PRINCIPIA HISTORIA OR R. G. COLLINGWOOD AND THE LOGIC OF HISTORY JAMES KENNETH DUVALL

PRINCIPIA HISTORIA

or

R. G. COLLINGWOOD AND THE LOGIC OF HISTORY

An Abstract Presented to the Graduate and Research Council of Austin Peay State University

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Master of Arts

> by James Kenneth Duvall

> > May 1988

ABSTRACT

In historical thinking the mind reaches an Archimedean point. A past thought to be known must become actual. This is possible only by building up a structure of reasoned thought to serve as its context. The thought itself must be one the historian is capable of thinking, for it must become a thought of his own. Re-enactment is the goal towards which historical method aims.

The three correlative major principles implicit in the principle of reason are possibility, participation, and limited objective. The first asserts the existence of objects as yet undiscovered and is the formal aspect of the logic of history. The second is a recognition that these objects are known already, but only implicitly; it is their explicit actuality which is possible. When they are found to be necessary we must assert their actuality. This process of discovery is accomplished through the activity of language or imagination. The exposition of Collingwood's theory of imagination serves as a context for the doctrine of re-enactment. The historical imagination is a higher development of aesthetic activity-imagination made rational by incorporating reason or scientific method within itself. Such thought differs from imagination proper in that its constructions

are obligatory. The mind, however, must feel the necessity of the imagined object, because certainty itself rests on more than a sum of proofs. The process of individual relations must be transcended in a single aesthetic act in which the whole is felt to be necessary. The actual is that which is both possible and necessary. The object and the thought which seeks to grasp it must be identical. The re-enactment of past thought is what makes history possible; hence it is a necessary doctrine for the philosophy of history.

Historical knowledge, then, is necessarily selfknowledge. The historian can only know thoughts he can think for himself; history gives him an understanding of <u>his</u> past, and insight into his present situation. By this knowledge he gains a place to stand, a point from which he can make intelligent changes in the present situation; indeed, he has already begun to act.

The doctrine of re-enactment, like every other principle of history, cannot be empirically verified. It is a transcendental principle which enables us to show how historical knowledge is possible: it is the necessary culmination of the historical imagination in which the object is made actual. The metaphysical principles on which history stands are rooted in theological presuppositions which supply the necessity implicit in all reasoning. Though the justification of historical presuppositions lies in the usefulness of history, the possibility of history lies in the necessity implied by this utility.

The object of the work is to illuminate Collingwood's major historical doctrines in the context of all his published philosophical work. In a sense the thesis is an attempt to make explicit a kind of philosophy best described as a <u>rapprochement</u> between the <u>Idea of History</u> and the <u>Principles of Art</u>, which Collingwood proposed but never lived to write. Some attention has also been paid to what Collingwood calls the "affinities" of his position with other major thinkers; particular emphasis is given to Bradley, Vico, and Kant. Abbreviations used in footnotes:

Books

- A&R "Appearance and Reality by F.H. Bradley (ed.2, 1930; ed.1, 1893)
- Auto. An Autobiography (1939)
- E.M. Essay on Metaphysics (1940)
- Essays Essays in the Philosophy of History ed.W.Debbins (1965)
- FML <u>First Mate's Log</u> (1940)
- F&R Faith and Reason ed. L. Rubinoff (1968)
- I.H. Idea of History (1946)
- I.N. Idea of Nature (1945)
- KRV <u>Kritik der reinen Vernunft</u>. This is the standard abbreviation of the <u>Critique of Pure Reason</u>; the citations are to the pages of the first and second editions designated as A (1781) and B (1787). The German edition used is that of Schmidt; the English translation that of Kemp Smith, though Müller is cited occasionally.
- N.L. <u>New Leviathan</u> (1942)
- P.A. Principles of Art (1938)
- P.M. Essay on Philosophical Method
- R.B. Roman Britain ed. 2 (1937)
- S.M. Speculum Mentis (1924)

Articles

CNI "Can the New Idealism Dispense with Mysticism? (1923)

- CPH "Croce's Philosophy of History" (1921)
- F&N "Fascism and Nazism" (1940)
- HSDK "Are History and Science Different Kinds of Knowledge: (1922)
- LHK "The Limits of Historical Knowledge" (1928)
- NAPH "The Nature and Aims of a Philosophy of History" (1925)
- PAE "The Place of Art in Education" (1926)
- PNP "The Present Need of a Philosophy" (1934)
- PPA "Plato's Philosophy of Art" (1925)
- RFCI "Reason is Faith Cultivating Itself" (1927)
- SPAT "Some Perplexities About Time: With an Attempted Solution" (1926)
- S&H "Science and History" (1923)
- S&T "Sensation and Thought" (1923)
 - Reprinted articles are also cited by pages in Essays.

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A Thesis Presented to the Graduate and Research Council of Austin Peay State University

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> by James Kenneth Duvall

> > May 1988

To the Graduate and Research Council:

I am submitting herewith a Thesis written by James Kenneth Duvall entitled "Principia Historia; or, R. G. Collingwood and the Logic of History." I have examined the final copy of this paper for form and content, and I recommend that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts, with a major in History.

Rectard P. Hilline

We have read this thesis and recommend its acceptance:

Minor Profess

or Second Committee Member

Accepted for the Graduate and Research Council:

William J. Erlen

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Acknowledgements

People in a number of libraries have been helpful. Woodward Library of Austin Peay State University has the most complete collection of works by and about Collingwood of any library in which I have worked. Particular thanks are due Anne Berwind, Don Carlin and Anita K. Burton. I have borrowed many books from the University of Cincinnati Libraries; I owe a special thanks to Marianna Wells of the Physics library, and to Jean Wellington of the Classics library. Sue Schweir in the Inter-library Loan Department of the Kenton County Public Library has graciously acquired for me a large number of valuable articles. The staff at Thomas More College Library also was helpful.

I wish to thank my committee, especially my major professor, Dr. Gildrie, as well as Dr. Dixon and Dr. Winn, for their time and effort. I am indebted to Dr. Dixon for introducing me to Collingwood. It was reading <u>Roman Britain</u> that aroused my interest in its author. Beth Seay of the Graduate Office has been particularly helpful. I would also like to thank Mrs. Iva Kelsay for giving me a copy of the <u>Critique of Pure Reason</u>. Most of all, I thank my typists, my father and mother, who sustained me, both physically and mentally, at crucial points along the way.

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What though I am not wealthy in the dower Of spanning wisdom; though I do not know The shiftings of the mighty winds that blow Hither and thither all the changing thoughts Of man: though no great minist'ring reason sorts Out the dark mysteries of human souls To clear conceiving: yet there ever rolls A vast idea before me, and I glean Therefrom my liberty; thence too I've seen The end and aim of poesy.

Keats. Sleep and Poetry 11. 284-293.

CHAPTER I

COLLINGWOOD AND THE ARCHIMEDEAN POINT

R. G. Collingwood has made the most important twentieth-century contribution to the philosophy of history, as most of the recent major writers on the subject concede. Many areas of his thought have not yet been adequately explored and developed. The logic of history and the theory of imagination are two of the most important aspects which remain undeveloped. These must be studied in relation to each other, a relation best described in terms of Collingwood's conception of a scale of forms. By concentrating on the relation between history and the activity of imagination we can elucidate Collingwood's thought and perhaps increase its value.

Collingwood came to regard history as the most important form of human experience. This was especially true in the modern world. He considered history the only "science of human affairs" of any value for laying the foundations of the future. Only history could serve as the content of scientific and philosophical thinking. Because of its great importance to all modern thought, historical thought must itself be thoroughly understood if the powers latent in it were to be fully developed. History must become a science. But not by aping the natural sciences, it must develop its own implicit logic. Collingwood writes:

In the last thirty or forty years historical thought has been achieving an acceleration in velocity of its progress and an enlargement in its outlook comparable to those which natural science had achieved about the beginning of the seventeenth century. It seemed to me as nearly certain as anything in the future could be, that historical thought, whose constantly increasing importance had been one of the striking features of the nineteenth century, would increase in importance far more rapidly during the twentieth; and that we might very well be standing on the threshold of an age in which history would be as important for the world as natural science had been between 1600 and 1900. If that was the case (and the more I thought about it the likelier it seemed) the wise philosopher would concentrate with all his might on the problems of history, at whatever cost, and so do his share in laying the foundations of the future.1

The value of historical thought and of the philosophy of history in particular has come to be more generally recognized since Collingwood. Though the truth of this insight could be fully justified from a perspective of centuries justified by historical thinking—his own work remains the highwater mark of modern thought on the philosophy of history.

In the second book of his <u>Principles of Art</u> Collingwood develops a comprehensive and highly significant theory of imagination. Collingwood did not live to develop it in relation to history, and for this reason it has not yet received proper attention. It is on this aspect of Collingwood's philosophy of history that the present thesis will concentrate. Imagination is intimately connected with many

¹ <u>Auto</u>., 87-88.

aspects of Collingwood's theory of historical knowledge; this is particularly the case with his logic of question and answer, or what in its specialized form is called here the logic of history.

Collingwood's theory of history is here divided into four major principles. The first is the principle of reason; that is, the historian (to state the matter in its simplest form) must have a reason for the assertions he makes. This involves a consideration of the nature of historical reason. The three other principles are further subdivisions of the first. The second principle is the principle of possibility, that everything is not yet known. This is the formal aspect of reason, the scale of forms which form the logic; the steps on that scale are, supposal, question, evidence and knowledge. The third principle is that called here the principle of participation This is the active principle and may be regarded as identical with imagination proper, though to be specific it must be called historical imagination. It is this principle on which the present work will concentrate. The fourth is the principle of limited objective. This is concerned with the necessity of the reasoned object, that is, the construction of the historical imagination, and it is under this principle that Collingwood's doctrine of re-enactment must be considered. The four principles will be seen to correspond in a general way with Kant's concept of empirical thought and its

postulated—the possible, the actual, and the necessary. 2

Collingwood's thought rests upon presuppositions that are essentially Romantic and Christian.³ These presuppositions were manifested in his philosophy by a desire for what he calls "unity of mind."⁴ His chief link with the Romantic movement was John Ruskin, who he regarded as possessing in an eminent degree that unity of mind so characteristic of the Middle Ages. "Romantic" is not a synonym for dreamer. Jacques Barzun has pointed out, in a book in which he has amassed a great deal of evidence, that romanticism is not opposed to realism; romanticism <u>is</u> realism.⁵ The essence of the Romantic doctrine in philosophy, as in art, is <u>all knowledge begins with experience</u>, the unity of mind.⁶ This is the basis of the work of Kant, and indeed, of every philosopher of the Romantic movement.

The single most important intellectual influence on Collingwood's philosophy was Oxford. His work reflects the tensions in its atmosphere between Idealism, which when Collingwood arrived, had lately been the dominant school,

 2 KRV, A 218, B 286, see especially A 234, B 286; E.M., 273f.

³ On the compatibility of these see Jacques Barzun, <u>Classic, Romantic and Modern</u> (Garden City: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1961), p. 95; S.M., 36-38.

⁴ S.M., 27. ⁵ <u>Ibid</u>., p. 58f.

⁶ On this point Barzun offers a comparison between <u>Faust</u> and the <u>Discourse on Method</u>, which Descartes had originally intended to entitle <u>The History of My Mind</u> (<u>Ibid</u>., pp. 87f, 211).

and the growing influence of those who called themselves "realists." The earlier school had been led by Thomas Hill Green, whose philosophy Collingwood styles as "a reply to Herbert Spencer by a profound student of Hume."⁷ This movement, which had a profound effect on English political life, was, according to Collingwood, "a continuation and criticism of the indigenous English and Scottish philosophies of the middle nineteenth century."⁸ He adds, however, "they had some knowledge of Hegel, and a good deal more of Kant." The most important philosopher of the school was F. H. Bradley, considered by Collingwood to be the "father of modern realism."⁹ A number of Cook Wilson's logical doctrines, as Collingwood points out, were borrowed from Bradley. About all that was left of this school when Collingwood came to Oxford were his teacher, J. A. Smith, and H. H. Joachim, an internationally recognized authority on Descartes and Spinoza.¹⁰

Auto., 15. He means of course Locke, Berkeley and Hume, of whom he says, "The English school, then, is reorientating philosophy in the direction of history, though as a whole it is not clearly aware that it doing so. (I.H., 73).

⁹ MS "The Nature of Metaphysical Study," 1934. p. 27; cited in W. J. Van der Dussen, <u>History As A Science: The</u> <u>Philosophy of R. G. Collingwood</u> (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1981), p. 195.

¹⁰ James Patrick, <u>The Magdalen Metaphysicals: Idealism</u> <u>and Orthodoxy at Oxford 1901-1905</u>. (Macon, Georgia: Mercer University Press, 1985).

⁷ <u>Auto</u>., 15.

The "realists," led by professor of logic John Cook Wilson, became the dominant school of philosophers at Oxford in the years following the turn of the century. Though Collingwood had great personal admiration for Cook Wilson, he generally found the "realists," or "minute philosophers," as he calls them, his opponents in philosophical battles.¹¹ Most of their errors he attributed to historical blunders, failure to understand the doctrine being criticised.¹² This anti-historical tendency was a characteristic of the school from the first. One of Cook Wilson's students relates how the professor in discussing Zeno's paralogism of Achilles and the Tortoise "would speak as though Zeno were in the next room: 'what does the fellow mean by <u>never</u>?'" An incident even more revealing also recorded in this memoir occurred in a small discussion class about 1892:

He was treating by request the Kantian paradox: "the mind makes nature, the material it does not make." He paused in his familiar way and ...blurted out: But why shouldn't that table be there, just where we see it?" Silence attended the result. The professor sprang once into the air; said very fiercely indeed: "Why shouldn't it?" and then relapsed into reverie.¹³

¹¹ P.A., 265n; <u>Auto</u>., 19, 26; 21-22. ¹² <u>Auto</u>., 23.

¹³ A. S. L. Farquharson, "Memoir," in John Cook Wilson, <u>Statement and Inference with Other Philosophical Papers</u>, 2 vols. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1926), I, xviii, xix. It is possible that Cook Wilson is the philosopher mentioned by Collingwood in S.M., 311-12: "A philosopher once refuted idealism by begging his audience to watch his desk and see whether, when he left the room, it continued to exist or not." Note that here, as in all other direct quotations in this work, italics appear only if in the original.

The student never returned to class.

Such failures by Cook Wilson and his followers Collingwood excused in his youth, though he was quite aware that they were blunders, on the grounds that these men were philosophers, not historians.¹⁴ Later Collingwood came to realize that the two disciplines are inseparable and to actively combat the unhistorical procedure inherent in the methodology of "realism," which criticised doctrines before determining the problem it was meant to solve (that is, the context which gave the doctrine its meaning), because they were unaware that it was meant to solve a problem at all. Criticism cannot be divorced from understanding, it must rest on it. The critic must work from within.¹⁵

The most important philosophical influences on Collingwood, other than Plato and Aristotle, were Vico (1668-1744) and Kant (1724-1804). These two philosophers developed complementary aspects of the philosophy of Descartes, and like him both insisted on experience as the foundation of thought. Philosophically Collingwood felt he owed more to Vico than to any other thinker. Peter Burke remarks, "So far as the English-speaking world is concerned, Vico's appearance on the intellectual map probably owes more to

^{14 &}lt;u>Auto.</u>, 23; cf. Owen Barfield, <u>Romanticism Comes of</u> <u>Age</u> (Middletown, Conn; Wesleyan University Press, 1967), p. 198.

¹⁵ P.M., 219; cf. C. S. Lewis, <u>The Abolition of Man</u> (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1943; rpt. New York: Macmillan/ Collier Books, 1955), pp. 57-60.

Collingwood than to any other individual." He excepts only the English translators of the <u>Scienza Nuova</u>. Norman O. Brown's remark on the appearance of this translation was a bit premature: "Here is Vico's <u>New Science</u> back again (Cornell University Press, 1968), and doing no better in the scholarly world than it did the first time round." There now exists an Institute of Vico Studies in New York, and there are a large number of studies being published about his life and work.¹⁶

Caponigri says, "The great merit of Vico is to have stated and, within his own terms, to have resolved the philosophical problem of history as the basic problem of the philosophical study of man."¹⁷ He remarks that the enthusiasm of Italian scholars for Vico is such that they "discover in him both the fulfillment of the Renaissance and the anticipation of the Kantian revolution."¹⁸ Ruggiero says that for Vico, "the study of history suggests no longer the distinction between substance and accident, but the new idea of the development, the unfolding of the human

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 1.

¹⁶ T. M. Knox in I.H., viii; Peter Burke, <u>Vico</u> (Oxford University Press, 1985), p. 7; N. O. Brown in <u>American Scholar</u> 39 (Spring 1970): 322; see especially G Tagliacozzo, ed., <u>Vico: Past and Present</u> (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1981. In this collection is an interesting article by Joseph M. Levine, "Collingwood and Vico." (II, 72-84.).

¹⁷ A. Robert Caponigri, <u>Time and Idea: The Theory</u> <u>of History in Giambattista Vico</u> (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1953), p. 6.

mind: Vico lays the foundations of history." ¹⁹ There is in Vico's work both a speculative and methodological dimension. The latter is derived from his study of Bacon, and Vico seems to have been generally sympathetic towards English empiricism.²⁰ The speculative side of his thought belongs to the transcendental aspect of the philosophy of history, and this is particularly exemplified in his doctrine of ricoursi, or historical cycles. In this doctrine, as Ruggiero points out, Vico has "a glimpse of a metaphysic of mind," adding, "Vico introduces the true concept of mind when he expounds his doctrine of the providence immanent in the development of nations....history as he conceives it is the complete expression of human nature in its entirety."²¹ Together the doctrines of ricoursi and providence perform a function similar to that of the architectonic in Kant's philosophy. They are a prefiguration of what Collingwood developed as the scale of forms. Vico's study of Bacon led him to propose the discovery of a common principle by which "the whole of divine

¹⁹ Guido de Ruggiero, <u>Modern Philosophy</u>, trans. A. Howard Hannay and R. G. Collingwood (London: Allen & Unwin; New York: Macmillan, 1921), p. 303; I.H., 63-71.

²⁰ Caponigri, p. 6. Vico, for example, sent Newton a copy of the <u>Scienza Nuova</u>, though there is no evidence it was ever received. Frank Edward Manuel, <u>Isaac Newton</u>, <u>Historian</u> (Cambridge: Belknap Press, Harvard University Press, 1963), p. 43.

²¹ Ruggiero, p. 304; see also Caponigri, chap. 8, "Ricoursi," (p. 130f.), cf. I.H., 88n., and Bacon's "Of Vicissitude of Things," in <u>Essayes</u>.

and profane wisdom" might be unified.²² This principle is implicitly identical with the principle of reason, or history itself.

Collingwood's opinion of Vico is quite justified. Vico's influence on him is nowhere greater than in his theory of imagination; and this again places Collingwood directly in the romantic tradition of philosophy. Croce says,

Romanticism, too, especially in Germany but also more or less in other countries, was Vician, emphasising as it did the original function of the imagination. His doctrines of language recurred when Herder and Humboldt treated it not intellectualistically as an artificial system of symbols, but as a free and poetic creation of the mind.²³

The importance of Kant for Collingwood's philosophy had received very little attention. This is surprising, for if Vico influenced him in the broad philosophical conception of history, Kant's influence is more obvious and extends to particular details. In addition Collingwood tells us in his <u>Autobiography</u> that he discovered and read Kant's "Ethics" at the age of eight; in fact nearly everything he ever wrote contains some reference to Kant. In

²² Caponigri, p. 20. This was the point of Vico's <u>De nostri</u>, as it is generally called, or <u>De nostri tem-</u> <u>poris studiorum ratione</u> (1709). <u>On the Study Methods of</u> <u>Our Time</u>, trans. Elio Gianturco (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, Library of Liberal Arts, 1965).

²³ Benedetto Croce, <u>The Philosophy of Giambattista</u> <u>Vico</u>, trans. R. G. Collingwood (1913; rpt. New York: Russell & Russell, 1964), pp. 238-39; see also appendix 3 "The Sources of Vico's Theory of Knowledge," (pp. 279-301), P.A., 80, 138n.

the Essay on Philosophical Method he says,

The philosophical work of Kant is one of those things whose magnitude only seems to increase with every advance in our understanding of them; it bestrides the world, even now, like a colossus, or like a mountain whose waters irrigate every little garden of thought in the plains beneath it.²⁴

Schiller indicated the importance of Kant for European philosophy in his epigram Kant und seine Auslager:

Wie doch ein einziger Reicher so viele Bettler in Nahrung Setzt! Wenn die Könige baun, haben die Kärrner zu tun.²⁵

The importance of Kant for the philosophy of history can hardly be overstated. Collingwood says in <u>Speculum</u> <u>Mentis</u>, "The Kantian synthesis of intuition and conception enriched philosophy with one priceless possession, historical fact or the concrete universal."²⁶ Kant reached implicitly an Archimedean point which makes history possible. According to Collingwood,

The Kantian "Copernican revolution" contained implicitly, though Kant himself did not work it out, a theory of how historical knowledge is possible not only without the historian's abandoning the standpoint of this own age, but precisely because he does not abandon that standpoint.²⁷

Collingwood's work can be best understood as a detailed

²⁵ <u>Schillers samtliche Werke</u> (Leipzig: Hesse & Becker, n.d.), I, 270. "How many starvelings one rich man can nourish! When monarchs build the rubbish carriers flourish." <u>The Poems and Ballads of Schiller</u>, trans. Sir Edward Bulwer Lytton (London and New York: Frederick Warne & Co., 1887), p. 287.

²⁶ S.M., 286.

²⁷I.H., 60.

²⁴ P.M., 24.

working out of this Archimedean point based on a critical understanding of Kantian philosophy. His "Outlines of a Philosophy," written in 1928 (better known as the "Die manuscript") shows obvious Kantian influence. The four sections of this manuscript, which was of great importance in the actual formation of his thoughts on the subject, were arranged, "out of compliment to the Kantian critiques," under the headings Quality, Quantity, Relation and Modality.²⁸ W. J. Van der Dussen points out,

The influence of Hegel on Collingwood's thought is often emphasized, this judgement usually being based on <u>Speculum Mentis</u>. The lectures of 1926 and 1928 prove, however, that he was not less influenced by Kant: their main characteristic can even be seen as a "transcendental analytic."²⁹

In the manuscript of 1926 Collingwood states: "History is one of the necessary and transcendental modes of mind's activity and the common property of all minds."³⁰ Under the heading of "Quality" in the 1928 lectures—a revision of those of 1926—Collingwood first began to develop his famous doctrine of re-enactment.

In Kant's system there is a distinction between reason and intelligence. Reason is architectonic or teleological.

30 Ibid., 143.

^{28 &}lt;u>Auto.</u>, 107f; MS "Outlines of a Philosophy of History," 1928, Preface; cited in Van der Dussen, p. 143.

²⁹ Van der Dussen, p. 133; also significant among Collingwood's manuscripts is his "Translation of the Preface to the 'Critique of Pure Reason' of Kant" (both editions), a 32 page MS, perhaps the beginning of an attempt to translate the whole, which was made unnecessary by the appearance of the third English translation, that of Kemp Smith, in 1929; also his "Comment on the Preface of Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason'" a 34 page MS; both are undated. See Van der Dussen, p. 451.

Intelligence is basically instrumental and pragmatic. Kantian reason is a fusion of Plato's <u>logos</u> and <u>eros</u>; he regards reason as having an aspect of <u>becoming</u> which is absent from the Platonic conception of a fixed <u>logos</u>. Reason itself, for Kant, is "erotic." He says, "Human reason is by nature architectonic."³¹ The <u>Critique of</u> <u>Pure Reason</u> as Kant conceived it is an attempt to perfect the architectonic, to develop a propaedeutic or method which would subsequently retain validity for all philosophical thought whatever. This, as Collingwood shows, can never, in the very nature of the case, be true; the method used must change with the growth of knowledge.³² No architectonic can be complete, for history is always open at one end and further progress cannot be anticipated.

Kant found ever new uses for his architectonic. The manuscripts of his <u>Opus Postumum</u>, begun in his old age, indicate that he had begun applying it to natural phenomena. Even in the <u>Critique of Pure Reason</u> he implies that progress in the field of the <u>Ubersinnlichen</u> ("supersensible") may be open, and data may be found "sufficient to determine reason's transcendent concept of the unconditioned

³² P.M., 21-22.

³¹ KRV, A 474, B 502; by architectonic Kant includes dialectical, though he has another more specific use for the latter term and its derivatives, in addition the term architectonic has a more explicit teleological connotation; essentially he seems to mean the same by both terms, cf. "human reason, being by its very nature dialectical" (A 849, B 877), and "the dialectic which lies concealed in his own breast" (A 755, B 783).

[unbedingten], and so...to pass beyond the limits of all possible "experience."³³ Kant's application of the architectonic in this manner is very like the method of Goethe in his valuable (but little recognized) scientific work, for example in his theory of colours and his study of plant forms. Kant came to believe it was possible to anticipate sense perception, the various modes of energy, for example, and his theories seem in certain respects to be anticipations of quantum mechanics.³⁴ Kemp Smith remarks that even into his eighties Kant was "astonishingly flexible in all save his most fundamental philosophical convictions."³⁵ It is because of his architectonic (not in spite of it, as Kemp Smith implies) that Kant retained this mental flexibility. Kant realized that all alleged knowledge is subject to critical reflection, and the architectonic is a forerunner of the scale of forms, and so of the logic of history.

 $^{\rm 33}$ KRV, B xxi, and see the note at xxii.

³⁴ For example, one can determine either the velocity or position of an atom due to Heisenberg's law, however one can determine in advance which "experience" is to take place. A selection of the original MSS were published in Erich Adickes, <u>Kants Opus Postumum</u>, <u>dargestellt und beurteilt</u> (Berlin, 1920), extracts and discussion of it are given in an appendix to Norman Kemp Smith, <u>A Commentary to Kant's</u> "Critique of Pure Reason," 2nd ed. (London: Macmillan, 1923), p. 611. (cited hereinafter as <u>Commentary</u>) Rudolf Steiner, <u>Goethes Weltanschauung</u> (Weimar: E. Felber, 1897) trans. <u>Goethe's Conception of the World</u> (rpt. New York: Haskell House, 1973); see also Rudolf Steiner, <u>A Theory of Knowledge</u> <u>Implicit in Goethe's World Conception</u> (1886), trans. by Olin D. Wannamaker (Spring Valley, N.Y.: Anthroposophic Press, 1968).

³⁵ Commentary, p. 610.

Together, then, these two great lights of the Romantic movement, Vico and Kant, were blended in Collingwood's thought and form the background from which his own work can be better understood. He writes:

The importance of Vico lies in the fact that, for him, history becomes an affair neither of accepting nor of rejecting what the "authorities" say, but of interpreting it. The centre of gravity of historical thought is thus placed in the principles by which the historian interprets documents. Knowledge does not come flying into the empty mind, as Locke seemed to think, through the windows of the senses; it arises inside the mind when the data of sense are interpreted by principles grounded, as Kant showed, in the nature of the mind itself. So for history; historical knowledge cannot be poured out of one mind into another, it has to be built up by each historian for himself, using the universal and necessary principles of historical thought to interpret the data which the past has left behind it. This fundamental conception is what we owe to Vico.36

There is another important factor in considering Collingwood's philosophy of history, and that is the fact that he became his "own authority" in a particular field; his original archaeological excavations and research made him an internationally recognized authority on Roman Britain. The invitation to write <u>Roman Britain</u> in the Oxford History of England series, he says, "came at exactly the right moment."³⁷ It is a remarkable book and a model of lucid exposition. Sir George Clark, editor of the series, says,

When the late professor Collingwood's masterly installment on Roman Britain was published one of the other contributors remarked rather tartly: "He gives the impression that we know more about Roman Britain

³⁶ "The Philosophy of History" Historical Association Leaflet No. 79, 1930; rpt. in <u>Essays</u>, p. 128.

³⁷ Auto., 121.

than about any subsequent period."³⁸

Roman Britain was designed "to display in concrete form the principles of historical thinking as I then understood them."³⁹ Here Collingwood is speaking of methodological principles and the book is fully as valuable in this respect from the philosophical point of view as Collingwood claims for it. From the aspect of history and archaeology it remains the standard text in the area of Romano-British studies.⁴⁰ Very little study of it has been done from the philosophical point of view.⁴¹

The work on Roman Britain was one of the principal means by which Collingwood qualified himself for work in the philosophy of history; he qualified himself by a similar process for work on the philosophy of art.⁴² Indeed, the two subjects, history and art, are closely related in Collingwood's thought. A review of the <u>Principles of Art</u>, probably written by Collingwood himself, and referring to it

³⁸ Sir George Clark in <u>The Times</u> 15 November 1961; cited in Van der Dussen, pp. 248-49.

³⁹ <u>Auto.</u>, 121; for an account of these principles see chap. 8, "Roman Britain" (p. 120f.).

⁴⁰ Nor has it been superseded by the latest addition to the series, volume IA, Peter Salway, <u>Roman Britain</u> (Oxford University Press, 1977).

<u>Auto.</u>, 118n.

as "the author's chief work down to the present time," explains the purpose for which it was written:

Its aim is not simply to add one more to the many extant "theories of art", but to illustrate the author's doctrine concerning the relation between philosophy and history by focussing attention on contemporary art and its problems, and treating these as part of the problem of contemporary civilization.⁴³

It is pointed out further that in the third book the theoretical discussion is brought to bear on the specific problems of contemporary art.⁴⁴ The work is in fact an historical study of contemporary art for, according to his doctrine, philosophy can only proceed by use of historical method: only when the problem is fully understood can the philosopher go beyond history to seek his own insight into the nature of a possible solution. As Collingwood points out elsewhere, "The attempt to dissociate philosophy and history breaks down because, in point of fact, we never do so dissociate them. One simply cannot make general statements without any thought of their instances."⁴⁵ The <u>Principles of Art</u> is actually more important than <u>Roman Britain</u> from the transcendental aspect in illustrating Collingwood's rapprochement between philosophy and history.

⁴³ Anonymous review in <u>Transactions of the Cumberland</u> <u>and Westmorland Antiquarian</u> <u>and Archaeological Society</u> n.s. 38 (1938): 314. Collingwood was president of the society and editor of the <u>Transactions</u>; it is highly unlikely the review is by another hand.

⁴⁴ P.A., vi-vii.

⁴⁵ F&R, 80-81.

The second book of the <u>Principles of Art</u>, entitled "The Theory of Imagination," is an important and original contribution to aesthetic theory. As Collingwood acknowledges elsewhere, it is strongly influenced by the aesthetic philosophy of Benedetto Croce. However Collingwood has gone beyond Croce, for he develops the Kantian theory of imagination by returning to Hume and clearing up the difficulties in Kant's conception. He eliminates the need for internal images or representations postulated by Kant by resolving the theory of imagination into the theory of language:

The artist or poet, like other men, achieves consciousness of his feelings only so far as he finds words for them; but he is conscious not only of the feelings but of the linguistic activity, and works at performing this activity as well as he can.⁴⁶

This doesn't mean that we never think in images, but that images themselves are in the nature of language and are not required as an intermediate step. The importance of Collingwood's theory is that he has in effect brought about a synthesis of history, philosophy and art that constitutes a <u>rapprochement</u>between theory and practice as well.⁴⁷

It is only by exercising his faculty of language, and so becoming aware of himself as standing in a certain situation, that man can acquire the insight necessary to act in a given situation. This linguistic activity must be

⁴⁷ See especially <u>Auto</u>., chapt 12. "Theory and Practice" (p. 147f.).

⁴⁶ N.L., 6.29, also 6.41.

a reflection upon his own past experience: "We study history in order to see more clearly into the situation in which we are called upon to act."⁴⁸ Elsewhere Collingwood says,

Man's world is infested by <u>Sphinxes</u>, demonic beings of mixed and monstrous nature which ask him riddles and eat him if he cannot answer them, compelling him to play a game of wits where the stake is his life and his only weapon is his tongue.⁴⁹

This is the importance of history. "If knowledge as to the facts of one's situation is called historical knowledge, historical knowledge is necessary to action."⁵⁰

What history gives us is not ready-made rules to follow, but insight into the unique situation in which we are called upon to act. All the good will in the world cannot overcome sheer ignorance, and historical insight allows us to see what may be a storm beneath an apparently calm surface. Aeneas mourned his helmsman, Palinurus, in these plaintive words:

O nimium caelo et pelago confise sereno, nudus in ignota, Palinure, iacebis harena. Aeneid v. 870-71⁵¹

History gives us insight, philosophy gives us wisdom, which is that knowledge of how we should act in the situation in

⁴⁸ <u>Auto</u>., 114.
⁴⁹ N.L., 2.52; cf. <u>Auto</u>., 78.
⁵⁰ <u>Auto</u>., 148.

⁵¹ "For trusting too much in peaceful sea and sky, Palinurus, you'll lie unburied on unknown sands."

which we find ourselves. There is no wisdom without insight; history arises from the practical problems of life, and its function is to give insight which will afford intelligent direction to that life. It is only the practical attempt to understand an actual situation that makes possible the logic of history; it is only this relation to the actual that gives logic the element of necessity that makes it applicable. All thought, as Collingwood holds, is both theoretical and practical: "Its theoretical forms depend more completely on its practical than its practical do upon its theoretical; without theory there would only be a few rudimentary types of practice, but without practice there would be no theory at all." ⁵² The logic of history-and this is the fundamental point of the present thesis, for the whole idea of an Archimedean point turns on it—can exist only in relation to a practical problem: the possibility of history depends upon its usefulness. Because history is necessary for action it stands in the closest possible relation to both logic and ethics, so that history and philosophy must stand in mutual dependence.

Where the nature of historical thinking is very little understood the dependence of other forms of thought upon history and their relation to ethics is not likely to be realized. Philosophers and scientists fail to recognize the historical element, for example in observation and

⁵² N.L., 1.67.

their debt to predecessors, that forms a necessary part of their own work. For this reason Collingwood insists, "The chief business of twentieth-century philosophy is to reckon with twentieth-century history." This kind of reflection is now necessary for, as Collingwood says, historical thought has now passed far beyond the rudimentary stage:

It would be an understatement to say that since 1800 history has passed through a Copernican revolution. Looking back from the present day one sees that a much greater revolution has been accomplished than that associated with the name of Copernicus. 53

"Give me a place to stand," says Archimedes, "and I will move the world." The historical revolution gives the thinker a place to stand.

In history Collingwood finds the point at which thought and action meet; for in history these are not two things, but one. The Archimedean point lies not outside history but within it.⁵⁴ A man has already begun to act when he comes to understand the situation in which he stands. To have an accurate knowledge of one's situation is already to have changed it, for the knower is the active element in every situation, and he has begun to change the only aspect in

⁵³ Auto., 79; see also I.N., 176-77.

⁵⁴ Jacob Burckhardt uses the term <u>einen archimedischen</u> <u>Punkt</u> for those said to be able to view history from outside of events, a point outside history, adding that there are few who can achieve this point and "overcome in the spirit" [geistig zu uberwinden]. See <u>Weltgeschichtliche</u> <u>Betrachtungen</u>, ed. R. Marx (Leipzig: A. Kroner, 1929), p. 8.

the situation that he can change-himself. Here the Archimedean point is reached, for in changing himself man changes his world. To act is to change oneself in order to meet the needs of the situation. Historical insight or consciousness is a further development of the aesthetic activity by which all consciousness is achieved. The Archimedean point is achieved through the bodily activity of language. This is what Spinoza means when he says, "In truth, he who has a body, as, for example, an infant or child... is conscious scarcely of itself, of God, or things: whereas he who has a body capable of many things has a mind which, considered in itself, is very conscious of itself, of God, and things."⁵⁵ The discovery of this power to change one's situation — and it can only be discovered by means of language-is identical with the discovery of freedom, the Archimedean point, a place to stand. It was from such a vantage point, a point within history, that Collingwood could envision a "new philosophical movement" growing out of this new historical consciousness, "in which man is conceived neither as lifted clean out of nature nor yet as the plaything of natural forces, but as sharing, and sharing to an eminent degree, in the creative power which constitutes the inward essence of all things."⁵⁶

⁵⁵ Benedict Spinoza <u>Ethics</u> V, prop. XXXIX, note; Everyman ed., p. 222.

⁵⁶ PNP, 265.

CHAPTER II

THE LOGIC OF HISTORY

Empirical history, or historiography, is an activity which seeks to understand the world. It is empirical because the world it seeks to understand is an object independent of itself, existing as something to be discovered. The object of philosophical thought can never be so conceived. Scientific or empirical thought can never be an object to itself for it cannot conceive its object as activity. This means that empirical thought can only be an object of philosophical thinking; "Philosophical thought," says Collingwood, "is that which conceives its object as activity; empirical thought is that which conceives its object as substance or thing."¹ Philosophy is reflection upon the activity of thinking.

The historian treats his object as a "substance," rather than as an activity, for he regards the past as fixed and existing in its own right. Empirical history, then, is a science. The philosophy of history stands in a different position. Though the object of history may be

¹ R. G. Collingwood, "Economics as a Philosophical Science," <u>International Journal of Ethics</u> 36 (1925): 162.

treated as "substance," history itself can only be regarded as an activity. Historiography can be reflected upon only as an activity. There is a sense, however, in which it can be treated in the manner of any past action, that is in what Collingwood calls second-order history, or the history of history.

The word history has at least two meanings. One is the inquiry into the past; the other is its use as a synonym for that past itself. Ultimately the distinction between these two meanings of the word breaks down. The historian studies not merely "the past," but "the past-inthe-present," the results of past activity surviving into the present. On the other hand, as Collingwood points out, all problems ultimately arise on the plane of "real life," and that to which they are referred for their solution is history.² Historiography is not something other than "real life"; there is between the two a distinction without a difference. Life as a rational activity contains the seed of history within itself. As objects to philosophical reflection these concepts overlap, all conscious activity contains at least a minimum essence of "history," and the most primative form of history is perception. Empirical history is an extension and development of perception which

² <u>Auto</u>., 114; see also, C.S. Peirce, <u>Philosophical</u> <u>Writings of Peirce</u>. ed. J. Buchler. (New York: Dover, 1955), p. 142.

is the most fundamental and elementary determination of fact. $^{\rm 3}$

The place of perception in Collingwood's theory of history corresponds in importance to what Kant called <u>synthesis</u>, the act of putting together different representations, grasping what is manifold in them, and thereby uniting them to form a certain <u>content</u>. This ability to grasp the manifold in a single act of knowledge is due, Kant says, to the power of imagination. ⁴ He regards this power of imagination as spontaneous or transcendental. Perception has both an empirical and a transcendental aspect. In a manuscript of April 1927 Collingwood says,

History is a transcendental conception, like art and science, when regarded as a pure form of activity; thought becomes, like them, an empirical conception when it is arbitrarily restricted to certain specialized embodiments of that form...the empirical concept is nothing but the prima facie application of the transcendental concept.⁵

Regarded philosophically history <u>is</u> transcendental; but as an empirical concept it has transcendentals, for history as it is practiced by the historian must exhibit certain characteristics corresponding to the transcendental concepts, namely, the applications of those concepts.

The interpretation of data requires principles, and this body of principles constitutes historical method.

- ⁴ KRV, A 77, B 103.
- ⁵ Van der Dussen, p. 135.

³ NAPH, 167, <u>Essays</u>, 49.
Some of these principles have an empirical character; that is, they compose special historical sciences, such as archaeology or numismatics. But not all of them relate to particular kinds of evidence: "Some are philosophical, that is, they apply universally to all evidence whatever, and compose the logic of historical method."⁶ This logic is the link between the empirical and the transcendental aspects of history, and is part of the method of philosophy. Collingwood calls it the logic of question and answer, and it is his major contribution to historical method. This logic is related to the traditional branches of philosophy known as logic and ethics. It bears this double relation because historical inquiry is not simply theoretical but is also a form of practical action. The rapprochement between history and philosophy turns on the fact that the knowledge achieved by the historian in his inquiries is a knowledge of his situation, which is at the same time knowledge of himself.⁷ Such knowledge is at once theoretical and practical.

Towards the end of the eighteenth century Kant observed that logic had undergone no radical changes since it left the hands of Aristotle.⁸ Kant was responsible for the most important changes in the traditional

⁶ "The Philosophy of History," Historical Association Leaflet No. 79 (1930) rpt in <u>Essays</u>, 136.

⁷ Auto., 114. ⁸ E.M., 5.

logic.⁹ What he was working toward was actually a logic of question and answer.¹⁰ Following Hume and Leibniz, Kant carried philosophy further in the direction of history, though he possessed little of the historical sense himself. He made valuable contributions to philosophy, but with no real understanding of the nature of historical thought. He ignored historical thought for the most part, concentrating upon scientific knowledge, for, strictly speaking, there was no genuine systematic and organized body of historical knowledge upon which he could have reflected to discover its proper method. He is hardly to blame for this, since according to Collingwood:

It was not until late in the nineteenth century that historical thought reached a stage of development comparable with that reached by natural science about the beginning of the seventeenth; but this event has not yet begun to interest those philosophers who write textbooks of logic.¹¹

It is important to recognize that the demand for a logic of history is not a revolt against logic as such; Collingwood points out that if his logic is "merely a wanton defiance of logic, we can be sure of soon discovering the fact; for logic is well able to revenge itself on those who defy it."¹²

¹⁰ Auto., 35. ¹¹ I.H., 254. ¹² P.M., 45-56.

⁹ Norman Kemp Smith, <u>A Commentary to Kant's Critique</u> of Pure Reason" ed. 1 (London: Macmillan, 1923), p. 651. Jasche says the same thing in his preface to Kant's <u>Logic</u>, ed. 1, 1800, trans. R. S. Hartman and W. Schwarz (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1974), p. 7.

The logic of history has all the analytical powers of science at its command, but goes beyond it by applying it to what is concrete, that is, actual concrete fact. "The logic of history,: remarks Collingwood, "is the logic of the concrete universal.¹³ Elsewhere he explains this by saying:

The individual judgment of history contains within itself, in the shape of its own predicate, the universality of science; and history is shown to be, not something that falls short of scientific accuracy and rationality and demonstrativeness, but something that possesses all this and, going beyond it, finds it exemplified in an individual fact. ¹⁴

As José Ortega y Gasset points out,

Historical reason is, then, <u>ratio</u>, <u>logos</u>, a rigorous concept. It is desirable that there should not arise the slightest doubt about this. In opposing it to physico-mathematical reason there is no question of granting a license to irrationalism. On the contrary, historical reason is still more rational than physical reason, more rigorous, more exigent.¹⁵

The self-conscious thought essential for reflection is a characteristic of history. But this self-conscious element in historical thought may be suppressed, for reflection may be done, as Vico says, with a troubled and agitated spirit. Sciences which are developed by such reflection will be unaware of their own historical character.

¹⁴ "The Philosophy of History," Historical Association Leaflet No. 79, 1930; rpt. in <u>Essays</u>, 136.

¹⁵ José Ortega y Gasset, "Historia como sistema," in <u>Historia Como Sistema</u>, Spanish ed. 6, (Madrid: Revista de Occidente, 1970), p. 65; Eng. trans. in Klibansky, ed., <u>Philosophy and History</u> (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1936), p. 321.

¹³ S.M., 221.

Such sciences are <u>crypto-historical</u>. Collingwood defines crypto-history as "a name for sciences that <u>are</u> history but profess not to be."¹⁶ In the written scheme for the <u>Principles of History</u> Collingwood says: "History and the human sciences. These are crypto-history or just history."¹⁷ The examples he gives of crypto-historical sciences are anthropology, classical economics, and the teaching of military tactics.¹⁸

Traditional metaphysics has always been cryptohistorical, as Collingwood writes: "Metaphysics has always been an historical science; but metaphysicians have not always been fully aware of the fact."¹⁹ The same is true also of logic and ethics.²⁰ For example, Dewey's logic is crypto-historical; this can be shown by his doctrine that history is a progressive discipline,

As the methods of the sciences improve, corresponding changes take place in logic....When in the future methods of inquiry are further changed, logical theory will also change. There is no ground for supposing that logic has been or ever will be so perfected that, save, perhaps, for minor details, it will require no further

¹⁶ MS, "Historiography" (1938-39), p. 18, cited in Van der Dussen, p. 358.

¹⁷ The complete text of this MS is printed in Van der Dussen, Appx. 1, pp. 431-32.

¹⁸ Van der Dussen, p. 358.

¹⁹ E.M., 58.

²⁰ On this see especially two long quotations from the 1938-39 MS mentioned above, in Van der Dussen, pp. 182-83.

modification. The idea that logic is capable of final formulation is an <u>eidolon</u> of the theater.²¹

Logic, the theory of knowledge, must develop with the growth of knowledge. This is beginning to be generally recognized even in the sciences; a contemporary physicist points out,

Logic once insisted that the sun revolves around the earth, and not vice versa. Later, logic was called upon to do battle with the relativity theory, since the speed of light logically cannot be a constant in all systems moving in relation to each other. Physics, however is not subservient to logical thought as coloured by tradition. Rather, the logic of physics requires that thought be governed by the realities and truths of nature. Even that which, by habit or conviction, we call logic requires constant verification.²²

If the growth of science demands a new logic then certainly the growth of historical knowledge requires a development of logical theory to account for it.

Logic, then, can neither anticipate nor transcend its own history. Kant's failure to transform philosophy into a pure <u>episteme</u>, or philosophical science which would transcend its own history, is particularly instructive; for Kant's thought was for philosophy more like a new beginning than an end.²³ Logic is reflection upon knowledge; and among the kinds of knowledge upon which it may reflect is itself. All such reflection is historical. In constituting itself a logic of history, the theory of thought will

²¹ Dewey, Logic, 14; see also pp. 5-7.

Werner Schaaffs, <u>Theology, Physics and Miracles</u>, trans. R. L. Renfield (Washington, D. C.) Canon Press, 1974), pp. 64-65. ²³ See Yovel, pp. 225, 228; Ortega**y** Gasset, p. 31; Eng. trans., p. 300. include its own metaphysical grounds, that is its own history, within itself.

This kind of logic will set itself the task of studying actual thought, both past and present. It will study particularly the kind of thought most pursued during that time; and history itself is, in our time, the most important kind of thought being pursued.²⁴ The advance of logic, on this view, would be due to the fact that each thinker who took up the study of any kind of thought would, in summing up his results, be contributing to its progress, and to the progress of logic, for his results would not be complete without an account of his own experience or reflection. Such a logic would be an enterprise

> high-rife With old Philosophy, And mad with glimpses of futurity!²⁵

The study of logic would itself constitute historical progress, to the degree that it were truly historical.

When Collingwood set forth the view that logic is an historical science in the MS "Historiography," written in 1938-39, he was aware of the implications of his position. He says,

All that any logician has ever done, or tried to do, is to expound the principles of what in his own day passed for valid thought among those whom he regarded as reputable thinkers. This enterprise is

²⁵ John Keats, "Lines on Seeing a Lock of Milton's Hair." (<u>Complete Poetical Works</u>, Modern Library ed.), p. 236.

²⁴ <u>Auto</u>., 87-88.

strictly historical....Logic as a "theory of scientific method" is in effect, at any given time, a fragment of a history of scientific method.26

This is a revolutionary position and its implications are important. Collingwood states: "In logic I am a revolutionary; and like all revolutionaries I can thank God for the reactionaries. They clarify the issue."²⁷

Metaphysics, the study of that which is, must also be studied historically. Logic and metaphysics are complementary historical sciences. Speaking of formal logic, Collingwood says:

Logic and metaphysics are necessary to each other. Without metaphysics, logic can only show that thought has principles and abides by them; but these principles might be such as to falsify, instead of verifying, the thought which obeys them. Without logic, metaphysics can only show what the real world is like; but it may be such a world as, to our thinking faculties, must remain unknown and unknowable.²⁸

Every logic stands on a metaphysical basis. Any attempt to abandon metaphysics is an attack on the foundation of science—logic, and therefore an attack on science itself. Collingwood puts this in the terse phrase, "No metaphysician, no scientist."²⁹

The chief difference between Collingwood's metaphysics and that of Kant is Collingwood's recognition that

²⁶ MS, p. 16; cited in Van der Dussen, p. 182.
²⁷ <u>Auto</u>., 52; See also E.M., 104.
²⁸ S.M., 271.
²⁹ E.M., 233.

metaphysics is historical. Kant's use of the term <u>principles</u> corresponds very closely with what Collingwood calls <u>absolute presuppositions</u>.³⁰ The major difference between the two is that absolute presuppositions have an explicit historical character, whereas Kant's principles remained Crypto-historical. Kant's principles are incapable of proof, but each principle has

the peculiar character that it makes possible the very experience which is its own ground of proof, and that in this experience it must always itself be presupposed. 31

Likewise, absolute presuppositions are not verifiable; the value of presuppositions lies in their <u>logical</u> <u>efficacy</u>; that is, their ability to cause questions to arise.

As unverifiable supposals, absolute presuppositions are neither true or false; as Collingwood specifically remarks of them, 'the idea of verification is an idea which does not apply to them," and again, "the distinction between truth and falsehood does not apply to absolute presuppositions at all, the distinction being peculiar to propositions."³² Like Kant's principles, absolute presuppositions are not derived from experience, but are "catalytic agents which the mind must being out of its own resources to the manipulation of what is called

³⁰ KRV, A 737; B 765; A 300; B 356; E.M., 31-33.

³¹ KRV, A 737, B 765.

 32 E.M., 32 Collingwood here gives a reference to p. 25, def. 1.

'experience.'"³³ Absolute presuppositions can only be detected by observing the way in which they are actually used in manipulating experience, that is, they can only be discovered by historical analysis.

Absolute presuppositions are absolute in their relation to the structure of knowledge of any given thinker in any given time and place; that is, the thinker finds them selfevident, or obligatory, in relation to a specific system of thought. Absolute presuppositions do not remain constant because the mind brings them out of its own historical experience: "By coming to think more truly about the human understanding we are coming to improve our own understanding."³⁴ The mind does not choose the categories under which it operates; it acquires them through an historical process. Nor can these principles be verified, they can only be made explicit through historical analysis. Collingwood says: "How can we ever satisfy ourselves that the principles on which we think are true, except by going on thinking according to those principles, and seeing whether unanswerable criticisms of them emerge as we work."³⁵

If the metaphysician does not prove presuppositions but simply presupposes them and attempts to discover by analysis what they are, the question arises as to why they should change at all.³⁶ In an important note in the <u>Essay on</u>

³³ E.M., 197. ³⁴ I.H., 84. ³⁵ I.H., 230. ³⁶ K. L. Ketner, <u>An Emendation of R. G. Collingwood's</u> <u>Doctrine of Absolute Presuppositions</u> (Lubbock, TX: Texas Tech Press, 1973), p. 20.

Metaphysics Collingwood says that such changes are not a matter of choice, for people are not ordinarily aware of their presuppositions, and so are not aware of changes in them.³⁷ Nevertheless it is a radical change which entails the abandonment of all a man's "most firmly established habits and standards for thought and action." Changes in absolute presuppositions are historical changes due to "strains" which are always present but "taken up" in various ways. These strains are the essence of history itself, for as Collingwood remarks, "where there is no strain there is no history."³⁸ At any given phase of a society's history there is a "constellation" of absolute presuppositions which is subject to these strains; if these strains become too great, perhaps because two members of the constellation are not consupponible, the structure collapses. This, Collingwood says "is replaced by another, which will be a modification of the old with the destructive strain removed; a modification not consciously devised but created by a process of unconscious thought." ³⁹ Absolute presuppositions do not change because they have been disproved, for they cannot be disproved any more than they can be proved. 40 Collingwood says,

An absolute presupposition cannot be undermined by the verdict of "experience," because it is the

³⁷ E.M., 48n.
 ³⁸ E.M., 75f.
 ³⁹ E.M., 84n.
 ⁴⁰ cf. KRV, A 753, B 781; A 772, B 800.

yardstick by which "experience" is judged. To suggest that "experience" might teach my hypothetical savages that some events are not due to magic is like suggesting that experience might teach a civilized people that there are not twelve inches in a foot and thus cause them to adopt the metric system. As long as you measure in feet and inches, everything you measure has dimensions composed of those units. As long as you believe in a world of magic, that is the kind of a world in which you live.⁴¹

Absolute presuppositions are unprovable and need no proof. The metaphysician is not creating beliefs; he is finding out what they are. By inquiring into his presuppositions in detail, making clear to himself what was only implicit in his experience, he is enabled to understand the experience better. Collingwood says, "The truth is that if the human mind comes to understand itself better, it thereby comes to operate in new and different ways." ⁴² This change will, in time, give rise to new presuppositions, some of which will be absolute. But that does not give one the license to choose his absolute presuppositions to suit himself; they always arise through historical necessity. Kant remarks: "All necessity, without exception, is grounded in a transcendental condition."⁴³ The necessity is a matter of faith, and all absolute presuppositions are held by an act of religious faith.

The historical work of detecting absolute presupposition is metaphysics. Metaphysics, as Collingwood says,

is no futile attempt at knowing what lies beyond the limits of experience, but is primarily at any time an attempt to discover what the people of that time believe about the world's general nature; such beliefs

41 E.M., 193-94.

42 T.H., 85.

43 KRV, A 106.

being the presuppositions of all their "physics," that is, their inquiries into its detail. Secondarily, it is the attempt to discover the corresponding presuppositions of other peoples and other times, and to follow the historical process by which one set of presuppositions has turned into another.⁴⁴

Absolute presuppositions are held by an act of faith. Collingwood says bluntly, "A man who will not recognize that a thing is so until he knows why it is so is a man who will never come to any good."⁴⁵ Faith and reason never conflict, for neither can exist without the other. Faith cannot exist without reason; nevertheless faith is necessary to reason, and the sphere of reason falls within that of faith: "Reason builds on a foundation of faith, and moves within a system whose general nature must be determined by faith before reason can deal with it in detail." Describing further the relation between faith and reason Collingwood says,

The proper sphere of faith is everything in the collective sense—everything as a whole. The proper sphere of reason is everything in the distributive sense—every separate thing, no matter what. All finite things are proper objects of this scientific habit of mind. There is no fact or class of facts which can be withdrawn from its analysis or spared its criticism. Superstition means the denial of this.⁴⁶

Collingwood says, "Faith is the specific form of the religious reason. It is that knowledge of ultimate truth which, owing to its intuitive or imaginative form, cannot

⁴⁴ <u>Auto</u>., 66.
 ⁴⁵ N.L., 5.49.
 ⁴⁶ R. G. Collingwood, <u>Faith and Reason</u> (London: Ernest

Benn, 1928); cited in F&R. 142.

justify itself under critism."⁴⁷ Reason is founded on faith, and this faith is the foundation of logic. As C. S. Lewis remarks, "If nothing is self-evident nothing can be proved. Similarly, if nothing is obligatory for its own sake, nothing is obligatory at all."⁴⁸

The ground on which the principle of reason stands is the immediate certainty of existence which is absolutely presupposed in self-consciousness. Like every absolute presupposition it is an act of "pure" supposal, or faith, implicit in all our thinking. All logic stands on a metaphysical basis; this is true whether it is explicitly recognized by the logician or not. The first empirical manifestation of the principle of reason is the activity of perception, which is the fundamental characteristic of mind.

The importance of the metaphysical basis of perception for the logic of history is that all history is a development of perception and the origin of historical thought lies within history itself. According to Collingwood, "History in its fundamental and elementary form is perception. Perception is the simplest case of historical thinking: it is the most elementary determination of fact."⁴⁹ Perception is the result of the synthetic activity of the

⁴⁸ <u>Abolition of Man</u>, p. 53; cf. F.M.L., 151: "It is only because some things are good in themselves that anything can be useful."

⁴⁹ NAPH, 167, <u>Essays</u>, p. 49; SM, p. 204-05.

⁴⁷ s.N., 132.

imagination. Collingwood says,

Art is an activity, one of the fundamental forms of mental activity which some philosophers call the categories of the spirit. Art is not a quality of objects (there are, strictly speaking, no <u>objets</u> <u>d'art</u>); it is a mode of acting; a necessary mode, in so far as every mind that is a mind at all acts in this way. Our ordinary name for this mode of acting is "imagination." To imagine is to be a good artist; to imagine superlatively well is to be a great artist. And there is no mind that exists without imagining; of that we can be tolerably certain, not only from introspection and observation, but from reflection on what it is to be a mind.⁵⁰

This activity of imagination, or art, is the basis of historical thought as well. Collingwood points out,

The only difference between what we ordinarily call perception and what we ordinarily call historical thinking is that the interpretative work which in the former is implicit and only revealed by reflective analysis is in the latter explicit and impossible to overlook. History is sometimes said to be an inferential superstructure built upon perceptual data; but this conveys the impression that history and perception are two distinct activities, the one mediated by thought, the other immediate. This is an error, due to the fact that the thought which is explicit in history is only implicit in perception; for in perception we are making a judgment, trying to answer the guestion what it is that we perceive, and all history is simply a more intense and sustained attempt to answer the same question.⁵¹

All perception depends upon past experience, for essentially perception is the attempt to answer a question. The knowledge which is the result of the power of perception, is an object which the mind, in its attempt to answer the question what it is that it perceives, constructs imaginatively.

⁵⁰ PAE, 439-40; <u>Essays on Art</u>, ed. Donagan, p. 195.
⁵¹ NAPH, 167-68, <u>Essays</u>, p. 50.

In perception we do not proceed by an explicit process of question and answer as we do in scientific or systematic thinking. The process of question and answer is rarely explicit in perception. Nevertheless it actually does happen.⁵² The process remains implicit because "proof" is not demanded in perception; one has an immediate conviction based on past experience, never strict proof. To argue about any object given to immediate consciousness is what Collingwood calls "The Fallacy of Misplaced Argument": "A man convinced by a piece of mathematical reasoning is immediately aware of conviction. Whether he is convinced or not is a question on which to argue would be to indulge the Fallacy of Misplaced Argument Whatever is thus immediately given is removed from the sphere of argument."⁵³ A man who demands proof for that which is immediately given has no proof for anything at all, including his own existence. Perception is the first principle of the logic of history. History is unlike perception in that it uses the perceptual process as a means to go beyond what is immediately given. History is an attempt to grasp indirectly that which is not here and now. As in perception this is accomplished by imagination. Perception always survives as an element in historical thought because that which is grasped indirectly must be based on that which is immediately present.

⁵² s&T, 75. ⁵³ N.L., 4.74-.75.

History is not perception nor is it science in the usual meanings of those terms; rather, it is something which includes both of these and goes beyond them. Perception is of the here-and-now; its objects are concrete and actually existing. The objects of scientific thought are abstract and universal, things not actually existing at all except in the mind of the scientist. History is like perception in that its object is concrete and individual; it is also like it in that it grasps its object through the power of imagination. It is like science in that the knowledge which is gained is inferential and reasoned; it is unlike science in that it is not knowledge of the abstract. History is neither science nor perception, but something else.

Many attempts have been made to combine these two accounts of knowledge, the aesthetic and the scientific, into a single theory. In these attempts at combination, as Collingwood says,

provision is made for the peculiarities both of a perception which grasps the here and now, and of the abstract thought that apprehends the everywhere and always: the **GicOHCIC** and **NOHCIC** of philosophical tradition. But just as history is neither **GicOHCIC** nor **NOHCIC**, so it is not a combination of the two. It is a third thing, having some of the characteristics of each, but combining them in a way impossible to either. It is not partly acquaintance with transient situations and partly reasoned knowledge of abstract entities. It is wholly a reasoned knowledge of what is transient and concrete.

⁵⁴ I.H., 234. aïcoHcic , perception by the senses; NÓHCIC , intelligence, or thought.

Collingwood's attempts to give an account of "this third thing which is history" occupied much of his philosophical thought. His attempts at a theory of this form of thought constitute a logic of history.

The logic of history is a critique of history as the analysis of Life. A friend once remarked to Kettering that "sometimes logic is a method of going wrong with confidence."⁵⁵ According to G. K. Chesterton, there is "a sort of secret treason in the universe"; the trouble with the world, he says, is that it is nearly reasonable, but not quite: "Life is not illogicality; yet it is a trap for logicians."⁵⁶ Life is not logic. To some extent it always resists analysis; the grammar of life must serve a practical function.⁵⁷ Collingwood remarks, "Hegel realized that history is logical, but then he made the mistake of jumping to the conclusion that it was logic."58 The logic history must recognize its limitations and must change with the growth of knowledge; in short, it must recognize itself as an historical account of how historical thinking actually proceeds. "That real life

⁵⁵ <u>Prophet of Progress: Selections from the Speeches</u> <u>of Charles F. Kettering</u> ed., T. A. Boyd (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1961), p. 95.

⁵⁶ G. K. Chesterton, <u>Orthodoxy</u>. 1908 (Garden City: Doubleday Image Books, 1959), p. 81.

⁵⁷ cf. P.A. 257-59.

⁵⁸ "Lectures on the Philosophy of History," MS, 1929, p. 12; cited in Van der Dussen, p. 159. Van der Dussen says, "These lectures deal with Kant, Hegel, nineteenth century positivism and Croce." p. 447.

is illogical everyone admits"; Collingwood remarks, "but that is the fault not of life, but of logic, abstract thinking."⁵⁹ Life retains a dynamic richness of variety and vitality that can never be completely comprehended by thought.

Historical thinking, though it is only one aspect of the life of the mind, is not a mere excrescence upon the body of Life. It is the center; it is the means by which every strain within that consciousness is perceived. It is the point from which any attempt to resolve these strains must begin, for nothing can be changed on purpose unless its existence is known. It is this indirect or analytical perception that is the unique power of history and which makes it so useful as a basis for action. Historical thought perceives what is not actually present, on the basis of that which is.⁶⁰ The need to perceive what is implicit in the present makes historical understanding absolutely necessary as the practical basis of successful action.

Practically speaking historical understanding is the means of progress—specifically, it is the means by which strains and contradictions in the historical process are removed. The tension between unresolved conflicts is characteristic of history; there is always a certain amount

⁶⁰ Michael Joseph Oakeshott, <u>Experience and its Modes</u> (Cambridge: At the University Press, 1933), p. 108.

⁵⁹ sM, 226-27.

of strain which exists in any historical situation because the present sums up the past as an element within itself. Collingwood says in Speculum Mentis:

History— and our work is to comment on history—is not a sheer flux of unique and disconnected events, each absolutely new and unprecedented.... It is a process in which method or regularity does not exclude novelty; for every phase, while it grows out of the preceding phase, sums it up in the immediacy of its own being and thereby sums up implicitly the whole of previous history. Every such summation is a new act, and history consists of this perpetual summation of itself.⁶¹

Strain is a part of the inner dynamic of life to which its activity is due, and even when a strain is overcome it exists negatively in the new situation as a stepping stone which led to its resolution.

Though individual conflicts may be resolved, a final resolution of all tension would mean the end of history. If some contradictions are resolved by the historical understanding, it makes others stand out more clearly. In fact to resolve conflicts is not the same as solving problems; Jacques Barzun says, "Human affairs do not contain problems with solutions. They contain predicaments, difficulties, which are at best only partly overcome—when it is possible to overcome them at all—a very different thing from solving problems."⁶²

⁶¹ S.M., 56.

⁶² Jacques Barzun, "The Quality of Life," in <u>Man and</u> <u>Life: A Sesquicentennial Symposium</u> (Cincinnati: University of Cincinnati, 1969. p. 12.

Manipulation of experience is the real object of history. It contains theoretical elements, just as grammar contains theory, but in practical sciences theory is subordinated to the results. Collingwood says, "Real thinking is always to some extent experimental in its method; it always starts from practice and returns to practice; for it is based on 'interest', that is, on a practical concern with it."⁶³ The logic of history is also real thinking; it begins with the practical problems presented by the activity of historical thinking, gives them a theoretical formulation, and then applies them to its own special problems. It is an attempt to make actual practice correspond with the Principle of Reason; but it is also the means by which we give content to our idea of reason and discover more distinctly what it is. Dewey holds that logic is both an art and a science:

If thinking is the way in which deliberate reorganization of experience is secured, then logic is such a clarified and systematized formulation of the procedures of thinking as will enable the desired reconstruction to go on more economically and efficiently. In language familiar to students, logic is both a science and an art; a science so far as it gives an organized and tested descriptive account of the way in which thought actually goes on; an art, so far as on the basis of this description it projects methods by which future thinking shall take advantage of the operations that lead to success and avoid those which result in failure.⁶⁴

⁶⁴ John Dewey, <u>Reconstruction in Philosophy</u> (1920; enlarged ed., Boston: Beacon Press, 1948), pp. 134-35.

⁶³ N.L., 18.13.

History includes its own logic for it is a unique combination of science and perception.

In the <u>Timaeus</u> (31^{b-c}) Plato says, "It is impossible that two things only should be joined together without a third. There must be some bond in between them both to bring them together." We find the same idea in Kant's theory of perception: "Obviously there must be some third thing, which is homogeneous on the one hand with the category [i.e., original pure concepts of synthesis], and on the other hand with appearance [i.e., the undetermined object of an empirical intuition (sensation)], and which thus makes the application of the former to the latter possible."⁶⁵ Kant holds that this third thing is the transcendental schema, which is "in itself always a product of imagination."⁶⁶ In the same manner history is the third thing in relation to Life which can bring together the abstract and universal concepts of science with the concrete and particular empirical experiences we call perception. It is because man himself is a "third thing" neither purely spirit nor purely matter, neither pure imagination nor pure reason, that history is a characteristic form of human expression and a necessary form of human thought. Through

⁶⁵ KRV, A 138, B 177.

⁶⁶ KRV, A 140, B 179.

exercise of the historical understanding man applies his universal concepts to his empirical experience and so can control that experience by controlling himself. The discovery of history is the discovery of freedom, a discovery made by degrees and never completely realized. As Collingwood says in one of his essays:

Man's life is a becoming; and not only becoming, but self-creation. He does not grow under the direction and control of irresistible forces. The force that shapes him is his own will. All his life is an effort to attain to real human nature.⁶⁷

67 "The Devil" in B. H. Streeter, et. al. (eds.) <u>Concerning Prayer</u> (London: Macmillan, 1916); rpt. in F&R, 232; cf. IH, 318.

CHAPTER III

THE PRINCIPLE OF PARTICIPATION

The principle of possibility—that there are objects of perception which have not yet been perceived—Collingwood says, "is an absolute presupposition of all science in so far as science implies the organized and systematic asking of questions."¹ When a scientist describes a thing as actual he means he has observed it. When he describes it as necessary, he has discovered its connections with other things, he knows what it means. When he describes a thing as possible, he means he is looking for it—he is asking the question whether or not it is actual.²

The principle of possibility depends at every point on the activity of imagination. Imagination or concrete thinking is the necessary foundation of analytical or abstract thinking, which is the essence of scientific thought. Emily Dickenson says in one of her little poems,

¹ E.M., 274-75.

² The principle of possibility is of great importance to Collingwood's thought as the formal aspect of reason, or the scale of forms through which knowledge moves—supposal, question, evidence, knowledge. It was necessary to omit an eighty page discussion of this principle, including examples from <u>Roman Britain</u> and elsewhere, to reduce the thesis to an acceptable length.

The gleam of an heroic act, Such strange illumination— The Possible's slow fuse is lit By the imagination!3

Without the spontaneous activity of imagination knowledge is not possible. "Pure" imagination is an abstraction, for imagination cannot act alone. We are concerned with a "third thing"— participation. Participation is imagination in relation to the possible, for all actual knowledge is the result of a synthetic act in which the sensous and the conceptual are united.

The first participative function of the ego is its own self-actualization, spoken of above. In like manner, as Kant was at such pains to show, it participates time and space. The further development of the principle, which is identical with the development of consciousness, involves <u>figuration</u>, or what Kant calls <u>figurliche Synthesis</u>.⁴ All consciousness involves figuration, and figuration is necessary for perception. This figuration is felt as beauty before it is consciously grasped. Collingwood points out that all perception depends on past experience.⁵ In fact, it depends on figuration but this figuration is not <u>a priori</u>, as Kant held, it is historical. Kant says

This synthesis of the manifold of sensible intuition, which is possible and necessary <u>a priori</u>, may be entitled figurative synthesis (synthesis speciosa), to

Alfred Dickinson, ed. Martha Dickinson and Alfred Leete Hampson, (Boston: Little, Brown, 1937), p. 230. ⁴ KRV, B 151. ⁵ NAPH, 168, Essays, 50-1.

distinguish it from the synthesis which is thought in the mere category... $^{\rm 6}$

Kant tended always to geometrize the historical into the <u>a priori</u>, and he never really understood that figuration is historically conditioned.

The principle of participation goes back at least to Plato, who held that through perception we share or participate in the process of coming into being.⁷ Socrates held that no sensible object can be regarded as having any absolute existence; they must be regarded instead as being generated in their intercourse with one another. For this reason neither the "doer" nor the "sufferer" has any existence until they are united.⁸ Perception is not a participation in reality for what is produced is appearance, which is not real. Rather appearance has contradictory predicates being a confused version of an higher degree of reality. Appearance is contradictory in that doubts about its reality are easily raised, as Socrates points out; one cannot prove, for example, that we are awake and not dreaming. That which is perfectly real can contain no such contradiction. This is set forth as part of Plato's famous theory of the grades or degrees of reality which is

⁸ Plato <u>Theaetetus</u> 156-158^a;

⁶ KRV, B 151.

⁷ Barfield, <u>Saving the Appearances</u>, (London: Faber & Faber, 1957), p. 102.

the key to the <u>Republic</u>. Each grade is an imitation

(MiMHCIC) of the one next above it.9

In Plato's philosophy art copies nature and so is concerned with the appearance of an appearance; and in the system of the degrees of knowledge it falls rather low. The right name for art according to Plato is images, and its objects are phantasms apprehended by an activity rather like dreaming. The imaginative activity results in works containing not truths, but a kind of glamour, or beauty. Imagination by initating an appearance, creates a phantasm at two removes from the truth, and this phantasm possesses glamour because it indirectly symbolises truth it is truth felt rather than thought.¹⁰

MMHCIC is a term expressing the relation between an appearance and the reality it appears to be. Dialectic is the study of the structure of the degrees of reality which enables the philosopher to pass out of the lower grades into the region of reality. Perception, for example, is a higher degree of reality and possesses a certitude which imagination does not. In perception the absolute and eternal forms are imitated, so that they, being a distorted version of the forms, are less real than the forms. These forms are absolute and unchangeable, and all else participates in it imperfectly. In dialectic, then, there is a kind of Principle of Participation, but the forms themselves being absolute and eternal cannot be participated. This doctrine

9 PPA, 160-61.

10 PPA, 161-62.

of forms, called by Collingwood "the sheet-anchor of scientific dogmatism to this day, is inconsistent with Plato's discovery of dialectic—the dialogue of the soul with itself—whose function was to "annihilate the hypotheses" (Tác ýποθέςεις ἀΝΑιροỹςα) on which the sciences were built, in order to participate in a higher degree of reality.¹¹ On Plato's theory, how ever near one may approach to the forms he can only participate appearance, never reality.

Plato's answer to the problem of the nature of appearances is that they are brought into existence by imitation of that which is more real—an object of a concept, a work of art of an object, and so on. Imitation is a kind of participation resulting in distorted images of reality. Being incompatible with his doctrine of the nature of reality its existence is at least problematic. But if thought must be regarded as a constituent part of reality, then it is the nature of reality that is problematic and the principle of participation must be accepted.¹²

There is in Plato rudiments of a theory both of possibility and of participation; the two ideas are connected, for they are parts of his attempt to account for the possibility of knowledge of reality—how ever much that knowledge may be distorted as appearance—and to account for the possibility of appearance as well. This attempt,

¹¹ S.M., 279; <u>Republic</u>, 533^C, E.M., Ch. XV "A Positivistic Misinterpretation of Plato," see especially p. 156.

¹² See especially I.N., 61-3, PPA, 171; cf. <u>Auto.</u>, 44.

though it conflicts with Plato's "realism," is of great philosophical importance. Kant recognizes this by devoting several pages of his <u>Critique</u> to an exposition and criticism of Plato's philosophy.¹³ He then goes on to show that even the doctrine of forms is sound as far as it goes. He holds, for example, that Plato was right in asserting that a prince can rule well only in so far as he participates in [<u>teilhaftiq</u>] the ideas.¹⁴ Kant even suggests that perhaps we understand Plato better than he understood himself: Plato rightly discerns clear proofs of an origin from ideas, ideas "completely determined in the Supreme Understanding, each as an individual and each as unchangeable," or what Kant calls "the original causes of things." So far Kant agrees with Plato, but he adds an important qualification—

und nur das Ganze ihrer Verbindung im Weltall einzig und allein jener Idee Vollig adaquat sei.15

This qualification is important because the thought which comprehends the idea is part of the universe and so is

¹⁵ KRV, A 318, B 374-75: "and only the totality of things in their interconnection as constituting the universe, is completely adequate to the idea."

¹³ KRV, A 313, B 370.

¹⁴ Vico also makes an important use of Plato's commonwealth, <u>Scienza Nuova</u> §1097; Eng. tr., p. 377; <u>Opere</u>, p. 861; Croce comments: "Vico took from Plato the idea of an eternal state, but entirely inverted it by the reservation which he adds to it, that the true eternal republic is not the abstract state of Plato, but the course of history in all its phases, including the brutes at one end and Plato at the other.... The great state of the nations founded and governed by God, is thus nothing else than History." Croce, pp. 107-08.

required as a constituent part of the real, and must be taken into consideration if the idea itself is to be completely rational. With this modification he approves Plato's program:

If we set aside the exaggerations in Plato's methods of expression, the philosopher's spiritual flight from the ectypal made of reflecting upon the physical world-order to the architectonic ordering of it according to ends, that is, according to ideas, is an enterprise which calls for respect and imitation.¹⁶

The idea of reason as a constituent part of the real has implications which Kant did not fail to work out. Earlier it was pointed out that the idea of a <u>presentiment</u> of reality is connected with the interest of reason. Kant says of reason—<u>Sie ahndet Gegenstände, die ein große</u> <u>Interesse für sie bei sich führen</u>.¹⁷ In fact Kant regards reason as a whole system of interests. Reason is a selfsufficient teleological system; but nevertheless it has a <u>becoming</u>, for rationality is not ready-made but selfconstituted. By conceiving reason as <u>dynamic</u> Kant breaks away from the classical or Platonic view of the **Aóros**; if the activity of reason must be included in the <u>logos</u> it can no longer be regarded as fixed or independent of mind. Kant's definition of reason in terms of motivating interests ascribes to it what Yovel calls an "erotic nature:

Kantian reason is not mere <u>logos</u> but a fusion of Plato's <u>logos</u> and <u>eros</u>. Plato drew a fundamental distinction

17 KRV, A 796, B 824: "Reason has a presentiment of objects which possess a great interest for it."

¹⁶ Ibid.

between the rational and the motivational aspect of the mind. Reason in itself is the pre-established goal of the mind, to which its erotic principle aspires. Kant accepts the basis of this theory, with two modifications. First, the rational goal is not prescribed in advance, but rather projected, or constituted, by the activity that pursues it. And consequently it is <u>reason itself</u> that has the erotic side, i.e., the aspect of aspiration and becoming. Thus, in effect, we find that the Kantian texts are studded with expressions that amount to a virtual <u>erotic glossary</u> of reason.¹⁸

Reason, or what he calls the "faculty of principles," is not for Kant a pre-existent reality, or even the goal towards which the mind aspires. In his important chapter "The Architectonic of Pure Reason" he speaks of the "sheer self-development of reason."¹⁹ This spontaneous activity of the ego, which is the <u>becoming</u> of reason, is at the same time the activity by which it <u>actualizes itself</u>. In Kant's system the unity of apperception is the "highest principle of all human knowledge."²⁰ Kant holds that perception is a synthesis which is an action [<u>Wirkung</u>] of the understanding on the sensibility.²¹ The correlate of all our representations, in regard to possible consciousness of them, is "pure apperception": <u>das stehende und bleibende</u> <u>Ich.²²</u>

Yovel explains Kant's idea by saying that the identity of the ego is actualized by fulfilling the function of unifying the manifold of impressions into an objective

18 Yovel, see especially pp. 12-20.
19
KRV, A 835, B 863.
20
KRV, B 135; Müller, p. 747.
21
KRV, B 152.
22
KRV, A 123.

world. He adds that pertaining to this "transcendental ego" is the idea of a "pure processuality," and that Kant's "whole Copernican reversal hinges upon it."²³ Kant's Ich denke goes far beyond the Cogito of Descartes because it expresses the act of determining my existence. 24 He regards the ego not as ready-made, as Descartes thought, but as constituting itself through its own operation.

Yovel asks what principle bridges pure change in consciousness and actual states in time; and he considers the lack of an answer one of the fundamental difficulties with the Kantian system.²⁵ This is similar to the criticism offered by Collingwood in Speculum Mentis: Kant's philosophy collapsed into "another abstract realism," he says, because of his failure to identify the "empirical eqo" with mind in its ideal perfection."²⁶ Even without considering Kant's view of time the problem does not appear so fundamental as Yovel seems to think. The operation of the ego is itself historical in the sense that it brings into actuality what was only a transcendental possibility viz., itself. Kant seems to suggest this historical relation between the two at several places.

Kant's transcendental ego appears to be a kind of schema, or abstract representation of the actual ego which includes the possibility inherent within it. It is the idea

²⁴ See the important footnote at KRV, B 157-58; Müller, p. 761. 26 S.M., 285-86. ²⁵ Yovel, p. 186.

²³ Yovel, p. 285.

or concept "ego," which must be postulated if we are to conceive of the actual ego. "To cognize something <u>a priori</u> means to cognize it out of its mere possibility"²⁷ This applies also to the ego itself, for as Kant says, "All possible appearances, as representations, belong to the totality of a possible self-consciousness."²⁸ We must imagine the schema of such a possible self-consciousness because all possible appearances are necessarily connected with each other and with actual appearance.

The structure of a category—the schema of a concept can only be determined by historical analysis. The structure of any individual's consciousness is determined by his entire historical past, in fact is that historical past. Kant's analysis of this transcendental ego (what we might call the historical ego) is crypto-historical and so partly in error.²⁹

The principle of self-consciousness as Kant uses it becomes the key to the Principle of Participation, for the activity which determines my existence is a fundamental participation in reality. The importance of Kant's theory is the fact that it follows necessarily from it that selfconsciousness is bound up with the consciousness of other things as well: "the consciousness of my existence is at the same time an immediate consciousness of the existence

^{27 &}lt;u>Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Sciences</u>; cited in the translators' introduction to the <u>Logic</u>, p. xcv.
28 KRV, A 113.
29 E.M., Part III B, p. 231f.

of other things outside me." 30

The activity of the mind as given to itself Kant terms "sensibility," because as an object of intuition it appears to itself without spontaneity. This sensibility of the mind to its own activity is the basis of all sensibility. The mind can only know itself as activity ; but this is all that is necessary, for sensation requires the activity of a mind. Sensibility can exist only in relation to a mind as it affects itself. A perception is what Kant calls Vorstellung mit Bewußtsein (representation with consciousness) and is the lowest existing form of the genus representation-what Collingwood would call its "minimum generic essence." 31 Intuition is the mode in which we are affected by objects; only by intuiting (i.e. forming a representation) of its own relation to other intuitions can representations be produced. Kant says, "The understanding can intuit nothing, the senses can think nothing. Only through their union can knowledge arise."32

Perception, the fundamental act of participation, is the activity by which an object of knowledge is created. According to Kant intuition (<u>Anschauung</u>) is a form of knowledge which is single and relates immediately to the object. This intuition <u>as a representation</u> is the only

³⁰ KRV, B 276; cf. S.M., 299.

³¹ KRV, A 300, B 376.

³² KRV, A 51, B 75; see also A 320, B 376-77; B 67-69.

thing which can be antecedent to any and every act of thinking; and this representation, if it contains nothing but relations(i.e. various acts of intuition), is itself the form of intuition. Since this form, Kant continues,

does not represent anything save in so far as something is posited in the mind, it can be nothing but the mode in which the mind is affected through its own activity (namely, through this positing of its representation), and so is affected by itself; in other words, it is nothing but an inner sense in respect of the form of that sense.

Kant points out that because everything represented through a sense can be so represented only as appearance "we must recognize that the subject, which is the object of the sense, can be represented through it only as appearance." Apperception or consciousness of the self is the simple representation of the "I".

Kant disagrees with Leibniz and Wolff who hold that our entire sensibility is nothing but a confused representation of things, containing at least something of what belongs to the object in itself; the difference between the sensible and the intelligible they regarded as nothing more than a logical distinction. But according to Kant's doctrine this is not true at all: "It is not that by our sensibility we cannot know the nature of things in themselves in any save a confused fashion; we do not apprehend them in any fashion whatsoever."³³ He says further that we have to do with nothing but appearances and that the transcendental object remains unknown to us. 34

Knowledge arises through the faculty of judgment—"all judgments are functions of unity among our representations."³⁵ Thus concepts rest upon functions:

By function I mean the unity of the act of bringing various representations under one common representation. Concepts are based on the spontaneity of thought...the only use which the understanding can make of these concepts is to judge by means of them.³⁶

In the <u>Critique of Judgment</u> Kant says, "In general judgment is the faculty for thinking of the particular as contained under the general."³⁷ If the general principle or rule is given, the judgment which subsumes the particular is <u>determining</u>; if only the particular is given and the universal has to be found, the judgment is <u>reflecting</u>, and it gives a law, that is, a concept, to itself. Both cases involve the active participation which Kant calls a function of unity.

All concepts are products of participation and are representations of reality—though not necessarily external reality. In forming a concept we participate not objects (as in intuition) but other representations. Kant says that no concept is ever related to an object immediately. The act of judgment participates representations, and these representations are affected by that participation. In

 $^{^{34}}$ KRV, A 45-46, B 63; An appearance is "the undetermined object of an empirical intuition" (A 20, B 34).

³⁵ KRV, A 69, B 93. ³⁶ <u>Ibid</u>.

³⁷ <u>The Philosophy of Kant: Immanuel Kant's Moral and</u> <u>Political Writings</u> ed. C. J. Friedrick (New York: Modern Library, 1949), p. 270.

subsuming particular representations—whether these representations be intuitions or themselves concepts under the general we modify them, for they are treated as something they are not, that is, as fixed determinations of appearance with which thought can begin. Representations as determinations of appearance are themselves always in flux, and to treat them as "fixed" (which we must do if we are to mediate between them at all), is to destroy something of their nature. These products of imagination, which are essentially in flux, by being treated from an abstract point of view, are really given a kind of permanence. The act of judgment alters representations, actually participating in reality to produce something of a different order the representation of other representations.

A concept is related only to other representations, never to objects. Nevertheless thought depends upon the original representation formed in participating objects which Kant calls <u>intuition</u>: "if intuition [<u>Anschauung</u>] be lacking, there is nothing which can enable us to go out beyond a given concept, and to connect another with it."³⁸ There is in every judgment a concept mediating and containing many representations, and among them must be some representation (intuition) which is immediately related to an object. Kant says, "Judgment is therefore the mediate knowledge of an object, that is, the representation of a

³⁸ KRV, B 289.
representation."³⁹ Concepts are created by participation acts of synthetic judgment involving representations resulting from intuition. Knowledge proceeds by creating higher concepts which mediate the unity of these "collected representations" or lower concepts. All thought is participation for, as Kant says, "Thought is knowledge by means of concepts."⁴⁰ Knowledge is always a product of the activity of imagination.

Imagination, the "complete unitary act of cognition" presupposed in thought, is the native power of reason; we have called it participation. The principle according to which the imagination is directed is what Kant calls the <u>architectonic</u> of pure reason; Kant says human reason is architectonic by nature.⁴¹ In the system of Kant this architectonic corresponds to the Principle of Participation.

The development and elaboration of the architectonic is the major theme of the <u>Critique of Pure Reason</u> and is Kant's major contribution to the logic of history. Interested as he was in the natural sciences, he was more interested in theology and ethics. Kant developed his method of logic on the basis of what he regarded as relatively certain knowledge—mathematics and natural science—that he might apply it to areas of knowledge which he regarded as having less certainty. Kant's real interest is not science but

⁴⁰ KRV, A 69, B 94.

⁴¹ KRV, A 474, B 502; **APXITEKTONIKH**, "the masterknowledge" which makes possible the highest end or aim, that is, right action (Aristotle, <u>Ethics</u> I, 1.). metaphysics, for he is more concerned to analyse the <u>mode</u> of scientific knowledge than he is concerned with science itself.

The importance of the architectonic has been generally underestimated. Erich Adickes, a great Kantian scholar, refers to it as Kant's "favourite hobby," a phrase echoed by Norman Kemp Smith, who complains that Kant has for his architectonic an "unreasoning affection which not infrequently attaches to a favourite hobby." He says of Kant's important "Postulates of Empirical Thought"⁴² in the Analytics: "the section affords further illustration of the perverting influence of Kant's architectonic...."⁴³ To call the architectonic Kant's favourite hobby is to say his favourite hobby was systematic thinking—true; but hardly worth saying. To ignore the architectonic or downplay its importance is to miss the essential element in the Critique.

We saw above how Kant regarded the categories under the class of modality—"we are justified in regarding these three functions of modality as so many moments of thought."⁴⁴ Edward Caird regarded this as an anticipation of the Hegelian dialectic. Kemp Smith rejects this idea: "As a matter of fact, Kant's remark is irrelevant and misleading." This, he says, is only a "Psychological order

44 KRV, A 76.

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⁴² KRV, A 218f, B 265f; E.M., ch. XXVIII, p. 273f.

⁴³ <u>Commentary</u>, pp. xxii, 579, 611, 392.

in the mind of the individual"; he adds, "Logically knowledge of the possible rests on and implies prior knowledge of the actual and of the necessities that constitute the actual."⁴⁵ What Kemp Smith says is true, as we saw; but for Kant, as we pointed out also, the order is not merely psychological but also logical—in fact it is this psychological activity, the "spontaneous generation" of reason, or imagination, that <u>constitutes</u> the logical according to the principle of possibility.

The importance of the architectonic is beginning to be recognized. The Israeli philosopher Yirmiahu Yovel writes:

As a young undergraduate in Jerusalem, then under strong Neo-Kantian influence (originating in Hermann Cohen's [1842-1918] Marburg school), I was led to think that Kant had spelled the doom of all metaphysics, and that his contribution to ethics lay in his formal, all too formal, doctrine of the categorical imperative. As for his essays on history, if they deserved attention at all, they were to be deemed incompatible with the system.

Rereading Kant, however, I have found that, far from abolishing metaphysics, he had set out to renew it, and that beyond his formal imperative he was laying the ground for a second, material stage of practical philosophy, culminating in the idea of moral history. Moreover—and that came almost as a revelation—the two issues metaphysics and moral history, were closely related in Kant's architectonic.⁴⁶

The scale of forms is essentially a theory of historical knowledge. Kant says the architectonic is the "art of constructing systems," or what he calls "the doctrine of the scientific in our knowledge."⁴⁷ The scale of forms, which might be called Collingwood's "favourite hobby," is the doctrine of the historical. It includes both what is constructed and the act by which it is constructed. The scale of forms has in Collingwood's philosophy much the same function, generally speaking, as the dialectic does in Plato's, providence in Vico's, the pre-established harmony in Leibniz', and the architectonic in Kant's.⁴⁸

Collingwood's doctrine seems to have been influenced most by Plato, Kant, Hegel, and F. H. Bradley. The scale of forms might be considered an architectonic in which the false disjunctions are eliminated: Kant's categories are fixed, Collingwood's overlap; Kant had hoped to complete his philosophy as a system, Collingwood held that the scale of forms was never complete, always capable of further development; the Kantian view is that thought develops through three distinct <u>momenta</u>, thought for Collingwood develops itself through a scale of forms, each successive stage growing out of the one immediately proceeding it and including it as an element within itself. Collingwood's program is, nevertheless, much like that of Kant.

The concept of a scale of forms is arrived at by <u>combining</u> differences of degree with differences of kind; neither degree nor kind in the abstract can find a place on

⁴⁸ Croce says Vico's providence is found as "the cunning of reason" in Hegel (Yovel uses Hegel's phrase often in his discussion of the "interest of reason" in Kant), Schopenhauer uses it again ("ingeniously but perversely treated," says Croce), as the "cunning of the species," it appears again as Wundt's ("so-called law") of the "heterogenesis of ends." Croce, pp. 240-41.

the scale. All things actually exist in combination, and no absolute minimum of this combination can ever be realized: we can always go lower on the scale. Absolute evil, for example, can never be reached—one can always become more wicked, for on a scale that has evil at one end and good at the other, evil must have within it a "minimum generic essence" of good to even be on the scale at all. Evil then is not the opposite of good, but the counterfeit of good.⁴⁹ Because each term must contain to some degree the "generic essence" of the concept to even be on the scale, every higher term will reaffirm the content of the lower term—that is, its generic essence. Thus, as Collingwood says, "wherever we stand in the scale, we stand at a culmination."⁵⁰

The basic principle of the scale—that a given term both negates and reaffirms the content of the next lower term—must be assumed to understand any process whatever. Collingwood assumes it in his theory of mind as the <u>Law of</u> <u>Primative Survivals which he formulates thus:</u>

When A is modified into B there survives in any example of B side by side with the function B which is the modified form of A, an element of A in its primitive or unmodified state.⁵¹

Though it must be assumed if we are to understand any process, there is a special reason it must be assumed if we are to understand mind: "Unless a man reflecting had in him

⁵¹ N.L., 9.52.

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⁴⁹ P.M., 82.

⁵⁰ P.M., 89; see chapter III, especially §6.

a primative survival of mere consciousness, he would have nothing to reflect on, and would not reflect."⁵² The lower term here, consciousness, is negated in that it is no longer the awareness of the present moment, nevertheless as an <u>object</u> of the conscious state, which follows it and into which it developed, it still exists within it; it exists negatively because it is no longer simply the subject, but an object within the present awareness—a culmination of consciousness.

This scale of forms is also the principle behind the idea of history as a process. Collingwood held that history is concerned not with "events" but with "processes":

"processes" are things which do not begin and end but turn into one another; and that if a process P_1 turns into a process P_2 , there is no dividing line at which P_1 stops and P_2 begins; P_1 never stops, it goes on in the changed form P_2 , and P_2 never begins, it has previously been going on in the earlier form P_1 . There are in history no beginnings and endings. History books begin and end, but the events they describe do not.⁵³

We can see here what Collingwood calls the first rule of philosophical method: beware of false disjunctions.⁵³ The

⁵³ <u>Auto</u>., 97-98; This was the main point of Collingwood's MS <u>Libellus de Generatione</u> (1920), which was a study of the implications of process or becoming.

⁵⁴ P.M., 48-50.

⁵² N.L., 9.54; Collingwood points out that evolutionists assume this law without attempting to justify it, for it would involve explaining, among other things, why the whole inorganic world doesn't come alive (N.L., 9.52-53). Elsewhere he says the hypothesis of evolution "was greatly strengthened, if not actually suggested, by the study of human history." (I.N., 134).

traditional designation of this principle is the phrase "a distinction without a difference." An example of this is Fichte's view of the relation between authority and the subject over which it is exercised: "Revolution is not anarchy, it is the seizure of government by the subjects. Hence forth the distinction between governing and being governed still exists as a real distinction, but it is a distinction without a difference: the same persons govern who are governed."⁵⁵ There is a distinction between each phase of a process but there is no difference between them as they are parts of a single process. But they are also something more than mere "parts" of that process; Collingwood says,

The dynamics of history is not yet completely understood when it is grasped that each phase is converted into the next by a process of change. The relation between phase and process is more intimate than that. One phase changes into another because the first phase was in unstable equilibrium and had in itself the seeds of change, and indeed of that change. Its fabric was not at rest; it was always under strain. If the world of history is a world in which <u>tout passe</u>, tout lasse, <u>tout casse</u>, the analyses of the internal strains to which a given constellation of historical facts is subjected, and of the means by which it "takes up" these strains, or prevents them from breaking it in pieces, is not the least part of an historian's work.⁵⁶

The scale of forms was developed from Collingwood's use of it in <u>Speculum Mentis</u> to explain the relation between

⁵⁵ I.H., 107; see also <u>Auto</u>., 62 for another example.
⁵⁶ E.M., 74.

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what he calls the forms of experience—Art, Religion, Science, History and Philosophy. There are between these forms no disjunctions; nevertheless there are differences between them: each form develops into the next and that form is contained as an element within it.

In the paper "Some Perplexities About Time" (1926) Collingwood discusses the theory of compact series which mathematicians have held to solve the problem of the relation between the continuity of events and their plurality. Such a series is held to be at once discrete, because it is a series, and continuous, because it is compact. Collingwood gives reasons for rejecting this answer, and says, "it is only advanced in the interests of what I take to be a logical error, namely logical atomism, which in its application does not differ widely from the sensational atomism of Hume, and is amenable to all the same criticisms." For this reason Collingwood doesn't attempt to solve the problem of the relation between continuity and plurality-he assumes it. "I shall therefore assume: he says, "that an event takes time and is always (i) part of an event which takes more time, (ii) divisible into events that take less; and that events are in no sense composed of instants or point-instants but always of events."⁵⁷ In other words, to understand a process such as time you must presuppose the scale of forms: you can find no "instant" or absolute zero on the scale, only events, and these events are parts of larger events.

SPAT, 136-37.

In an essay entitled "Why Space Has three Dimensions," published posthumously in 1913, Henri Poincaré analyses space in terms of mathematical continua on the basis of <u>analysis situs</u>. This continua is a form of the theory of compact series, for he says that each of the points in such a series "is an individual thing absolutely distinct from the others and, moreover, absolutely indivisible." With this view he contrasts what he calls physical continua, which are the continua directly revealed by our senses. He says,

It is possible to tell the difference between a 10-gram weight and a 12-gram weight at a guess; it would not be possible to tell an 11-gram from either a 10-gram or a 12-gram weight. More generally, there can be two sets of sensations which we can tell apart without being able to tell either one set or the other from a third set. With this posited, we can imagine a continuous chain of sets of sensations such that each of them cannot be distinguished from the next one although the two extremities of the chain can easily be told apart.⁵⁸

The "law" which governs such continua, he says, is that of the philosopher Gustav Theodor Fechner (1801-1887). In fact it is not a law; it is an absolute presupposition. Poincaré points this out by saying the notion of continuum has an intuitive origin. The definitions he gives of mathematical continua cannot satisfy the philosopher, though from the view-point of mathematics they are flawless, because, as he says, "They substitute the object to be defined and the intuitive notion of this object with a construction made up of simpler materials."⁵⁹

⁵⁹ <u>Ibid</u>., pp. 28-29.

⁵⁸ Henri Poincaré, <u>Mathematics and Science: Last Essays</u> trans. J. W. Bolduc (New York: Dover, 1963), p. 30.

In fact such continua are abstractions; any actual continuum must presuppose the principle of the scale of forms—each point of the series contains something of the whole, is therefore related to the whole and so is not actually a point. The notion of a continuum must in fact presuppose the idea of a minimum generic essence.

The relation of the scale of forms to Plato's dialectic is obvious. Dialectic is the study of the structure of appearance in relation to higher grades of reality. Further, as Collingwood points out, Plato held that within each grade of the series leading to reality,

each grade will develop within itself distinctions of a similar kind to those which separate it from the others; thus each will show the same general type of structure with each other and with the whole.⁶⁰

The method of dialectic is to "annihilate hypotheses."⁶¹ The master of dialectic does this by demanding an "account of the essence of each thing," and therefore dialectic stands as the coping-stone of the whole structure of knowledge, and no other study deserves to be set higher.⁶²

These hypotheses, which are laid down only to be annihilated when the essence of each is perceived, form a series

⁶² <u>Republic</u>, 533^C, 534^{b,e}.

⁶⁰ PPA, 160; <u>Republic</u>, 511^b: "unaided reasoning apprehends by the power of dialectic, when it treats its assumptions, not as first principles, but as <u>hypotheses</u> in the literal sense, things 'laid down' like a flight of steps up which it may mount all the way to something that is not hypothetical, the first principle of all...." (Cornford's trans., p. 226).

⁶¹ This means not (as Cornford, p. 254, n.3, and others suggest) <u>confirming</u> them, but, as Collingwood says, "un-supposing a supposition." E.M., 156, 158.

which at last culminate in reality, the form which is <u>the</u> essence of that thing. This differs from the scale of forms in that each degree on the Platonic scale is appearance which incompletely embodies the reality or, rather, imitates the reality which is wholly contained in the highest grade. Collingwood remarks:

What is significant in Plato is not so much the actual scale of forms by which in one or another passage he expounds the structure of this or that concept, as the evident conviction, pervading all his work, that this is the type of structure which philosophical concepts possess.⁶³

This use of the scale of forms as the key to philosophical concepts is nearly universal.

Doubtless Edward Caird is right to connect the Hegelian dialectic, what Collingwood calls at one place "the monstrous concatenations of the Hegelian dialectic," with Kant's architectonic.⁶⁴ Hegel, as Collingwood says, did more than any other man to revive the study of Plato and Aristotle. This was not, Collingwood says, an "unmixed blessing," furthermore Hegel re-introduced the word <u>dialectic</u> in its Platonic sense: "Hegel thought that a dialectical world is a world where everything <u>argued itself into existence</u>." This mistake Collingwood calls the Fallacy of Misplaced Argument. "Hegel aims at building up the concrete out of abstractions; not realizing that, unless the concrete is given from the start, the abstractions out of which it is to be built up

⁶³ P.M., 58; here he points out other philosophers, including Leibniz and Kant, held the same conviction.

⁶⁴ P.M., 65, 103.

are not forth coming."⁶⁵ Hegel did do one thing for the doctrine of forms, however, that is very important. Platonic forms do not themselves fall into a scale, they contain the entire essence of the idea to which the appearances approximate to a greater or less degree, and thus only appearances form a scale. The idea of the forms themselves as capable of forming a scale comes from Hegel.

Hegelian forms have a peculiarity which makes them capable of falling into a scale. Nature, according to the Greek philosophers, is always partly indeterminate, and this element of indeterminacy, or what Aristotle called "potentiality," means nature is not yet resolved into perfect actuality. Hegel accepts this view of nature, but he gives a reason for this element of indeterminacy—an answer Collingwood considers "profoundly original":

Hegel's view is that the forms of nature fail to get perfectly embodied because of a certain peculiarity in these forms themselves. They are forms of a peculiar kind which owing to something in their very structure cannot be completely realized.

The Greeks suggested that matter was recalcitrant and the form, though itself perfect, was not perfectly embodied because of this recalcitrance—which was no answer, as Collingwood points out, but a restatement of the fact that the form was not perfectly embodied. Hegel's answer is

⁶⁵ N.L., 33.83-.89; Collingwood gives a reference here to 6.58-.59, which is the conclusion of his chapter on language. He also points out why Marx inverted Hegel's scheme: "He did not think he had cured the fault of the Hegelian dialectic; he did not know it was a fault. He was obsessed by the idea that the freedom of the will must at all costs be denied." (33.99).

that the task nature is trying to realize is impossible and can only be accomplished approximately, for the forms both demand realization and yet have in them something which makes realization impossible. In Collingwood's words:

What makes their realization impossible is the fact that they are "abstract": that is, the fact that they stand over against their own instances as transcendent patterns which in themselves are essentially immaterial but which nevertheless demand to be reproduced in matter.⁶⁶

This view of forms means that some forms can be more perfectly embodied than others, and so the forms themselves can form a scale. What is important is that the forms are recognized as being abstract. This means that as such they don't fall on Collingwood's scale at all—it is only in combination that things actually exist, and scale of forms is concerned with the actual. But there is one more step before we reach this stage.

F. H. Bradley held that appearances are reality itself appearing. Collingwood regarded this doctrine as the culmination of metaphysics: "After three centuries of attempting in vain to separate appearance from reality, Bradley has shown that the attempt must be given up...."⁶⁷ The fundamental thesis of <u>Appearance and Reality</u>, Collingwood says, is that reality is not something other than its appearances and hidden behind them—it is these appearances themselves, forming a whole, and this whole forms a single

67 MS, "The Nature of Metaphysical Study," (1934), pp. 27, 28; cited in Van der Dussen, p. 195.

⁶⁶ T.N., 124-25.

system consisting of experience and all our experiences form part of it: "A reality so defined can only be the life of mind itself, that is, history."⁶⁸ Bradley's work seems to fuse the Platonic notions of appearance and reality: "The Absolute, considered as such, has of course no degrees; for it is perfect.... Such predicates belong to and have meaning only in the world of appearance." And again he says, "Nothing perfect, nothing genuinely real, can move. The Absolute has no seasons, but at once bears its leaves, fruit, and blossoms. Like our globe it always, and it never, has summer and winter."⁶⁹ Nothing could be more Platonic; on the other hand, nothing could be less Platonic than his view of appearance:

All is appearance, and no appearance, nor any combination of these, is the same as Reality. This is half the truth, and by itself it is a dangerous error. We must turn at once to correct it by adding its counterpart and supplement. The Absolute <u>is</u> its appearances, it really is all and every one of them. That is the other half-truth....⁷⁰

In another un-Platonic passage we can see the idea of a "minimum generic essence" of reality present in everything actual, Bradley says,

We can find no province of the world so low but the Absolute inhabits it. Nowhere is there even a single

⁶⁸ I.H., 141.

⁶⁹ F. H. Bradley, <u>Appearance and Reality: A Meta-</u> <u>physical Essay</u> ed. 2 (London: Oxford University Press, 1930), pp. 318,441. The first edition of this work appeared in 1893, the second in 1897. This work will be cited hereinafter as A&R.

⁷⁰ A&R, 430-31.

fact so fragmentary and so poor that to the universe it does not matter. There is truth in every idea however false, there is reality in every existence however slight; and where we can point to reality or truth, there is the one undivided life of the

The point Bradley is making here is obvious enough in relation to history; every error, fallacy, or fable has the value of an important fact; every delusion or fantasy may radiate in many directions. Marco Polo tells the tale in 1295 of the spirits that talk to travellers lost in the desert and attempt to lead them astray.⁷² This story was believed by Europeans for centuries; even today these spirits whisper in the pages of Milton. And the story itself doubtless expresses some truth about the state of mind of lost travellers.

Every appearance finds a place within the whole: nevertheless, Bradley says, appearances differ in worth.⁷³ Though the Absolute <u>as such</u> has no degrees, there are degrees of value among appearances for some contain more of the Absolute. Bradley discusses this in "Degrees of Truth and Reality," a chapter in which he acknowledged particular indebtedness to Hegel.⁷⁴ Here he says, "The truth and the fact, which, to be converted into the Absolute, would require less rearrangement and addition, is more real and truer. And this is what we mean by degrees of reality and truth."⁷⁵ This idea of appearances as real and each containing something of

⁷² <u>Travels</u> I,39; cf. I.H., 317: "superstition is a fact."
⁷³ A&R, 489.
⁷⁴ A&R, ch. 24, p. 318,n.
⁷⁵ A&R, 323.

⁷¹ A&R, 431-32.

the Absolute, but containing it by degree, so that some are more real than others, is the essential idea that is found in Collingwood's scale of forms. It differs from Plato's dialectic in that the appearance for Plato does not contain in it anything of the real, it merely imitates the appearance next above it, which is a closer imitation of the real. In fact what is expressed by the term M'MHCIC in Plato's theory is the relation between an appearance and the reality it appears to be.⁷⁶ The essential difference between Bradley's idea and Collingwood's is Bradley lacks the idea of a scale, though this is implicit in his theory and might have been worked out by him easily enough. This is particularly noticeable in the following passage:

The Absolute is each appearance, and is all, but it is not any one as such. And it is not all equally, but one appearance is more real than another. In short the doctrine of degrees in reality and truth is the fundamental answer to our problem. Everything is essential, and yet one thing is worthless in comparison with others. Nothing is perfect, as such, and yet everything in some degree contains a vital function of Perfection. Every attitude of experience, every sphere or level of the world, is a necessary factor in the Absolute. Each in its own way satisfies, until compared with that which is more than itself.⁷⁷

Bradley's thought is complex; the scale of forms is much simpler to understand, though I doubt it has such farreaching implications. Bradley expresses himself in almost poetic imagery.⁷⁸ He is easy to misunderstand, and it is

76 PPA, 161; cf. I.N., 61-63. 77 A&R, 431.

⁷⁸ cf. P.M., 213. C. S. Lewis remarks that we can make our language duller but we cannot make it more literal. You can say that Bradley expresses himself metaphorically as long as you recognize that all language is metaphorical.

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necessary to learn his language. Many people have not bothered to learn this (not so very difficult) language, and have labelled his work non-sense; others have tried to identify his Absolute with God (which is a mistake) and have considered him some kind of pantheist. 79 We can see that what Bradley is really doing is analyzing an absolute presupposition of modern European thought. His analysis is still for the most part crypto-historical, which leads to some ambiguities. He recognizes current thought presupposes reality is not a form existing apart from appearance. Here the false disjunction between form and appearance is eliminated-the appearance contains its own form and so is reality appearing. We saw as wellthat Bradley's analysis implies the scale of forms, which in its form as the Law of Primative Survivals is a necessary presupposition if we are to understand mind. The scale of forms is also a presupposition of the idea of process, an idea itself presupposed by much of modern thought and certainly necessary for any understanding of history. When we understand that Bradley's work is probably the most important direct influence on Collingwood's scale of forms, and his idea perhaps even more fundamental than the scale itself, then we can rightly give it the

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⁷⁹ An example of the first error is A.J. Ayer. Language, Truth and Logic ed. 2 (New York: Dover, 1946), p. 36. Ayer quotes a remark at random from A&R, 442, calling it a "metaphysical pseudo-proposition"; he allows that Bradley may be using words in a way they are not commonly used, nevertheless since it can't be "verified"—"then it follows that he has made an utterance which has no literal significance even for himself." The second objection has been answered by Bradley himself, A&R, 488.

importance Bradley himself assigned to it:

The positive relation of every appearance as an adjective to Reality, and the presence of Reality among its appearances in different degrees and with diverse values—this double truth we found to be the centre of philosophy.⁸⁰

What is most important in Bradley is he has gotten past Hegel's Fallacy of Misplaced Argument, for he holds that only the immediate is real. This view of reality, as Collingwood points out, means that reality must be defined as the life of the mind. In fact Bradley, though he does not seem to be clearly aware of it, is describing history, which is both appearance and reality. Bradley's crypto-historical approach leaves unsolved at least one important problem, the nature of the relation between thought in its abstract form with mind in its immediacy. The solution of this problem is Collingwood's major contribution to English philosophy.

CHAPTER IV

IMAGINATION AND LANGUAGE

Collingwood's theory of imagination rests directly on the idea of a scale of forms. Imagination is a dialectical process which sums up itself at each point of its development, while at the same time containing inplicitly the next stage of its development. Feeling or sensation is the minimum generic essence of thought. Feeling is not the absence of thought, for it presupposes it. J. A. Smith, Collingwood's mentor, states this quite precisely:

Feeling in its character and existence pre-supposes the character and existence of experience or some experience better developed or organized, more autonomous or architectonic, more substantial or substantive, or at least it cannot be conceived of except by contrast with such experience, as <u>not</u> being what that experience is or is conceived to be, or as being less what that experience is more.¹

Imagination is the level of experience between sensation and intellect, "the point at which the life of thought makes contact with the life of purely psychical experience"; crude sensation, or feeling, is converted by the activity of

J. A. Smith, "On Feeling," <u>Proceedings of the</u> <u>Aristotelian Society</u> 14 (1913-14: 56.

consciousness, or attention, into imagination. As names for this level of experience consciousness and imagination are synonyms, though within a single experience there is a distinction; consciousness effects the conversion, imagination undergoes it: "Imagination is thus the new form feeling takes when transformed by the activity of consciousness."²

The act of imagining is always a synthesis, a unity which is self-constituted or participatory. The object of perception is always imaginatively participated; as Kant says, "Experience is possible only through the representation of a necessary connection of perceptions."³ This "necessary connection," must be absolutely presupposed, but it is not something given to the percipient in the phenomena; it is something supplied in the act of perceiving. As Owen Barfield says, "Participation is the extra-sensory relation between man and the phenomena."⁴ The process of imagining, then, is not a mere drifting of images across the mind; it is the process of unifying the "world" which occupies the whole of that mind's gaze, as Collingwood says in <u>Speculum Mentis</u>,

 2 P.A., 215. This was discussed at length in a part that had to be omitted. For particulars see P.A., Bk II, the first six chapters of N.L., and the article S&T.

³ KRV, B 218; see E.M. chapter 27 (p. 262f.).

⁴ Owen Barfield, <u>Saving the Appearances</u> (London: Faber & Faber, 1957), p. 40; John Lukacs remarks, "<u>all</u> human perception is, to some extent, extrasensory." <u>Historical Con-</u> <u>Sciousness</u> (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), p. 238.

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and which it strives to see whole:

The various feelings, emotions, sensations, or by whatever other name we call the subsidary imaginations, are modified and adapted so as to fall into such an imaginable totality, a single coherent imaginary whole in constructing which we tentatively imagine subsidary parts and either fit them in or reject them, retaining the right to modify the whole according as a new subsidary part suggests

The correlative of imagination is beauty, which exists only in relation to imagination and can only be defined in relation to it. Beauty is the principle which guides the mind's spontaneous activity; and the mind is nothing other than this process of imagination—"it creates itself as the activity of imagination by creating these works of art which are its imaginary objects."⁶ J. A. Smith, taking Wordsworth as his starting-point, says,

Seriously and deliberately I propose to take the experience of the beautiful as the earliest and most fundamental indication of Mind's presence in the Universe... For what is "Beauty" but a beautiful synonym for what is by common agreement essential to any and every datum of sense or imagination, viz., the integration of a boundless multiplicity and variety of parts into a single and singular whole in which all the variety is merged without loss and re-emerges in an unbroken quality which has no antecedent or parallel elsewhere, constituting a characteristic individuality or uniqueness.⁷

"Beauty is a character or feature of things which nothing but Mind can create or behold," says Smith; but most poets hold that beauty exists before Mind.

⁵ s.m., 65. ⁶ s.m., 65.

⁷ J. A. Smith, "The Nature of Mind and the Reality of Genuine Intercourse Between Minds, <u>Proceedings of the</u> <u>Sixth International Congress of Philosophy</u> ed. E. S. Brightman (New York: Longmans Green, 1927), pp. 130-31. Under the arch of Life, where love and death, Terror and mystery guard her shrine, I saw Beauty enthroned; and though her gaze struck awe, I drew it in as simply as my breath.⁸

Collingwood says that our word beauty belongs to the common language of European civilization (<u>le beau</u>, <u>il bello</u>, <u>bellum</u>), and has a meaning essentially the same as that of **TO KAXÓN** in Greek:

If we go back to the Greek, we find that there is no connection at all between beauty and art. Plato has a lot to say about beauty, in which he is only systematizing what we find implied in the ordinary Greek use of the word. The beauty of anything is, for him, that in it which compels us to admire and desire it: TÒ KAXÓN is the proper object of Epws, "love". The theory of beauty is thus, in Plato, connected not with the theory of poetry or any other art, but primarily with the theory of sexual love, secondly with the theory of morals (as that for the sake of which we act when action is at its highest potency: and Aristotle similarly, of a noble action, says that it is done "for beauty's sake", TOY KANOY ENEKA), and thirdly with the theory of knowledge, as that which lures us on-ward in the path of philosophy, the quest of truth. To call a thing beautiful in Greek, whether ordinary or philosophical Greek, is simply to call it admirable or excellent or desirable. A poem or painting may certainly receive the epithet, but only by the same kind of right as a boot or any other simple artifact. The sandals of Hermes, for example, are regularly called beautiful by Homer, not because they are conceived as elegantly designed or decorated, but because they are conceived as jolly good sandals which enable him to fly as well as walk.9

Thus it is simply untrue to call beauty a quality of objects: "The aesthetic experience is an autonomous activity. It

⁹ P.A., 37-38; see also PAE, 439; cf. Isaiah, 52:7.

⁸ D. G. Rossetti, "Sibylla Palmifera," <u>Poems and Trans-</u> <u>lations, 1850-1870</u> (London: Oxford University Press, 1914), p. 148.

arises from within; it is not a specific reaction to a stimulus proceeding from a specific type of external object." Nor is there any reason to call beauty subjective: "to say that beauty is subjective means that the aesthetic experience which we enjoy in connection with certain things arise not from any quality that they possess, which if they did possess it would be called beauty, but from our own aesthetic activity."¹⁰

We must connect beauty not simply with art or imagination but with knowledge as well. The idea of beauty as the object of eros means that imagination is erotic, or seeks its own ends, in the manner Kant conceived reason as doing. Beauty is not a concept; rather, it is "the guise under which concepts in general appear to the aesthetic imagination."¹¹ Collingwood says,"Beauty means structure, organization, seen from the aesthetic point of view, that is imagined and not conceived."¹²

Speaking of dreams, Norman O. Brown makes this interesting, if rather cryptic, comment:

¹⁰ P.A., 40-41, cf. p. 149; Bradley, A&R, 412; cf. Dennis de Rougement, <u>L'Amour et L'Occident</u> (Paris: Plon, 1939), trans. M. Belgion, <u>Love in the Western World</u> (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1940), pp. 69-70.

¹¹ S.M., 66.

¹² S.M., 66. Kant's use of the term <u>synthesis speciosa</u> implies that he was aware of the relation between figuration and beauty. <u>Speciosa</u>, "beautiful," or "splendid," derives from <u>species</u>, meaning "a seeing," or "aview." (KRV, B 151-152).

The body is an utterance. Man is a Logos, a word, to be interpreted, a code to be deciphered, not a machine to be manipulated. Libido speaks, desire speaks, love speaks, it is the unspoken meaning: Like the Delphic oracle - OY TI XERE ANNA CHMAINES it does not say but signifies.¹³

The interpretation of dreams, Brown says, "is the discovery of meaning in dreams."

We may say that beauty is the presentiment of meaning, for the structure implicit in an imagined object is nothing but the structure of the act by which it is created and which is revealed explicitly by further analysis. Its glamour (a word which originally referred to magic and is connected with the word grammar) is the gleam of an "heroic act" by which the possible's fuse is lit. It is the presentiment of structure because it is the desire for a certain relation not yet achieved; hence its connection with $\xi \rho \omega \varsigma$. Eros, says Hesiod, is "the most beautiful of the immortal gods, who in every man and every god softens the sinews and overpowers the prudent purpose of the mind."¹⁴ It is this desire, which is at the same time a dissatisfaction with the existing situation, which gives every experience its possibility.

The theory of meaning is the theory of love. Beauty is not so much a product of imagination as the struggle for a certain relation. Collingwood says,

Beauty is in the eye of the beholder; that is to say,

¹³ Norman O. Brown, "On Interpretation," in Sugarman, ed.,p. 35; on dreams see S.M., 92-96.

^{14 &}lt;u>Theogony</u> 11. 120-23; trans Norman O. Brown (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill/Library of Liberal Arts, 1953), P. 56.

the beauty which is, no doubt, characteristic of all beloved objects is the effect, not the cause, of relation with an object it can and does create, a beautiful not-self. The establishment of this relation, or even of a struggle towards it, is the origin both of the not-self which is thereby created, and of the self which in creating it establishes itself as a focus of activity with an identity of its own, unique and different from everything else, that is, from every not-self.¹⁵

The relation between the self and the not-self, or subject and object as we have got in the habit of calling them, is dialectical.

The relation between the self and the not-self is not merely a product of consciousness, but a thing without which consciousness cannot exist. As Socrates says, to perveive is to perceive something, and there is no consciousness where there is nothing to be conscious of. There can be no disjunction between the self and the not-self, for the relation between them is created by our own act; beauty is the point at which the two blend. Because the subject and object come into existence together there is always a link between them, and together they form a "world." This means that one without the other in as abstraction, and the minimum generic essence of reality is the act of immediacy in which both the subject and object participate. The structure present within the act is felt as beauty-a "strange illumination." The two aspects develop together in a process which proceeds according to a scale of forms. This does not mean the subject has no freedom in relation to the object which it creates; it is the assertion of that freedom. The process includes the

¹⁵ N.L., 8.43-.45.

possibility of further development, indeterminate in everythingbut its own past. The world which is made up of these two aspects is historical, and to say it develops according to a scale of forms is merely to assert the continuity of that world's development.

Imagination then is the creation or participation of a beautiful not-self. To separate these two is to create an abstraction, or rather two abstractions, neither of which is completely intelligible. It is only in connection that these retain their meaning; an object is unintelligible apart from its context. The continuity between the self and its world must be one of discourse, in which the subject and object develop together. Maybe this is what Goethe means when he says "Hold fast by the present. Every situation—nay, every moment—is of infinite worth; for it is the representative of a whole eternity."¹⁶ Such a continuous discourse can only be identical with language, and Collingwood holds that language is identical with imagination.

In its original form, according to Collingwood, language is an imaginative activity whose function is to express emotion or feeling, and thus in this form is identical with imagination.¹⁷ In its widest sense, Collingwood says,

language is simply bodily expression of emotion, dominated by thought in its primative form as consciousness. Language here exists in its absolutely original shape... beneath all the machinery of word and sentence lies the primative language of mere

¹⁶ Conversations, p. 33. ¹⁷ P.A., 225.

utterance, the controlled act in which we express our emotions. 18

Elsewhere he says,

Language in its simplest form is the language of consciousness in its simplest form; the mere "register" of feelings, as wild and mad as those feelings themselves; irrational, unorganized, unplanned, unconscious. As consciousness develops, language develops with it. When consciousness becomes conceptual thought, language develops abstract terms.¹⁹

Language itself is an abstraction from "discourse," defined by Collingwood as the activity by which a man means anything. Discourse is continuous, and even the "rests" or "pauses" in it, as in music, are parts of its structure. Just as a visual field begins by being a continuous feeling and afterwards is divided into colour-patches by selective attention, so discourse begins as a continuous activity, and only afterwards does selective attention divide it into parts or "words"—vocal if spoken discourse, gesture-words if it is gestural discourse. This cutting up of discourse into segments is an arbitrary act which is identical with supposal. A discourse is not built up out of words; rather words are arbitrary enclosures within a unified field of activity, and always retain that quality expressed by F. H. Bradley in the phrase the "ragged edges of thought.²⁰

¹⁸ P.A., 235-6.

¹⁹ N.L., 6.58; Collingwood gives a reference here to 7.21.

20 N.L., 6.1-.14; Bradley, A&R, vii, cited in introduction by R. Wollheim. Language is the structure, the system or rules followed in the activity of discourse. All languages are thus related to bodily gesture: "Speech is after all only a system of gestures, having the peculiarity that each gesture produces a characteristic sound so that it can be perceived through the ear as well as through the eye."²¹ Painting, instrumental music, even athletic exercises such as tennis, are such systems of gestures: "Every kind of language is in this way a specialized form of bodily gesture, and in this sense it may be said that the dance is the mother of all languages."²² Ccllingwood elaborates:

I said that "the dance is the mother of all languages"; this demands further explanation. I meant that every kind of order of language (speech, gesture and so forth) was an offshoot from an original language in which every movement and every stationary poise of every part of the body had the same kind of significance which movements of the vocal organs possess in a spoken language. A person using it would be speaking with every part of himself. Now, in calling this an "original" language, I am not indulging (God forbid) in that kind of a priori archaeology which attempts to reconstruct man's distant past without any archaeological data. I do not place it in the remote past. I place it in the present. I mean that each one of us, whenever he expresses himself, is doing so with his whole body, and is thus actually talking in this "original" language of bodily gesture.... This "original" language of total bodily gesture is thus the one and only real language, which everybody who is in any way expressing himself is using all the time.²³

Rigidity is as much a gesture as movement.

Dance has always been associated with meaning. Many myths speak of creation as the dance of God. Lucian, the

²¹ P.A., 243. ²² P.A., 243-4; PAE, 447. ²³ P.A., 246-7. 89

second century Roman poet, says, "With the creation of the universe the dance too came into being, which signifies the union of the elements "24 The meaning is not something apart from the act itself; it is implicit in the activity by which it is expressed. There are two aspects to this activity, each by itself being an abstraction: first, there is a vehicle of discourse, which is "bodily" (in the psychological sense of the word, mentioned above). This vehicle is "a succession of feelings, or sensations with their emotional charges, 'produced' by the activity of speech or the like." This sensuous vehicle (sound, or whatever) is not discourse: "To discourse is to mean something by the sounds (or what not) you make. A language is not a system of sounds or the like; it is a system of sounds or the like as having meanings." Thus it makes no sense to ask how a word gets its meaning-it means what the person using that word means by making that sound.25

Meaning as such is never simply given; it must always be inferred, that is, interpreted. Collingwood says in the

²⁵ N.L., 6.17-.18.

²⁴ Lucian, <u>On the Dance</u>; cited in M. Wosein, <u>Sacred Dance</u>: <u>Encounter with the Gods</u> (New York: Thames and Hudson, 1974), p. 8. The American Indians believed that in the dance a maiden revealed whether she was emotionally fitted for marriage. M. Austin in <u>American Indian Poetry</u> ed. G. W. Cronyn (New York: Liveright, 1934). p. xxvi. There is also the account of Alexis Zorba and his friend who could communicate account of Alexis Zorba and his friend who could communicate only through dance, see chapter 6 of Nikos Kazantzakis, <u>Zorba the Greek</u> trans. Carl Wildman (New York: Simon & <u>Schuster/ Touchstone</u>, 1952), especially pp. 69-74; see also Rudolf Steiner, <u>A Lecture on Eurythmy</u>. Given at Penmaenmawr on 26 August 1923 ed. 2. (London: Rudolf Steiner Press, 1967).

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thought differs precisely from sensation or feeling in that it is never an immediate experience. In the immediate experience of sight, we see a colour; only by thinking can we know ourselvesto be seeing it and also know it to be what we do not see it to be: an object at a distance from us, for example, which we have seen before.²⁶

All perception involves interpretation; as Collingwood says elsewhere: "Any distance outward from the eye is admittedly reached by interpretation and is never an immediate sense-datum."²⁷ What is true of sight is true of all perception whatever.

What we are conscious of whenever we are conscious at all is our bodily activity—the totality of our motor activities raised from the "psychical" to the conscious level. That which is raised to the conscious level is thereby converted by consciousness into an idea; what we have is no longer an object of sensation, it is an object of imagination. "The language of total bodily gesture is thus the motor side of our total imaginative experience." And this means, as Collingwood says in the <u>New Leviathan</u>, "Without language there is no thought."²⁸ Speech is a function of self-consciousness and in its essence is simply expression of the self—the act of speaking which is at the same time the consciousness of speaking.

Language begins as mere utterance. Such language is

26
I.H., 194-95.
27 S&T, 68; see especially §3.
28
P.A., 247; N.L., 28.16.

unaddressed. Collingwood says,

Language in its original imaginative form may be said to have expressiveness, but no meaning. About such language we cannot distinguish between what the speaker says and what he means. You may say that he means precisely what he says; or you may say he means nothing, he is only speaking (where speaking, of course, means not making vocal noises, but expressing emotion).²⁹

This original act of utterance is at a later stage differentiated by being addressed to oneself and to others. As a function of self-consciousness a speaker is, even at the earliest stage, a listener to himself, and so the experience of speaking is also an experience of listening. But consciousness, as Collingwood points out,

does not begin as a mere self-consciousness, establishing in each one of us the idea of himself, as a person or centre of experience, and then proceed by some process, whether of "projection" or of argument by analogy, to construct or infer other persons. Each one of us is a finite being, surrounded by others of the same kind; and the consciousness of our own existence is also the consciousness of the existence of these others.

The "persons" thus discovered may in fact be due to error, perhaps the cat, or a tree, or moving shadows; but however much error may be involved at first "the fact remains that the child's discovery of itself as a person is also its discovery of itself as a member of a world of persons."³⁰

Persons as merely sentient organisms are related by what Collingwood calls "various modes of sympathy which

³⁰ P.A., 248. cf. Vico, <u>Scienza Nuova</u> §§ 186-87; <u>Opere</u>, p. 449; Bergin and Fisch, p. 64.

²⁹ P.A., 269.

arise out of psychical expression of their feelings." Such relations exist between all sentient organisms. He says, "Self-consciousness makes a person of what, apart from that, would be merely a sentient organism." But persons are connected by another kind of relations as well, a kind they construct, and which arise out of their consciousness of themselves and each other. These are linguistic relations:

The discovery of myself as a person is the discovery that I can speak, and am thus a <u>persona</u> or speaker; in speaking, I am both speaker and hearer; and since the discovery of myself as a person is also the discovery of other persons around me, it is the discovery of speakers and hearers other than myself. Thus, from the first, the experience of speech contains in itself in principle the experiences of speaking to others and of hearing others speak to me.³¹

Emotions cannot be shared; to communicate an emotion can only mean causing another person to have emotions like those I have myself. Independently of language there is no means by which two emotions can be compared. There is no means whatever by which one man can produce in another either an act of thought or an act of will. What he can produce is emotion.³² The expression of emotion is a single experience having two elements, a specific kind of emotion not merely psychic (impression), but a conscious emotion of which the person is conscious (and by that consciousness is idea); and a controlled bodily action in which he expresses this idea or

³¹ P.A., 248-49. Reid, <u>op. cit</u>. pp. 181-84, has a discussion of the communication of aesthetic experience. He says it need not be, as I. A. Richards says, in the focus of the artist's consciousness. (p. 183).

³² P.A., 276-77.

conscious emotion. The two are inseparably united: "the idea is had as an idea only in so far as it is expressed." That expression is speech, and in hearing himself speak the person is conscious of himself as the possessor of the idea he hears himself expressing.

Thus two statements are both true, which might easily be thought to contradict each other: (1) it is only because we know what we feel that we can express it in words; (2) it is only because we express them in words that we know what our emotions are. In the first, we describe our situation as speakers; in the second, our situation as hearers of what we ourselves say. The two statements refer to the same union of idea with expres₃₃ sion, but they consider this union from opposite ends.

Speech by its very nature as expression of emotion makes communication possible. In a sense this may be regarded as a detailed working out of Kant's remarkable discovery that the consciousness of my own existence is at the same time an immediate consciousness of the existence of other things outside me.³⁴

The act of speech contains in principle the experience of communication, which Collingwood describes thus:

The person to whom speech is addressed is already familiar with this double situation. If he were not it would be useless to address him. He, too, is a speaker, and is accustomed to make his emotions known to himself by speaking to himself. Each of the two persons concerned is conscious of the other's personality as correlative to his own; each is conscious of himself as a person in a world of persons, and for the present purpose this world consists of these two. The hearer, therefore, conscious that he is being addressed by another person like himself (without that original consciousness the so-called communication of emotion by language could never take place), takes what he hears exactly as if it were speech of his own:

³³ P.A., 249-50. ³⁴ KRV, B 276; cf. S.M., 299.

he speaks to himself with the words that he hears addressed to him, and thus constructs in himself the idea which those words express. At the same time, being conscious of the speaker as a person other than himself, he attributes that idea to this other person. Understanding what some one says to you is thus attributing to him the idea which his words arouse in yourself; and this implies treating them as words

This does not presuppose that the speaker and the hearer share a common language. On the contrary: "one does not first acquire language and then use it. To possess it and to use it are the same. We only come to possess it by repeatedly and progressively attempting to use it."³⁶ Collingwood points out it may be objected if this were the case there could never be any absolute assurance for either speaker or hearer that the one had understood the other. Collingwood agrees.

That is so; but in fact there is no such assurance. The only assurance we possess is an empirical and relative assurance, becoming progressively stronger as conversation proceeds, and based on the fact that neither party seems to the other to be talking nonsense.

L. A. Reid remarks, "Communication is, approximately, possible." <u>Solvitur interloquendo</u> is the phrase Collingwood uses regarding whether or not two people understand one another.³⁷

We have covered the basic ideas of Collingwood's theory

³⁵ P.A., 250; see also pp. 139-41, on the communication of aesthetic experiences; Collingwood says we must think of communication "as a 'reproduction' of the speaker's thought by the hearer, in virtue of his own active thinking." (p. 140).

³⁶ P.A., 250. ³⁷ P.A., 251; Reid, p. 182.

of imagination, which is at the same time a theory of art, a theory of language, and a theory of knowledge. "The aesthetic experience, or artistic activity, is the experience of expressing one's emotions; and that which expresses them is the total imaginative activity called indifferently language or art. This is art proper."³⁸ "The artistic activity does not 'use' a 'ready-made language', it 'creates' language as it goes along."³⁹ "Art is knowledge; knowledge of the individual."⁴⁰ The most important aspect of the theory from the aspect of the philosophy of history is the view that the communication of thought depends upon the hearer re-enacting it in his own mind. Collingwood says,

The possibility of such understanding depends on the hearer's ability to reconstruct in his own consciousness the idea expressed by the words he hears. This reconstruction is an act of the imagination; and it cannot be performed unless the hearer's experience has been such as to equip him for it.⁴¹

Here then we have in substance a theory of history, for as a result of the ability of the mind to re-enact the thought of others in principle any thought whatever can be known. As Collingwood remarks in a manuscript, "thought is always and everywhere <u>de jure</u> common property, and is <u>de facto</u> common property wherever people at large have the intelligence to think in common."⁴²

³⁸ P.A., 275 ³⁹ Ibid. ⁴⁰ P.A., 289. ⁴¹ P.A. 251. ⁴² "Outlines of a Philosophy of History" April 1928, P. 14; cited in Van der Dussen p. 149. We see then that the theory of imagination rests upon the concept of a scale of forms, which is the theory of the historical. This justifies the identification of History as Life with the thought which develops out of it history or historiography. History like Art is knowledge of the individual, but the historian knows more clearly than the artist his relation to his object. He sees not merely Beauty enthroned; he knows that it is he who has enthroned her.

There are some further points to consider that may clear up a few points that might be misunderstood. Gilbert Ryle, for example, Collingwood's successor to the Waynflete chair, simply denies the whole theory of imagination.

There is no special Faculty of Imagination, occupying itself single-mindedly in fancied viewings and hearings... Indeed, if we are asked whether imaging is a cognitive or a non-cognitive activity, our proper policy is to ignore the question.⁴³

"Cognitive" says Professor Ryle, is a word belonging to the vocabulary of examination papers. Ryle thinks that if we are very careful to use literal language we find that such an idea is superfluous. He says (rightly) that

the great epistemologists Locke, Hume, and Kant, were in the main advancing the Grammar of Science, when they thought that they were discussing parts of the occult life-story of persons acquiring knowledge. They were discussing the credentials of sorts of theories, but

⁴³ Gilbert Ryle, <u>The Concept of Mind</u> (London: Hutchinson, 1949) pp. 257-58; Noam Chomsky is highly critical of Ryle's views on language. <u>Aspects of the Theory of Syntax</u> (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1965), p. 8; <u>Cartesian Linguistics</u> (New York: Harper & Row, 1966), pp. 12-13. See also the criticism in Barfield, <u>Poetic Diction</u> ed. 2, (London: Faber & Faber, 1952), p. 20.
they were doing this in para-physiological allegories.44 Ryle doesn't mention Collingwood in his book but he did say something of his work in his Inaugural lecture first published in 1946. There he says Collingwood had made "that great philosophic advance of reducing a puzzle to a problem"; that is, he saw that the natural and human sciences

are not giving rival answers to the same questions about the same world; nor are they giving separate answers to the same questions about rival worlds; they are giving their own answers to different questions about the same world.⁴⁵

This idea of mistaking the answers for one set of questions with those for another Ryle called the "category mistake," and it is the main theme of his Concept of Mind. Collingwood had a more colourful name for it: the Fallacy of Swapping Horses. 46 Ryle dismisses the problem of the faculty of imagination on this ground; but he offers no grounds to show that a theory of imagination is a mistake; and his real ground for dismissing it is that his positivist assumptions cover up the problem. In fact a careful reading of the book reveals that he is concerned with a little bit of everything but the concept of mind. There is no grounds for von Leyden's assertion:

I may add (what must have become apparent throughout) that for the purpose of elucidation and appraisal

⁴⁵ Gilbert Ryle, "Philosophical Arguments," in Logical Positivism ed. A. J. Ayer (New York: Free Press, 1959), p. 328. ⁴⁶ N.L., 2.71.

⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 318.

Collingwood's philosophy of mind might profitably be studied in conjunction with Ryle's. If held up beside the latter, it shows shortcomings; on the other hand, apart from the implicit criticism of it in <u>The Con-</u> <u>cept of Mind</u>, its impact appears to have survived in some of Ryle's own positive pronouncements. 47

Another positivist has controverted Collingwood's theory for another reason: This is the famous German philosopher, Ernst Cassirer, who takes exception to Collingwood's statement, "Every utterance and every gesture that each one of us makes is a work of art."⁴⁸ We have seen what Collingwood means by this: a gesture is an expression of meaning in a controlled act, and this is the essence of all art whatever. He does not mean that waving my arm to get someone's attention or clasping my hands in prayer is something that can be hung in a gallery of fine art; nevertheless they are art because they embody the generic essence. Cassirer comments:

But here again the whole constructive process which is a prerequisite both of the production and of the contemplation of the work of art is entirely overlooked. Every gesture is no more a work of art than every interjection is an act of speech. Both the gesture and the interjection are deficient in one essential and indispensable feature. They are involuntary and instinctive reactions; they possess no real spontaneity.⁴⁹

It is difficult to think that Cassirer has really read what Collingwood wrote, for of course this spontaneity is just what a gesture does possess, otherwise it would be called a

 47 W. von Leyden, "Collingwood's Philosophy of Mind," in Krausz, ed., p. 41.

49 Ernst Cassirer, <u>An Essay on Man: An Introduction to</u> <u>a Philosophy of Human Culture</u> (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1944), p. 142.

⁴⁸ P.A., 285.

reflex. Mere movement is not gesture. An interjection is something more than a noise. The constructive process which Cassirer says is being overlooked is in fact what is being described. The real problem here is that Cassirer's assumptions will never allow him to penetrate below the symbol to the level at which symbols are created. The "philosophy of symbolic forms" is a variation of Platonism. Im Anfang war das Wort, says Faust, and, unsatisfied, he proceeds to substitute Sinn, then Kraft, and at last Tat. His fellow philosopher must substitute <u>Symbol</u>.⁵⁰ It is true that these expressions which Cassirer calls involuntary and instinctive may be at a very low level of consciousness-though not necessarily, for a raised eyebrow may communicate more than a twenty-pound tome-but they do possess spontaneity, the act of expression which is an act of will.⁵¹ It is only on reflection that the conscious expression becomes a symbol, and that at a relatively high level of its development.

The history of language serves as an example of the principle of the scale of forms in relation to language. At any given period a language is so intimately connected with the past out of which it grew and the form into which it develops that we can scarcely tell them apart. Indeed,

⁵⁰ <u>Faust</u>. 11. 1224-37; Kaufmann, p. 152. See also P.A., 226. This was the same error made by I. A. Richards in his <u>Principles of Literary Criticism</u>, ed. 2 (London: Kegan Paul, 1926), ch. 34. James Patrick (p. 138) says that Collingwood's rebuttal "is surely among the masterpieces of twentiethcentury philosophic <u>reductio ad absurdum</u>." See P.A., 262-68, and p. 35, n. 1; cf. Lewis, <u>Abolition of Man</u>, pp. 46-47, and Barfield, <u>Rediscovery</u>. p. 132.

⁵¹ P.A., 236-7.

between two arbitrarily chosen points we can tell scarcely any difference if they are fairly close together, say within an hundred years or so; but over a longer period we can tell them apart easily. This is pointed out by Chaucer, and serves as an example of the phenomenon:

Ye knowe ek that in forme of speche is chaunge Withinne a thousand yeer, and wordes tho That hadden pris, now wonder nyce and straunge.⁵²

Such language is partly dead, but since it is a stage in the past of our own language it is partly living as well. On the basis of these living traces we may with scholarship and a certain amount of imagination re-enact this past language for ourselves; not merely the part that lives, but the part that was dead as well.

In current morphology we find that Collingwood's view of words as <u>abstractions</u> from discourse is accepted as a matter of course. Collingwood says,

Every word, as it actually occurs in discourse, occurs once and once only. But if the dissection is skillfully carried out, there will be words here and there which are so like one another that they can be treated as recurrences of the same word.

This then is the fiction of the recurring word. Modern grammarians use the concept of <u>sandhi</u>, a Sanskrit word meaning "joining." Sandhi has certain rules and forms, but the model,

⁵² Troilus and Criseyde II, 22-24; ek, "also"; tho, "then"; pris, "price" or "worth"; wonder, "wonderfully"; nyce, "foolish"; straunge, "foreign"; Chaucer lived about 1340-1400, a gap of alsmot 600 years, which is a long enough span to show how the later develops out of the earlier and the earlier survives in the later.

⁵³ P.A., 256.

as P. H. Matthews points out, is essentially <u>dynamic</u>. He says "if readers will listen carefully to their own speech they will find numerous detailed phonetic effects of a fusional or sandhi-like nature."⁵⁴

Dr. Waismann raises the question of how a child can be taught mathematics if he can only express his understanding in further symbols. Waismann does not really offer a satisfactory answer, but the solution to the dilemma is in his own hands, for he points out that mathematics is not the precise science it was once thought to be; the concept of number itself is uncertain, "a question of feeling and tradition." Norbert Wiener, along with other mathematicians, has gone so far as to say that mathematics "constitutes the most colossal metaphor imaginable, and must be judged, aesthetically as well as intellectually, in terms of the success of this metaphor."⁵⁵ What is needed, of course, is the idea of re-enactment whereby the mind creates for itself these symbols and their meanings, which is possible only because mathematical symbols are expressions of emotionsintellectual emotions -as well. 56

It will be instructive here to compare the positivistic

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⁵⁴ P. H. Matthews, <u>Morphology: An Introduction to the</u> <u>Theory of Word Structure</u> (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974), p. 97f., especially pp. 102-03, 113.

⁵⁵ Friedrich Waismann, <u>Introduction to Mathematical</u> <u>Thinking: The Formation of Concepts in Modern Mathematics</u> (New York: Harper & Row, 1959), pp. 237-30; W. W. Sawyer, <u>A Concrete Approach to Abstract Algebra</u>. (San Francisco & London: W. H. Freeman & Co., 1959), p. 6; Wiener, op. cit., p. 129; see also Morris Kline, <u>Mathematics: The Loss of</u> <u>Certainty</u> (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980).

⁵⁶ See P.A., 291.

view of language with that of Collingwood. Superficially they may appear to be very much alike; perhaps this is what mislead von Leyden. In a widely quoted aphorism Wittgenstein says, "The limits of my language mean the limits of my world."⁵⁷ On the other hand we have a statement in which Collingwood says of the artist, "His world is his language." 58 It would be hasty to say that because these two authors have used similar words they mean almost the same thing, and therefore their theories are practically identical. Here we may take Wittgenstein's advice given in another context: Es heißt hier immer: Blicke weiter um dich! Our motto shall indeed be to "take a wider look around," for that is what historical thinking is; or in Collingwood's words, "the secret of success is to study the background."⁵⁹ Statements have no meaning apart from their context. We might call this the First Law of Participation.

It is only from the context then that we can determine what Wittgenstein means when he says <u>Die Grenzen meiner</u> <u>Sprache bedeuten die Grenzen meiner Welt</u>. (The limits of my language mean the limits of my world.) And we find that what he is calling language is not really language at all,

⁵⁷ Tractatus, 5.6. ⁵⁸ P.A., 291.

⁵⁹ Ludwig Wittgenstein, <u>Bemerkungen Uber die Grundlagen</u> <u>der Mathematik</u> (London: Blackwell, 1956) trans. G. E. M. Anscombe, <u>Remarks on the Foundation of Mathematics</u> (Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press, 1967), p. 54; E.M., 191. but a theory of logic which is untenable:

Logic pervades the world: the limits of the world are also its limits.... We cannot think what we cannot 60 think; so what we cannot think we cannot <u>say</u> either.⁶⁰ Because there is no language there is no possibility. It is only by an appeal to the "mystical" that Wittgenstein can avoid what he calls "pure realism," that is, solipsism. "The self of solipsism," he says, "shrinks to a point without extension, and there remains the reality co-ordinated with it."⁶¹ Here we have a self—if it can be called self that is absolutely without choices; it is a slave, a self wholly swallowed by its not-self: an impossible world.

Wittgenstein did not actually embrace solipsism, though only at the cost of an inconsistency in his system, an appeal to the mystical that "makes itself manifest." He was forced to abandon this position, of course, and we find a corresponding change in his theory of "language." In a later book he says, "For a <u>large</u> class of cases—though not for all— in which we employ the word 'meaning' it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language."⁶² This we can see is quite an advance, but it does not explain how a word gets a meaning; nor is there any possibility of

60 <u>Tractatus</u>. 5.61. This was discussed at length in the chapter on possibility which had to be omitted.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² L. Wittgenstein, <u>Philosophical Investigations</u> (Oxford: Blackwell, 1953), p. 20 item 43; cited in Adam Schaff <u>Introduction to Semantics</u> trans. O. Wojtasiewicz (New York: Macmillan, 1962), p. 257.

development in meaning. He comes closest of all in a work on mathematics, and in a manner in which at first sight he would appear to be farthest away:

Wenn die Mathematik ein Spiel ist, dann ist ein Spiel spielen Mathematik treiben, und warum dann nicht auch: Tanzen?⁶³

It does not follow that every game is the same game, but we have seen that dancing and mathematics have something in common—they are both language. And here, perhaps, the two would have eventually fused into one had Wittgenstein given the subject more thought. As it is we must say he has no theory of language at all. We might also point out once again Chesterton's remark about the "morbid logician."⁶⁴

Collingwood says of the artist—and for Collingwood to be a man is to be an artist—"His world is his language. What it says about him it says about himself; his imaginative vision of it is his self-knowledge."⁶⁵ He sees in it what he is able to see and it shows him what kind of man he is. It is a world of possibility, for knowledge of that world is a remaking of the world in the shape of consciousness; a world of crude sensa transformed in the shape of language. It is converted into imagery and charged with emotional significance or meaning.⁶⁶ Here also there is a place for the mystical, but it is not something beyond its outer limit pushing its way in. It is more like something

⁶³ <u>Bermerkungen</u>, IV. 4: "If mathematics is a game, then playing some game is doing mathematics, and in that case why isn't dancing mathematics too?" ⁶⁴ <u>Orthodoxy</u>, p. 28. ⁶⁵ p.A., 291. ⁶⁶ p.A., 292.

behind the self, so to speak, which shines through it into that world.⁶⁷ "In our own being," says Leibniz,"is contained a germ, a footprint, a symbol of the divine nature and its true image."⁶⁸ Mystical experience, says Collingwood, is "an act of mind which reaches out beyond the given, grasps the new thought as it were in the dark, and only after that consolidates its new conquest by building up to it a bridge of reasoned proof."69

It is not the mystical which is grasped; the new thought is grasped by means of the mystical. Collingwood says, "Art is the cutting edge of the mind, the perpetual out-reaching of thought into the unknown, the act in which thought eternally sets itself a fresh problem."⁷⁰ Thus the world as such is never completely real; it is a world in which the self participates and therefore it contains possibility. What is mystic lies behind the self, and the world into which it shines is a mirror of it, a mirror that reflects our colours. The self is dependent upon a higher power, and therefore it is not completely real either. But this is no loss to the self, on the contrary, it is its greatest gift-it contains

69 _{NL}, 174.

⁶⁷ cf. John 1:9.

⁶⁸ Leibniz, Of the True Mystical Theology; cited in Ernst Cassirer, "The Mind of the Enlightenment," in Backgrounds to Eighteenth-Century Literature ed. K. Williams (Scranton: Chandler Publishing, 1971), p. 149. Cassirer remarks: "in Leibniz's system every individual substance is not only a fragment of the universe, it is the universe itself seen from a particular viewpoint. And only the totality of these unique points of view gives us the truth of reality." (p. 148). This is certainly a prefiguration of Bradley's views, and thus of the scale of forms.

possibility. It is faced with a world of choices, a possible world, and it is free. This is the truth Beatrice expressed to Dante in these words:

> Lo maggior don che Dio per sua larghezza fesse creando ed alla sua bontate piu conformato e quel ch'e' più apprezza, fu della volontà la libertate; di che le creature intelligenti, e tutte e sole, fuoro e son dotate. <u>Paradiso</u> V, 19-24.71

Because the world is participated in by the self it is only by an act of its own will that it can be brought into bondage. "Choose well," says Goethe: "your choice is brief and yet endless."⁷² But this leads us to reflections that we need not discuss here.

What is important is that we must consider the not-self, that is, language as the meaning of the world, to be as real as the self. One cannot exist without the other. If the self means anything its object must have meaning too. If language has meaning nature must have meaning. If positivism is right then the history of the human mind, as C. S. Lewis puts it, has consisted in "almost nobody making linguistic mistakes about almost nothing." The real significance of positivism, as Barfield points out, is that it forces the

72 Goethe, "Masonic Hymn"; cited in <u>Proc. Arist. Soc.</u> (1916-17): 409.

^{71 &}lt;u>The Divine Comedy</u> trans. John D. Sinclair vol. III <u>Paradiso</u> (New York: Oxford University Press/ Galaxy, 1961) p. 75: "The greatest gift that God in His bounty made in creation, the most conformable to His goodness and the one He accounts the most precious, was the freedom of the will, with which the creatures of intelligence, all and only these, were and are endowed."

issue to its logical conclusion:

At last the choice is plain. Either we must concede that 99 percent of all we say and think (or imagine we think) is meaningless verbiage, or we must—however great the wrench—abandon positivism."73 Barfield points out that "wrench" is not too strong a word because positivism is subtly entangled with our thought at all points on almost every subject. What is necessary is that positivism be abandoned without abandoning science; that is, rational orderly thought. Further, as Barfield points out, irrationalism is not the opposite of positivism, it is <u>its logical conclusion</u>.

All language is metaphorical. Collingwood says, "Literal language is only language recognizedly metaphorical, and what we call metaphorical language is language failing to recognize that it is only metaphor."⁷⁴ Thus when he comes to discuss the meaning of the word <u>cause</u> in the <u>Essay on</u> <u>Metaphysics</u> he says,

A proper usage of a word is one which as a matter of historical fact occurs in the language to which the word belongs. The contradictory of "metaphorical" is "literal"; and if the distinction between literal and metaphorical usages is a genuine distinction, which in one sense it is, both kinds of usage are equally proper. There is another sense in which all language is metaphorical; and in that sense the objection to certain linguistic usages on the ground that they are metaphorical is an objection to language as such, and proceeds from an aspiration towards what Charles Lamb called the

⁷³ "The Rediscovery of Meaning" <u>The Saturday Evening</u> <u>Post</u> 234 (7 Jan 1961) 36-37, 61, 64-65; rpt. in <u>Rediscovery</u>, pp. 13-14; cf. Auto., 52.

⁷⁴ S.M., 130.

uncommunicating muteness of fishes. But this topic belongs to the theory of language, that is, to the 109 science of aesthetic, with which this essay is not To oppose positivism is certainly not to oppose science; but of course there is science and then there is "science"; in one place Collingwood speaks of the "science" of nineteenth century positivism, that compendium of empiricist logic and materialist metaphysics which to the best modern scientists appears so quaintly archaic a thing, and is thought by many other people to be what the best modern scientists In fact, as Collingwood shows in more than one place, the modern view of nature "is based on the analogy between the processes of the natural world as studied by natural scientists and the vicissitudes of human affairs as studied by historians."⁷⁷ Nature certainly has meaning, and Collingwood's view of language is not in the least anti-scien-

tific.

The principle of participation includes the principle of possibility, in fact this latter depends upon it. We arrive at the ancient idea of man as the candle of Javé, ⁷⁸ A <u>logos</u>, a self containing possibility. That self is in fact the sum

 75 E.M., 288-89; he refers to P.A. especially ch. 11. (p. 225f).

⁷⁶ F&R, 145; cf. Lewis, <u>Abolition of Man</u>, pp. 82, 87-89; and Schaafs, <u>Theology</u>, <u>Physics and Miracles</u>, p. 25; Schaafs cites also a physicist who argues that the entire theology of Rudolf Bultmann is based on the "unalterable conviction that science today is just where it was one hundred years ago." Pascual Jordan, <u>Schopfung und Geheimnis</u> (Bremen: Stalling, 1970).

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I.N., 9; see especially E.M., 333-37.
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Proverbs, 20:27.

of the process in which that possibility is developed in determinate ways. As Gilbert Highet remarks, "Within every one of us, not far from the surface, lie hidden many personalities, some of them as young as childhood, and only one as old as today."⁷⁹ These personalities are developed by the use of language in which man expresses his emotion and so comes to know himself and his world.

Javé Elohim, says the ancient text, formed from the ground all the living of the field and all the flying of the heavens and brought them to Adam to <u>see</u>; and anything which he "cried out"⁸⁰ for it, whatever he "cried out" for that "living soul,"⁸¹ it was <u>there</u>.⁸² Adam did not create the animals; but by an act of language in which he expressed his emotion, he made them part of his own experience—he participated them. He expressed astonishment at the sight

⁷⁹ Gilbert Highet, <u>The Art of Teaching</u> (New York: Vintage, 1950) p. 52.

80 cf. 2 Kings 18.28, where the same Hebrew verb is used.

⁸¹ One word in Hebrew.

⁸² Genesis 2.19. I am reading the text according to my own interpretation. Where the original text has 100; I am reading 100, "there," instead of the Massoretic interpretation 100, "name." Actually both meanings are included as they both are derived from the root 1000 (cf. Ugaritic $\frac{5m}{2}$), Which means both "to be astonished" and "to destroy" the act of attention by which a thing is abstracted from its context destroys that context in one sense, but the perfection of the object thus created causes astonishment; hence the translation "cried out." This root is also related to (Ugaritic $\frac{5m}{2}$), which means "to hear, attend, obey, understand, utter a voice, to sing, etc., also in Psalms 132. 6, "a thing." Lest it be thought this is Collingwood's view I should add that the interpretation given above, whether good or ill, is entirely my own. of his fellow creatures, and by this language-perhaps it was very much like a dance, and his "seeing" certainly wasn't limited to sight-he made them a part of his world; and at the same time made himself their master. His "dance" was an expression of joy at life that was like to his: "The bright eyes of a mouse or the fragile vitality of a flower are things that touch us to the heart," says Collingwood, "but they touch us with the love that life feels for life...[the] kind of experience which Plato called *ë***pwc**."⁸³ Each creature evoked a different feeling and the "crying out" was a there appropriate to Adam's experience of that creature, and, properly speaking the creature was there for Adam in the act of naming, not in the "name" itself. Some may regard this as a myth; for me it falls in the category of what C. S. Lewis calls "true myth," something that really happened but has a significance beyond its own actual occurance.

With the introduction of language, then, we have a world of infinite possibility in which the knower participates. The implication of this view of mind's participation in reality may be fittingly expressed in the words of Heraclitus:

You would not find the boundaries of mind $(\psi_{YY\dot{H}})$, even by traveling along every path, so deep is its Aóroc.84

84 Diels-Kranz, 22, fragment 45. According to Colling-Wood **Aóroç** means a "self-differientiating unity." EM, 220.

⁸³ P.A., 39-40.

CHAPTER V

NECESSITY AND RE-ENACTMENT

Imagination is the foundation of every higher form of thought. Einstein's widely quoted remark, "Imagination is more important than knowledge," is true in the sense that without it knowledge is not possible. Imagination lies on a scale midway between feeling and intellect; it is not in itself the highest form of thought, but thought never loses the character bequeathed it by imagination. Reason is imagination perfected.

Imagination is a form of thought which cannot justify itself. It requires higher forms to insure that its constructions are not merely arbitrary. Keats asks,

Is there so small a range In the present strength of mankind, that the high Imagination cannot freely fly As she was wont of old? prepare her steeds, Paw up against the light, and do strange deeds Upon the clouds? Sleep and Poetry 11. 163-68.

It is true that reason is like a bridle on imagination, but imagination in the form of reason can also do strange deeds.

Reason is a further development of imagination. As an higher form of thought it exhibits its own original

characteristics.¹ Thought develops as language, from the feeling associated with bodily activity, through a scale of forms into reason. Language in its original shape is the bodily expression of emotion dominated by consciousness, or thought in its primative form. Reason is the self-conscious use of language-aesthetic activity subordinated to the purpose of truth.² The advent of reason is identical with the introduction of grammar into language, of logic into thought, and of self-consciousness, or reflection, into mere consciousness.

Reason never leaves feeling behind. On the contrary; without feeling reason would have no material for analysis, consciousness would have nothing to reflect on. Collingwood says,

Unless a man reflecting had in him a primative survival of mere consciousness, he would have nothing to reflect on, and would not reflect.³

Milton expresses the same idea in the phrase, "Of Elements/ The grosser feeds the purer."⁴ Collingwood's "law of primative survivals" is simply a statement of the principle of the scale of forms. In Milton we have an early version of the same "law." He tells of Raphael describing to Adam how at creation there was "one first matter all,/ Endued with various forms, various degrees,/ Of substance, and, in things that live, of life." All things, says Raphael, tend to become

¹ Smith, "On Feeling," p. 57.

- ³ N.L., 9.54. ² See P.A., 215f.
- Paradise Lost V, 416.

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"more spiritous and pure"-root, stalk, leaves, flower, and so, he says, to fruit,

Man's nourishment, by gradual scale sublimed, To vital spirits aspire, to animal, To intellectual; give both life and sense, Fancy and understanding; whence the Soul Reason receives, and Reason is her being, Discursive, or Intuitive: Discourse Is oftenest yours, the latter most is ours, Differing but in degree, of kind the same. <u>Paradise Lost</u> V, 472-90.

Reason is the culmination of thought, but within reason itself, as many thinkers besides Milton have held, there is a distinction. Reason can be either discursive or intuitive. Intuition corresponds with what Wordsworth calls "feeling intellect," which he says is "Reason in her most exalted mood."⁵ Kant calls it <u>reinen Vernunft</u>, or "pure reason," which he says contains no opinions at all.⁶ Spinoza says there are three divisions of thought. The first is imaginatio or opinio, the second ratio, and the third is intuition or scientia intuitiva. 7 The third kind, which corresponds to pure reason or feeling intellect, arises only from the second, ratio, and is, he says the greatest virtue of the intellect. Scientia intuitiva "proceeds from an adequate idea of the formal essence of certain attributes of God to the adequate knowledge of the essence of things."⁸

⁵ <u>Prelude</u> XIV. ⁶ KRV, A 781, B 809. ⁷ <u>Ethics</u>, II, prop. XL, note 2; p.68. Knowledge of the second and third kinds, as he says is <u>necessarily</u> true. Ibid., II, prop. XLI; p. 69. ⁸ Ibid., V, prop, XXV; see also props. XXVI-XXI; pp. 214-17.

Reason contains an element of necessity which is absent from imagination proper. Just because the fairy gives you a golden key you are not obliged to believe that it will open the door which leads to the sleeping princess, though it is highly likely that it will do so. This is not true of reason. If we say A is the reason for B, we mean that there is something A which obliges us to believe E. Arbitrary reasons are opinions; they are not obligatory, though through the process of reasoning they may become so. Opinions have a place in the scale which leads up to reason, but reason proper-pure reason-doesn't contain any opinions. An opinion which is found necessary becomes a reason and so is a part of our knowledge. Without necessity we never leave the realm of imagination. As Spinoza says, knowledge of the first kind is the only cause of falsity; the other two kinds are necessarily true. 9 We must now give a short sketch of the doctrine of necessity, touching only upon a few main points.

In Platonic science any theory which "saves the appearances" is acceptable. Such knowledge is opinion, or what Plato calls knowledge of the second degree. There is no necessity attached to such a theory and its value is conditional, or as Collingwood says, "relative to the need (**xpeix**) which it satisfies."¹⁰ A science such as astronomy

¹⁰ PPA, 155-56.

⁹ Ibid, II, props. XLI-XLII; p. 69

is fundamentally an interpretation that harmonizes the sphere of appearance with that of "reality." On this view a theory <u>cannot be true</u>, it is only <u>like</u> reality, an imitation of it. This conception of scientific thought dominated astronomy until the time of Copernicus.

The Copernican revolution concerns not so much astronomy as the logic of science. In Platonic science the principles are true, and any theory that saves the appearances is satisfactory, so long as the principles are not compromised. Copernicus came to think if a theory saves <u>all</u> of the appearances <u>it must be identical with the truth</u>. This involves a reversal; it means that the principles must be in accord with the phenomena. The essential difference in the two views concerns the procedure of scientific thinking. Copernicus <u>questioned</u> the phenomena on the basis of the principles rather than merely applying the principles to them. <u>The only principles he regarded as fixed were his</u> <u>axioms or postulates</u>.

This was a revolution in the theory of theory. This theory, as E. A. Burtt points out, "carried with it a tremendous metaphysical assumption"; this is the assumption that everything in the universe, including the earth, is fundamentally mathematical in character.¹¹ This revolution

¹¹ E. A. Burtt, <u>The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern</u> <u>Physical Science</u> (Garden City: Doubleday Anchor, 1954), p. 55.

in the theory of knowledge made Copernicus the father of a new logic which was systematized by Bacon. "According to modern science, from Bacon onwards, facts are things which give us answers to our questions," as Collingwood says; he points out that this is identical with the principle of possibility.¹²

Scientific theories are still an interpretation of nature, but there is an element of necessity as well—if the theory saves all the appearances it is identical with truth. This necessity, as Collingwood shows, is grounded in theological presuppositions, religious beliefs about God and nature: "Take away Christian theology, and the scientist has no longer any motive for doing what inductive thought gives him permission to do."¹³ This is the significance of Galileo's pronouncement that nature is a book written by the hand of God in the language of mathematics. As Collingwood says: "He was making a fighting speech."¹⁴

Mathematics is the theory of order.¹⁵ It is a kind of thought that absolutely presupposes order. Mathematics must assume the principle of possibility and it does this in supposing the basis of the science of number—the infinite.

¹² E.M., 277. ¹³ I.H., 255-56.

¹⁴ E.M., 250; cf. Leonardo's paean to Necessity among his Optical MSS; <u>The Notebooks of Leonardo da Vinci</u>, trans. E. MacCurdy (New York: Brazillier, 1955), pp. 238-39; cf. S.G. Lipson and H. Lipson, <u>Optical Physics</u> (Cambridge: At the University Press, 1969), p. 14: "Quanta <u>had</u> to be accepted." See also pp. 14-15, 22-326.

¹⁵ S.M., 165f.

As Dantzig says, "The concept of infinity is not an experiential nor a logical necessity; it is a mathematical necessity."¹⁶ This assertion of the possibility of order presupposes the existence of the infinite. The prospect of order articulated to infinity is what led Novalis, following Descartes and Leibniz, to attempt to develop an Arithmetica universalis not limited to the physical sciences, but to be projected into all fields of knowledge. 17 Possibility cannot be completely resolved into actuality, and mathematics is structura nihil-the structure of a null class.¹⁸ Granted the axioms of mathematical thought, however, its conclusions are obligatory. Conversely, if we are convinced of the validity of the results the axioms are binding. It is not the kind of necessity which causes a man to say, "Quite likely that is so." It is the kind which prompted Benjamin Peirce, one of Harvard's leading mathematicians in the nineteenth century, to exclaim to his students on discovering for himself the formula of De Moivre:

Gentlemen, that is surely true, it is absolutely paradoxical; we cannot understand it, and we don't

¹⁶ Tobias Dantzig, <u>Number: The Language of Science</u> ed. 4 (Garden City: Doubleday Anchor, 1956), p. 249.

¹⁷ Martin Dyck, <u>Novalis and Mathematics</u> (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1960), p. 75f; see also J. A. Smith, "Is There a Mathematics of Intensity?" <u>Pro-</u> <u>ceedings of the Aristotelian Society</u> 18 (1917-18): 121-37.

¹⁸ S.M., 169. See the remarks on Godel's Theorem in D. R. Hofstadter, <u>Godel, Escher, and Bach: An Eternal</u> <u>Golden Braid</u> (New York: Vintage, 1980), pp. 15-19, et passim; cf. <u>Auto</u>., 52.

know what it means, but we have proved it, and therefore, we know it must be the truth.19

The logic of physics is mathematics. Metaphysical analysis of scientific knowledge reveals that in this kind of thought order is absolutely presupposed. Jaki remarks, "All great creators of science found most useful, nay indispensable, for their scientific creativity, the belief that the universe is fully ordered."²⁰ In modern science the applicability of mathematics to the natural world is absolutely presupposed. This is particularly noticeable in physics the "queen of the sciences." This statement cannot be developed here in detail; it will suffice to show, by competent testimony, that physics rests on supposal and that what is supposed is necessary.

Einstein points out that in physics order is absolutely presupposed.

One may say "the eternal mystery of the world is its comprehensibility." It is one of the great realizations of Immanuel Kant that the setting up of a

¹⁹ Cited in Edward Kasner and James Newman, <u>Mathe-</u> <u>matics and the Imagination</u> (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1940), pp. 103-04. C. S. Peirce says that in 1870 his father declared mathematics to be "the science which draws necessary conclusions," declaring that mathematics must be defined "subjectively," not "objectively." <u>Philosophical</u> <u>Writings</u>, p. 137. The formula is: e^{im+1=0}.

²⁰ S.L. Jaki, <u>The Origin of Science and the Science of</u> <u>its Origin</u> (South Bend, Indiana: Regnery/ Gateway, 1979), p. 99; cf. Carl Van Doren, <u>Benjamin Franklin</u> (New York: Viking, 1938), p. 182.

real external world would be senseless without this comprehensibility.²¹

He says that there are no final categories of thought as Kant holds, and that "success in the result is alone the determining factor," in the creation of order in sense experience—which we have seen means the production of language. Here is Einstein's version of the supposal which is the foundation of possibility:

All that is necessary is <u>the statement</u> of a set of rules, since without such rules the acquisition of knowledge in the desired sense would be impossible. One may compare these rules with the rules of a game in which, while the rules themselves are arbitrary, it is the rigidity alone which makes the game possible.²²

The supposals themselves are arbitrary; it is possible to begin with another set of rules (though the rules cannot conflict), but in that case you are playing a different game. That which is absolutely presupposed is not arbitrary, this is the presupposition that there is an order which the rules make possible. It is the act of supposal or hypothesis by which the rules are laid down that introduces necessity into experience, allowing for order or meaning in experience. Einstein says,

Physics constitutes a logical system of thought which is in a state of evolution, and whose basis cannot be obtained through distillation by any inductive method from the experiences lived through, but which can only be obtained by free invention. The justification (truth content) of the system rests in the proof of usefulness of the resulting theorems on the basis of

Albert Einstein, "Physics and Reality," trans. J. Piccard Journal of the Franklin Institute 221 (Mar 1936): 351. 22 <u>Ibid.</u>; On Einstein and language see Barfield, <u>Rediscovery</u>, p. 134f. sense experiences, where the relations of the latter to the former can only be comprehended intuitively. Evolution is going on in the increasing simplicity of the logical basis. In order further to approach this goal we must make up our mind to accept the fact that the logical basis departs more and more from the facts of experience, and that the path of our thought from the fundamental basis to these resulting theorems, which correlate with sense experiences, becomes continually harder and longer.²³

Physics rests on supposal, or "free invention," progresses by simplifying its basis (uncovering its presuppositions), the relation of sense experiences to truth must be grasped intuitively, and further, the logical basis or path of thought becomes longer and harder, that is, we become increasingly convinced of its necessity.

Modern science came into being when scientists became so convinced of the necessity of their presuppositions that they no longer wasted their time in the attempt to prove them. Collingwood says, "All modern science recognizes what I will call <u>the principle of limited objective</u>. That is the most fundamental difference between the modern sciences and the sciences of ancient Greece."²⁴ The modern scientist feels necessity in the form of time; he must arrive at some conclusion if his results are to be useful. This has been well put by Newman:

We shall never get at our first principles. Resolve to believe nothing, and you must prove your proofs and analyze your elements, sinking farther and farther, and finding "in the lowest depth a lower deep." till you come to the broad bosom of scepticism.... tife is for action. If we insist on proofs for everything, we shall never come to action: to act you must assume,

24 _{N.L.} 31.61.

23 Ibid., p. 38.

and that assumption is faith. 25

The principle of limited objective was first laid down by the Christian Fathers, of whom Collingwood says if they were better known the main lines of European history would be better understood.²⁶ Galileo applied it to physics with brilliant success. Collingwood states it thus:

Limit your objective. Take time seriously. Aim at interpreting not, as the Greeks did, any and every fact in the natural world, but only those which you think need be interpreted, or can be interpreted (the two things are not, after all, so very different); NOW, choose where to begin your attack. Select the problems that call for immediate attention. Resolve to let the rest wait.²⁷

This statement contains in embryo the logic of question and answer.

Reason rests on the feeling of immediate certainty associated with the holy. Vico attaches great importance to the statement of Tacitus (<u>Annals</u> V, 10) that frightened men <u>fingunt simul creduntque</u>—"imagine and immediately believe."²⁸

²⁵ John Henry Newman, <u>A Grammar of Assent</u> (1870; rpt. Garden City: Doubleday Image, 1955), p. 91.

²⁶ N.L., 31.71 It is not true, as one of his critics charges, that Collingwood "invented" it to bolster "a ramshackle theology of history and politics," and to debase and dispose of philosophy. Eric Voegelin, "The Oxford Political Philosophers," <u>Philosophical Quarterly</u> 3 (1953): 112. One can find the same doctrine in Kant's essay on the four figures, trans., Abbott, p. 90, and in Ruskin, <u>Modern</u> <u>Painters</u> III, ch ix, in <u>Works</u>, pp. 151-52.

²⁷ N.L., 31.68.

²⁸ Vico, <u>Scienza Nuova</u> § 376; <u>Opere</u>, p. 503, Bergin and Fisch, p. 105. This is true, but the ancients say that fear made the gods. This, as Collingwood points out, is an error:

The first notion of a god which arises untaught in every man's mind is much older than fear. It is born of hunger. It is the notion of what a hungry man is pursuing: the infinitely magnified image of himself.29 The consciousness of hunger is in itself a presentiment of reality. It is a desire for that which will satisfy the hunger; the activity by which this object is conceived is love, and the object itself is conceived as beauty, the satisfaction of man's hunger. The holy is the realization of what Wordsworth calls "that beauty, which, as Milton sings, / Hath terror init." ³⁰ When the reality of the object is felt the beautiful is transformed into the holy: "the holy is the beautiful asserted as real." It is for this reason that "there is something a little uncanny about absolute presuppositions. They give people more than a touch of the feeling which Rudolf Otto called numinous terror."³²

Supposal is an aesthetic activity which is the foundation of all rationality. Barfield says,

logical judgments by their nature, can only <u>render more</u> <u>explicit</u> some one part of a truth <u>already implicit in</u> <u>their terms</u>. But the poet makes the terms themselves.

N.L., 8.28. ³⁰ <u>Prelude</u> XIV; cf. Psalm 29:1; 96:9. ³¹ S.M., 120. Collingwood adds, "it is easy to slip into idolatry because the aesthetic attitude and the religious attitude are so closely akin."

³² E.M., 46. All order is felt before its reality is explicitly figured. cf. RIFCI, 13, and Lucian Levy-Bruhl, <u>Primative Mentality</u>, trans. L. A. Claire (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966), pp. 445-46; cf. 210-11. Levy-Bruhl calls such a view "pre-logical." He does not make judgments, therefore; he only makes

them possible—and only he makes them possible.33 Reason must begin with necessary supposals: "Rule out the categorical judgment, and you rule out all judgment." 34 A thinker is free to make any supposals he likes; but there are some supposals he is obliged to make if he is to think at all. These are absolute. They may also be implicit. The act of supposal itself, for example, contains a kind of implicit necessity, as Collingwood points out; you cannot simply suppose that you are supposing, you must assert it.³⁵ In Collingwood's system of logic absolute presuppositions are those which are obligatory for a certain form of thought, some are obligatory for all thought whatever. Such supposals cannot be logically justified; they can be justified in the pragmatic sense alone.³⁶ The origins of such obligation may be obscure, but when we inquire into their history we find that they have their roots in religious beliefs about nature and its creator God.³⁷ As Collingwood says,

Reason builds on a foundation of faith, and moves within a system whose general nature must be determined by faith before reason can deal with it in detail. So far from a conflict between faith and reason being inevitable from the nature of things, they are in point of fact necessary each to the other.³⁸

A man who is reasoning cannot simply think anything he pleases. He feels himself obliged to proceed in a definite

³³ Poetic Diction, p. 113n, cf. 131n. S&T, 64. ³⁵ S.M., 184. ³⁶ E.M., 254. 34 ³⁸ F&R, 143. 37 cf. I.H., 255.

and systematic manner; given certain premises he finds himself compelled to extrapolate in certain ways and not in others.³⁹ If he is to reason at all he must absolutely presuppose that his subject-matter is rational and orderly; without this he is simply wasting his time: what is irrational cannot be the object of any science. In fact the Kantian idea of an architectonic which orders all things is very ancient; it derives from Christianity:

By faith we conceive "an ordering of the ages by God's utterance"; regarding that which is seen (TO BLETTÓMENON) [i.e. this ordering], it does not arise out of appearances (**ék ¢aino MéNGN**).⁴⁰ As Einstein puts it, this ordering can only be conceived <u>intuitively</u>, not obtained through "distillation" by an

inductive method.

The historian, like the mathematician and the physicist, must absolutely presuppose order in his subject matter history. We can even say he must presuppose absolute order. In fact the God presupposed in historical thinking is selfcreative, all-knowing, absolutely rational, and wills everything. Historical presuppositions are essentially Calvinistic.⁴¹ The order presupposed is not of the exact kind as that presupposed by natural science, for it is a kind of order which, whatever else it may create, creates history. This can be easily misunderstood. It does not mean that history is not a product of human will and thought, but that

³⁹ I.H., 255.
⁴⁰ Hebrews, 11:3 (my translation); cf. Isaiah 40:26.
⁴¹ cf. RIFCI, 14.

there is an order in it not consciously willed by human agents.⁴² Vico taught that Providence is subtle. Pascal used the term <u>Deus absconditus</u>.⁴³ The Norsemen spoke of <u>Wyrd</u>, "fate"; and when we call a thing "weird" we are saying we don't quite think it an accident.

For history there are no accidents. To call a thing accidental is to say it cannot be understood;

A truly historical view of human history sees everything in that history as having its own <u>raison d' être</u> and coming into existence in order to serve the needs of the men whose minds have corporately created it.⁴⁴

The historian must absolutely presuppose an orderly past, and to the extent he thinks it irrational to that extent he must give up trying to explain it. Collingwood says,

What is irrational means what my principles of explanation do not explain. An irrational element in the self is called "caprice"; one in the not-self is called an "accident."⁴⁵

The historian must assume the past is rational:

to the historian historical processes are not accidental, because his business is to understand them, and calling an event accidental means that it is not capable of being understood.46

This assumption is obligatory for historical thought. Its basis is theological and cannot be proved or verified. In fact it is true, as Collingwood says, that

the special problems of theoretical and practical life all take their special forms by segregation out of the body of religious consciousness, and retain their

⁴² I.H., 48-9.
⁴³ "A hidden God"; <u>Pensées</u>, 242, 518; Isaiah 45:15.
⁴⁴ I.H., 77; cf. S.M., 227
⁴⁵ N.L., 15.8.
⁴⁶ E.M., 289.

validity only so far as they preserve their connexion with it and with each other in it.47 Like all other scientific thinkers the historian is obliged to hold by his presuppositions if he hopes to make any contribution to thought. This is one of the most signif-

icant points Collingwood makes in the <u>Essay on Philosophical</u> <u>Method</u>.⁴⁸ All thought rests upon faith, and faith is always immediate certainty. Logic must rest upon a reality that is felt rather than reasoned.

Reason is imagination under obligation. Milton says that "opinion in good men is but knowledge in the making."⁴⁹ An opinion is a supposal which has not yet been justified; a reason is one which has been found necessary. Reason proper is a necessary system of reasons. Kant says,

What pure reason judges <u>assertorically</u>, must (like everything else that reason knows) be necessary; otherwise nothing at all is asserted. Accordingly, pure reason does not, in point of fact, contain any opinions whatsoever.⁵⁰

Reason is a teleological structure of reasons each of which is necessary in relation to the rest. Even the act of supposal, which is in the realm of opinion, must be regarded as a kind of reason because of its implicit necessity. Collingwood calls it practical reason:

Reason is distinguished into <u>theoretical reason</u> and <u>practical reason</u>: i.e. reason for "making up your mind <u>that</u>" (reason for what logicians call a proposition) and reason for "making up your mind <u>to</u>" (reason for what moralists call an intention).

47 I.H., 315. 48 P.M., 225-26. 49 <u>Areopagitica</u>; rpt. in John Milton, <u>Complete Poems</u> and Major Prose, ed. M. Y. Hughes (Indianapolis: Odyssey Press, 1957), p. 743. 50 KRV, A 781, B 809. We shall see that, of these two, practical reason is the prior: it is the original form of reason, theoretical reason being a modification of it; and by the Law of Primative Survivals a practical element is always present in a case of theoretical reason.51 It is this practical necessity which holds a logical structure together else it is a rope of sand.

Reason aims at a certain kind of logical structure, namely a coherent logical whole, each part of which is necessary and agrees with the whole. But how can reason know what it is aiming at unless it already knows it? - a Platonic dilemma. The answer is it is known implicitly. Discursive reason is a process of clarification which makes advances by logical steps in a series of reasons which will form a coherent logical structure. The end which is given implicitly in the initial supposal must be justified by the entire structure. The certainty that the end has been obtained must rest on the necessity given through the chain of judgments; this certainity itself must be something besides a sum of proofs. If the end itself must be proved to be proved, that proof must also be proved, and so on. Newman remarks, "certitude is the result of arguments which, when taken in the letter, and not in their full implicit sense, are but probabilities."⁵² This means there must be, as Milton says, a distinction within reason itself; that is, within theoretical reason. Besides discursive reason there must be a kind of reason which can recognize when the end has been

⁵¹ N.L., 14.3; cf. 9.5.

⁵² Newman, p. 234; see his examples.

achieved. Intuitive reason must consist of an immediate feeling that the reasons given are correct, and must at the same time be a realization of the reality which was only a presentiment in the initial supposal. Such a feeling cannot in itself be a product of logic.

Pure reason is an intuition which rests upon discursive reason or <u>reasoning</u>. Collingwood says,

Knowledge is the conviction or assurance with which a man reaffirms a proposition he has already made after reflecting on the process of making it and satisfying himself that it is well and truly made.⁵³

This conviction or recognition that reason has achieved its aim must be felt rather than reasoned, an intuition that our reasoning is correct. In fact it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the whole series of reasons are a process of such intuitive leaps that can be analyzed into explicit "reasons" only by later reflection. Ruskin writes:

No less intense and marvellous are the logical errors into which our best writers are continually falling, owing to the notion that laws of logic will help them better than common sense. Whereas any man who can reason at all, does it instinctively, and takes leaps over intermediate syllogisms by the score, yet never misses his footing at the end of the leap; but he who cannot instinctively argue, might as well, with gout in both feet, try to follow a chamois hunter by the help of crutches, as to follow, by the help of syllogism, a person who has the right use of his reason.⁵⁴

This is the quality Kant calls <u>Mutterwitzes</u> ("mother-wit"), adding, "its lack no school can make good."⁵⁵

⁵³ N.L., 14.22; cf. 11.11.
⁵⁴ Rusking, <u>Modern Painters</u>, III, 14.
⁵⁵ KRV, A 133, B 172.

Intuitive reason seems to be a kind of "wordless" thought which Barfield, following Rudolf Steiner, calls "concrete thinking." It is the minimum generic essence of thought, a reality that contains its own meaning and is prior to all other thinking. It is the $\Lambda oroc$, the presentiment and source of meaning. T. S. Eliot says of it,

If the lost word is lost, if the spent word is spent If the unheard, unspoken Word is unspoken unheard; Still is the unspoken word, the Word unheard, The Word without a word, the Word within The world and for the world; And the light shone in darkness and Against the Word the unstilled world still whirled About the centre of the silent Word. <u>Ash-Wednesday V.</u>

The Word, as yet undivided into "words," is a selfdifferentiating unity. It constantly pours its meaning into new moulds, and its unity is destroyed in the analysis of thought and language. And yet ever again this unity is reborn in the moment of self-recognition, richer for its differentiation. As Barfield says, "It is from the Gorgon's head, petrifying life into the stone of abstraction, that Pegasus is born."⁵⁶ Perception itself (Kant calls it "intuition") is such a grasped unity with an immediate certainty of reality. In perception intuition is not yet perfected, or rather, intuitive reason is perception raised to its highest degree of perfection. Intuition is not less logical than reason; it is more logical, for logic is concerned with degrees of certainty, and intuition is thought

⁵⁶ <u>Poetic Diction</u>, p. 108; see also p. 88.

which has achieved certainty.

All necessity rests upon absolute presuppositions which ultimately are held by an act of religious faith. Without this nothing is obligatory. The process of analysis or discursive reason does not make the feeling associated with faith superfluous.⁵⁷ It becomes, as Spinoza asserts, more intense:

In so far as we imagine anything to be necessary we affirm its existence, and on the contrary, we deny the existence of a thing in so far as we imagine it not necessary: and accordingly the emotion towards a thing necessary is more intense, <u>ceteris paribus</u>, than towards a thing not necessary.58

This "feeling intellect" is the true culmination of reason. Imagination and "intellectual Love" must, as Wordsworth says, stand each in each.

This spiritual Love acts not nor can exist Without Imagination, which, in truth, Is but another name for absolute power And clearest insight, amplitude of mind, And Reason in her most exalted mood. Prelude XIV.

Feeling intellect or <u>scientia intuitiva</u> is like perception or primary intuition in that it grasps reality, but here reality is grasped conceptually; it is both felt and figured.

Collingwood's doctrine of the re-enactment of past thought is a specific application of intuitive reason to the past. The remark of one of his critics, except for the negative implication, is essentially correct: "Collingwood's

⁵⁷ cf. F&N, 168-69, 174, 176.

58 <u>Ethics</u> IV, prop XI, proof; p. 151; cf. I, prop, XXXIII, note 1; p. 16.

type of theory postulates a quasi-Spinozist <u>scientia</u> <u>intuitiva</u> for which some philosophers have often hankered without ever being able to convince their more empiricist colleagues of its possibility."⁵⁹ "Quasi" is the correct word. Collingwood's theory is like that of Spinoza; the differences are almost as important as the similarities. One of the most important differences is that Spinoza's system lacks any teleology, properly speaking: the end towards which the mind strives exists already and there can be no becoming.⁶⁰

The most important modification in the theory of knowledge as the culmination of reason in "feeling intellect," is due to F. H. Bradley. It is true, as J. A. Smith points out, that there are an host of philosophical precedents in support of this view, but he cites in particular the view of Bradley "who holds that as experience progresses towards perfection it transcends relations and reaches a totality which, if not Feeling, is pre-figured in Feeling, i.e. has a character which Feeling has, and Thought and Action have not."⁶¹ Bradley himself says,

Our experience is always from time to time a unity which, as such is destroyed in becoming an object. But one such emotional whole in its destruction gives place inevitably to another whole. And hence what we feel, while it lasts, is felt always as one, yet not as simple nor yet

⁵⁹ Jonathan Cohen, "A Survey of Work in the Philosophy of History, 1946-1950," Philosophical Quarterly 2 (1952): 177.

⁶⁰ I.N., 15-16; <u>Ethics</u> III, prop. VI; p. 91.

⁶¹ Smith, "On Feeling," p. 70.

again as broken into terms and relations. From such an experience of unity below relations we can rise to the idea of a superior unity above them.62

Bradley wonders whether this superior unity can even be called thought at all. A consumation in which thought and feeling and will had merged would mean there was no difference between thought and thing:

Since both truth and fact are to be there, nothing must be lost, and in the Absolute we must keep every item of our experience. We cannot have less, but, on the other hand, we may have very much more; and this more may so supplement the elements of our actual experience that in the whole they may become transformed.⁶³

Such a mode of apprehension must be identical with reality; in it, as he says, the whole of relational form must be merged.

Such processes must be dissolved in something not poorer but richer than themselves. And feeling and will must also be transmuted in this whole, into which thought has entered. Such a whole state would possess in a superior form that immediacy which we find (more or less) in feeling; and in this whole all divisions would be healed up. It would be experience entire, containing all elements in harmony. Thought would be present as a higher intuition; will would be there where the ideal had become reality; and beauty and pleasure and feeling would live on in this total fulfillment... if truth and fact are to become one, then in some such way thought must reach its consummation. But in that consummation thought has certainly been so transformed, that to go on calling it thought seems indefensible.⁶⁴

Not all of the consummations of thought are this extreme. What Bradley speaks of here is like what Dante saw contained in the depth of the Eternal Light;

⁶² A&R, 461; cf. p. 160.
⁶³ A&R, 151.
⁶⁴ A&R, 152.
legato con amore in un volume, ciò che per l'universo si squaderna: sustanze e accidenti e lor costume, quasi conflati insieme, per tal modo che ciò ch'i' dico è un semplice lume. <u>Paradiso</u> XXXIII, 86-90.65

All too rarely do we rise to the plane of beatific vision and attempt to grasp <u>la forma universal</u>. But in our attempt to comprehend lesser objects something analogous happens. Every concept is a universal, and these lesser objects also are felt, figured and fused into an immediate perception or act of intuition in which the essence of the thing is grasped.

Thought is a series of such consummations. Bradley does not apply to it a specific term. Olympiodorus, a neo-Platonic philosopher of the sixth century A.D., uses the word $\pi \alpha \lambda$ ("born again") of the recovery of knowledge by recollection.⁶⁶ Kant calls such a consummation <u>Gemeinschaft</u>, "community," or "mutual participation," his third category under the heading "Relation." He explains that the understanding, when it thinks as divisible a whole made up of things, represents to itself the parts "as existing (as substances) in such a way that, while each exists independently of the others, they are yet combined together in one whole."⁶⁷ Relations are preserved and yet

67 KRV, B 113.

⁶⁵ Sinclair, trans., p. 483: "boundby love in one volume, that which is scattered in leaves through the universe, substances and accidents and their relations as it were fused together in such a way that what I tell of is a simple light."

⁶⁶ Cicero uses it to mean "restoration" after exile. It is also used in Matthew 19:28 of the restoration of all things.

each element participates in the whole. What is important is that immediate certainty rests upon an act in which every element participates. Collingwood says, "immediacy rests on mediation, for every certainty is the fruit of a process and sums up that process"; it is, he says a "perpetually renewed immediacy and certainty."68

Such culmination in thought is similar to what Dewey calls "judgments of appreciation," which he defines as "enjoyment as consummation of previous processes and responses."⁶⁹ He says, "Judgments of appreciation are found wherever subject-matter undergoes such development and reconstruction as to result in a satisfying whole." He points out further:

Judgments of appreciation are not confined, however, to the final close. Every complex inquiry is marked by a series of stages that are relative completions. For complex inquiries involve a constellation of subproblems, and the solution of each of them is a resolution of some tension. Each such solution is a heightening of subject-matter, in direct ratio to the number and variety of discrepant and conflicting conditions that are brought to unification. The occurance of these judgments of completion, not different in kind from those ordinarily called esthetic, constitutes a series of landmarks in the progress of any undertaking. They are signs of the achieved coherence of factual material and the consistency of conceptual material. 70

Dewey's view is in some respects not so satisfactory as that of Bradley, for intuition is something more than appreciation or reflection, though it includes it. It is a whole process of analytical thought ascertained and presented to the mind

69 Logic, p. 175. 68 _{S&T}, 75. 70 Ibid., pp. 176-77; see also his criticism of Bradley, p. 553; cf. I.H., 198-301, N.L., 7.63-67; and see pp. 445-46.

immediately in the form of a belief; it is the mind's intuitive certainty of the necessity, and hence the actuality, of its object.

Re-enactment is <u>scientia intuitiva</u>, with certain modifications, as applied to past thought, to history. Many of Collingwood's readers have mistaken the doctrine for a method by which historical knowledge might be acquired. It is the logic of question and answer which serves that function. Re-enactment is the objective of the logic of history and is one of its transcendental aspects. Van der Dussen says,

the re-enactment doctrine, as developed in the lectures of 1928, is not a proposal for an historical methodology, a sort of methodological device for arriving at reliable knowledge of the past. It is a response to the question how historical knowledge is possible, not to the different question how we arrive at it.⁷¹

Spinoza conceived of the third kind of thought as "adequate knowledge of the essence of things." Re-enactment is adequate knowledge of the essence of past thoughts. The words "adequate" and "essence" in this formula require a closer look.

The historian must acquire adequate knowledge by limiting his objective. We can never be certain that we understand another's meaning completely.⁷² The historian must concentrate on what his present evidence can tell him. He never completely makes up his mind on any subject. The battle of Hastings, to take Collingwood's example, is not something known, but something partly known and partly unknown, and it can never be completely ascertained.⁷³

71 Van der Dussen, p. 148.
72 cf. KRV, A 728, B 756.
73 NAPH, 159-60, <u>Essays</u>, 42.

One never reaches the end of possibility. It is only due to necessity in the form of reason—obligatory supposals that the historian can reach any kind of conclusion. "At any given moment," says Collingwood, "the historian can only present an interim report on the progress of historical studies, and there will be gaps in it."⁷⁴ This is due to practical necessity; modern sciences must be useful, and history is a science. We reject the characteristic pagan attitude expressed by Lucan in the words, Nihil actum credens, dum quid superesset agendum. -- "Thinking nothing done while anything remained to be done." The principle of limited objective is the quintessence of all the historian's principles.

What is meant by the essence of anything? The matter can only be touched on here because it involves the whole philosophical problem of "universals" which lies at the heart of most modern controversies concerning the theory of knowledge. 75 Many philosophers have pointed out that it is impossible to grasp the essence of an object from appearances or external relations alone. Kant's view is that appearances are a kind of scaffold around the "transcendental object" which the mind cannot reach, and this implies that

⁷⁴ Essays, 87; cf. E.M. 65; Ortega y Gasset in Philosophy and History, pp. 292-93; cf. P.M.

⁷⁵ See the correspondence of Collingwood and Ryle, extracts of which are given in Lionel Rubinoff, Collingwood and the Reform of Metaphysics (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1970), pp. 216, 202-03; cf. G. K. Chesterton, The Poet and the Lunatics (1929), Russell Kirk, "Chesterton, Madmen, and Madhouses, " in Myth, Allegory, and Gospel (Minneapolis: Bethany Fellowship, 1974), pp. 45-6.

mind cannot really know the essence of things.⁷⁶ Vico agrees that this is true of things, but not true of mind:

The human soul, situated in the body, cannot attain to the substances of things, but wanders about upon their surfaces by the help of the senses... But the knowledge of the mind, which creates the fact, is in a sense itself the fact... whence it is clear that there is in us a natural science of a different kind from

To grasp the essence of anything the mind must have the same essence as that object, which is why Aristotle says that mind $(\psi\gamma\chi\dot{\mu})$ is, in a manner, all things; and in cases which involve no matter, what thinks and what is thought are identical.⁷⁸

The essence of any object is its universal, the concept of that thing as conceived by thought. The mind necessarily shares this essence, for it is mind that brings order into experience and gives it meaning. This order, as we saw, is the product of imagination or language. By the act of supposal an object is distinguished within the notself; and thus the universal is implicit in the object, though only made explicit by analysis. Words themselves are isolated segments of discourse containing implicit meaning or thought-essence. Barfield says, "The full meanings of Words are flashing, iridescent shapes like flames—everflickering vestiges of the slowly evolving consciousness

⁷⁶ KRV, A 42, B 59; A 45-46, B 63; A 278, B 334; contrast B xxvi and xxviii; see I.N., 116-20.
⁷⁷ Vico, <u>De subtilate</u>; cited in Croce, p. 288.
⁷⁸ <u>De anima</u>, 430^a, 431^b.

beneath them." ⁷⁹ The mind creates the order in its objects, and whatever mind cannot become cannot be an object of thought; it is irrational, that is, it has no essence or meaning, and the historian can have nothing to do with it. Thought is the essence of all things and is universal. The possibility of history and, indeed, of all communication rests on this.

Knowing the thought of another means grasping what is universal in it. This means, as Collingwood says, that two minds thinking the same thought are, to that extent, not two minds, but one.⁸⁰ Every thought has two aspects, one is the immediacy in which it lives in the thinker's mind, that is, the context of other thoughts and feelings of that mind. On the other hand it has also a mediate or universal aspect, that is, it is capable of being sustained, recalled, or reflected upon. It is true, as Collingwood points out, "The historian cannot apprehend the individual act of thought in its individuality, just as it actually happened."⁸¹ For that matter the original thinker cannot recall it in its immediacy either; you cannot step twice into the same stream of consciousness; if one wishes to recall a thought he must re-enact it. Past acts of thought can only be grasped in their mediacy and incapsulated within a new context. This

⁷⁹ Poetic Diction, p. 75.

⁸⁰ F&R, 263, 171-73. The term "intersubjectivity," used by Rubinoff, Neurath, Barzun, and many others, is not only inadequate, it implies that thought is not as real as "objective" things; in fact "inter-objectivity" would be at least as accurate.

⁸¹ I.H., 303.

universality is the characteristic which distinguishes thought from feeling or sensation. When by the activity of imagination a distinction is made in consciousness, the result of that act is "there" as an idea for acts of further reflection.

Re-enactment is necessary in the theory of historical knowledge for the same reason it is necessary for the theory of communication—the object of thought must be something actual. This means it must be a thought of my own. One mind can never directly know the thought of another. Meaning must always be inferred. Ernest Becker comments, "People are really separate minds and separate bodies.... Everyone lives in his own little compartmentalized world to an extent that is terrifying."⁸² Meaning must have continuity with what went before, for it depends on context. As the consummation of a process of thought, therefore, it must be inferred or intuited, else it would have no connection with the thoughts of the hearer and would remain a form of words. Barfield says,

meaning itself can never be <u>conveyed</u> from one person to another; words are not bottles; every individual must intuit meaning for himself, and the function of the poet is to mediate such intuition by suitable suggestion. ⁸³

⁸² Sam Keen, "A Conversation with Ernest Becker," <u>Psychology Today</u> 7 no. 11 (Apr. 1974): 78; see also C. S. Lewis, <u>The Problem of Pain</u> (New York: Macmillan, 1945),p. 18. <u>83</u> <u>Poetic Diction</u>, p. 133; cf. <u>Saving the Appearances</u>, p. 179. In this sense every speaker is a poet, or at least he is indebted to the poets for his clichés. We re-enact thoughts in conversation by re-constructing the thought and attributing it to the other person.⁸⁴ Even our own thoughts are not known to us in their immediacy, but as a continuity; as Collingwood says, "thought is not mere immediate experience but always reflection or self-knowledge, the knowledge of oneself as living in these activities."⁸⁵

Because all knowledge is self-knowledge re-enactment has a practical consequence as Collingwood points out:

This doctrine has a practical bearing on historical method. It implies that in order to understand a past event or state of society the historian must not only have sufficient documents at his disposal; he must also be, or make himself, the right kind of man: a man capable of entering into the minds of the persons whose history he is studying.86

In order to think the thoughts of others the historian must be able to... think their thoughts. Kierkegaard says, "It is useless for a man to determine first of all the outside and afterward fundamentals. One must know oneself before knowing anything else."87

A re-enacted thought is one which is reconstructed by the thinker's activity and lives in his own thought in the

⁸⁵ I.H., 297; cf. p. 219; KRV, B 158.

86 Remarks on an article by Gentile in a review of Philosophy and History, in English Historical Review 52 (1937): 144.

Sören Kierkegaard, Journals (New York: Oxford Uni-87 Versity Press, 1951), 1835 entry; cited in <u>The Nature of Man</u>, E. Fromm and R. Xirau, eds. (New York: Macmillan, 1968), p. 225; cf. Plato Phaedrus 229-230

⁸⁴ P.A., 250.

context of that structural framework. Such a thought Collingwood calls "incapsulated." He says,

Historical knowledge is the re-enactment of a past thought incapsulated in a context of present thoughts which, by contradicting it, confine it to a plane different from theirs.⁸⁸

Such a thought is "perfectly alive," he says, but it "forms no part of the question-answer complex which constitutes what people call the 'real' life, the superficial or obvious present, of the mind in question."⁸⁹ In a sense the essence of anything can only be grasped by <u>disimagining</u> the observer, which involves a contradiction; the observer becomes the object, nevertheless he must be conscious of himself before he can know it to be the thought of another living within the complex of his own.

The essence of a thought is grasped by an act of supposal. In re-enacting the thought of another one builds up a structure of thought in accordance to the "evidence" supplied by the speaker, by which his meaning may be inferred. This is true of the interpretation of all actions. One grasps the meaning or essence of the thought not by boring through the structure of external relations, analogy and criticism which he has built up in his mind, and which must form the context in which the thought lives; he grasps it by an act of supposal, for this structure of relations is simply the concrete result of the logic of question and answer. Meaning is absolutely presupposed—one is obliged to believe that the speaker means <u>something</u>. Through the

⁸⁸ Auto., 114. ⁸⁹ Auto., 113.

process of question and answer the hearer determines what is meant. He can only do this if the thought is one he is able to think for himself. At some point in the reconstructive or interpretative process he may reach the point where he can say: "Suppose he means this?" And he may have sufficient reason to find the supposal justified; he finds his answer obligatory. Only if he is capable of thinking the thought for himself will he be able to make the necessary supposal, for it is only in this manner that he can extrapolate from what he already knows. It is thus that two seemingly contradictory things happen: the fact that our own thought always maintains its continuity-the thought is our thought—and that it is also the $\pi \alpha \lambda i \Gamma r \epsilon n \epsilon c i a$ of another's thought in our mind. A man doesn't know another man's thought by a process of "re-enactment"; he re-enacts it, and knows that it is the other's thought, because he is obliged to believe that this is what the man actually thought.

Past thought, like every object of thought, must become actual if it is to be known. And it can only become actual through re-enactment.⁹⁰ Re-enactment is possible because the past is already implicitly incapsulated within the present. The historian's own mind is heir to the past: "A people, like a single human being, is what its past has made it."⁹¹ Elsewhere Collingwood says, "since the historical present includes in itself its own past, the real

90 _{Т.Н.}, 288. ⁹¹ _{R.В.}, 253.

ground on which the whole rests, namely the past out of which it has grown, is not outside it, but is included within it."⁹² The other side of the re-enactment doctrine is Collingwood's view of the living past; this incapsulated past can only be made explicit by concentrating on the traces it has left in the present.

Re-enactment is the culmination of a process of historical reasoning which is grasped as an imagined whole. Every kind of thought must have such an end or consummation, a point at which its goal is reached, at least implicitly, in terms of its ideal. In the attempt to unify its world imagination builds up a synthetic network of relations;

These with a thousand small deliberations Protract the profit of their chilled delirium, Excite the membrane, when the sense has cooled, With pungent suaces, multiply variety In a wilderness of mirrors. T. S. Eliot Gerontion.

The intermediate steps, or "judgments of appreciation" must await the final consummation to be verified; as Oakeshott says, "Each separate 'fact' remains an hypothesis until the whole world of facts is established in which it is involved."⁹³ Reason realizes its aim by actually becoming the object, and so grasping its essence, while at the same time remaining itself. Here reason is transcended in a new synthesis which is more than a mere judgment of appreciation. It is <u>Scientia intuitiva</u>. Intuitive knowledge is not something

⁹² I.H., 229-30; cf. R.B., 324.

93 Experience and Its Modes, p. 113.

occult or irrational; it is the culmination of reason, the necessary imagination in which relations are transcended, but are still there. Kant says,

The pure concept of this transcendental object, which in reality throughout all our knowledge is always one and the same, is what can alone confer upon all our empirical concepts in general relation to an object, that is, objective reality.⁹⁴

The emotion felt towards such an object which is necessary must, as Spinoza says, be more intense than towards the unnecessary. Intuition is the emotion we feel when we encounter reality.

credimus? an, qui amant, ipsi sibi somnia fingunt? Virgil <u>Ecloque</u> VIII, 108.

"May we believe? Or do those who love create dreams for themselves?" The strange deeds of imagination become actual.⁹⁵ Imagination, when it reaches the stage of perfection in which its true character is manifest, is identical with reality. At last it realizes itself as the act that creates the fact, that is, reality; and this was true implicitly all along.

History is a form of thought which attempts to see the whole world in terms of the past. In history the Archimedean point is reached when the historian realizes that this means in terms of his own past, the world seen from the view-point of his own historicity. "The historian is

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⁹⁴ A, 109.

⁹⁵ See Irwin Edman, "Religion and the Philosophical Imagination," in <u>Adam the Baby and the Man From Mars</u> (Cambridge, Mass.; Houghton Mifflin, 1929), p. 219f, see especially pp. 221-22.

thus not exploring a rubbish-heap of dead past facts, he is coming to grips with his own personality, by reconstructing the past in ways determined by the forces at work in that personality."⁹⁶ History is a constant mediation between the self and the not-self. The more the past becomes his past the better he understands the world and the more conscious he becomes of both the world and himself. It is only by way of such polarity that one can become universal, which perhaps is what Spinoza means by a "mind the greater part of which is eternal"; and this, as Barfield says, means becoming still more individual than you are now.⁹⁷ Historical consciousness is the moment of waking, the explicit realization of self-consciousness. It is, in this sense, theoretical, making up your mind <u>that</u>. Barfield says:

The Greek word $\Theta \epsilon \omega \rho i \alpha$ (theoria) meant "contemplation" and is the term used in Aristotle's psychology to designate the moment of fully conscious participation, in which the soul's <u>potential</u> knowledge (its ordinary state) becomes <u>actual</u>, so that man can at last claim to be "awake".98

Such an act is both theoretical and practical; the mind has reached the Archimedean point. The distinction between theory and practice has vanished.⁹⁹

⁹⁶ Review of <u>Philosophy and History</u>, in <u>EHR</u>, p. 144.
⁹⁷ Interview in <u>Evolution of Consciousness</u>, p. 19.
⁹⁸ <u>Saving the Appearances</u>, p. 49; cf. George Mac Donald,
<u>The Portent(1864; rpt. San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1975, p. 28.</u>
⁹⁹ cf. MS. "Scheme for <u>The Principles of History</u>,"
1928-39; rpt. entire in Van der Dussen, pp. 431-32.

To re-enact past thoughts a thinker must be capable, or capable of making himself capable, of thinking those thoughts for himself. In a passage which contains the essence of his philosophy of history Collingwood says:

If what the historian knows is past thoughts, and if he knows them by re-thinking them for himself, it follows that the knowledge he achieves by historical inquiry is not knowledge of his situation as opposed to knowledge of himself. In re-thinking what somebody else thought, he thinks it himself. In knowing that somebody else thought it, he knows that he himself is able to think it. And finding out what he is able to do is finding out what kind of a man he is. If he is able to understand, by re-thinking them, the thoughts of a great many different kinds of people, it follows that he must be a great many kinds of man. He must be, in fact, a microcosm of all the history he can know. Thus his own self-knowledge is at the same time his knowledge of the world of human affairs.100

The more completely the historian masters the logic the more capable he will be of re-enacting the past. Because all his knowledge is self-knowledge he has a place to stand; the more he understands himself the more he will understand the past, and conversely. As the Spanish philosopher Gratian says, "A man without knowledge, a world of darkness. Understanding and will, they are the eyes and the hands; a mind without courage is dead."¹⁰¹ The historian, and even today the scientist, as Toulmin points out, finds that he cannot remain a spectator; at some point theory passes over into

^{100 &}lt;u>Auto</u>., 114-15.

¹⁰¹ Baltasar Gracian, <u>Oraculo Manual, y Arte de Pru-</u> <u>dencia</u> (Madrid, 1633),¶ 4; trans. M. Fischer, <u>A Truth-</u> <u>telling Manual and the Art of Worldly Wisdom</u>. (Springfield and Baltimore: Charles C. Thomas, 1934, 1939), pp. 18-19.

practice.¹⁰²

The awakening to reality is self-recognition. Knowledge of the self is knowledge of reality. Kant teaches that everything actual is necessary, though we need not go quite so far as Bradley, who says, "This world is the best of all possible worlds, and everything in it is a necessary evil."¹⁰³ Without necessity, some obligation to believe our constructions are true, we remain in the realm of imagination. Perception, even in this realm, can never be completely in error; we perceive reality <u>apercu</u> — catch a glimpse of it. What we see is real, but we are uncertain of relation, it is seen only "in enigma" — a phrase Collingwood uses as the epigraph of <u>Speculum Mentis</u>.¹⁰⁴ Intuitive reason is the moment of awaking, reflection, $heta arepsilon \omega$, full consciousness; and at this point history stands on the threshold of philosophy.

In the moment of consummation or re-enactment the mind recognizes the reality of its object in its own continuity with the past. And as Collingwood says, "The world of fact which is explicitly studied in history is therefore

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¹⁰² Stephen E. Toulmin, <u>The Return to Cosmology: Post-</u><u>modern Science and the Theology of Nature</u> (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982), p. 151. Toulmin wrote the introduction to the latest edition of Collingwood's <u>Autobiography</u> (Galaxy, 1982).

¹⁰³ A&R, xiv. 104 1 Corinthians 13:12.

implicitly nothing but the knowing mind as such."¹⁰⁵ Historical thought passes over into self-realization. Consider these lines from "The Dragon Pool," by the twelfthcentury poet Hsin Ch'i Chi:

> The ancients met success and failure, The centuries match our griefs and joys— I understand it all in a flash; And who it is Furling his sail by a sandy bank To moor in the setting sun.106

The historian re-creates in the context of his own mind the thought of the people he studies; and in his mind that past lives again.

Do we ever fully reach the moment of <u>theoria</u>? Collingwood says, "When you know what you mean, you have achieved philosophy; but when you know that you mean something, and cannot tell what, you have already achieved something: you have achieved Art."¹⁰⁷ Perhaps we never achieve more than art; but it can be a kind of thought in which creation and criticism are transmuted into a single act. And at times, as in historical thinking, this act may touch reality. In the words of that most extraordinary poet, Sidney Lanier:

¹⁰⁶ <u>A Further Collection of Chinese Lyrics</u> (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1970), p. 161; notes on p. 253.

¹⁰⁷ S.M., 89-90.

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¹⁰⁵ S.M., 245; cf. NAPH, 164-65, <u>Essays</u>, 46-47.

My soul is like the oar that momently Dies in a desperate stress beneath the wave, Then glitters out again and sweeps the sea: Each second I'm new-born from some new grave.108

In creative thought there must always be movement. Barfield points out that poetry is movement from one plane of consciousness to another—a kind of strangeness—which means that movement is absolutely necessary for the present existence of poetry.¹⁰⁹ Philosophy and history stand not dividually, but "each in each," as Wordsworth says of imagination and feeling intellect. Reflection is movement, an oscillation of full self-consciousness. Philosophy and history merge in a dynamic polarity and "become, together, a single science of all things human."¹¹⁰ The unity of mind with which all reason begins, and towards which Collingwood directed all his intellectual efforts, is reborn as the unity of thought; and this unity must stand as the cornerstone for the foundations of the future.

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"Struggle," in <u>Selected Poems of Sidney Lanier</u>
(New York: Scribner's, 1947), p. 120.
109
<u>Poetic Diction</u>, p. 180.
110
CPH, 164, <u>Essays</u>, 4.

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