Toguri? How do their attitudes concerning her compare with Vietnam veterans? Was it the prevailing attitude of post-World War II America which convicted Iva Toguri? No doubt it played a large part in her conviction. Had Iva Toguri made the same type of broadcasts during the Vietnam conflict, it is doubtful she would have been charged with treason.

Personal interviews were conducted with World War II veterans who heard "Tokyo Rose" broadcasts. Their attitudes concerning Iva Toguri will be compared with the attitudes of Vietnam veterans. Certain general conclusions can be drawn from the following interviews.

Guy Maynard served as a staff sergeant during World War II with the 495th Engineer Shop Company stationed in the Philippines. According to Mr. Maynard, "Tokyo Rose" was not taken seriously. He considered her broadcasts good entertainment and was surprised she was convicted of treason. Concerning her pardon, Mr. Maynard said, "I thought they ought to have pardoned her. I was glad. We liked to listen to her and she didn't bother us in our outfit." 190 Mr. Maynard was discharged from the army after the war.

W. J. Kemp served during World War II with the 38th Division, 149th Infantry under General Chase. Mr. Kemp felt "Tokyo Rose" had no effect on the men he served with because they considered her only a source of entertainment. Mr. Kemp heard "Tokyo Rose" broadcast at Leyte Gulf and near Manila. Although he considered her broadcasts harmless, he believed she should have been tried for treason because "... she was an American." Mr. Kemp also returned to civilian life immediately after war.

Carlos Abney and Harold Timmerman both served in World War II in the Pacific theatre of war. Mr. Abney, a sergeant who served in the 201st Anti-Aircraft Artillery Battalion, heard several "Tokyo Rose" broadcasts while serving at New Guinea, Los Negros Island and the Philippines. According to Mr. Abney, the men in his company were always anxious to hear one of her broadcasts and were especially thrilled once when

<sup>190</sup> Mr. Guy Maynard, Personal Interview, March 27, 1977.

<sup>191</sup> Mr. W. J. Kemp, Personal Interview, September 3, 1974.

she called their battalion by name. Also, she played American music and it was better than listening to Australian music. He stated "Tokyo Rose" might have slightly affected some of the married men in his company due to her suggestive remarks concerning their wives back home, but he did not feel her broadcasts were responsible for anyone's death. Mr. Abney strongly believed if Ms. Toguri had to face trial, then Captain Ince should have been charged with treason too. He supported Ford's pardon for Ms. Toguri because "... she paid for what she did and it wasn't a big crime anyway."

Mr. Timmerman agreed with Mr. Abney. Mr. Timmerman, an Air Force captain, served with the 345th Bomber Group in New Guinea, Okinawa and the Philippines. Although Mr. Timmerman believed that "Tokyo Rose's" intelligence information was successful concerning the location of Allied units, the broadcasts did not cause harm. He felt no one paid any particular attention to her chatter, but really enjoyed her music.

Mr. Timmerman believed her conviction for treason was too harsh.

Both Mr. Abney and Mr. Timmerman returned to civilian life after the war.

The next three World War II veterans with whom interviews were conducted reacted differently to Ms. Toguri's activities.

Mr. Carlos Abney, Personal Interview, March 7, 1977.

Mr. Harold Timmerman, Personal Interview, February 3, 1974.

Sergeant Major Murray Morris, who served in the Pacific, felt she was ", , , personally responsible for the death of many American troops." 194 He emphasized her conviction and sentence were just.

Technical Sergeant John V. Fleming served in the European theatre of war during World War II, but he heard "Tokyo Rose" broadcast during an intelligence briefing. Mr. Fleming judged that her style of propaganda did have its effects on troop morale. According to Mr. Fleming, letters from wives and girl friends were not as believable as the information "Tokyo Rose" broadcast over the radio. Mr. Fleming obviously felt very strongly about Ms. Toguri's punishment. He suggested a better punishment would be pulling every piece of her skin 195 out by tweezers.

E. W. Roberts, a retired lieutenant colonel in the Marines, served at Guadalcanal and on New Britain Island. Mr. Roberts also agreed that "Tokyo Rose's" intelligence was good. Although Mr. Roberts concluded that few of the troops took her seriously, he believed she should have been punished because ". . . nobody gets away from their sins." Mr. Morris, Mr. Fleming and Mr. Roberts are retired military personnel.

<sup>194</sup> Mr. Murray Morris, Personal Interview, April 11, 1973.

Mr. John V. Fleming, Personal Interview, April 11, 1973.

<sup>196</sup> Mr. E.W. Roberts, Personal Interview, May 7, 1974.

Several other World War II veterans were interviewed. With the exception of Mr. Kemp, who felt Iva Toguri should have been punished, the results of the interviews were the same. Those veterans who returned to civilian life immediately after World War II, felt Ms. Toguri's punishment was too harsh for the crime. Those veterans who remained in the armed forces felt her punishment was appropriate or too lenient.

Fewer general conclusions can be drawn from interviews with Vietnam veterans concerning their attitudes about Ms.

Toguri. The majority of Vietnam veterans, even those who were career servicemen, held a more lenient attitude toward Ms.

Toguri. Again, several interviews were conducted and the following are random samplings of their results.

Ivan Hampton, now a civil servant, served as a sergeant in Vietnam, assigned to the 23rd Infantry Battalion. In August, 1967, Mr. Hampton lost an eye when a booby trap blew up and sent metal and glass flying into his face. According to Mr. Hampton, Ms. Toguri was a traitor, and many people were psychologically hurt because of that. He stated the only justification for a pardon was the jury's prejudical attitude toward Ms. Toguri.

Lieutenant Colonel H.R. Boose, the Director of Personnel and Community Affairs at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, served in

<sup>197</sup> Mr. Ivan Hampton, Personal Interview, January 26, 1977.

Vietnam as a major in 1968-69. Lt. Colonel Boose felt Ms. Toguri should have been tried and convicted; however, he admitted she would probably not have been tried had she broadcast the same material during the Vietnam conflict, but she should have been. He said, "I think it was well worth the price to convict her. It lets others know we don't put up with that kind of activity. The major use of punishment is as a deterrent."

198 Yet, Lt. Colonel Boose felt she should have been pardoned because she had paid the price.

Colonel Thomas E. Blagg, Commander of the 1st Brigade at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, served in Vietnam as a captain in 1964 and again as a lieutenant colonel in 1970. Colonel Blagg believed Ms. Toguri received an unfair trial. "I feel confident that the emotionalism and the commitment of the nation led to her conviction," he said. "Things more treasonous were committed in Vietnam by government officials." Colonel Blagg's attempt to explain why Iva Toguri was punished and Captain Ince was promoted in rank raises some interesting questions about our military and judicial logic. Comparing Ince and Ms. Toguri, he said, "One was a P.O.W., the other was a victim. She was

 $<sup>$198</sup>_{\hbox{\scriptsize Lt.}}$$  Colonel H.R. Boose, Personal Interview, March 31, 1977.

<sup>199&</sup>lt;sub>Ibid</sub>.

<sup>200&</sup>lt;sub>Colonel Thomas E. Blagg, Personal Interview, April 6, 1977.</sub>

less prepared to make a patriotic judgment than the captain."

It is ironic that this high ranking military official could view Captain Ince's collaboration with the enemy as a patriotic judgment.

<sup>201</sup> Ibid.

## Chapter V

Many questions still remain concerning Iva Toguri's case. The answers to these questions could possibly have changed the outcome of her trial for treason.

In 1941, why was she refused re-entry into the United States after the American consulate had given her permission to go to Japan on an emergency basis? Why did Iva Toguri face trial for treason rather than renounce her U.S. citizenship? How could the federal authorities justify indicting Ms. Toguri, but renege on their promise to indict Captain Ince? Why is Captain Ince's name never mentioned in recent interviews or news stories concerning Ms. Toguri, and why do military authorities refuse to give information concerning his whereabouts today?

All of these are important, yet unanswered questions. Only the major characters in Ms. Toguri's story can answer these questions, yet they have failed to do so. Many agencies and individuals were contacted in an attempt to gather more inside information concerning Ms. Toguri's case. Most government agencies elected to remain silent or evasive. A majority of the information in this paper came from newspaper and magazine articles; therefore the conclusions are based on these sources.

Ms. Toguri, herself, remains very vague concerning certain events in her story. Since her pardon, she has granted

personel interviews to newsmen on the television shows, "60 Minutes," and "Good Morning America." In both interviews she was extremely critical of Captain Cousens, the Australian prisoner of war who worked with her at Radio Tokyo. However, she failed to mention Wallace Ince's name. In a letter received from Ms. Toguri by the author, she again refused comment on Ince, but refers the question to her lawyer, Wayne Collins.\* Mr. Collins failed to reply to the correspondence.

Government and military agencies were even more mysterious about Wallace Ince. Several agencies were contacted in an attempt to discover Ince's whereabouts; no information was available. A telephone call was made to the military library in Washington, D.C. by a Fort Campbell major, seeking information on Ince. Mr. Delmar Finca informed the major that Wallace Ince's files were sealed and a "reason to know" was required before any information was released. A few days later the same Mr. Finca denied the statement to the author.

If calling American troops fighting in combat, "orphans of the Pacific," is treason, and Ms. Toguri made that particular broadcast, then she was guilty of treason. However, her participation at Radio Tokyo, forced or otherwise, is not the most important question. Did Iva Toguri receive a fair trial as guaranteed by our Constitution? It is doubtful. Racism and the emotional climate following World War II convicted Iva Toguri of

<sup>\*</sup>See the copy of Ms. Toguri's letter in the appendix.

treason. Thousands of lives were lost in World War II, but this personal loss, however tragic, gives no one the right to deny another person his basic rights, including the right to a fair trial. If the government felt treason charges were in order, they should have included Wallace Ince, as well as Ms. Toguri. Although of Japanese descent, she too was an American citizen. Race obviously played a large part in deciding who would be indicted and who would not.

In January, 1977, over twenty-seven years after her conviction, Ms. Toguri was pardoned by President Gerald Ford. A pardon is not a declaration of innocence. Neither does the granting of the pardon imply any admission of mistakes or racial prejudice by the government or military agencies. It was a presidential pardon—nothing more, nothing less.

Morton Grodzins, author of <u>The Loyal and Disloyal</u>:

<u>Social Boundaries of Patriotism and Treason</u>, claims "...


patriotism, and treason, must be analyzed as the products of social situations and human reactions to those situations." 202 Ms. Toguri's situation in wartime Japan and her reaction to that situation have to be considered together.

 $<sup>\</sup>frac{202_{Morton~Grodzins,}}{\text{Social}} = \frac{\text{Disloyal}}{\text{Morton~Grodzins,}} = \frac{\text{The Loyal}}{\text{Disloyal}} = \frac{\text{Disloyal}}{\text{Chicago}} = \frac{\text{Social}}{\text{The University}} = \frac{\text{Boundaries}}{\text{Of Chicago}} = \frac{\text{Of Patriotism}}{\text{Press}} = \frac{\text{And}}{\text{p. 5}} = \frac{\text{The Loyal}}{\text{Treason}} = \frac{\text{Disloyal}}{\text{Chicago}} = \frac{\text{Social}}{\text{The University}} = \frac{\text{The University}}{\text{The University}} = \frac{\text{Social}}{\text{The University}} = \frac{\text{The University}}{\text{The University}} = \frac{\text{The University}}{\text{The$ 

Ms. Toguri's relatives, fearing reprisals by the Japanese government, insisted she leave their home. During World War II, there were few jobs available to Americans living in Japan. Since Nisei were not high on the priority list for permission to return to the United States, she was forced to look for employment. Even the wisdom of returning to the United States must have seemed doubtful to her. Since Pearl Harbor, racial hatred of the Japanese had run rampant in the United States and Ms. Toguri's mother was a victim of a Japanese relocation camp at Gila River, Arizona.

Ms. Toguri's 1949 treason trial can only confirm the suspicion of racism apparent in post-World War II America. At the grand jury session held in 1948 to indict Ms. Toguri, the Justice Department agreed to bring charges against Wallace Ince, Ms. Toguri's co-worker at Radio Tokyo. This agreement was not fulfilled. Even jury selection in her treason trial hints at racism; no member of a minority group was selected for jury service.

Questions still remain today concerning the subpoenaing of witnesses. The prosecution was allowed to subpoena aliens; yet the defense was allowed only to take depositions from aliens. A witness for the government admitted in open court he had perjured himself and had been bribed to testify. Instead of declaring a mistrial, the judge encouraged the jury to convict. Testimonies for the defense and prosecution were



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
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
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# UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

MAR 7 1977

Miss Betty Glenn Kemp 2191 Memorial N132 Clarksville, Tennessee

37040

Dear Miss Kemp:

Your recent letter to the Attorney General has been referred to this office for reply. You request information as to why this Department did not prosecute Walter Ince, an officer in the United States Army, who worked with Iva Toguri D'Aquino, also known as "Tokyo Rose."

Presumably, Mr. Ince's work with Mrs. Toguri occurred while he was a prisoner of war in Japan at which time he was a member of the Army. Therefore, he was within the jurisdiction of the Army, and the Department of Justice has no authority to prosecute such matters.

You may be interested to know that, under the Freedom of Information Act, this Department has released 1,491 pages of material from the files in the "Tokyo Rose" case. This material is available for your inspection here in Washington, or you may obtain copies at a cost of \$.10 per page.

Sincerely,

JOHN H. DAVITT, Chief Internal Security Section Criminal Division

February 25, 1977

Dear Mr. Kemp,

I wish I could thank each of you personally for your kind letters and telegrams following the pardon and restoration of my American citizenship. Unfortunately, because so many of you were só thoughtful, the task became so overwhelming that I decided to acknowledge your messages in this form to at least let you know how much I appreciated your kind words.

The last month has been extremely busy for me with the dozens of friends and well-wishers who stopped by to say hello. At the same time there was a flood of requests for television, radio, and newspaper interviews from as far away as Japan, Brazil, and Italy. I often wanted to say "no" to all the media requests, but I felt I had a responsibility to tell my story in the hope that it might help others caught in similar unfortunate circumstances.

Now that the attention has finally begun to die down, I'm looking forward to a good rest, the chance to resume my simple life, and a new peace of mind with the cloud of the last thirty years being lifted at last.

With warmest regards,

Iva Toguri d'Aguino

Cliente with Wayne Callins, Attorney.

Mills Tower, Rm 1300

Per Capt have 220 Bush 57

San Francisco, Calif

You major 94104