

**THE APACHE SCOUTS 1871 - 1886:
NEMESIS OF THE NETDAHE**

DIETMAR HECTOR

THE APACHE SCOUTS 1871-1886:

NEMESIS OF THE NETDAHE

An Abstract

Presented to

the Graduate Council of
Austin Peay State University

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts in History

by

Dietmar Hector

November, 1980

ABSTRACT

The Apaches who served as members of the United States Army Indian Scouts were the decisive factor in concluding three hundred years of Apache warfare in the American Southwest. Their contributions in the Apache campaigns consisted of tracking down renegades; guiding American troops through hostile surroundings; serving as interpreters between the American soldiers and Apache renegades; and participating in combat in unit strength or as individuals assigned to the cavalry.

Prior to any study of the Apache Scouts, it is essential that an examination be made of the Apache warrior, a remarkable product of his environment. He was the epitome of Charles Darwin's theory of the survival of the fittest. The study of this hardy individualist will convey to the reader the almost insurmountable hardships and anguish suffered by the American and Mexican troops assigned to track, relocate, or exterminate this elusive adversary.


The Apache Scout proved amazingly loyal to the United States Army, with the exception of the mutiny at Cibicu. The Apache Scout fought his kinsmen repeatedly

and his combat record has proven his faithfulness to his Scout Company and the United States Army.


This thesis will bring to light the formation of the United States Army Indian Scout companies comprised of Apaches; their participation in the numerous campaigns from 1871 through 1886, and their betrayal by the United States Government. The history of the Apache Scouts is a dismal record of American relations with its Indian auxiliaries, but it is also a unique and provoking chapter in American history.


To the Graduate Council:

I am submitting herewith a Thesis written by Dietmar Hector entitled "The Apache Scouts 1871-1886: Nemesis of the Netdahe." I recommend that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts, with a major in History.


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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I wish to express my sincere appreciation to Dr. Malcolm Muir, Jr., Professor of History, Austin Peay State University, who suggested the topic for this study, and advised and guided me in its completion. I wish to also thank the other members of my advisory committee, Dr. Preston J. Hubbard and Dr. Thomas P. Dixon, for their interest in the completion of this project.

Thanks are also due to the library staff at Miller Library, Western New Mexico University, Silver City, New Mexico; to Mrs. Christine Buder in the archives section at New Mexico State University, Las Cruces, New Mexico; and a special thanks to the library staff at Austin Peay State University, Clarksville, Tennessee. A note of special thanks goes to Mr. Charles Quarles. Their assistance enabled me to locate the research materials included in this thesis.

For special reasons, my love is extended to Karl Friderich and Lydia Schneider and Gilbert A. and Monika Hector, who prepared me for the path of life.

A special thank you is extended to Mr. John Kyle Thomas, my fellow scholar-companion who was a friend on my sojourn at Austin Peay State University.

My fondest appreciation is for Gayle Pendleton Barnwell Hector, without whose support and love this project would have been impossible. Her patience and encouragement during this undertaking made the composition of this work a pleasure.

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CHAPTER I

THE ANTITHESIS OF THE AMERICAN SOLDIER:

THE APACHE SCOUT

Since prehistoric times, the Apaches have had an extraordinary military record in the Southwest. They forced the earlier Indians from parts of the territory and remained in the desert and mountain regions establishing their culture. The Apaches' political, social, and economic systems had their foundations based on continuous warfare. The Apaches fought all intruders entering their territory and terrorized the enemy's settlements. Each newcomer into the Southwest represented a threat to the Apaches' existence; and the Apaches fought the Spaniards, Mexicans, and Americans with equal intensity.

However, the effectiveness of Apache resistance was greatly diminished by Apache disunity. They were a remarkably diverse people who ranged from west Texas to southeastern Arizona; north to the southern portions of Kansas and Colorado; and south into the Mexican states of Sonora and Chihuahua. The Lipans and Kiowa-Apaches wandered from west Texas northward to Kansas. The northern half of New Mexico was home for the Jicarillas, and in the southern portion were the Mescaleros and Warm

Springs Apaches. The Chiricahuas roamed over southeastern Arizona and western New Mexico. The final division of Apaches lived in central and east-central Arizona. These Apaches, known as Western Apaches, were the White Mountain, Cibicu, San Carlos, and Coyoteros.¹

Prior to the Spanish incursion into the Southwest in the 1500's, the numerous Apache bands enjoyed peaceful relations with the Pimas, Pueblos, and other non-Apache tribes. On occasion Apache bands formed alliances with non-Apaches to fight rival Apache groups. As a rule, Apache bands rarely formed permanent alliances among themselves to fight mutual enemies. The Apache bands retained their jealous independence, a perpetual weakness exploited by all three, Spaniard, Mexican, and American alike.²

The Spaniards extended their empire northward along the Rio Grande. The Spanish succeeded in conquering most of the Indian tribes along the route, but they failed to pacify the Apache bands. Prior to the arrival of the Americans, the Apaches terrorized the Spanish inhabitants and their Indian allies.

The Apaches' first contacts with Americans occurred

¹Odie B. Faulk, The Geronimo Campaign (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), pp. 4-5.

²Jack D. Forbes, Apache Navaho and Spaniard (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1960), p. 284.

in the 1830's with trappers and traders. For the most part, relations between Apaches and Americans were cordial until 1837. In that year, a Warm Springs chief, Juan Jose Compa, and twelve of his followers died as a result of treachery by a scalp-hunter, James Johnson, in the pay of Mexican officials. This incident initiated the hostilities between Apaches and Americans.³

Official American relations with the Apaches resulted from the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo that concluded the Mexican-American War in February 1848. Article XI of the treaty stated:

that a great part of the
territories . . . now occupied
by savage tribes, . . . will
hereafter be under the exclusive
control of the government of the
United States. . . .⁴

Thus, the Americans inherited the Apache problem that had plagued the Spaniards and Mexicans. Neither had been able to subjugate the Apaches. It was now the Americans' turn to try their hand to tame them. The Americans' war record against other hostile Indians had been impressive. The Apaches would be civilized or exterminated in short order,

³Dan L. Thrapp, The Conquest of Apacheria (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1967), pp. 10-12.

⁴U. S., Congress, Senate, The Treaty Between the United States and Mexico, 30th Cong., 1st Sess., exec. No. 52. (1848), p. 50.

or so most Americans thought.⁵

However, from 1848 to 1861, American forces were frustrated; then, in 1861, the ill-fated Bascom Affair almost resulted in the extermination of Americans in Arizona Territory when the Army troops withdrew for the eastern Civil War campaigns. The Apaches' raids went unchecked throughout the war. After the Rebellion, troops returned to Arizona in such small numbers that the raids were as rampant as ever, despite citizens' pleas for increased government protection.

In 1870, the government took more vigorous action. The military District of Arizona, originally part of the Department of California, was reorganized on April 15 as the Department of Arizona with General George Stoneman as its first commander. Stoneman's record in the field was not impressive, however. His only successes proved to be against old men, women, and children, as at the Camp Grant Massacre in April 1871.⁶ The Apaches' ceaseless warfare against American settlers and troops continued on such a large scale that the Army relieved Stoneman on May 2, 1871, and replaced him with a seasoned veteran Indian campaigner, Lieutenant Colonel George Crook, who assumed the duties of

⁵Odie B. Faulk, Crimson Desert: Indian Wars of the American Southwest (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974), pp. 143-168.

⁶Ibid.,

commander of the Department of Arizona on June 4, 1871.⁷

George Crook was an Army officer with an impressive military record. He had graduated from West Point in 1852 and was breveted major general in 1864 during the Civil War. Crook was mustered out on January 22, 1866, but on July 28, 1866, was appointed lieutenant-colonel of the Twenty-third Infantry stationed in the Pacific Northwest. On March 19, 1868, he assumed command of the District of the Lakes, and in May he temporarily commanded the Department of the Columbia until he was relieved by General Edward Canby in 1870. In 1871, Crook received orders to command the Department of Arizona.⁸

In combating the Apaches, Crook planned to employ Indians of the southwest as scouts. Crook's policy was not a new one. Indians of various tribes had always served the Army as trackers, guides, and scouts, but it was not until Congress passed the Military Reorganization Act of 1866, General Orders No. 56 on June 22, 1866, that Indian scouts received official status as Army Indian Scouts by the United States government. This Act stated, "the President is authorized to enlist a force of Indians

⁷ Leonard Wood, Chasing Geronimo: The Journal of Leonard Wood May-September, 1886, ed. Jack C. Lane (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1970), p. 6.

⁸ George Crook, General George Crook: His Autobiography, ed. Martin F. Schmitt (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1946), pp. 157-160.

not exceeding one thousand who shall act as scouts. . . ."

In 1873, section 1112 of the Revised Statutes provided the Indian Scouts with the same pay and benefits as the cavalry.⁹ The Scouts' monthly wages were thirteen dollars plus their rations. The term of enlistment was six months.¹⁰

Upon his arrival in Tucson, Arizona, Crook enlisted Apache Scouts from various Apache tribes. The first Apache Scouts were Coyoteros and White Mountain Apache, recruited at Fort Apache in July 1871.¹¹ As the campaigns progressed other Apaches, principally the Chiricahuas, also enlisted as Indian Scouts. Crook, on several occasions, employed Navahos, Pimas, Maricopas, Papagos, and other non-Apache Indian Scouts against Apaches but these scouts proved a dismal failure.

In Crook's early campaigns, the recruitment of Apache Scouts was easy because of the hostilities that existed among the numerous bands. The Apache Scouts generally came from the enemy bands of the hostiles the Army was hunting at the time. Many of the Apaches took

⁹W. A. Graham, The Custer Myth: A Source Book of Custeriana (Harrisburg, Pa.: Stackpole Co., 1953), p. 27.

¹⁰William T. Hagan, Indian Police and Judges: Experiments in Acculturation and Control (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), p. 44.

¹¹Crook, p. 165.

this opportunity to settle old scores.¹² At the San Carlos Agency, "the Government has cultivated their martial feelings, and at the same time turned them to its own account, by enlisting the most trusty warriors as soldiers in its own service. . . ."¹³ John Rope, an Apache Scout, stated:

At San Carlos there were lots of Indians gathered to enlist. . . . We lined up to be chosen. My brother was the first one picked. My brother said if he was to be [a] scout, then he wanted me to go as scout with him too. He told this to the officers. They asked which one I was and he took them to where I was standing. These officers looked me over to see if I was alright. They felt my arms and legs and pounded my chest to see if I would cough. That's the way they did with all the scouts they picked and if you coughed they would not take you.¹⁴

The Apache Scouts "were wilder . . . than the Pimas and Maricopas, but far more reliable, and endowed with a greater amount of courage and daring." Another reason why Crook preferred Apache Scouts was the timing of their religious ceremonies. The Apache "bunches all his religious duties . . . and defers his bathing" until he returns home from a campaign," but the Pimas and

¹²Faulk, The Geronimo Campaign, pp. 32-34.

¹³Frederick Schwatka, "Among the Apaches," The Century Magazine, vol. XII (May, 1887), 47.

¹⁴Grenville Goodwin, Western Apache Raiding and Warfare, ed. Keith H. Basso (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1971), pp. 103-104.

Maricopas are punctilious, and resort to the rites of religion the moment a single one, either of their own numbers or of the enemy, has been laid low."¹⁵ Many of the non-Apache Indians were excellent guides but they were no match for their savage enemy, the Apache.

The Apache Scout was a product of a rigorous physical regimen that was part of every Apache warrior's way of life. His training started when he was barely out of infancy. The young Apache learned nature's intricacies by participating in it directly because his future as a successful warrior depended on "his observant receptivity."¹⁶

The Apache boys had to endure a Spartan existence. They had to remain awake for extended periods of time and run for miles with a load strapped on their backs. The fundamentals of the art of camouflage were also part of their training. To build their stamina, they competed in long distance races. In these events, each participant was given a mouthful of water and had to carry the water for the entire length of the course. This test forced the boys to breathe through their noses without gasping for air. To return without the same quantity of water meant failure.

¹⁵ John G. Bourke, On the Border With Crook (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1891), p. 203.

¹⁶ Charles F. Lummis, The Land of Poco Tiempo (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1906), p. 163.

serve as trackers; to participate in hostilities against renegades; to perform as police if the Indian Police could not maintain control on the reservations; and to act as representatives of the United States Government.²³

There were seven Scouts who did not perform the regular duties. These Scouts served as the "eyes and ears" on the reservation for Crook.²⁴ Crook selected the seven Scouts from the most reliable Apaches who volunteered for the hazardous duty. Lieutenant Britton Davis, commander of the Apache Scouts at San Carlos, stated:

The duty of these scouts was to report to us every indication of discontent or hostility that might arise among the Indians on the reservation. They took no part in campaigns, but were employed solely to keep us posted on symptoms of unrest or agitations that might lead to serious difficulties in or between the various tribes, or even to outbreaks; a duty they performed thoroughly and faithfully, enabling us to nip in the bud many situations that might have led to serious trouble.²⁵

The Apache Scouts received military uniforms but wore them only for official functions or when the Scout wanted to display "all his finery."²⁶ The Scout's clothing

²³Fairfax Downey and Jacques N. Jacobsen, Jr., The Red/Bluecoats: The Indian Scouts U. S. Army (Fort Collins, Colorado: The Old Army Press, 1973), p. 11.

²⁴Cochise, p. 21.

²⁵Britton Davis, The Truth About Geronimo (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1929), pp. 38-39.

²⁶Bourke, An Apache Campaign, pp. 39-40.

issue was the Army blue blouse and a pair of trousers. The non-commissioned officers' chevrons were white and bordered with red.²⁷ Around the Scout's head was the red headband that distinguished him as a Scout.²⁸ John G. Bourke described the Scout's dress in a campaign. He stated on the march they wore a:

loosely fitting shirt of red, white, or gray . . . of calico. . . . The moccasins are the most important articles of Apache apparel. In a fight or on a long march they [the Scouts] will discard all else, but under any and every circumstance will retain the moccasins.²⁹

Some Scouts carried "little buckskin bags of Hoddentin, or sacred meal," to offer as a sacrifice, and other Scouts wore amulets to ward away the enemy's arrows or bullets. Several Scouts possessed "sashes and shirts of buckskins upon which are emblazoned the signs of the moon, lightning, rainbow, hail, fire, the water-beetle, butterfly, snake, centipede, and other powers to which they may appeal for aid in the hour of distress."³⁰

The Scouts' standard weapon was a Springfield breech-loading rifle.³¹ Some Scouts also carried a

²⁷Downey, p. 159.

²⁸Eve Ball, In the Days of Victorio: Recollections of a Warm Springs Apache, narr. James Kaywaykla (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1970), p. 156.

²⁹Bourke, An Apache Campaign, p. 39.

³⁰Ibid., pp. 40-42.

³¹Ibid., p. 40.

nickel-plated Colt single action .45 caliber revolver.³² Around all Scouts' waist was a leather belt with forty rifle cartridges, but while in camp or on the reservation they carried only five cartridges because "cartridges passed as currency at twenty-five cents each and the temptation to sell or gamble them was great."³³ They received their full complement of ammunition when they prepared to campaign. On his person a Scout also carried a butcher knife, a canteen of water, and an awl to repair his moccasins.³⁴

During a campaign, the Apache Scouts "moved with no semblance of regularity." They progressed at their own pace. Their speed was approximately four miles an hour, "or not quite fast enough to make a horse trot." It was not unusual for the Scouts to march thirty or forty miles a day "on foot crossing wide stretches of waterless plains upon which a tropical sun beats down with fierceness, or climbing up the faces of precipitous mountains which stretch across this region in every direction."³⁵ As the Scouts trotted over the arid terrain, they placed a small stone in their mouths to quell their thirst.³⁶ At the end of a

³²Downey, p. 163.

³³Davis, p. 150.

³⁴Bourke, An Apache Campaign, pp. 40-41.

³⁵Ibid., pp. 38-46.

³⁶Bourke, On the Border, p. 134.

march, the Scouts posted their guards and arranged their bedding. The Scouts constructed a windbreak and spread their blankets on the ground. Sometimes two or three Scouts huddled "close together, each wrapped up in his own blanket. Whenever fires were allowed, the Apaches would kindle small ones, and lie down close to them with feet towards the flame. . . ." ³⁷

The advantages of the Apache Scouts over the American troops were the Scouts' familiarity of the terrain and their ability to survive under the harshest conditions. ³⁸ The American soldiers "had to be desoldierized as completely possible before they were of any earthly use in a campaign against Indians who had turned war into a science." The Apache Scout, in his habitat, "was self-reliant, self-contained, and self-sufficing. . . ." ³⁹ In the fighting against hostile Apaches, Crook's policy of pitting their kinsmen against one another was the most effective means of concluding warfare in Apacheria.

³⁷ Bourke, On the Border, p. 187.

³⁸ Bourke, An Apache Campaign, p. 46.

³⁹ Lummis, p. 166.

CHAPTER II

THE ORIGINS OF THE APACHE SCOUTS

The concept of employing Apaches as scouts originated with Lieutenant Howard B. Cushing, Third Cavalry; however, they were only utilized in a limited capacity.¹ The individual responsible for organizing, expanding, and deploying the Apache scouts was Lieutenant Colonel George Crook.

Crook's plan revised American strategy against the Apaches. The decision to employ Apache scouts was in keeping with Crook's design to fight Apaches on their conditions and employ their tactics. The cavalry was still instrumental in his campaign but would be useless in the treacherous mountain country; therefore, the scouts would be employed to track the hostiles.² Crook's attitude towards all Indians was to make no promises unless they could be fulfilled and not to cheat the Apaches. Crook was convinced that the Apaches must be defeated before peace would prevail in the Southwest.

¹Paul I. Wellman, Death on Horseback (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1934), p. 345.

²Alexander B. Adams, Geronimo: A Biography (New York: Putnam's, 1971), p. 179.

Crook accepted the assignment to Arizona Territory. He departed San Francisco and arrived in Tucson by stagecoach in June 1871. He entered Tucson "without the slightest pomp or parade." He temporarily resided with Arizona Governor A. P. K. Safford, an old confidant, for several months. During his stay in Tucson, Crook "required":

Every officer within the limits of what was then called the southern district of Arizona . . . to report to him From each he soon extracted all--he knew about the country, the lines of travel, the trails across the various mountains, the fords where any were required for the streams, the nature of the soil, especially its products, such as grasses, character of the climate, the condition of the pack-mules, and all pertaining to them, and every other item of interest a commander could possibly want to have determined. But in reply not one word, not one glance, not one hint, as to what he was going to do or what he would like to do. This was the point in Crook's character which made the strongest impression upon every one coming in contact with him--his ability to learn all that his informant had to supply, without yielding in return the slightest³ suggestion of his own plans and purposes.

Crook's fairness in his associations with Apaches made him "a favorite" with them "and though terrible in his severity when they broke out and made war, and perhaps at all times distrustful of them yet he believed in keeping his word with an Indian" ⁴ Crook's personal

³ John Gregory Bourke, On the Border With Crook (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1891), pp. 108-109.

⁴ O. O. Howard, My Life and Experiences Among Our Hostile Indians (Hartford: Worthington, 1907), p. 152.

interest in the Indians' welfare earned him the admiration of the Apaches and Eastern philanthropists, but not that of the Southwesterners, Mexicans, and the railroad interests.

Crook remained in Tucson collecting valuable information from his subordinates until July 11, 1871. Slowly and in a calculating manner, Crook was formulating the strategy to be deployed against the hostiles. He had several discussions with Governor Safford and the leading citizens of Tucson. These men recommended to Crook "that the Mexicans were the solution" to the Apache "problem." Crook's Arizona friends based this on the Mexicans' knowledge of "the country, the habits and mode of Indian warfare, that with a little pinole and dried beef they could travel all over the country without pack mules to carry their provisions, that with ten day's rations on their backs they could march over the roughest country at the rate of from thirty to fifty miles per day, that they could go inside an Apache and turn him wrong side out in no time at all" Crook was convinced by his friend's endorsements and recruited fifty Mexicans, known as the Destroying Angels, as scouts.⁵

On July 11, 1871, Crook's expedition consisted of Army Troops B, D, F, H, and L, Third Cavalry, approximately two hundred men, and a company of an "ethnographical

⁵ George Crook, General George Crook: His Autobiography, ed. Martin Schmitt (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1946), p. 163.

collection" of scouts composed of "Navajoes, Apaches, Opatas, Yaquis, Pueblos, Mexicans, Americans, and half-breeds of any tribe one could name." Some of these men "were good, and others were good for nothing."⁶ Crook learned the merits of these scouts during a "practice march" so that the "officers and men could be acquainted with each other and with the country in which at a later moment they should have to work in earnest."⁷ This dress rehearsal, from Tucson to Camp Verde, enabled Crook to analyze the Apache "problem" first hand. He gained valuable information of the Tonto Apaches' conduct when fighting the Army. He learned that they fought the Army when all odds were in their favor. The time of battle was at their discretion. Crook reported that their tactics were to "swarm your column, avoid, or attack, as their interests dictate, dispute every foot of your advance, harass your rear and surround you on all sides. Under such conditions regular troops are as helpless as a whale attacked by a school of sword-fish."⁸

After unsuccessful scouting, Crook arrived at Fort Apache to "refit leaving my Mexican outfit, pinole and all, to be discharged."⁹ Crook analyzed the military

⁶Bourke, pp. 137-138. ⁷Bourke, p. 137.

⁸George Crook, "The Apache Problem," Journal of Military Service Institution of the United States, VII (October, 1886), 262.

⁹George Crook, General George Crook: His Autobiography, p. 165.

situation in Apacheria and concluded that the only people capable of tracking down the Apaches were other Apaches. During his stay, Crook initiated discussions with the leaders of the peaceful Coyoteros and White Mountain bands in an attempt to acquire their consent "to join in my plans for subduing the hostiles which was for them to enlist as scouts and act in conjunction with our troops."¹⁰ His call for a company of scouts was a resounding and surprising success. Previously Crook had concluded that the Apaches would in all probability reject his offer because "it was difficult to realize that there could be any of the Apache tribe who were friendly to anybody."¹¹

Crook appointed Captain Guy V. Henry, Third Cavalry, to command the first company of scouts. He promptly made preparations to undertake an expedition against Apaches who had recently bolted from the reservations. Captain Henry reported that the consolidation of soldiers and Apache scouts surpassed all anticipations. The success of the team concept removed any lingering doubts as to the scouts' worthiness.¹² Crook, with his command reduced to three companies, departed for "Camp Verde to organize similar expeditions."¹³ Crook's final destination

¹⁰Ibid., p. 166. ¹¹Ibid., p. 165.

¹²Donald E. Worcester, The Apaches: Eagles of the Southwest (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1979),

¹³Crook, General George Crook: His Autobiography, p. 166.

on his fact finding tour was Prescott, where he relocated the department headquarters from Los Angeles.¹⁴

By September 1871, General Crook was ready to initiate operations against Apache renegades but suffered a check with the arrival of Vincent Colyer, an agent sent by the Permanent Board of Peace Commissioners to impose President U. S. Grant's Peace Policy.¹⁵ Even though Colyer's mission was labeled a failure by the western presses, it did establish the Tularosa Apache Reservation and it also induced Major General J. M. Schofield, commander of the Military Division of the Pacific, to establish uniform accountability procedures necessary to entrench "military control in the Territory of Arizona"¹⁶ This order even required the peaceful Apaches to inform on the hostiles, their kinsmen, "so that the whole tribe may not suffer for the crimes of a few."¹⁷ Columbus Delano, Secretary of the Interior, in a letter to President Grant, requested the War Department to appoint "some suitable and discreet officer of the Army to act as Indian agent" for the reservations.¹⁸

¹⁴Bourke, p. 159.

¹⁵Crook, General George Crook: His Autobiography, pp. 167-168.

¹⁶Vincent Colyer, Peace with the Apaches of New Mexico and Arizona: Report of Vincent Colyer, Member of Board of Indian Commissioners, 1871 (1872; Rpt. New York: Books for Libraries Press, 1971), p. 56.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 57.

¹⁸New York Times, November 11, 1871, p. 5, col. 5.

Following in the footsteps of Colyer, General O. O. Howard arrived in Arizona, in February 1872, on a comparable mission to Colyer's. His only achievement was an arrangement whereby Cochise's sanctuaries in the Huachuca Range and Dragoon Range would be excluded from military control.¹⁹ Hubert H. Bancroft stated that "General O. O. Howard had offered the olive branch and Crook, with the sword, was enforcing its acceptance." When the young warriors jumped the reservations they were pursued "not only by the troops, but by Apache warriors [scouts] . . . whose services were most profitably utilized."²⁰

The reaction of Arizona's citizens to Colyer and Howard was hostile. For many of the American settlers, Crook's appointment had given them new hope in their decision to remain in Arizona. Their newly discovered expectation for the future quickly diminished when they learned that the Peace Commissioners had assumed power to regulate the Apaches.²¹ Their displeasure was also attributed to the killing of approximately forty Americans.

¹⁹ John Morgan Gates, "General George Crook's First Apache Campaign," Journal of the West, VI (April, 1967), p. 314.

²⁰ Hubert Howe Bancroft, The Works of Hubert Howe Bancroft, Vol. XVII, History of Arizona and New Mexico 1530-1888 (San Francisco: The History Company, 1889), p. 564.

²¹ New York Times, November 9, 1871, p. 3, col. 1.

Fifty raids against settlements by the hostiles occurred since Colyer's initial peace attempts in Arizona.²²

When the order to commence operations against the hostiles was sent by the War Department, in August 1872, Crook was thoroughly prepared for the upcoming campaign. The posts and camps "were stripped of the last available officer and man . . ." for the campaign. Crook's plan of operations "was to make a clean sweep of the Tonto Basin, . . . and this sweep was to be made by a number of converging columns, each able to look out for itself, each provided with a force of Indian scouts, each followed by a pack-train with all needful supplies, and each led by officers physically able to go almost anywhere. After the centre of the Basin had been reached, if there should be no decisive action in the meantime, these commands were to turn back and break out in different directions, scouring the country, so that no nook or corner should be left unexamined."²³

Crook's subordinate officers were Major George M. Randall, Twenty-Third Infantry, operating from Fort Apache; Major George F. Price, Fifth Cavalry, from Date Creek; Major William Brown, Fifth Cavalry, from Camp Grant; Major Alexander MacGregor, First Cavalry, from Fort Whipple;

²²Frank C. Lockwood, The Apache Indians (New York: MacMillan Company, 1938), p. 192.

²³Bourke, p. 181.

Colonel Julius W. Mason, Fifth Cavalry, from Camp Hualpai [Hualapai]; and Colonel C. C. Carr, First Cavalry, commanded the troops from Camp [Fort] Verde. These officers were veterans and employed "great discretion and good judgement."²⁴

General Crook's "main dependence," the Indian Scouts, were instrumental in inflicting two stunning defeats on the hostiles.²⁵ The first occurred on December 27, 1872, in the Rio Salado Canyon. Major William Brown's command was joined by Captain James Burns, forty troopers of Company G, Fifth Cavalry, and approximately one hundred Pima scouts. However, it was the Apache scouts of Brown's command that located the enemy. By a stroke of luck, one of the scouts, Nantaje, had grown up in the hostiles' sanctuary and led Brown and his volunteers "down the slippery, rocky, dangerous trail in the wall of the gloomy cañon [canyon]. . . ."²⁶

Thanks to the advice of the scouts, the troopers had acquired moccasins to reduce their noise while moving. Stealthily they came "upon the cave inhabited by hostiles"²⁷ Nantaje and fifteen Army marksmen aimed their

²⁴ Bourke, p. 182.

²⁵ Crook, General George Crook: His Autobiography, p. 175.

²⁶ Bourke, p. 190.

²⁷ Ibid., p. 189.

rifles at the unsuspecting and singing Apaches. "The surprise and terror of the savages were so complete that they thought only of the safety which the interior of the cave afforded" ²⁸ The hostiles refused to capitulate and in the ensuing massacre, seventy-six hostiles perished. The only survivors were twelve women and children. The only casualty in Brown's command was one Pima scout. ²⁹

The second amazing defeat of Apache hostiles occurred in April 1873. After resting briefly at Fort McDowell, almost the entire Fifth Cavalry headed for the Superstition Mountains in search of Deltchay and other Apaches who had bolted from the San Carlos Reservation. With the exception of Deltchay, the entire band of hostiles, numbering over three hundred, surrendered to Crook. The reason for their surrender was:

they had never been afraid of the Americans alone, but now that their own people were fighting against them they did not know what to do . . . they had retreated to the mountain tops, thinking to hide in the snow until the soldiers went home, but the scouts found them out and the soldiers followed them. ³⁰

The success of these operations is attributed to Crook's preparation of his troops, pack trains, and his Apache scouts. In comparison with the Pima and Maricopa

²⁸ Ibid., p. 192. ²⁹ Gates, p. 317.

³⁰ Bourke, pp. 212-213.

scouts in the expedition, the Apache scouts were "far more reliable, and endowed with a greater amount of courage and daring." The longer amount of time the officers served with the Apache scouts, the more impressed they were with their performance. As a result, the Pimas and Maricopas were sent back to their reservations. They proved to be utterly "worthless" ³¹

General Crook's 1871-1873 campaign was widely acclaimed by the territorial press. The citizens unanimously approved of Crook's "mode of conducting warfare . . ." and that it could not "be improved upon." ³² John Morgan Gates, a historian, stated that Crook's first Apache campaign "stands out as a perfect example of the well-conducted counter-guerrilla operation." ³³ Crook successfully altered Army tactics, which were still dictated by experience gained in the Civil War, and employed strategy and tactics that were realistic with the terrain and enemy in the Southwest. ³⁴

³¹ Ibid., p. 203.

³² The Daily New Mexican, January 2, 1873, p. 1, col. 3.

³³ Gates, p. 319.

³⁴ Odie B. Faulk, The Geronimo Campaign (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 32.

CHAPTER III

THE VICTORIO CAMPAIGN

In June 1879, Victorio, the Mimbres chieftain, consented to relocate his band from Camp Goodwin, situated on the San Carlos Reservation, to the Mescalero Reservation in the Sacramento Mountains in New Mexico Territory. In exchange, Victorio was assured by Indian Agent Samuel Russell that the band's women and children, located on the San Carlos Reservation, would be permitted to live together. Victorio promised Russell that all he desired was "peace and quiet," and would adhere to all of Russell's orders. All this he swore and asked only that they would not be returned to the San Carlos Reservation.¹

Irate citizens of southern New Mexico bitterly denounced the Federal Government for allowing these "marauding and murdering Indians" to settle on the Mescalero Reservation.² A tragic but avoidable chain of events unfolded. In Silver City, New Mexico, the Grant County seat, a hastily assembled grand jury issued

¹Dan L. Thrapp, Victorio and the Mimbres Apaches (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1974), p. 217.

²Joseph A. Stout, Jr., Apache Lightning: The Last Great Battles of the Ojo Calientes (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974), p. 91.

indictments against Victorio and his warriors. There were three indictments against Victorio, two for horse stealing and one for murder.³ Agent Russell telegraphed E. P. Smith, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, of the impending crisis. Lieutenant Charles B. Gatewood stated "that any man empowered to adjust Victorio's well-founded claims, could have prevented the bloody and disastrous outbreak of 1879."⁴ As the events were to prove, there was no such man in authority.

Victorio quickly gained knowledge of the indictments and surmised what might be the consequences if he went to trial. The Mimbres did not have any faith in Russell's guarantee of protection and "thereafter moved about cautiously, heavily armed and prepared to fight for their freedom."⁵ There were additional causes for the unrest. Joseph Stout, a historian, states, "as a result of Agent Russell's inability or unwillingness to supply Victorio's band with adequate supplies, and the natural animosity of Apache factions toward each other, there was little chance for harmony."⁶ By September 4, the Mimbres chief, his

³Eve Ball, In the Days of Victorio: Recollections of a Warm Springs Apache, Narrator James Kawaykla (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1970), p. 64.

⁴Thomas Cruse, Apache Days and After (Caldwell, Idaho: The Claxton Printers, 1941), p. 158.

⁵John U. Terrell, Apache Chronicle (New York: World Publishing, 1972), p. 337.

⁶Stout, p. 89.

warriors, and a handful of Mescaleros had fled the Mescalero Reservation. Two months were to pass before Agent Russell learned from Albert J. Fountain, an attorney in Mesilla, the actual reason for Victorio's departure. Russell stated that "Victoria [Victorio] heard of the indictment against him in Grant County, or as they say, that a paper was out against him." Judge Warren Bristol, Mr. Fountain, and other leaders of Grant and Dona Ana counties were passing through the Mescalero Reservation on a hunting trip but were mistaken by Victorio as the arresting posse from Silver City. It was this ill-timed excursion that prompted Victorio's return to the warpath.⁷

The flight of Victorio's band was due west to their old homeland in the Black Range.⁸ Soon as many as 350 Renegades, Mescalero, Chiricahua, and Comanche, were joining Victorio.⁹ Major A. P. Morrow, commander at Fort Bayard, New Mexico, immediately dispatched all available troops to intercept Victorio. Military posts in Apacheria were placed on alert and prepared to initiate field service. The military camps in "southeastern Arizona

⁷Thrapp, p. 219.

⁸Ball, p. 66.

⁹Dan L. Thrapp, The Conquest of Apacheria (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1967), p. 181. Note: Joseph Stout states that Victorio had "about seventy-five, and there were never more than 450 people a few Mescaleros and Lipans, less than fifty" Stout, pp. 90-91.

comprise principally those in the region south of the Little Colorado and its branches, and east of longitude 111°. The posts are . . . garrisoned by nine companies, and headquarters Sixth Cavalry, four companies Twelfth Infantry, and three companies Indian Scouts."¹⁰

Lieutenant Gatewood and Scout Company A, composed of approximately twenty Apache scouts, were dispatched from Fort Apache to "intercept Victorio" if he attempted to retrieve his band's families still at the San Carlos Reservation.¹¹ Lieutenant Guy Howard, commanding a detail of Sixth Cavalry and Apache scouts from Company D, reconnoitered the vicinity east of Camp Huachuca, Arizona. Captain Tullius C. Tupper surveyed the Fort Grant area and Lieutenant Augustus P. Blocksom, with a detail of Apache scouts from Company C, entered the field from Fort Bowie, Arizona.¹² The Army initiated a strategy that it would rely on repeatedly: The "immediate screening of the area" to locate the Apaches and if possible to return them to the reservations.¹³

¹⁰U. S. Congress, Executive Documents, Report of the Secretary of War, 46th Congress, 3rd Sess., 1880-81 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1881), p. 216.

¹¹Charles B. Gatewood, "Campaigning Against Victorio in 1879," The Great Divide, (April, 1894), pp. 102-104.

¹²Thrapp, The Conquest of Apacheria, p. 183.

¹³Stout, p. 94.

The elusive renegades completely baffled the Army by unexpectantly returning from raids in Mexico. On September 18, 1879, at the head of the Las Animas Creek, Victorio trapped Lieutenant Byron Dawson, forty-six Navajo scouts and troopers of Company L, Ninth Cavalry. Approximately 140 renegades were on the verge of annihilating Dawson's command, but the timely arrival of Captain Charles D. Beyer and fifty-two soldiers and militiamen from Hillsboro enabled the troopers to continue the fight until evening when they disengaged from the fight.¹⁴ The retreat of the soldiers was the signal for Victorio that he had been victorious over the Army. The Apaches captured the personal luggage of the officers, the medical supplies, and fifty-three government horses.¹⁵ The government fatalities were five troopers, two Navajo scouts, one civilian, and thirty-two horses.¹⁶ The Navajo scouts at the fight had proved unable to spy the Apache ambush and were more often than not, inept at tracking. Gatewood, commenting on the Navajo scouts, stated they "belonged rather to the coffee-cooling class, and, with several exceptions, made serious objections to following a trail

¹⁴ Thrapp, The Conquest of Apacheia, pp. 183-184.

¹⁵ Thrapp, Victorio and the Mimbres Apaches, p. 240.

¹⁶ New York Times, September 27, 1879, p. 2, col. 2.

that was getting warm."¹⁷ Henceforth, whenever possible, the Army used Apache Scouts.

Major Morrow, after news arrived of the Las Animas fight, immediately dispatched Lieutenants Gatewood and Blocksom, who had arrived at Fort Bayard only a short time before, in the hope of catching Victorio in a vise. The plan was sound and executed properly, but it was unsuccessful due to the slow movement of the troops and Victorio's awareness of the trap. The Apache cautiously withdrew his warriors.¹⁸ Gatewood and Blocksom, with their Scout Companies, A and C respectively, pursued Victorio into the Black Range to locate his rancherias. This pursuit was an exhausting and painstaking campaign lasting over six weeks. The campaign was vividly illustrated by Gatewood:

. . . we marched in the broiling heat all day in a southeasterly direction, and about dark found a small tank of water in the rocks near the foot of the Goodsight Mountains, which furnished perhaps half a pint to each man and animal. There we camped for the night. All the next day the command plodded along through the sand and heat, across the desert north of the Guzman Mountains. The trail wound among sand hills and lava beds, tending generally southward. Horses and mules began to grow leg weary and suffer from thirst and heat, and for every horse that was shot by the rear guard a soldier was placed on foot In the two days' march fully seventy miles had been covered. An unknown country still lay ahead, but the hope of overtaking the enemy spurred the men on to extra efforts. The next morning march was resumed. The

¹⁷ Gatewood, p. 102.

¹⁸ Stout, pp. 96-97.

number of animals killed by the rear guard increased, the sun seemed to beat down hotter and hotter. There was no singing, no joking, no conversation, no smoking in the column, and the banjo of a colored soldier that used to enliven the men was silent. The Indian scouts, who always march on foot, were more used to hardships, but even they began to show the effects. . . . After dark we entered the projecting ridges of the Guzman Mountains, twenty miles perhaps from Janos. Here the very plain trail ran between two parallel ridges, covered with bushes and rocks, and a line of warriors in each ridge waited for us to come within easy range.

But our scouts were not deceived. The full moon had just arisen, and in that clear atmosphere one could see a man at considerable distance. Some of our scouts succeeded in getting to the rear of one of the lines and a volley, followed by the advance of dismounted soldiers, caused a precipitate evacuation of their strong position. They rallied on a higher ridge, a few hundred yards further on, but the Apaches can't stand close quarters; they broke and ran, as they always will. Our men steadily advanced into a rougher and more broken mountain region. The Indians seemed to have plenty of ammunition and the whole top of the mountain was a fringe of fire flashes. . . . Suddenly the firing ceased; the rumbling and crashing of large stones down the mountainside could be heard; the line had run against a palisade of solid rock, twenty feet high or more, which had not been noticed.¹⁹

The troopers and Scouts were unable to dislodge the Apaches. Finally under heavy fire the hostiles retreated down the mountain. There ensued a respite with the only sounds emanating from the hostiles attempting to encourage the Scouts to desert. Fortunately for Major Morrow and his troopers, Victorio was unsuccessful.

¹⁹Gate, pp. 103-104.

Gatewood recalled that the battle casualties were "several soldiers killed and six or seven wounded."²⁰ Major Morrow, however, reported one scout killed and two wounded.²¹

The order to withdraw sounded and as the troopers departed the area, "many men showed symptoms of that wild insanity produced by great thirst." When Major Morrow's command came upon a stream all the troops, "white, colored and red men, horses and mules, all rushed pell-mell for the water. They drank of it, they rolled in it, and they got out of it and returned to it. They wept and cheered and danced in it, and the mud they made seemed to make no difference in drinking."²² After refreshing themselves, Morrow's troops safely returned to Fort Bayard on November 3, 1879. Victorio and his band crossed the international border into Chihuahua, Mexico, and out of reach of the American troops. For the remainder of the year, the hostiles engaged in small isolated raids into American territory.

Major Morrow's report to his superiors stated that his command consisted of eighty-one enlisted men and eighteen scouts.²³ In addition, Morrow credited the

²⁰Ibid., p. 104.

²¹Thrapp, Victorio and the Mimbres Apaches, p. 250.

²²Gatewood, p. 104.

²³Thrapp, Conquest of Apacheria, p. 188--footnote.

expulsion of Victorio to the scouts. Without their assistance, Victorio would still be hiding in New Mexico's mountain ranges.

The territorial presses published good news in December. They announced that at the San Carlos Reservation Geronimo, Juh, and other hostiles were returning from Mexico to surrender. After meeting with A. S. Haskell, Thomas Jeffords, and Archie McIntosh, Juh and Geronimo stipulated four conditions that had to be guaranteed. They demanded the "scout companies be withdrawn. . . . They also ask that I [Haskell] remain with them until they are settled at San Carlos . . . and they want to be with their own people at the sub-agency [on the south side of the Gila River, about sixteen miles east of San Carlos] and they desire that . . . Noglee . . . visit them there."²⁴ The military authorities agreed to these stipulations and after the Apaches settled on the San Carlos Reservation, Reuben Woods, a trader, even suggested that Juh, Geronimo, and several other leaders enlist as scouts, but nothing came of this proposition.²⁵ The only noted Apache leader who had not returned from the warpath was Victorio.

Throughout the winter of 1879, the number of Army

²⁴Dan L. Thrapp, "Juh: An Incredible Indian," Southwestern Studies, Monograph 39 (1973), 20.

²⁵Ibid., 21.

units in Arizona and New Mexico steadily increased. Southeastern Arizona was "garrisoned by nine companies, and headquarters Sixth Cavalry, four companies Twelfth Infantry, and three companies of Apache scouts."²⁶ The troops in New Mexico consisted of three companies of the Ninth Cavalry, Gatewood's Scout Company A, Blocksom's Scout Company C, and Lieutenant Stephen C. Mills' Scout Company D. In February, Captain C. B. McLellan and Company L, Sixth Cavalry, were released for duty in New Mexico at Colonel Edward Hatch's request.²⁷ Over two thousand American cavalry, infantry, and scouts were in pursuit of Victorio. Included in the number were Lieutenant J. A. Maney and sixty-three Apache scouts from the San Carlos Reservation. "This was the largest command of Indian Scouts, 114 Scouts, ever gathered to chase Victorio. . . ."²⁸ In an effort to aid Hatch's Ninth Cavalry, Colonel Benjamin Grierson and troops from the Tenth Cavalry and Twenty-Fifth Infantry from West Texas were to intercept any fleeing hostiles heading for the San Andres Mountains.²⁹

²⁶Report of the Secretary of War, p. 216.

²⁷Ibid., pp. 216-217.

²⁸Joyce E. Mason, "The Use of Indian Scouts in the Apache Wars, 1870-1886" (Ph. D. dissertation, Indiana University, 1970), p. 170.

²⁹Thrapp, Conquest of Apacheria, p. 194.

On several occasions, Morrow nearly succeeded in overtaking Victorio but the hardships of the terrain and elusiveness of the hostiles were too much for Morrow's men to overcome. The daring raids by Victorio's men continually caught the soldiers off guard and were exploited by the territorial presses which charged incompetence on the Army's part.³⁰

In April 1880, Hatch, in an effort to curb the flow of supplies intended for Victorio, tried to disarm the Mescaleros and place troops on the reservation to prevent any possible disturbance. Approximately forty warriors bolted, and in the ensuing clash fourteen were killed. The troops pursuing the escaping Mescaleros killed several warriors and recovered what seemed to be stolen stock. Twenty-six Mescaleros managed to reach sanctuary in the Guadalupe Mountains.³¹ The disarming of the Mescaleros had its desired effect in halting the supplies destined for Victorio.

Now, the only source of arms and ammunition that Victorio could obtain were from the soldiers or civilians he killed. For a brief period Victorio was content to show a low profile. Suddenly in May 1880, he raided through the Black and Mogollon Ranges killing over twenty-nine people. Near Mineral Creek, in the Mogollon

³⁰ New York Times, March 13, 1880, p. 5, col. 5.

³¹ Ibid., April 24, 1880, p. 1, col. 6.

Range, Victorio's son, Mennolito, and fourteen warriors killed three ranchers.³² This small band raided in the San Carlos vicinity in an attempt to induce the followers of Juh and Geronimo to join Victorio, but to no avail. As the murders and pillaging increased, the public demanded swift action.³³

Colonel Eugene Carr, commander of the Sixth Cavalry, prepared to order to the field Companies D and F, and Company A, Indian Scouts from Camp Thomas.³⁴ In New Mexico, Colonel Hatch knew that the only hope to solve the Apache crisis "was the scouts." General Orlando Willcox, commander of the Department of Arizona, recalled his Apache Scouts from New Mexico. Upon their return, Major James Biddle, Sixth Cavalry, noted that the "Indian Scouts have accomplished good work in aiding the troops of New Mexico. . . ."³⁵ Colonel Hatch requested permission to raise two Apache scout companies, consisting of fifty men each. This request was disapproved by General Philip Sheridan because the Department of the Missouri, of which New Mexico was a district, was only authorized two hundred scouts, and all positions were up to strength.³⁶

³² New York Times, May 18, 1880, p. 1, col. 6.

³³ Stout, p. 139.

³⁴ New York Times, May 18, 1880, p. 1, col. 6.

³⁵ Report of the Secretary of War, p. 213.

³⁶ Thrapp, Victorio and the Mimbres Apaches, pp. 273-274.

The territorial presses continued to blast Hatch and the Army for their inability to halt the depredations committed by Victorio. There was much ill-feeling towards the scouts also. It was suggested, "if instead of enlisting Indian Scouts, Hatch would employ Americans and Mexicans who know the country he would get a more reliable and equally effective force. Discharge the thieves and let the people have a chance."³⁷ It is ironic that in less than three weeks from this article, it would be the Apache scouts who would inflict the severest blow against Victorio and force him to seek sanctuary in Chihuahua, Mexico.

On May 17, 1880, Major Morrow, recuperating near the San Francisco River, was asked by H. K. Parker, Chief of Scouts at Fort Bayard, for permission to continue the search for Victorio. Morrow approved Parker's request and outfitted his expedition with four days rations. Parker and sixty Apache scouts reached Hatch's camp at Ojo Caliente on the fourth day.³⁸ There he was resupplied with rations and instructions to harass the hostiles as much as possible until the Army was prepared to take to the field.³⁹

Parker resumed his pursuit on May 21 and succeeded

³⁷ Thirty-Four (Las Cruces), May 12, 1880, p. 5, col. 4.

³⁸ Thrapp, Conquest of Apacheria, p. 200.

³⁹ Thrapp, Victorio and the Mimbres Apaches, p. 279.

in locating Victorio's trail on May 23 in the morning. So as not to be spotted, Parker moved up into the mountains and crept to the rear of the hostiles' camp. Parker, in a dispatch to Hatch on May 26, wrote, "[I] sent out scouts, two and three at a time, to learn the lay of the camp and the best way to jump it. At sunset they returned and pronounced camp favorable to jump. I sent 20 scouts entirely around their camp and 30 in rear. I then took 10 scouts on opposite side, that leaving only the way they came in for their escape, which I knew an Indian would not do--take back trail. We crept all night and daylight found us in fifty yards of his [Victorio's] camp. The 30 scouts in rear of camp opened on them at daybreak. . . ." The hostiles were completely unaware of the scouts' presence until the firing commenced. They panicked and in the first volley several were killed. In their haste "the men ran and left their guns," and darted towards Parker's position but were forced to retreat "back towards 20 scouts up the cañon." Victorio succeeded in collecting his warriors to offer a defense. They dug trenches and forced their women to expose themselves to the scouts' shots while they completed their defensive earthworks. Throughout the day, Victorio and the scouts talked over the noise of the battle. He remarked that he had been wounded in the leg.⁴⁰

⁴⁰ Report of the Secretary of War, pp. 99-100.

The battle lasted all day and all night. Parker maintained his death grip on Victorio and on the morning of May 25, he dispatched a courier to Colonel Hatch, whose command had temporarily moved to Camp French, requesting more "cartridges." By late afternoon, the scouts' ammunition and water were critically low. Parker was forced to withdraw approximately five miles where the nearest source of water was located. The scouts waited there two nights and one day expecting to be resupplied. With no supplies or reinforcements in sight, Parker concluded that his runner had been killed. Silently, a dejected Parker and his Apache scouts withdrew to Ojo Caliente.⁴¹

Parker marched to Ojo Caliente and then to Camp French searching for Colonel Hatch. Parker located his courier who assured Parker that he had delivered his message for assistance to Colonel Hatch. Parker also questioned several officers at Camp French as to why no support was rendered by Hatch. They merely replied that they were only obeying orders.⁴² Hatch did, however, dispatch Major Morrow to follow up the "scouts' success."⁴³

Upon receiving Parker's messenger, Colonel Hatch

⁴¹Thirty-Four (Las Cruces), June 2, 1880, p. 2, col. 4.

⁴²Thrapp, Victorio and the Mimbres Apaches, p. 280.

⁴³New York Times, June 16, 1880, p. 1, col. 6.

"immediately started for Fort Craig to telegraph . . .," the War Department "that he had defeated Victorio. . . ." ⁴⁴ Once the news of Hatch's actions reached the citizens of New Mexico, they accused him "of criminal neglect of duty in refusing or failing when called upon to send ammunition, supplies or assistance to the Indian Scouts. . . ." The censure of Hatch by the territorial was extremely critical. It even demanded his removal and "a competent commander be sent to this district." ⁴⁵

The achievement of H. K. Parker and the Apache scouts must not be discounted. The reported fatalities suffered by Victorio's band vary, but Parker reported the Scouts killed "30 men and women and children." ⁴⁶ The territorial presses reported that Parker "slaughtered 50 of his [Victorio's] braves." ⁴⁷ Lieutenant Cruse commented, "whatever the number actually killed it was a deadly blow to Victorio, as he lost some of his best men." ⁴⁸ In addition to his casualties, Victorio lost "74 head of stock." For Victorio this battle was the pivotal event in

⁴⁴Thirty-Four (Las Cruces), June 2, 1880, p. 2, col. 4.

⁴⁵Thirty-Four (Las Cruces), June 16, 1880, p. 4, col. 2.

⁴⁶Report of the Secretary of War, p. 100. Note: Thomas Cruse stated "ten or twelve" were killed. (Ruse, p. 84).

⁴⁷Thirty-Four (Las Cruces), June 2, 1880, p. 2, col. 4.

⁴⁸Cruse, p. 84.

his career as a war leader. In this fight Parker achieved what few others were able to do and that was to employ the element of surprise so successfully that not any of his scouts were killed.⁴⁹ The majority of New Mexicans felt that only the Apache scouts were capable of terminating Victorio's depredations. Parker's victory was one of the "greatest feats accomplished in the country in several years."⁵⁰

Victorio and the remanents of his band moved through the Black Range, turning in a southerly direction towards Cooke's Peak. Reports of massacres were rampant throughout the area of Silver City. The Apache "problem" was severe enough to suspend all mail communication to the town.⁵¹ Near Cooke's Peak, Victorio's band divided into three groups to confuse the troops. One of these bands skirmished with Morrow's command and in the fight two hostiles were killed and three were wounded. One of the hostiles killed was Mennolito, Victorio's son. The remaining hostiles were pursued by Morrow's Apache scouts and Company L, Ninth Cavalry. Another unit was also in pursuit of the second band whose trail led through the Black Range and into Mexico. Victorio's main body of

⁴⁹Report of the Secretary of War, p. 100.

⁵⁰Thirty-Four (Las Cruces), June 2, 1880, p. 2, col. 4.

⁵¹New York Times, June 1, 1880, p. 5, col. 2 and col. 3.

hostiles, approximately one hundred strong, were also tracked to the Mexican-American border. The Mexican government was promptly notified.⁵²

In Santa Fe, numerous dispatches were received from Chihuahua disclosing the accounts of Apache raids throughout northern Mexico. Victorio had attacked San Lorenzo and the ranch belonging to Luis Terrazas, Governor of Chihuahua. The renegades slaughtered over one hundred horses, and near Santa Clara, thirty miles west of San Lorenzo, they murdered several Mexicans and captured several horse herds to replenish their depleted stock. Terrazas swiftly ordered Federal troops and volunteers into the field to track Victorio.⁵³

Colonel Adolfo Valle, accompanied by 370 cavalry and 150 infantry, managed to corner the hostiles at Ojo de Piño, and in the skirmish that followed, three Mexicans and four hostiles were slain. On July 29, the Mexican force again attacked the Apaches who were racing to the Rio Grande. In this clash six Mexicans were killed; the Apaches outdistanced the Mexican force and managed to cross the Rio Grande. As the hostiles were endeavoring to bypass Fort Quitman, they were spotted by Colonel Ben Grierson and his Tenth Cavalry escort patrolling in the

⁵² New York Times, June 9, 1880, p. 8, col. 3.

⁵³ New York Times, June 2, 1880, p. 1, col. 6.

vicinity.⁵⁴ Only the timely arrival of Captains Nicholas Nolan and Charles Viele, with troops from the Tenth Cavalry, saved Grierson.

Victorio retreated northward toward the Guadalupe Mountains. The Mexican troops in pursuit of Victorio halted at Fort Quitman and returned to Chihuahua. Victorio's luck continued to falter. At Rattlesnake Springs, two companies, under Captain Viele, set an ambush near the Hueco Tanks, the only source of water. The fatigued renegades were straggling toward the ravine when unexpectedly, the concealed troopers delivered an appalling volley of rifle fire. The Apaches quickly scrambled behind the nearest rocks and the two sides exchanged fire for two hours.⁵⁵ Captain J. C. Gilmore and a detachment from the Twenty-Fourth Infantry, escorting a supply train, arrived at the scene of the battle unaware of the fight that had just occurred. The Apaches, seeing an opportunity for securing desperately needed supplies, attacked the supply wagons but were repulsed by the detachment riding in the wagons unknown to the Apaches.⁵⁶

The exhausted and thirsty Apaches regrouped and retreated across the Rio Grande. Victorio's destination

⁵⁴New York Times, July 30, 1880, p. 2, col. 1.

⁵⁵Thrapp, Victorio and the Mimbres Apaches, p. 288.

⁵⁶Carl C. Rister, The Southwestern Frontier 1865-1881 (New York: Russell and Russell, 1928; Reprint ed. 1969), p. 213.

was the sanctuary of the Candelaria Range. This time Victorio was in Mexico permanently, never to raid into the United States again.

Some Mescaleros from Victorio's band did continue to raid into southern New Mexico and West Texas. As a result, all stage travel between Socorro, Silver City, and El Paso were hazardous because of these incessant raids.⁵⁷

In Mexico, Chief Caballeo, leader of the Mescaleros with Victorio, ordered his people to return with him to the Mescalero Reservation, but Victorio would not permit any unnecessary reduction of his band. To remove any doubt of his authority, Victorio shot the Mescalero chief. The Mescaleros stayed.⁵⁸

Governor Terrazas appointed Don Joaquin Terrazas, his cousin, to lead the recently reorganized Mexican forces, but there was bitter disagreement between Joaquin Terrazas and Federal Colonel Valle concerning the strategy to be employed against Victorio. Valle's argument was that every time his forces pursued the renegades, they would reach the American border and safety. Joaquin Terrazas proposed that Valle's Federal troops be reassigned to his command, but Valle countered, arguing

⁵⁷Cruse, p. 54.

⁵⁸Thrapp, Victorio and the Mimbres Apaches, p. 291.
Note: According to Kaywakla, Caballeo or Caballero and his band were unknown. Ball, pp. 73-74.

that his men were too exhausted to pursue any Apaches. Valle refused to participate in the Governor's campaign. The Governor, however, would not be deterred. He ordered Joaquin Terrazas and Juan Mata Ortiz, an Indian scalp hunter, to raise the necessary troops. They were able to hire 219 civilians plus Tarahumare scouts.⁵⁹

On September 10, forces from all points were converging on Victorio. Texas Ranger Lieutenant Baylor, fourteen Texas Rangers, and numerous volunteer citizens linked with Captain Charles Parker's sixty-eight Apache scouts and Lieutenant James Maney with twenty troopers from the Ninth Cavalry.⁶⁰ Colonel George Buell's troops from New Mexico scouted down the Rio Grande, on the Mexican side, in the search for the elusive Victorio. Buell's men were camped at Borracho when news arrived from Governor Terrazas stating that the Mexican Government objected to the Americans' presence in Mexico. Colonel Buell complied with the demand and led his troops back into New Mexico.⁶¹ Paul Wellman stated that it was the combined American and Mexican venture that located

⁵⁹ Thrapp, Victorio and the Mimbres Apaches, pp. 294-295.

⁶⁰ Paul I. Wellman, Death in the Desert: The Fifty Years' War for the Great Southwest (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1935), p. 189. Note: Dan L. Thrapp states that it was H. K. Parker and not Charles Parker. Thrapp, Victorio and the Mimbres Apaches, p. 298.

⁶¹ New York Times, October 20, 1880, p. 1, col. 7.

Victorio's trail and followed it to Tres Castillos. It was at that point when Joaquin Terrazas astonished his American allies by requesting they return across the border. His reasons were that the Chiricahua scouts were too savage and many of them were related to members in Victorio's band.⁶²

Joaquin Terrazas received reports from his Tarahumare scouts that Victorio was bound for either Cerro Lagrimas or for Tres Castillos. Terrazas followed a southerly route and at Ojo del Carrizo he divided his force. Mata Ortiz, with one column, proceeded south toward Cerro Tosisihue, while Terrazas followed fresh renegade tracks leading west to Llanos de los Castillos. Terrazas, with an eleven man patrol, arrived at Tres Castillos at two o'clock in the afternoon on October 14. He surveyed the area but there were no signs of any hostiles. Terrazas climbed one of the principal hills and scanned the horizon with his binoculars. Suddenly he spotted a trail of dust about a dozen miles away to the south. He quickly surmised that this was Victorio's band approaching Tres Castillos and so he hurriedly rode off to reunite his column with Ortiz's.⁶³

Once reunited, the Mexican force encircled the

⁶²Wellman, pp. 189-190.

⁶³Thrapp, Victorio and the Mimbres Apaches, pp. 301-302.

Apaches and immediately collided with Victorio's main group. Shooting between the two antagonists quickly ensued and continued until midnight. By ten o'clock in the morning, the fighting finally ceased. Terrazas lost three men in the action, but he had slain and scalped over seventy-eight Apaches, of whom fifty were warriors and the remainder women and children. The low Mexican casualty rate was attributed to the Apaches' lack of ammunition. Terrazas bagged seventy prisoners, recovered two Apache captives, and recaptured 250 horses and mules in the Apache camp.⁶⁴

The death of Victorio is the subject of dispute. One report stated that he was killed in the first exchange of fire.⁶⁵ A second version described Victorio's death as a coup de grace ordered by Terrazas.⁶⁶ James Kaywakla, a four year old survivor of the battle, stated that Victorio committed suicide by stabbing himself with his knife into his heart.⁶⁷ For still another version, Lieutenant Thomas Cruse stated that the Mexicans were able to entice Victorio to participate in "a big fiesta," and subsequently Victorio's band was duly "exterminated."⁶⁸

⁶⁴New York Times, October 23, 1880, p. 2, col. 4.

⁶⁵Stout, p. 176.

⁶⁶Thrapp, Victorio and the Mimbres Apaches, p. 305.

⁶⁷Ball, p. 102.

⁶⁸Cruse, pp. 85-86.

Thirty warriors, including an aged warrior named Nana, escaped the catastrophe at Tres Castillos. The Mexican authorities stated that they had a "competent force" pursuing them and expected little trouble. Colonel Buell, over confidently, remarked, "I think I shall be able to head [off] the small party that escaped."⁶⁹

The aftermath of Tres Castillos did not produce the results desired by the American or Mexican authorities, which was the termination of the Apache "problem" and a lasting peace in northern Mexico and in the American Southwest. President Rutherford B. Hayes expressed an optimistic sigh of relief as he announced to the nation the death of Victorio:

The guerrilla warfare carried on for two years by Victorio and his band of Southern Apaches has virtually come to an end by the death of that chief and most of his followers on Mexican soil.⁷⁰

⁶⁹New York Times, October 28, 1880, p. 2, col. 6.

⁷⁰James D. Richardson, A Compilation of the Messages and Paper of the Presidents, Vol. VII, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1898), p. 624.

CHAPTER IV

MUTINY AT CIBICU AND THE AFTERMATH AT CHEVELON'S FORK

The death of Victorio at Tres Castillos brought an uneasiness in Apacheria. The renegade Nana led the only remaining Apache band on the warpath. This band was composed of the Warm Springs remnants of Victorio's band, Chiricahuas, "a few Coyoteroes, and some renegades from bands of the White Mountain Reservation."¹ They raided the towns in the northern Mexican states of Sonora and Chihuahua, "occasionally extending their pillaging operations north into Arizona and New Mexico, and returning to the fastness of the Sierra Madre Mountains when pursued by American troops."² The authority granting American troops to cross the international boundary did not go into effect until September 21, 1882.³

In August 1881, the combination of mismanagement

¹Britton Davis, The Truth About Geronimo, ed. M. M. Quaife (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1929), p. 9.

²Davis, p. 8.

³Charles I. Bevans, comp., Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States of America 1776-1949, Vol. 9 (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1972), p. 854.

and corruption by Indian Agent J. C. Tiffany and the Tucson Ring brought discontent at the San Carlos Reservation. The Ring was a collection of "wealthy unscrupulous men who throw a sanctimonious cloak over their rascalities and plunder the Indian and the government. . . ." The Ring, and fellow conspirators, not only funneled federal funds into their pockets but in doing so deprived the San Carlos Apaches of necessary food supplies.⁴ In addition to the Ring, the White Mountain and Chiricahua lands were overrun by miners and an influx of Mormon settlers east of the San Carlos Reservation.⁵

Nock-aye-de-Klinney, a former Scout, was a White Mountain Apache who had become intrigued with the Americans' culture and particularly Christianity while visiting Washington, D. C. in 1870. He was deeply affected by the story of Christ's resurrection and thought "how marvelous it was that one might pass away from this mortal world and yet be brought forth again to eternal life."⁶

Despite marvelling at the Americans' religion and culture, Nock-aye-de-Klinney possessed a lingering hatred

⁴ Mesilla Valley Independent (New Mexico), September 22, 1877, p. 2, col. 1.

⁵ Ralph H. Ogle, Federal Control of the Western Apaches 1848-1886 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1970), p. 203.

⁶ Cornelius C. Smith, "Fight at Cibicu," Arizona Hiways, 32 (May, 1956), 2.

for the Americans. With his newly acquired knowledge, he became a successful medicine man with a wide following among his people. As the Apaches grew more restless and disenchanted with the reservation authorities, Nock-aye-de-Klinney's appeal steadily increased. John Clum, San Carlos Indian Agent, stated that Nock-aye-de-Klinney's motives were in conspiracy with Geronimo "instead of by the god Usen [Apache god]." ⁷ By August 1881, Nock-aye-de-Klinney's preaching related exclusively to "the return of better times," and in order to achieve the resurrection, new dances had to be learned. ⁸ He also promised that he would resurrect all the dead Apaches. ⁹ Nock-aye-de-Klinney further excited his people when he announced he would resurrect Diablo and Eskiole, two former Coyotero chiefs. Everyone at the San Carlos Reservation, Apaches and Scouts, was affected by the "dances, dreams, and tiswin [liquor]." ¹⁰

⁷Woodworth Clum, Apache Agent: The Story of John P. Clum (Cambridge, Mass.: The Riverside Press, 1936), p. 265.

⁸Dan L. Thrapp, The Conquest of Apacheria (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1967), p. 218.

⁹William B. Kessel, "The Battle of Cibicu and Its Aftermath: A White Mountain Apache's Account," Ethnohistory, 21 (Spring 1974), 130.

¹⁰George Crook, General George Crook: His Autobiography, ed. Martin F. Schmitt (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1946), p. 242.

Nock-aye-de-Klinney's inability to resurrect the two Coyoteros caused considerable skepticism among the Apaches. To save face, he encouraged the Apaches to dance again, and if unsuccessful at resurrecting the dead, "it was because of the whites" and they must be killed.

Lieutenant Thomas Cruse, in command of Company A, Indian Scouts, feared these dances because they "always meant trouble"¹¹ As many as four to five hundred Apaches participated in the dances.

Nock-aye-de-Klinney refused invitations to call upon either Agent Tiffany or Colonel Eugene A. Carr, commander at Fort Apache. On August 13, 1881, General Orlando B. Willcox, commander of the Department of Arizona, ordered Colonel Carr to apprehend the medicine man after Carr consulted with Tiffany. Carr was apprehensive about arresting the prophet but Tiffany argued that Carr should "lure the medicine man into the post and then arrest him." Carr demanded precise instructions as to the situation. Tiffany replied that it did not matter if the Apache was killed or arrested. On August 29, Carr accompanied by D and E Troops, Sixth Cavalry, Lieutenant Cruse's Company A, composed of twenty-five Apache scouts, and approximately seventeen civilians departed for the prophet's location

¹¹Thomas Cruse, Apache Days and After (Caldwell, Idaho: The Claxton Printers, Ltd., 1941), p. 95.

near Cibicu Creek.¹²

Cruse was doubtful of the Scouts' loyalty, "if it comes to a showdown I don't see how they can side with us." Therefore, Carr withheld ammunition from them for several weeks and did not issue any ammunition until they arrived at Carrizo Creek. Cruse even suggested that his company be directed to Fort Huachuca and be replaced by Lieutenant Stephen Mills' company, which was a mixture of Mohave-Apaches, Yuma-Apaches, and Chiricahuas.¹³ Word of the authorization for transfer never arrived due to the downing of the telegraph lines by the hostiles.¹⁴

At Carrizo Creek, Colonel Carr briefed his troops and specifically his Scouts. Confident that they understood that it was Nock-aye-de-Klinney's doings that had caused the unrest, Carr set off to arrest the medicine man. Sergeant Mose, an Apache scout, was sent in advance to explain to the prophet "that the march was not made with any hostile intent," and to tell the Apaches not to fire at the troops or to leave their camp.¹⁵

Colonel Carr passed many armed Apaches along the trail to the medicine man's camp, but there were no serious

¹²Dan L. Thrapp, General Crook and the Sierra Madre Adventure (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1972), p. 14.

¹³Cruse, p. 100.

¹⁴Frank C. Lockwood, The Apache Indians (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1938), p. 237.

¹⁵Cruse, p. 104.

incidents. When Carr arrived at the camp, Mose and Nock-aye-de-Klinney were together. Using an interpreter, Charles Hurrle, Carr stated to the prophet that he:

would treat him as a friend till those charges had been investigated and if not true he would be released. I told him the agent [Tiffany] wanted to bring him in to talk, etc. . . . I then ordered a guard detailed; told him that he was in charge of that Sergeant, [John F.] MacDonald, Troop E, 6th Cavalry; that if he tried to escape he would be killed. He smiled and said he did not want to escape, he was perfectly willing to go. I then told him that if there was an attempt at rescue he would be killed. He smiled at that also, and said no one would attempt to rescue him. I also told him he could take part of his family along with him.¹⁶

Nock-aye-de-Klinney replied that he had important business to settle first before he would depart but when it was resolved he would return to Fort Apache in three or four days time. Carr retorted, "that will not do." Nock-aye-de-Klinney had to accompany him "now."¹⁷

As the dialogue between the two men was taking place, several hundred Apaches had assembled in the rear of the prophet's lodge. Carr took notice of this movement and realized that any further discussion would be fruitless. It was also apparent to Carr that his interpreter had erred on numerous occasions. "The Indians, getting an erroneous impression of what was intended, became greatly

¹⁶Thrapp, p. 20.

¹⁷Cruse, p. 106.

excited . . ." when Sergeant MacDonald and Sergeant Mose hurried Nock-aye-de-Klinney away from his group and set him on a horse. Carr issued the order to mount and "advance carbine."¹⁸ Carr, with his immediate staff, was in the lead followed by Captain Edmund C. Hentig with D Troop, next were Cruse and his Scouts, while Lieutenant William Stanton, with E Troop, was detailed as the rear guard.¹⁹ Slowly the command edged away from Cibicu closely shadowed by the Apaches.

Colonel Carr made camp a short distance from Cibicu Creek. Lieutenant Cruse was appointed Officer of the Day with special orders to guard Nock-aye-de-Klinney. Cruse stated that his instructions were to place him "in the inclosure being made of packsaddles and cargo and warn him to sit there quietly."²⁰

As the troops were setting up their camp, some of the prophet's followers were crossing the creek and attempted to enter the encampment. The prophet's brother told the Apaches, . . . "I will get my brother. No get my brother back, lots of trouble, you shoot."²¹ Carr yelled, "those Indians mustn't come into camp! Direct Troop Commanders to keep them out!" Captain Hentig, who had been watching his orderly, Private Edward Livingston, set out his bed roll, "moved toward the ford where a considerable

¹⁸Smith, p. 3. ¹⁹Cruse, p. 107.

²⁰Ibid., p. 110. ²¹Kessel, p. 131.

number of Apaches, mounted and dismounted, were moving. Hentig was unarmed, for his pistol still hung on his saddle." Hentig shouted at the Apaches "U-Ka-She! Get Away! Get Away!" It was this incident that triggered the Apaches to start firing.²² Tom Friday, a White Mountain Apache, has related a version that is at odds with all other accounts of the Cibicu fight. He stated Hentig grabbed the medicine man by the hair and cursed his brother. According to Friday, Hentig ordered his soldiers to kill the two Apaches, an order the soldiers carried out. It was this action by Hentig that prompted the scouts to turn on the troops.²³

Dandy Jim, a mutinous Apache Scout, hailed Hentig and proceeded forward and then "all hell broke loose."²⁴ Hentig was killed instantly. Livingston, Hentig's orderly, was also killed in the first moments of the fight. Sergeant MacDonald shot Nock-aye-de-Klinney but was wounded in the leg.²⁵

Carr's troops answered the Apache Scouts' fire by returning a well directed volley. Stanton's E Troop successfully swept the Apaches before them. Numerous Apaches were killed in this exchange including eight of

²²Cruse, p. 111. ²³Kessel, p. 131.

²⁴Cruse, p. 111.

²⁵James T. King, War Eagle: A Life of Eugene A. Carr (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1963), pp. 209-210.

the mutinous Scouts.²⁶ The soldiers cleared the immediate vicinity of Apaches which alleviated the "danger of any overwhelming rush by the Indians was past for the moment." Cruse approached Carr to report the medicine man's death and it was then that he "learned of the treachery of the Scouts."²⁷

The troops barricaded themselves from the enemy fire that continued until dusk. After conferring with his subordinate officers, Colonel Carr decided to withdraw from his positions. Even though half of their horses had been stolen, reduced to ten days rations, and outnumbered, Carr knew it was futile to defend his position against such overwhelming odds. Carr gave the order to prepare to move out.²⁸ The dead soldiers were buried and the wounded prepared for the retreat. Anton Mazzanovich stated "about nine P.M. Sergeant [John A.] Smith observed the medicine man crawling about on the ground. The Indian had not been killed. . . . Not daring to shoot for fear of alarming the command, Smith grabbed an ax that was lying [sic] nearby . . . and dispatched the wounded Apache."²⁹ By approximately ten o'clock that evening, Carr led sixty-two Americans and one Apache Scout, Sergeant Mose, on the march

²⁶Ibid., p. 210. ²⁷Cruse, p. 114.

²⁸King, p. 211.

²⁹Anton Mazzanovich, Trailing Geronimo (3d ed.; Los Angeles: Haynes Corporation, 1931), p. 124. Note: Cruse states that he was shot again, Cruse, p. 116.

to Fort Apache.³⁰ The command arrived safely in the afternoon on August 31, 1881.³¹

The hostile Apaches, including many of the mutinous scouts, followed on the heels of the troops. The Apaches approached the fort and "in one of the extremely rare instances" attacked the compound.³² The Apaches were driven off but not before wounding Lieutenant Charles Gordon. Cruse states that the only reason the Apaches were unable to capture the fort was because they were leaderless.³³

Throughout the country rumors were circulating stating that Carr had met the same fate as Colonel George A. Custer. General Irwin McDowell, commanding the Division of the Pacific, wired General Orlando Willcox, commander of the Department of Arizona, to ascertain if there was any truth of the annihilation of Carr's command. Willcox replied that his reports from the field confirmed a massacre of Carr's men and only "a few of General Carr's command escaped at Cibicu Creek."³⁴ McDowell, fearing a widespread Indian uprising, promptly dispatched twenty companies of troops into the Arizona Territory. General William T. Sherman, commanding general of the Army, stated,

³⁰Cruse, pp. 117-118. ³¹Lockwood, p. 240.

³²Dan L. Thrapp, The Conquest of Apacheria (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1967), p. 227.

³³Cruse, p. 118. ³⁴King, p. 214.

"it would be well for the Apaches at the San Carlos agency to realize that at any time the troops in Arizona can promptly be reinforced from the north and east. Sooner or later some considerable number of these Apaches will have to be killed by bullets rather than rope."³⁵ Sherman added that if extermination of the Apaches was the only solution to the "problem," then it was to be employed. He demanded "results not intentions."³⁶

The tremendous influx of troops greatly disheartened the Apaches. The failure of Nock-aye-de-Klinney to resurrect himself was also discouraging and slowly most of the Apaches rejoined their families on the reservation. There were, however, approximately sixty die-hard renegades who refused to concede. These hostiles diffused into several splinter groups and scattered in all directions.³⁷ Troops and Scouts from Camp Verde reconnoitered the area around Cibicu Creek for a week but only "captured a troop pack mule fully loaded with thousands of rounds of rifle ammunition."³⁸

Two Coyotero leaders, George and Bonito, were implicated by the Army for their part in the Cibicu affair

³⁵ John P. Clum, "Apache Misrule: A Bungling Agent Sets the Military Arm in Motion," New Mexico Historical Review, Vol. V, No. 2, (April, 1930), 150.

³⁶ Ogle, p. 206. ³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Dan R. Williamson, Narr. "Story of Oskay De No Tah," Arizona Historical Review, Vol. 3 No. 3, (October, 1930), 80.

but were paroled by General Willcox. The events to follow are what John P. Clum termed as "the last scene in this great drama of sorry blunders. . . ." ³⁹ Five days after Willcox paroled the two Apaches, Major James Biddle, with three troops of cavalry, arrived at Camp Thomas to cancel the two Apaches' parole. Camped nearby were the Chiricahuas and Coyoteros. This show of military force so near their camp prompted the Coyoteros to seek sanctuary in the Chiricahua camp. ⁴⁰ In fear of an unexpected attack by the troops, "Juh, Geronimo, Chatto, and Nachee [Natchez]," with approximately seventy warriors fled the reservation toward their sanctuaries in the Sierra Madre. ⁴¹ Hiram Price, the Indian Commissioner, stated "their flight was occasioned by fear, not hostility." Ezra Hoag, the civilian in charge at Camp Thomas, reported the Chiricahuas were "literally scared away" by the Army's show of force. ⁴² General Willcox gave another version as to the Chiricahuas bolting. He blamed the civilians on the reservation because they "did not help them [Chiricahuas] take out a water ditch." He also said that the Apaches feared being disarmed. ⁴³ The evidence presented to prove that their

³⁹ John P. Clum, "Geronimo," New Mexico Historical Review, Vol. III, No. 2, (April, 1928), 129.

⁴⁰ Thrapp, The Conquest of Apacheria, p. 232.

⁴¹ Ogle, p. 208. ⁴² Clum, "Geronimo," p. 129.

⁴³ Lockwood, p. 244.

flight was not premeditated was the large number of cattle that were left behind.⁴⁴

The mutinous scouts, Company A, First Scout Battalion, were veterans and until Cibicu were loyal in the execution of their duties.⁴⁵ Of the twenty-five scouts at Cibicu Creek, only Sergeant Mose did not desert to Nock-aye-de-Klinney's cause. The majority of the scouts either voluntarily surrendered or were captured. Five of the disloyal scouts were tried by a general court-martial for mutiny, desertion, and murder. Two were sentenced to life imprisonment at Alcatraz Island and three sentenced to be hanged. The three were Sergeant Dandy Jim, the accused slayer of Captain Hentig; Sergeant Dead Shot; and Private Skitashe (Skippy). On March 3, 1882, they were hanged at Fort Grant.⁴⁶ With the exception of several former scouts still out, the impact of the trials and sentences on the Apaches "had a corrective effect."⁴⁷

Desertions did not cease as a result of the trials, but mutinies by Apache scout companies never occurred again and there were no further reports of any Apache scouts attacking Army troops. Joyce Mason stated that the Scouts

⁴⁴Clum, "Geronimo," p. 130.

⁴⁵Fairfax Downey and Jacques Noel Jacobsen, Jr. The Red/Bluecoats: The Indian Scouts U. S. Army (Fort Collins, Colorado: The Old Army Press, 1973), p. 29.

⁴⁶Thrapp, The Conquest of Apacheria, p. 230.

⁴⁷Downey, p. 31.

inferred from the sentences that "deserters were not punished but mutineers were," therefore sporadic desertions continued but there was never another mutiny.⁴⁸

The die-hard renegades, including some former scouts, united under the leadership of Na-ti-o-tish and continued their raiding. On July 17, 1882, the band, numbering approximately fifty-four warriors, raided the San Carlos Agency and murdered Charley Colvig, Chief of Police, and seven of his Indian Police in an attempt to rouse the Apaches on the reservation to flee with him.⁴⁹ Na-ti-o-tish's efforts were not successful, and troops were dispatched to the agency to capture the renegades.

Na-ti-o-tish was informed by his sentries of cavalry pursuit led by Major A. R. Chaffee and his white horse troop of the Third Cavalry, and four troops from the Third and Sixth Cavalry under Colonel A. W. Evans. The Apaches carefully prepared an ambush for Chaffee's column at Chevelon's Fork but on July 17, they were almost ambushed themselves. Britton Davis reported on "the night of the 16th Chaffee sent word back to Evans that he was close on the hostiles and needed reinforcements." Lieutenant George Converse, with Troop E, Third Cavalry, joined Chaffee the following morning. The Apaches,

⁴⁸Joyce E. Mason, "The Use of Indian Scouts in the Apache Wars, 1870-1886" (PhD dissertation, Indiana University, 1970), p. 206.

⁴⁹Davis, pp. 9-10.

unaware that Converse's troop also rode white horses, only watched Chaffee and "if they saw Converse's troop of white horses at all, they mistook them for stragglers from Chaffee's." Much to the Apaches' chagrin, there were three more troops of cavalry trailing Converse. In addition to these troops, Coyotero Scouts from Fort Apache and Tonto Scouts from Fort McDowall, under Lieutenant George Morgan and Al Sieber, alerted Chaffee's troop of the trap.⁵⁰ The troops decisively overpowered the hostiles killing Na-ti-o-tish and over twenty of his warriors while the survivors fled in terror to the reservation. Ralph Ogle wrote this "was more than a victory; it was the end of an era in Apache affairs. Never again were the troops to fight the Apaches in Arizona; never again, with the exception of the Chiricahuas, were the Apaches violently to oppose governmental control."⁵¹

The ramifications of the minor battle at Cibicu Creek were to be felt for five more years. Ralph Ogle stated, "if the agency police had been allowed to ferret out the ring leaders and run down the few recalcitrants remaining out, the trouble would have ended in a few weeks. But grafting agency officials and aspiring military officers suffered no restraints . . ." and therefore the Apaches, primarily the Chiricahuas, and the United States would

⁵⁰Davis, pp. 13-14.

⁵¹Ogle, p. 215.

remain antagonists until September 1886.⁵² John P. Clum stated that the Cibicu "affair had much the appearance of a sudden and altogether unpremeditated flurry, and would probably never have occurred but for the firing of the Indian Scouts on Hentig. There was certainly no concerted action or prearranged attack."⁵³

⁵²Ibid., p. 206.

⁵³Clum, "Apache Misrule," p. 150.

CHAPTER V

THE FIRST GERONIMO CAMPAIGN

During the Cibicu incident, the Chiricahua and Warm Springs bands under Juh, Natchez, Chihuahua, and Geronimo bolted from the San Carlos Reservation for their Sierra Madre sanctuaries. In New Mexico it was rumored that over three hundred Apaches had fled the reservation.¹ Apache scouts trailed them to Fort Bayard, New Mexico but were unable to catch them. As the hostiles entered Mexico, they were able to elude their pursuers due to the restriction against American troops crossing the international border. Once the Apaches were in the Sierra Madre, they generally confined their raids to villages in Sonora and Chihuahua but occasionally mounted forays across the border.² Unknown to the Apaches, the United States and Mexico signed an agreement on July 29, 1882, in Washington, D. C., stating that the "regular federal troops of the two Republics may reciprocally cross the boundary line of the two countries, when they are in close pursuit of a band of

¹Silver City Enterprise (New Mexico), March 30, 1883, p. 3, col. 3.

²Dan R. Williamson, Narr. "Story of Oskay-de-no-tah," Arizona Historical Review, Vol. 3, No. 3, (October, 1930), 81.

savage Indians. . . ." ³ This agreement placed few restrictions on the renegades' movements but placed their sanctuaries in jeopardy of detection by American troops.

The Commanding General of the Army, William T. Sherman, replaced Colonel Orlando B. Willcox as commander of the Department of Arizona. Robert T. Lincoln, Secretary of War, decided to send an experienced and energetic officer to reverse the situation in the Territory. On September 4, 1882, General George Crook, previously the commander of the Department of the Platte, assumed command of the Department of Arizona. ⁴

When Crook arrived in Arizona, the Apache situation was perilous. Chiricahua and Warm Springs bands roamed in Mexico and the Apaches on the reservations, coerced by the Tucson Ring, started raiding for food supplies. Crook inspected his department to get a first hand account and as a result of his tour he made several changes to make those on the reservations self-supporting. ⁵

Crook held a council with the leading members of the reservation bands. Here he introduced Captain Emmett

³ Charles I. Bevans, comp., Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States of American 1776-1949, Vol. 9 (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1972), p. 847.

⁴ Dan L. Thrapp, General Crook and the Sierra Madre Adventure (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1972), pp. 101-103.

⁵ George Crook, General George Crook: His Autobiography, ed. Martin F. Schmitt (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1946), p. 243.

Crawford, the commander of the San Carlos Reservation, and Lieutenant Britton Davis, Third Cavalry, his assistant and commander of B Company, Indian Scouts. Lieutenant Charles Gatewood, Sixth Cavalry, commanded the Fort Apache (White Mountain) Reservation and A Company, Indian Scouts. These officers had full military supervision of their respective reservations.⁶ The Apache leaders received word that they would no longer be tagged for identification but would be liable for their actions to Captain Crawford and Lieutenant Gatewood. The Apache police and judiciary system were to ensure Apache control over their own people. The manufacturing of tiswin, a liquor, was strictly prohibited as were wife-beating and disfiguring. Federal troops would be employed only if the Apache authorities were unable to maintain discipline.⁷

Crook then turned his attention to the Apache scouts. He requested an increase in the number of scouts from 125 to 250. The commander of the Pacific granted his request and Crook established five new companies of Apache scouts.⁸ Each company was composed of twenty-six privates, two corporals, and two sergeants.⁹ Most of the older

⁶Frank C. Lockwood, The Apache Indians (New York: Macmillan Company, 1938), p. 261.

⁷Crook, pp. 244-245.

⁸H. B. Wharfield, With Scouts and Cavalry at Fort Apache (Tucson, Arizona: Arizona Pioneers' Historical Society, 1965), p. 19.

⁹Lockwood, p. 263.

scouts were discharged and new recruits enlisted. In the fall of 1882, Crook retired to his headquarters at Fort Whipple and "awaited the inevitable irruption of the Chiricahua Apaches from their stronghold in the Sierra Madre in Mexico."¹⁰ To prevent any hostile activity, Crook dispatched Crawford and Scout Companies A, C, and D to patrol the border. Crawford, near Cloverdale, Arizona, sent several of his Apache scouts into Mexico to obtain any information of the hostiles, but they returned empty handed.¹¹ Rumors of Apache raids continued despite Crook's claim that there were no renegades in Arizona Territory. The territorial press denounced this claim as "ridiculous." The newspaper stated that "three weeks to the outbreak [escape by the hostiles] , there was constant exchange between Juh's band in Mexico and the San Carlos Indians." The press vehemently charged that Crook's scouts' willingness to fight the hostiles was a "hoax."¹²

In March 1883, the hostiles, under Chihuahua and Chatto, raided into Arizona near the San Carlos Reservation and returned through Silver City, New Mexico. On March 28, they murdered approximately twenty-six people, including Judge H. C. McComas and his wife. Their son, Charley, was

¹⁰ John G. Bourke, On the Border with Crook (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1891), p. 447.

¹¹ Britton Davis, The Truth About Geronimo, ed. M. M. Quaife (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1929), p. 55.

¹² Silver City Enterprise (New Mexico), March 30, 1883, p. 2, col. 2.

kidnapped and was never recovered.¹³

Crook responded quickly to the news of this raid. Crook's plan included a march of approximately 500 miles into Mexico. Crawford's Apache scouts had located the principal rancheria "at least 350 miles" from Cloverdale, Arizona.¹⁴ One of the hostiles involved in the raid near Silver City, decided that he had his fill of raiding and surrendered to the military authorities. Pa-nayo-tishn or Peaches, as he was known to the soldiers, offered to guide Crook into the impenetrable Sierra Madre strongholds where no Americans or scouts had ever entered. Several of the leading Apaches vouched for Peaches' intelligence and sincerity.¹⁵ To ensure his good intentions, "a half-dozen prominent scouts promised to guard and watch him."¹⁶

Crook realized that in order to march into the Sierra Madre, he would violate Article I of the Right to Pursue Indians Across Boundary Line, because it limited his entry into Mexico only when "in close pursuit."¹⁷ To

¹³New York Times, March 30, 1883, p. 2, col. 3.

¹⁴Silver City Enterprise (New Mexico), April 27, 1883, p. 2, col. 2.

¹⁵G. J. Fiebeger, "General Crook's Campaign in Old Mexico in 1883," The Papers of the Order of Indian Wars (Fort Collins, Colorado: The Old Army Press, 1936, pp. 196-197).

¹⁶John G. Bourke, An Apache Campaign In the Sierra Madre: An Account of the Expedition in Pursuit of the Hostile Chiricahua Apaches in the Spring of 1883 (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958), p. 33.

¹⁷Bevans, p. 847.

circumvent any potential problems, "Crook visited Guaymas, Hermosillo (in Sonora), and Chihuahua . . . where he conferred with Generals Topete, Bernardo Reyes, and Carbo of the Mexican Army, Governor Torres, of Sonora, and Mayor Zubiran, of Chihuahua, by all of whom he was received most hospitably and encouraged in his purposes."¹⁸

Crook returned to San Bernardino Springs, Arizona, to review the final preparations for his expedition. His command consisted of "one hundred and ninety-three Apache scouts and one small company of the Sixth Cavalry, commanded by Major [Adna] Chaffee and Lieutenant Frank West. The scouts were commanded by Captain Emmet Crawford, Third Cavalry; Lieutenant [Charles] Gatewood, Sixth Cavalry; Lieutenant W. W. Forsyth, Sixth Cavalry; Lieutenant [James] MacKay, Third Cavalry, with Surgeon Andrews as medical officer." Also accompanying Crook were his aides-de-camp, Captain John Bourke and Lieutenant G. J. Fiebeger; the civilian chiefs of scouts Al Sieber and Archie MacIntosh; the interpreters Mickey Free, Severiano, and Sam Bowman.¹⁹

On May 1, 1883, Crook astride his mule, Apache, led his small expedition "down the hot and sandy valley of the San Bernardino, past the mouth of Guadalupe Canyon . . ." His guides were the Apache Scouts, Peaches and Alchesay.²⁰

¹⁸ Bourke, On the Border, p. 453.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Bourke, An Apache Campaign, p. 27.

The Apache Scout companies were all "in high feather, and entered into the spirit of the occasion with full zest."²¹ slowly the expedition travelled deep "into the unknown recesses of the Sierra Madre."²² The entire command suffered as it struggled over the rugged terrain covered with prickly vegetation that shredded their clothes and cut their bodies. Despite the hardships, "the Apache Scouts trudged without a complaint, and with many a laugh and zest. Each time camp was reached they showed themselves masters of the situation. . . . those Scouts who were not on watch gave themselves up to the luxury of the ta-a-chi, or sweat-bath."²³

The Scouts, on foot, spread out in a fan-like formation but "with no semblance of regularity; individual fancy alone governed." The Scouts moved in small groups of two or three scattering out among the rocks in all directions. They scanned their surroundings for hostile signs "with vision as keen as a hawk's," and listened for foreign sounds with "ears so sensitive that nothing" escaped their attention.²⁴

Apache Scouts located a hostile rancheria near the "head waters of the Yaqui River," and promptly dispatched

²¹Ibid., p. 33.

²²Bourke, On the Border, p. 453.

²³Bourke, An Apache Campaign, p. 62.

²⁴Ibid., p. 38.

several runners to alert Crook. Crook's Scouts stealthily advanced up the mountainside and encircled the camp. A brief skirmish ensued but the hostiles were demoralized by the surprise attack and rapidly yielded to Crook's Apache Scouts. Many of the hostile warriors had been absent on raids of their own and as they returned, they were apprehended and placed under guard by the Scouts.²⁵

Approximately 500 renegades, with their stolen goods and cattle, were escorted by the scouts to the San Carlos Reservation. The majority of those who came in were Warm Springs Apaches. The remaining Chiricahuas under Mangus, Loco, and Natchez remained in Mexico until October and November. The last Chiricahua band, under Geronimo, submitted to Crook and departed Mexico for the reservation in January 1884. These bands were relocated on the Fort Apache Reservation, "near the head-waters of the Turkey Creek, where, as well as on a part of the White River, they were set to work upon small farms." For approximately two years the peace reigned in Arizona Territory.²⁶

Once the former hostiles were settled on the reservation, all of the scouts were discharged except for Scout Companies A, B, and E.²⁷ The active duty Scouts returned to their homes to "live among their own people"

²⁵ Bourke, On the Border, p. 453.

²⁶ Ibid., p. 457.

²⁷ Davis, p. 71.

where they would be able to exert a temperate influence on the reservation.²⁸

The success in this Sierra Madre campaign proved that Crook's policy of using his Apache Scouts was successful. The Chiricahua and White Mountain Scouts demonstrated that they were the only men capable of successfully tracking and bringing their hostile kinsmen to bay.

The Chiricahuas, in an attempt to copy the Americans' ways, settled down to a life of farming. The land they were allotted, however, was not suitable for agricultural purposes. The choice plots of land "for farming purposes in the vicinity of Fort Apache had been assigned to the White Mountain, Cibicu, and Coyotero several years before. The newcomers had to take what was left."²⁹ Even though they were unable to acquire the necessary farm tools, they progressed steadily "to warrant the most hopeful anticipations." Several of their leaders, notably Chatto and Geronimo, had some of the best farms on the reservation. A general peace prevailed over New Mexico or Arizona without "an outrage or depredation of any kind."³⁰ Most of the Chiricahua and Warm Springs

²⁸ Lockwood, p. 260.

²⁹ Davis, p. 137.

³⁰ U. S., War Department, Report of the Secretary of War; Being Part of the Message and Documents Communicated to the Two Houses of Congress at the Beginning of the Second Session of the Forty-Eighth Congress 1884-85, p. 173.

leaders were content with reservation life and one of them, Chatto, was enlisted as First Sergeant of B Company, Indian Scouts.

In the summer of 1884, a notable disturbance occurred that had the potential of shattering the peace. A discontented Chiricahua chief, Ka-ya-ten-nae, attempted to stir his band into dances that recalled their valor in past engagements with the troops.³¹ Before the excitement reached a frenzied stage, Lieutenant Britton Davis dispatched Dutchy and other Apache Scouts to call in the chiefs for a council. The chiefs and leading men of the bands responded to Davis' call and arrived at his camp fully armed.

Chatto, Benito, Loco, Nana, Mangus, Geronimo, and Natchez entered the lieutenant's tent and seated themselves but Davis would not begin the talks until Ka-ya-ten-nae arrived. Davis, standing beside his tent, spotted Ka-ya-ten-nae and his band coming down an adjacent hill. His band halted approximately one hundred yards from the tent and there the chief spoke several words to his men. He was fully armed and primed for action. Davis stated, "he knew that he was the cause of the commotion, for he strode up to within three feet of me before he stopped and demanded angrily why I had sent for him."³² The young

³¹Ibid., p. 135.

³²Davis, p. 128.

lieutenant spoke firmly saying that Ka-ya-ten-nae was the instigator of the recent uneasiness on the reservation and that he was, with four troops of cavalry and scouts, there to arrest and escort him to see Captain Crawford at San Carlos.

Davis refused to answer any further questions and "for a moment he stood staring me in the face, then, without a word, wheeled in his tracks and started for his men. . . . Two scouts who had been standing behind me [Davis], Dutchy and a scout we called Charley, started after him with their rifles cocked and ready."³³ The scouts were prepared to kill the chief if there had been any threat to Davis' life. Apache sources have claimed that Mickey Free, scout and interpreter for Davis, "did not interpret honestly, and suspected that he was intentionally creating suspicion [in Davis' mind] of the trustworthy scouts. . . ." Chatto, no longer in many of the chiefs' favor, was also accused of conspiring against Ka-ya-ten-nae.³⁴

Ka-ya-ten-nae returned with his men to confront Davis. The chief was visibly shaken and found it difficult to ask Davis who his accuser might be. Davis reiterated that he would learn this information only at San Carlos.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Eve Ball, "The Apache Scouts: A Chiricahua Appraisal," Arizona and the West, Vol. 7, No. 4 (Winter, 1965), 324.

The young lieutenant espied his adversary's languishing self-mastery and calmly "unbuckled his cartridge belt with the revolver and threw it over my arm, telling him he was under arrest and would be sent to San Carlos at once with some of the scouts."³⁵ Davis permitted Ka-ya-ten-nae to retain his arms as a warrior, and within the hour the chief and his scout escort were on their way to San Carlos.

At San Carlos, Ka-ya-ten-nae was given a trial and found guilty of inciting the bands by an Apache jury. Captain Crawford, the presiding officer, sentenced the chief to three years imprisonment on Alcatraz Island.³⁶ Ka-ya-ten-nae served eighteen months of his sentence before General George Crook ordered his release from prison in early 1886. The chief returned to San Carlos, enlisted as a scout and "assisted the General [Crook] greatly in his efforts to secure the surrender" of Geronimo and his band in March 1886.³⁷

³⁵ Davis, p. 129.

³⁶ Report of the Secretary of War, p. 135.

³⁷ Davis, p. 130.

CHAPTER VI

THE SECOND GERONIMO CAMPAIGN

The Chiricahuas at San Carlos, numbering over five hundred, remained at peace despite power struggles between Indian Agent C. D. Ford and the military commander, Captain F. E. Pierce, First Infantry. Since assuming the command of San Carlos from Captain Emmet Crawford in February 1885, Pierce struggled to retain police control over the reservation, but his authority was challenged by Ford.¹ As a result of their rivalry, the Apaches were either neglected or used as pawns by the contesting authorities. Lieutenant Britton Davis aptly stated "that the Apache is no fool. He quickly saw the condition of affairs and at once took advantage of it. . . . The seed of divided authority sprouts and bears its natural fruit--defiance of all authority."²

The discontent at San Carlos spread to Fort Apache where the most recent hostiles were settled. At his camp

¹U. S., War Department, Report of the Secretary of War; Being Part of the Message and Documents Communicated to the Two Houses of Congress at the Beginning of the Second Session of the Forty-Eighth Congress 1884-1885, p. 183.

²Britton Davis, The Truth About Geronimo, ed. M. M. Quaife (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1929), pp. 138-139.

at Turkey Creek, Geronimo had been for several months restless because the Army had failed to discipline him for his past offences. He further resented the orders, established by General George Crook, prohibiting drunkenness, wife beatings, and "kindred minor offences." Geronimo refused to submit to Davis' authority "claiming a right to appeal to General Crook."³ Chihuahua and Geronimo were also distrustful of the Army. The Army's treatment of past Apache chieftains, notably Mangus Coloradas, who had been decapitated, unnerved them. The thought of mutilation, which for an Apache "was worse than death," fueled their thoughts for escape.⁴

On May 14, 1886, almost all of the Chiricahua and Warm Springs bands at Fort Apache went on a tiswin spree, but only one Apache, a scout who voluntarily surrendered, was taken into custody by Davis. The following morning, approximately thirty warriors plus Mangus, Geronimo, Natchez, Loco, Zela, Nana, and Chihuahua confronted Davis in front of his headquarters. The lieutenant posted his scouts who were armed for action. The Apache leaders and Davis entered his tent to begin their talk. Chihuahua, the most vocal, stated they had agreed to live in peace with everyone but "nothing had been said about their conduct

³ Silver City Enterprise (New Mexico), October 2, 1885, p. 2, col. 3.

⁴ Eve Ball, "The Apache Scouts: A Chiricahua Appraisal," Arizona and the West, Vol. 7, No. 4, (Winter, 1965), 325-326.

among themselves; they were not children to be taught how to live with their women and what they should eat or drink."⁵ He also told Davis of their latest drinking episode and asked what he proposed to do about it. Chihuahua and the others unanimously agreed that they must "all be punished or none."⁶ Davis replied that the situation was too serious for him to decide. He told them he would wire Crook for a directive.⁷

Davis wired Captain Pierce, his superior, at San Carlos. Pierce, still a novice of Apache ways, received the telegram but was uncertain of its importance to Crook. Pierce wisely consulted with Al Sieber, his Chief of Scouts, but unfortunately Sieber had a terrible hangover and was in no condition to give Pierce sound advice. Sieber scanned the telegram remarking it was only an Apache drinking spree and it was nothing serious. Pierce accepted Sieber's counsel and placed the telegram in a desk drawer.⁸

Davis waited for Crook's reply. He stated the Apaches "seemed to be waiting, as I was, for word from the General." On May 17, Davis received reports from his

⁵ Davis, p. 145.

⁶ Silver City Enterprise (New Mexico), October 2, 1885, p. 2, col. 3.

⁷ Davis, p. 146.

⁸ Dan L. Thrapp, Al Sieber: Chief of Scouts (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1964), p. 294.

scouts that an unknown number of Apaches had bolted.⁹ The direction of their escape was reported to be the Mogollon Mountains as all possible routes into Mexico were patrolled by the cavalry and scouts.¹⁰ The Apaches that escaped were "Geronimo, Chihuahua, Nachite [Natchez], Mangus, and old Nana. Chato, Benita, Loco, and Zele with three-fourths of the Chiricahua and Warm Springs refused to take part in it."¹¹

Crook promptly departed Fort Whipple and established temporary headquarters at Fort Bayard, New Mexico, to be close to the action.¹² Colonel L. P. Bradley, commander of the District of New Mexico, was directed by Major-General John M. Schofield, commander of the Division of the Missouri, to assist Crook without any regards to division boundaries and "to act fully under the orders of General Crook during present operations." Four troops of the Eighth Cavalry from Texas were ordered to reinforce the troops in New Mexico. The Third Cavalry was assigned to patrol the Rio Grande below Fort Bliss, Texas, to prevent any hostiles from escaping in that

⁹Davis, p. 149.

¹⁰El Paso Daily Times (Texas), May 22, 1885, p. 1, col. 3.

¹¹Davis, p. 152.

¹²George Crook, General George Crook: His Autobiography, ed. Martin Schmitt (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1946), p. 254.

vicinity.¹³

Reports continuously filtered into Crook's headquarters revealing the whereabouts of the renegades. One dispatch claimed they were near Diamond Creek in the Black Range, and immediately Major James Biddle and troops from the Sixth Cavalry were dispatched to Diamond Creek. Lieutenant Davis, with sixty White Mountain scouts, was also in pursuit.¹⁴ Other cavalry troops scoured the countryside through the Black Range, the Florida Mountains, and as far as Stein's Peak.¹⁵ Captain Allen Smith, Fourth Cavalry, and two cavalry troops encountered several hostiles at Devil's Creek and a skirmish quickly ensued in which one scout was wounded. The renegades slipped away unscathed.¹⁶

Many people in New Mexico were thoroughly disgusted with the troops' inability to capture the hostiles.¹⁷ In several Southwestern papers, rumors were printed that

¹³U. S., War Department, Report of the Secretary of War, 49th Cong., 1st Sess. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1886), p. 125.

¹⁴El Paso Daily Times (Texas), May 27, 1885, p. 1, col. 3.

¹⁵El Paso Daily Times (Texas), June 5, 1885, p. 1, col. 4.

¹⁶El Paso Daily Times (Texas), May 28, 1885, p. 1, col. 1.

¹⁷Lone Star (El Paso), May 27, 1885, p. 2, col. 4.

accused the Apache scouts of desertion.¹⁸ One unidentified military officer was quoted as saying that the Scouts could "rarely be relied upon. . . ."¹⁹ New Mexico Governor Lionel Sheldon received numerous petitions from irate citizens requesting he call out the First Cavalry Regiment, New Mexico Volunteers. Sheldon complied with the request and promptly dispatched Colonel Albert Fountain and the First Cavalry Regiment into the field, but soon they returned to Las Cruces, New Mexico exhausted and emptyhanded.²⁰ The following excerpt from a poem, "Song of the Apache," illustrates the citizens' contempt of the Army's handling of the Apache problem:

When I wish to rest my feet,
 General Crook and I will meet,
 and we'll sign a solemn pact,
 For a six months reign of peace. . . .²¹

Not all papers were so critical or abusive of the Scouts. In an editorial in the Lone Star, "the experiences of this campaign shows the inability of the troops to dislodge the Indians in any instance, and they have been run out of the Mogollon Mountains solely by

¹⁸ El Paso Daily Times (Texas), May 28, 1885, p. 1, col. 2.

¹⁹ New York Times, June 10, 1885, p. 1, col. 3.

²⁰ A. M. Gibson, The Life and Death of Albert Jennings Fountain (Norman: University of Oklahoma, 1965), pp. 132-133.

²¹ Black Range (Chloride, New Mexico), June 5, 1885, p. 1, col. 3.

Indian Scouts."²²

Despite Crook's efforts to contain the hostiles, by June 10, Apache Scouts reported all renegades heading for the Sierra Madre.²³ Crook moved his headquarters from Fort Bayard to Deming, New Mexico and there prepared his plans to enter Mexico. He organized two expeditions to pursue the hostiles. The American troops selected by Crook "were all picked athletes. . . ."²⁴ One column, commanded by Captain Emmet Crawford, consisted of Troop A, Sixth Cavalry, one hundred and thirty Apache scouts, primarily Chiricahuas and Warm Springs, and two pack trains. On June 11, this party proceeded south into Mexico. The second column, commanded by Captain Wirt Davis, was comprised of one troop of the Fourth Cavalry, one hundred scouts, and pack trains. This column departed Fort Bowie, Arizona on July 13.²⁵

The two columns slowly entered the wilderness of the Sierra Madre, and as they struggled over the rugged terrain the mules and horses "suffered considerably."

²²Editorial, Lone Star (El Paso), June 13, 1885, p. 3, col. 3.

²³El Paso Daily Times (Texas), June 10, 1885, p. 1, col. 3.

²⁴Charles F. Lummis, The Land of Poco Tiempo (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1906), p. 164.

²⁵Thrapp, p. 297.

several of the animals fell into rocky crevices.²⁶

Britton Davis remarked the "climbing to the crest of the Sierra Madre was no picnic."²⁷ The attrition rate of the Cavalry's horses forced the troopers to become infantrymen, much to their displeasure. The scouts, "trotting indefatigably afoot," were counted on heavily to track the hostiles.²⁸ This reliance on the scouts was vital as the campaign progressed. Due to the troopers' inability to keep pace with the scouts, "Crawford depended entirely upon his scouts for fighting."²⁹

The American columns labored through a "country of terrible roughness, where great privations were endured."³⁰ Crawford's party passed through the towns of Bacerac, Estancia, and Guachinera. They crossed the river at Oputo and "struck the trail of some hostiles who had been in the outskirts of the town. . . ." Chatto and thirty scouts were immediately dispatched to follow the trail of the renegades. The scouts located their camp but "on account of the rain the scouts were proceeding rather

²⁶ Thomas Cruse, Apache Days and After (Caldwell, Idaho: The Claxton Printers, Ltd., 1941), p. 219.

²⁷ Davis, p. 172.

²⁸ Cruse, p. 219.

²⁹ Eve Ball, In the Days of Victorio: Recollections of a Warm Springs Apache, narr. James Kaywaykla (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1970), p. 179.

³⁰ Lone Star (El Paso), August 12, 1885, p. 2, col. 4.

incautiously . . .," and as a result, one of the renegades detected the scouts and quickly sounded the alarm. The majority of the hostile warriors, women, and children escaped due to the action of their rearguard who successfully pinned down the scouts. The scouts, later, did capture fifteen women and children who were unable to flee with their band. The remainder of the hostile band escaped. As "was the usual result in fights with the Apache . . . they always chose a place where it was practically impossible to surprize them, and where in case of attack they had an easy line of escape in their rear."³¹

Captain Crawford knew it would be futile to attempt any further pursuit with the supplies that remained. Crawford directed H. W. Daly, the chief packer, and his pack trains to return to Lang's Ranch in New Mexico to collect three months supplies. Daly returned two weeks later with the necessary supplies and Crawford prepared to resume his march.³²

Crawford dispatched scouts in small parties within a fifty mile radius of his camp but "no trails other than cattle trails or those between the towns had been discovered." Crawford surmised that the hostiles must be in the higher ranges so he decided to reconnoiter the

³¹Davis, pp. 164-176.

³²H. W. Daly, "The Geronimo Campaign," Arizona Historical Review, Vol. 3, no. 1, (April, 1930), 28-29.

Sierra Madre.³³

One party of scouts, under Lieutenant Davis, crossed trails with a scouting party from Wirt's command led by Lieutenant Mathias Day. Davis found Day and another American in a wretched condition, "they were in their undershirts and torn overalls; hatless, dirty, unshaven for weeks, their feet swathed in bandages made from their flannel shirts."³⁴ Day's party had been living on "horse meat and acorns . . ." but when Davis discovered them, "they were out of food." Davis supplied them with rations to sustain them until they could obtain their own food and returned to Crawford's camp.³⁵

Crawford sent Davis, Sieber, Chatto, Free, and forty selected scouts to locate and pursue Geronimo's trail. On August 8, they started on their manhunt.³⁶ They located the trail which led the scouts down the eastern slopes of the Sierra Madre. Despite having exhausted their rations, they pressed on "hoping to overtake the hostiles before they got a remount" Davis stated the scouts' "progress was necessarily slow. The hostiles frequently changed direction to confuse

³³ Davis, p. 174.

³⁴ Ibid., pp. 174-175.

³⁵ El Paso Daily Times (Texas), September 8, 1885, p. 1, col. 5.

³⁶ Davis, pp. 176-178.

anyone who might be following them. The trail would at times lead due north, switch to the east, bend back toward the west or turn south. Frequently it would change direction on rocky ground, where even the tracks of the mule did not show. In such cases a halt, often of an hour or more, would be necessary to enable the scouts to again find the trail. These tactics, coupled with detours to avoid natural barriers in this mountainous country, forced us to travel a hundred and forty or fifty miles to cover a hundred as the crow flies."³⁷

Crawford had not received any word from Davis in over six days, therefore, he dispatched Lieutenant C. P. Elliott and five scouts to locate Davis and his party.³⁸ Elliott's party, with the exception of two scouts, were surprised by a superior Mexican force and subsequently incarcerated by them in Casas Grandes. The two scouts who were not with Elliott were able to locate Lieutenant Davis. Davis, escorted by Elliott's two scouts, was able to procure Elliott's release after producing proper and convincing identification for the Mexican officers. It certainly would have been beneficial for Elliott if he or any of his men had some command of the Spanish language.³⁹

³⁷Davis, pp. 178-179.

³⁸Ibid., p. 183. Note: H. W. Daly stated twenty-five scouts accompanied Elliott. Daly, p. 31.

³⁹Ibid., pp. 185-186.

Lieutenant Davis and his scouts pressed on after Geronimo but the chase was futile. Geronimo had long since passed into the Chiricahua Mountains in Arizona. Along the trail, Davis was forced to give up the search by Mexican Colonel Mesilla. Mesilla was also after Geronimo and did not want any interference from the American force. Davis obliged Mesilla and altered his course for El Paso, Texas, seventy-five miles away. Approximately ten miles outside of Juarez, Mexico, Davis rode his remaining mule and sped ahead to meet with the Mexican authorities to arrange their crossing into El Paso. Davis' physical appearance belied his being an officer in the United States Army. Davis commented on his attire, "I was certainly a sight for sore eyes. Ragged, dirty, a four months' beard, an old pair of black trousers that had been partially repaired with white thread blackened on the coffee pot, rawhide soles to my shoes, and my hair sticking through holes in my campaign hat. . . ." ⁴⁰

The Mexican officials initially refused to believe Davis' outlandish story. Only after Davis threatened to turn loose his scouts on Juarez did the Mexican authorities permit the party to cross into El Paso. The Mexicans had received confirmed reports of the presence of the Apache Scouts outside of El Paso del Norte's city limits. ⁴¹ On

⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 192.

⁴¹ Ibid., p. 193.

September 5, 1885, the "novel sight of Apache warriors" was seen on El Paso's streets. "They passed quickly through the city and went to camp at Fort Bliss."⁴² It had been twenty-four days since Davis departed Crawford's main camp and in that period of time Davis' party travelled:

over five hundred miles through a mountainous country in driving rains. . . . To avoid unexpectedly running into the hostiles . . . three scouts were kept constantly eight or ten miles in advance, they returning to us at night and being relieved by another three the next morning. Thus some of the ground was traversed three times.⁴³

On October 10, Crawford and Wirt Davis, and their columns, returned to Fort Bowie to confer with General Crook. It was also time to enlist new scouts or reenlist the veterans because their six month enlistments had expired. Many of the scouts were anxious to return to their families after almost a four month absence. Crook ordered Captain Davis to San Carlos and Captain Crawford to Fort Apache to recruit scouts for the upcoming winter campaign.⁴⁴

There was no shortage of volunteers to enlist for the new expeditions. Two battalions were formed of one hundred men each. The First Battalion, commanded by

⁴²El Paso Daily Times (Texas), September 8, 1885, p. 1, col. 4.

⁴³Davis, p. 194.

⁴⁴Crook, p. 258.

Captain Wirt Davis, was composed of San Carlos and White Mountain Scouts, plus a contingent of cavalry. The Second Battalion, under Captain Crawford, was a mixture of Chiricahua, Warm Springs, and White Mountain Scouts. The reason Crawford selected Scouts from these bands was because they were "as savage and as able" as their renegade kinsmen. In addition they were a mountainous people and had some knowledge where the concealed rancherias were located. The officers assigned to command Crawford's two companies were Lieutenant Marion P. Maus, First Infantry, and Lieutenant W. E. Shipp. Davis' area of operation was Chihuahua and Crawford's was Sonora.⁴⁵

As the Scouts collected, it was customary before every campaign to participate in a war dance. At these dances, "the 'medicine men' held one of their 'spirit' dances to consult with the powers of the other world and learn what success was to be expected."⁴⁶ In preparation for the ceremony, many of the Scouts would paint their faces red. The Scouts stood at the dances and sang songs and "as they sang, the dance leader would call out a scout's name, and the scout called would have to go out and dance around the fire with his rifle, acting as if he was fighting, pointing his rifle at the

⁴⁵ Nelson A. Miles, Personal Recollections and Observations of General Nelson A. Miles (Chicago: The Werner Company, 1896), p. 449.

⁴⁶ John G. Bourke, On the Border With Crook (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1891), p. 468.

them at daylight."⁵⁵

Just before dawn, the half-rested command surrounded the hostile camp, but the hostiles were warned by their braying burros. Shots were exchanged by both sides. Once again, the renegades disappeared down the mountainside "like so many quail. . . ." The Scouts captured their entire herd and all their camp goods. The officers and scouts ate what food they found and then rested their fatigued bodies. Several minutes passed, when unexpectedly an Apache woman entered the camp to relay the message that Geronimo and Natchez "desired to talk." The meeting was arranged for the following morning. After the woman departed, Crawford's command "threw themselves among the rocks, failing to maintain their usual vigilance."⁵⁶ This error was to be fatal the next day.

The next morning, January 11, 1886, "the sun rose clear and bright," over the higher portions of the Sierra Madre.⁵⁷ The camp was roused by yells from several of the scouts. Because of a morning fog in their location, visibility was markably reduced but Crawford and Maus were able to see "dusky forms in the distance." It was at first suspected that the "forms" were some of Captain

⁵⁵Miles, p. 455.

⁵⁶Ibid., pp. 456-457.

⁵⁷Daly, p. 39.

ground and pretending to shoot and putting his hand to his mouth and yelling as he would in battle." This would be repeated until all the scouts had participated in the festivities.⁴⁷ When the dances were concluded, the medicine men entered the area in single file. The head medicine man placed "his arms about the neck of the chief in such a manner that his wands crossed," and "murmured some words in his ear which seemed to be of pleasing import." The remaining medicine men followed suit repeating the ceremony of the first medicine man. "This terminated the great 'medicine' ceremony of the night, and the glad shouts of the Apaches testified that the incantations . . . promised a successful campaign."⁴⁸

The two commands reached Fort Bowie where they were inspected and briefed by Lieutenant General Philip Sheridan and General Crook. Concern in Washington, D. C., had compelled Secretary of War William C. Endicott to send Sheridan into the field to find out first hand what was transpiring in the Southwest. Sheridan, in his discussions with Crook, proposed a plan to remove the Chiricahuas and Warm Springs from Arizona but Crook, with Crawford's support, opposed the idea because of the catastrophic

⁴⁷ Grenville Goodwin, Western Apache Raiding and Warfare, ed. Keith H. Basso (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1971), pp. 108-116.

⁴⁸ Bourke, p. 470.

effect it would have on the scouts.⁴⁹

Sheridan must have entertained doubts on Crook's reliance on Apache scouts. As the campaign progressed however, Sheridan was quoted, "I have reason to believe that General Crook's operations will result in the destruction of Geronimo's band, and the restoration of quiet . . . but the work cannot be accomplished in a day. Now that General Crook has full sway his tact and fearless energy will, I doubt not, bring about good results."⁵⁰

Public outcry and editorials in Southwestern papers continued to mount against Crook and clamored against his Indian policy. The newspapers blamed his lack of success on his enlisting Apache scouts. One newspaper editorial stated, "that an Indian Scout is as much, or more, to be feared than a hostile warrior."⁵¹

On November 27, Captain Davis and the First Battalion departed for Chihuahua by way of New Mexico.⁵² Two days later, Crawford's Second Battalion marched in a southerly direction through the Dragoon Mountains and

⁴⁹Robert M. Utley, Frontier Regulars: The United States Army and the Indian 1866-1891 (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1973), p. 384.

⁵⁰Santa Fe Daily New Mexican, January 11, 1886, p. 1, col. 1.

⁵¹El Paso Daily Times (Texas), October 18, 1885, p. 2, col. 1.

⁵²Crook, p. 258.

crossed the border twenty miles north of Fronteras, Mexico. The scouts' progress amazed Lieutenant Maus. He stated their methods of scouting and "their system of advance guards and flankers was perfect, and as soon as the command went into camp, outposts were at once put out, guarding every approach. All this was done noiselessly and in secret, and without giving a single order."⁵³

The Apache scouts not only had to be alert for hostiles, but also Mexican scalp hunters and slave traders. In Mexico, "Indian slavery was still practiced;" therefore, the scouts had to keep a strict vigilance on their Mexican allies who were also chasing the Apache hostiles.⁵⁴

Slowly Crawford's command wound its way two hundred miles into Mexico always "sure the hostiles were near." The scouts passed Nacori, came upon several deserted rancherias, and picked up the hostiles' trail across the Jaros River. Climbing over the rugged terrain and into "deep and dark" canyons, the weary column finally spotted the hostile camp. The camp was "on a high point, well protected and apparently showing great caution on their part, it was decided to make a night march and attack

⁵³Miles, pp. 450-451.

⁵⁴Bernard C. Nalty and Truman R. Strobridge, "Captain Emmet Crawford: Commander of Apache Scouts 1882-1886," Arizona and the West, Vol. 6 No. 1, (Spring, 1964), 38.

Davis' scouts. Suddenly those "forms" loosened a barrage of shots wounding three of the scouts. The scouts quickly found shelter and returned the fire. It was soon discovered that the attacking party were Mexican irregulars comprised mainly of Tarahumari Indians. Captain Crawford shouted to the scouts to stop firing and approximately fifteen minutes later all firing had finally ceased. Thirteen Mexicans slowly approached Crawford's position, and as "I [Maus] spoke Spanish, I advanced about fifty or seventy-five yards to meet them and was followed by Captain Crawford. I told them who we were. . . . At this time we were all standing within a few feet of each other." Both commanders, Crawford and Mexican Major Mauricio Corredor, directed their men not to fire. The peace was quickly shattered as "one shot rang out distinct and alone . . . it sounded like a death knell and was followed by volleys from both sides."⁵⁸

Crawford was mortally wounded by the first shot and was "lying with his head pierced by a ball."⁵⁹ Crawford's murder was swiftly avenged by Dutchy, an Apache scout, who shot the Mexican sharpshooter.⁶⁰ The effectiveness of the scouts' firing forced the Mexicans

⁵⁸ Miles, p. 458.

⁵⁹ Ibid., p. 459.

⁶⁰ Anton Mazzanovich, Trailing Geronimo (3d ed.; Los Angeles: Haynes Corporation, 1931), p. 255.

to cease firing.

Lieutenant Maus, the new commander, and Tom Horn, chief of scouts, approached the Mexican line and initiated talks with "a most forlorn company of men . . . saying they thought we were the hostiles. All their officers were killed. . . ." ⁶¹ The Mexicans requested that Maus arrange to meet the following day in order to provide them with mules and medical assistance for their wounded. Even though Maus provided the requested supplies and medical aid, the Mexicans refused to allow Maus to leave their custody. Only when the Apache scouts raised their war cries and threatened to attack were the Mexicans finally induced to release Maus. ⁶²

Maus returned to his lines and issued orders to strike camp and construct a travois for the unconscious Crawford. Slowly the Second Battalion made its way back to Nacori. On January 17, Captain Crawford finally died and three days later the command entered Nacori and "near the unfenced cemetery . . . dug a grave in which we lowered the body to rest. . . ." ⁶³

Prior to Maus' departure for Nacori, two Apache women had arrived in his camp to arrange talks again. Throughout the engagement between the scouts and the

⁶¹Miles, p. 459.

⁶²Nalty, p. 39.

⁶³Daly, p. 40.

Mexicans, the hostiles "were interested spectators." Geronimo left word that he would meet Crook in "two moons."⁶⁴

On March 25, 1886, General Crook arrived at Maus' camp in Canyon de los Embudos, Sonora. Geronimo's camp was located approximately five hundred yards away. When Geronimo confronted Crook, Geronimo was adamant to explain why he left the Fort Apache Reservation.⁶⁵ Crook listened but told Geronimo it was futile "to try to talk nonsense." Crook flatly stated that Geronimo must surrender unconditionally or fight it out even if it might take fifty years. As the conference concluded, it was obvious that Geronimo was "nervous and agitated."⁶⁶

When the hostiles returned to their camp, Crook sent Alchesay and Ka-ya-ten-nae, Apache scouts, into their camp to create dissension among the renegade warriors.⁶⁷ This ploy bore fruit when Crook and the renegades resumed their talks on March 27.

When Crook and the Apaches met again, Chihuahua offered the surrender of his band and Geronimo soon followed suit. Crook accepted their surrenders and informed

⁶⁴Davis, pp. 197-198.

⁶⁵Black Range (Chloride, New Mexico), April 9, 1886, p. 2, col. 1.

⁶⁶Bourke, pp. 475-476.

⁶⁷*Ibid.*, p. 478.

them to be prepared to depart the following morning.

Lieutenant Maus was detailed to escort them to Fort Bowie.⁶⁸

All participants seemed satisfied by the talks that had transpired. Shortly after Crook departed, Geronimo, Natchez, and a dozen hostiles went on a "drunk" on mescal purchased from Bob Tribollet, an American trader.⁶⁹ In the evening of March 28, "during a drizzling rain, a part of the Chiricahuas--those who had been drinking Tribollet's whiskey--stole out from Maus' camp and betook themselves again to the mountains, frightened . . . by the lies told them by Tribollet. . . ." ⁷⁰ With the renegades on the loose again, it appeared to many of Arizona's and New Mexico's settlers that Geronimo's band would only "be exterminated when its members die of old age."⁷¹

⁶⁸ Black Range (Chloride, New Mexico), April 9, 1886, p. 2, col. 1.

⁶⁹ Davis, p. 213.

⁷⁰ Bourke, p. 481.

⁷¹ Albuquerque (New Mexico) Democrat, January 13, 1886, p. 2, col. 1.

CHAPTER VII

THE THIRD GERONIMO CAMPAIGN: AULD LANG SYNE

In May 1886, a Chiricahua renegade, Ki-e-ta, deserted Chief Natchez' renegade band and sought sanctuary among his people at the White Mountain Reservation. General Nelson Miles interviewed Ki-e-ta and was told that many of the renegades were tired and wished the fighting would cease. The Chiricahua remarked that there was a chance that the renegades might be induced to surrender if two or three well known and respected individuals would attempt to enter Geronimo's and Natchez's camp to open peace negotiations. General Miles agreed to such a plan even though he was disheartened because he would have to rely on Apache scouts and not on regular troops for success on this mission. By agreeing to this proposal, Miles conceded that his design to capture or force the renegades to surrender was a dismal failure.¹

General Miles ordered Lieutenant Charles Gatewood, a member of Captain Henry Lawton's mobile strike force, to convince Geronimo and Natchez of the futility of continued warfare. There had been three seasoned officers capable

¹Richard N. Ellis, "Copper-Skinned Soldiers: The Apache Scouts," Great Plains Journal, 5(1966), 62.

of successfully completing this mission but Captain Emmet Crawford had been killed in Mexico and Lieutenant Britton Davis resigned his commission to manage a ranch in Sonora, Mexico.² Lieutenant Gatewood was chosen because of his three years experience as commander of Apache Scouts at Fort Apache and his "bravery, cool judgment, and understanding of Apache character, with the knowledge the hostiles had of his fairness toward Apaches, made him virtually the only possible choice."³ On July 9, 1886, Gatewood, Ki-e-ta, Martine, George Wratten, the interpreter, Frank Houston, packer, and "Old Tex" Whaley, courier, set out on their mission.⁴ They carried with them the terms of surrender which were two years imprisonment before return to Arizona.⁵

Gatewood's small party passed through Fort Bowie to secure an escort, but were not successful. The outfit proceeded to the Mexican border where they were joined by a cavalry detachment from the Fourth Cavalry, under Lieutenant James Parker, who accompanied Gatewood to

²Britton Davis, The Truth About Geronimo, ed., M. M. Quaife (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1929), p. 195.

³Thomas Cruse, Apache Days and After (Caldwell, Idaho: The Claxton Printers, Ltd., 1941), p. 226.

⁴Davis, p. 224.

⁵Lawrence Vinton, "Reminiscences of Lawrence R. Jerome," Hostiles and Horse Soldiers: Indian Battles and Campaigns in the West, ed. Lonnie J. White (Boulder, Colorado: Pruett Publishing Company, 1972), p. 208.

Captain Lawton's encampment on the Rio Aros, approximately 250 miles below the border.⁶ Gatewood met Lawton and could scarcely believe the condition of the gaunt and fatigued soldiers before him. For over four months Lawton's command had pursued the renegades over 1,400 miles over the rugged terrain in northern Mexico. They had marched over the terrain that was "so torrid that the feet are blistered and rifle-barrels and everything metallic being so hot that the hand cannot touch them without getting burnt. It is a country rough beyond description. . . . We had no tents and little or no baggage of any kind except rations and ammunition. Suits of underclothing formed our uniforms and moccasins covered our feet."⁷

Lawton's scouts, under the command of Lieutenant R. A. Brown, on several occasions located the hostiles' rancherias but were always eluded. Even though Lawton was unable to conquer the renegades, the continuous pursuit by his command exacted its toll by breaking the hostiles' morale. On August 3, 1886, Gatewood placed himself under Lawton's command but only on the condition "that he was to proceed upon his mission as soon as circumstances

⁶Donald E. Worcester, The Apaches: Eagles of the Southwest (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1979), p. 302.

⁷Nelson A. Miles, Personal Recollections and Observations of General Nelson A. Miles (Chicago: The Werner Company, 1896), p. 517.

permitted."⁸ Lawton favored this arrangement as a temporary solution.

The Scouts received word from Mexican sources that the hostiles passed in the vicinity of Fronteras purchasing foodstuffs and liquor. Gatewood collected six more men, including Tom Horn and Jose Maria, and located the trail of two women from Geronimo's band who had been sent into Fronteras as "emissaries."⁹ Gatewood followed their trail for three days and located their position "four miles away on a lofty peak of the Torres Mountains. . . ."¹⁰ Lawton's troops lingered close on the heels of Gatewood's party.

Gatewood, Wratten, Ki-e-ta, Tom Horn, and Martine spotted Geronimo's well armed warriors.¹¹ Ki-e-ta, who had relatives among the hostiles, slowly advanced up the mountain waving a white flag. Martine was lagging behind Ki-e-ta because he was "always tying his shoestring or something."¹² Martine did not have relatives among the hostiles. As the two Scouts moved ahead, Gatewood and the others remained at the base of the mountain.

⁸Cruse, p. 227.

⁹Ibid., p. 229.

¹⁰Davis, p. 225.

¹¹Tom Horn, Life of Tom Horn: Government Scout and Interpreter (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1964), p. 207.

¹²Morris E. Opler, "A Chiricahua Apache's Account of the Geronimo Campaign of 1886," New Mexico Historical Review, XIII (October, 1938), 375.

The Apache lookouts had orders to kill anyone coming up the mountain and were prepared to kill the two Apache Scouts until some of Ki-e-ta's relatives recognized him and shouted "come on up. No one is going to hurt you."¹³

While Gatewood waited anxiously, and Martine inched his way to the hostiles' camp, Geronimo and Natchez permitted Ki-e-ta to speak to their warriors. Ki-e-ta stated, "All of you are my friends, and some of you are my brothers-in-law. I think a lot of you Indians, and I don't want you to get killed. The troops are coming after you from all directions. . . . The War Department's aim is to kill every one of you if it takes fifty years to hunt you down. . . . At night you do not rest as you should. . . . You even eat your meals running. You have no friends whatever in the world. So I beg you, my friends, do what the government wants you to do. That's what I'm up here for. . . . So I want you to go down with me when the troops come, and they want you to come down on the flats and have a council with them." The warriors in the band agreed with Ki-e-ta's proposals. Geronimo and Natchez sent Martine down the mountain with an invitation for Gatewood to enter their camp under a promise of safe conduct. Ki-e-ta remained in the camp feasting with his relatives while waiting for Gatewood's reply.¹⁴

¹³Opler, p. 375.

¹⁴Ibid., pp. 375-376.

Captain Lawton's thirty scouts, commanded by Lieutenant R. A. Brown, reached Gatewood and on August 24, they proceeded to Natchez's camp. Their progress was halted when hostile warriors barred their way. On orders from Natchez and Geronimo, only Gatewood's party was permitted to participate in the negotiations. Brown obeyed the order and Gatewood moved ahead about two miles to the site of the conference located in "a little glade on the bank of the bank of the Bavis pe. . . ." ¹⁵ Gatewood rendered the following account of the conference:

By squads the hostiles came in, unsaddled and turned out their ponies to graze. Among the last to arrive was Geronimo. He laid his rifle down twenty feet away and came and shook hands, remarking my apparent bad health and asking what was the matter. The tobacco having been passed around, of which I had brought fifteen pounds on my saddle, he took a seat alongside as near as he could get, the others in a semi-circle, and announced that the whole party was there to listen to General Miles' message.

It took but a minute to say 'surrender, and you will be sent with your families to Florida, there to wait the decision of the President as to your final disposition. Accept these terms or fight it out to the bitter end.'

A silence of weeks seemed to fall on the party. They sat there with never a movement, regarding me intently. Finally Geronimo passed a hand across his eyes, made his hands tremble, and asked me for a drink. ¹⁶

Gatewood did not have any liquor to calm Geronimo's

¹⁵ Davis, p. 225.

¹⁶ Ibid., pp. 225-226.

nerves. Geronimo explained that they had been on a mescal drinking spree and were suffering from the after effects.

Geronimo then rejected Miles' ultimatum and demanded to be placed on "the reservation or fight. . . ." ¹⁷ Tenseness and apprehension was reflected on Gatewood's face, but Natchez reassured him that he was in no danger. The meeting ended but Gatewood and Natchez agreed to resume talks the following morning. Before Gatewood departed, he spoke to Natchez and told him that his wife and daughter were already in Florida. ¹⁸

The Chiricahuas and Warm Springs bands at Fort Apache were virtually prisoners of war, but still went about the reservation fully armed. Few of these Apaches were engaged in farming; however, from the barley they did raise they produced "tiswin, a most intoxicating liquor, which has the peculiar characteristic of rousing all that is turbulent and vicious in the individual who had been imbibing; and the more barley they raised the more tiswin riots occurred." ¹⁹

Of greater concern to the military than tiswin was the communication and re-supply system occurring between the hostiles and the Apaches on the Reservation. General

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 226.

¹⁸ Cruse, p. 230.

¹⁹ Miles, p. 496.

Miles proposed that these "desperate" and "disreputable" people be removed from Arizona. To avoid trouble, Miles received authority from Washington, D. C. "to send a delegation" to the Capitol to secure the Apaches' approval for the removal. Chatto headed the delegation and was escorted by Captain Joseph Dorst, Fourth Cavalry. The results from their trip were negative and the Apache delegation demanded to be returned to Arizona. Enroute to Fort Apache, the Apache delegation was detained at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas where they became "defiant and insolent." Directions for the disposition of the Apaches stated the "place of confinement should be Fort Marion, Florida" for those at Fort Apache and "as to Chatto (then at Fort Leavenworth), and those with him, it was thought proper that he should be taken back to Arizona, to be sent to Marion with the others, and not taken directly there." They were to be treated as prisoners of war and the possibility of their removal to the Indian Territory was out of the question.²⁰

Gatewood's ace in the hole at the conference was the knowledge of the hostiles' future.²¹ When the

²⁰Ibid., pp. 496-500.

²¹Davis, p. 227. Note: Lawrence Vinton states that the lack of ammunition forced the hostiles to surrender. Lawrence Vinton, "Soldiering and Suffering in the Geronimo Campaign: Reminiscences of Lawrence R. Jerome" Journal of the West, ed., Joe A. Stout, Jr., Vol. XI (January, 1972), 168.

conference resumed, Geronimo and Natchez no longer made demands or threats in their conversation. The Apaches, aware that the area was the focal point of converging cavalry columns, became very sullen. They inquired about Miles' personality and Geronimo turned to Gatewood stating, "we want your advice. Consider yourself not a white man but one of us. Remember all that has been said today and tell us what we should do." Gatewood calmly replied, "trust General Miles and surrender to him." The Apache leaders agreed to surrender but only if they were allowed to retain their weapons until after their meeting with Miles; that Lawton should escort and guard them from Mexican and American troops hunting for them; Lieutenant Gatewood was to stay in their ranks day and night. All of these conditions were approved by Lawton.²² The troops supplied provisions for the hostiles and in the afternoon of August 25, 1886, the Apaches and their escort headed north to the border.²³

Three days later, at San Bernardino, the arrangements for the surrender of Natchez and Geronimo were concluded. It was agreed that the renegades would follow the Apache scouts to Skeleton Canyon. Leonard Wood, a member of Lawton's command, stated the Apaches were impatient about waiting to surrender. They feared the

²²Ibid., pp. 227-228.

²³Cruse, p. 231.

prospect of "falling into the hands of the civil authorities in Arizona."²⁴ As the two parties marched northward, they encountered Mexican troops on August 28, but after several suspenseful moments the American officers successfully intervened and prevented any bloodshed.²⁵ The reported stories of skirmishing between Mexican and American troops over the Apaches were false.²⁶ The scouts and hostiles reached Skeleton Canyon and established their camps approximately a mile and half apart. They patiently waited for General Miles' arrival.²⁷

On the evening of September 3, General Miles and Lieutenant John Dapray, his aide-de-camp, riding in a stagecoach, and a mounted escort arrived at Skeleton Canyon. Geronimo immediately approached Miles to question him of the surrender. Geronimo feared treachery by the Americans but Miles reassured him that "it is not the custom of officers of the United States army to misuse or destroy their prisoners. So long as you are our prisoners we shall not kill you but shall treat you justly."²⁸ Miles

²⁴ Leonard Wood, Chasing Geronimo: The Journal of Leonard Wood May-September, 1886, ed. Jack C. Lane (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1970), p. 104.

²⁵ Ibid., pp. 106-107.

²⁶ New York Times, September 4, 1886, p. 2, col. 3.

²⁷ Wood, p. 109.

²⁸ Miles, p. 521.

emphasized that there were no conditions to be expected except unconditional surrender, which would make the hostiles prisoners of war. Geronimo received instructions to obey any order they were given. He consented and promised to bring his band in the following morning.

Miles explained to Geronimo the futility of planning any mischief. He reminded him of the Army's superiority, specifically the heliostat. Miles stated that with it, "we can watch your movements and send messages over the tops of these mountains in a small part of one day, and over a distance which it would take a man mounted on a swift pony twenty days to travel."²⁹ Miles presented a demonstration by sending a message to Fort Bowie where Geronimo's brother, Perico, was a hostage. After receiving the reply that Perico "is all right," the Apaches dismissed any thoughts of escape.³⁰ All that Geronimo and his band desired now was to rejoin their families in Florida.³¹

Geronimo, Natchez, and Dapray rode in the coach with Miles when he departed Skeleton Canyon.³² The warriors, women, and children followed under the protection

²⁹Ibid., p. 523.

³⁰Ibid., p. 525.

³¹Silver City Enterprise (New Mexico), September 10, 1886, p. 3, col. 2.

³²Miles, p. 526.

of the scouts and several cavalry troops.

John Slaughter, owner of the San Bernardino Ranch, brought the first news of Geronimo's "capture" to Tombstone and soon the news spread like wildfire throughout the territories.³³ John Clum, editor of the Tombstone Epitaph, remarked at last the "serio-comic Geronimo campaign" was finally at an end.³⁴ There was no doubt that it was Gatewood who insured the "capture" of Geronimo. Captain Lawton confirmed his remark by stating that Gatewood was the only officer who deserved the credit for it.³⁵

One band of renegades that did not submit to the Army was led by Mangus. This band was comprised of "two men, three women, two half-grown boys, a girl, and four small children," all hiding in Mexico. This small party was soon captured by Captain Charles Cooper, Tenth Cavalry, with twenty troopers and two Apache scouts from Fort Apache. Britton Davis stated that Captain Cooper must be credited with "the only actual capture of armed Indian men during the entire campaign."³⁶

³³New York Times, September 5, 1886, p. 2, col. 4.

³⁴Woodworth Clum, Apache Agent: The Story of John P. Clum (Cambridge, Mass.: The Riverside Press, 1936), p. 284.

³⁵Sierra County Advocate (New Mexico), September 25, 1886, p. 2, col. 2.

³⁶Davis, pp. 231-232.

The Apache campaign was finally at an end. The only dilemma remaining for Miles was the final removal of the Apache prisoners of war. Several companies of soldiers were soon spotted by civilians passing through Albuquerque, New Mexico enroute to Holbrook, Arizona. Their ultimate destination was the San Carlos Reservation to aid in the removal of the Apaches.³⁷ Two train cars were dispatched by the A. and P. Railroad Company to transport some of the Apaches to Fort Union, New Mexico where they were to wait for further orders from Washington, D. C.³⁸

When Geronimo's band reached Fort Bowie, Miles placed a strong guard around the Apaches to protect them from the civil authorities. The former hostiles were "dismounted, disarmed, and placed under a strong escort . . ." and on September 8, the Apaches boarded the train on the Southern Pacific Railroad line. As the train pulled away from the Bowie Station, the Fourth Cavalry band "on the occasion of the final adieu to the Apaches whom they had been hunting and fighting for so many years . . . struck up Auld Lang Syne. . . ."³⁹ By four o'clock in the afternoon, the train was heading east to San Antonio, Texas.⁴⁰ The train almost did not leave

³⁷ Albuquerque Morning Democrat (New Mexico), September 3, 1886, p. 3, col. 1 and 2.

³⁸ El Paso Times (Texas), September 3, 1886, p. 3, col. 2.

³⁹ Miles, p. 527.

⁴⁰ Vinton, p. 168.

Bowie Station. Lieutenant William Thompson, Acting Assistant Adjutant General, approached Leonard Wood and whispered, "I have got something here which would stop this movement, but I am not going to let the old man [Miles] see it until you are gone, then I will repeat it to him."⁴¹ The "something" were instructions to retain the Apaches in Arizona in order that they stand trial for their "crimes."

Miles' decision to remove the Apaches to Fort Marion, Florida, was because Fort Marion was the "nearest fort or prison." He carried out the relocation contrary to President Grover Cleveland's instructions. Cleveland intended the fort or prison to be in Arizona Territory where the Apaches would be tried by the civil authorities.⁴² Miles accepted the responsibility for his actions against Cleveland's orders. Miles' decision was founded on familiarity with the Apache "dilemma." If they were detained for indictments issued by the territorial officials, the Apaches were already condemned before they appeared in a court room. The citizens' anger against their former adversaries was vehement. General Miles regarded the removal "more effective than if forty executions had taken place."⁴³

⁴¹Wood, p. 112.

⁴²Ibid., p. 114.

⁴³Silver City Enterprise (New Mexico), October 8, 1886, p. 5, col. 5.

The Chiricahuas and Warm Springs Apaches at Fort Apache were composed of peaceful farmers and discharged Indian Scouts from the recent Geronimo campaign. Several of the recently discharged Scouts were asked to reenlist but most refused because they were tired of scouting.⁴⁴ Shortly after returning home from the arduous campaign, the Apache Scouts obeyed the military authorities to assemble to receive rations. Once they were in a single file, "the commander ordered his troops to take their belts and ammunition and their guns away. . . . They herded the Scouts in the horse barn and guarded them day and night. They threw them horse blankets to lie on. Soldiers guarded them, the very men they had gone out with before."⁴⁵ A few days later wagons arrived to transfer them to the train station at Holbrook, Arizona. The Apaches were frightened and unable to comprehend why they "were taken to prison for what Geronimo had done."⁴⁶ These Apache scouts had served the Army loyally and incurred the wrath of their own people.⁴⁷ For the many years of loyal service, they were rewarded with deportation and "in this manner our great and beneficent government

⁴⁴ Rope, p. 51.

⁴⁵ Opler, p. 381.

⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 382.

⁴⁷ Eve Ball, "The Apache Scouts: A Chiricahua Appraisal," Arizona and the West, 7 (Winter, 1965), 196.

finally solved " the Apache problem.⁴⁸

Reactions to the deportation of the faithful scouts were voiced by those who had commanded them. John Bourke wrote that their incarceration "can never meet with the approval of honorable soldiers and gentlemen."⁴⁹ General Crook was outraged by the exile and delivered several speeches praising his Scouts.⁵⁰

General Miles defended their removal by accusing the Apache scouts of disloyalty. He charged Chatto, a sergeant in the Indian Scouts, with planning new hostilities and stated "that another outbreak was contemplated by the Indians," with many of the scouts taking part.⁵¹ Edmund G. Ross, Governor of New Mexico, endorsed Miles' action and in his Governor's Report to Lucius Q. C. Lamar, Secretary of the Interior, Ross wrote, "the active, vigorous, and wise policy of General Miles, which has at last resulted in the expulsion from the Southwest of every element of Indian hostility, has

⁴⁸Ross Santee, Apache Land (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1947), p. 48.

⁴⁹John G. Bourke, On the Border With Crook (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1891), p. 485.

⁵⁰George Crook, General George Crook: His Autobiography, ed. Martin Schmitt (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1946), p. 291.

⁵¹Miles, pp. 496-497.

re-established confidence and safety throughout that region."⁵²

Captain John Bourke, writing for the numerous officers who served with the Apache scouts, expressed their thoughts eloquently:

not a single Chiricahua had been killed, captured, or wounded throughout the entire campaign--with two exceptions--unless by Chiricahu-Apache scouts. . . . Yet every one of those faithful scouts--especially the two, 'Ki-e-ta' and 'Martinez,' [Martine] who had at imminent personal peril gone into the Sierra Madre to hunt up 'Geronimo' and induce him to surrender--were transplanted to Florida and there subjected to the same punishment as had been meted out to 'Geronimo'. . . . There is no more disgraceful page in the history of our relations with the American Indians than that which conceals the treachery visited upon the Chiricahuas who remained faithful to our people.⁵³

This is a fitting tribute by Bourke to the Apache scouts who sacrificed so much for a government that discarded them so easily. Arthur Woodward, a historian, remarked, if there was any organization that deserved recognition in the school textbooks of ours, "it is the Apache scouts."⁵⁴

⁵² Report of the Governor of New Mexico to the Secretary of the Interior 1886 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1886), p. 9.

⁵³ Bourke, p. 485.

⁵⁴ Arthur Woodward, "The Apache Indian Scouts," The Masterkey, IX (1935), 131.

CHAPTER VIII

EPILOGUE

The Apache problem in the American Southwest was finally solved by the removal of all Chiricahua Apaches from Arizona and New Mexico. Celebrations occurred throughout the territories commemorating the "capture" and relocation of the Apache prisoners of war. General Nelson A. Miles and Captain Henry Lawton attended numerous rallies where they accepted the applause for successfully "concluding the campaign against Geronimo."¹ At a banquet in Tucson, Arizona, Miles "was presented with a Tiffany sword and Lawton with a fine watch. . . ."²

The Apaches no longer posed any military problems, but rather an administrative headache. The Army had succeeded in subduing the Apaches. John C. Cremony, a former Apache captive, foretold in 1868 that "there can be but one policy pursued toward these Indians with any chance of satisfactory result. They must be subdued by force of arms, and after submission, they must be removed

¹El Paso Times (Texas), September 7, 1886, p. 1, col. 2.

²Britton Davis, The Truth About Geronimo, ed. M. M. Quaife (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1929), p. 235.

from their country."³ It was Miles' decision to relocate all the former hostiles and loyal Chiricahuas. One group of Apaches, removed from Arizona in March 1886, was at Fort Marion, St. Augustine, Florida. Geronimo's warriors were at Fort Pickens, Pensacola, Florida and their families detained at Fort Marion. The Apache scouts and their families arrived at Fort Marion thereby completing the removal of all Chiricahuas from Arizona Territory. Altogether, 498 Apache prisoners filled the Florida prisons.⁴

The Apaches remained in Florida until May 1888, when the government transferred them to Mount Vernon Barracks, Alabama. During their detention in Florida and Alabama, approximately twenty-four per cent of the Apaches died from various diseases. Only eighty-one babies had been born in captivity.⁵ General George Crook was extremely bitter at the government for the treatment his former scouts received. He enlisted General O. O. Howard, Senator H. L. Dawes, Secretary of War Redfield Proctor,

³ John C. Cremony, Life Among the Apaches (1st ed. 1868; New Mexico: Rio Grande Press, 1970), p. 316.

⁴ George Crook, General George Crook: His Autobiography, ed. Martin F. Schmitt (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1946), p. 290.

⁵ Eve Ball, Nora Henn, and Lynda Sanchez, An Apache Odyssey: Indeh (Provo, Utah: Brigham Young University, 1980), p. 158.

and Herbert Welsh, leader of the Indian Rights Association, to assist him in the fight to relocate the Apaches from Alabama to the Indian Territory.⁶ In January 1890, Dawes presented Joint Senate Resolution 42 that would grant "authority for the removal of Apache Indian prisoners and their families to Fort Sill, Indian Territory."⁷

Joint Senate Resolution 42 received hostile opposition from the western presses and General Miles. The westerners objected to the Apaches' close proximity to New Mexico and Arizona if the Chiricahuas settled at Fort Sill. There was a prevailing attitude among many Southwesterners that the Chiricahuas would escape and return to the warpath.⁸ Miles opposed any compromise with the Chiricahuas because they had surrendered unconditionally. As far as Miles was concerned, they had no rights whatsoever.

The Resolution had a chance for passage in the House of Representatives had it not been for the untimely death of Crook on March 21, 1890. With his death, the movement to relocate the Chiricahuas lost its momentum.⁹ Captain John Bourke stated that when Crook died the Apaches'

⁶Crook, pp. 291-292.

⁷U. S., Congressional Record, 51st Cong., 1st Sess., (1890), XXI, 620.

⁸Ball, p. 159.

⁹Crook, pp. 292-301.

hope died also and "despair came again."¹⁰

The Apaches did not leave Alabama until August 6, 1894, when Congress finally permitted them to relocate at Fort Sill. The Apaches, however, still retained prisoners of war status. Approximately \$15,000 was allotted to them to establish new homes at Fort Sill.¹¹ During their confinement on the Fort Sill Military Reservation, the Apaches prospered as farmers and ranchers. Upon their release as prisoners of war in 1913, the majority of the Chiricahuas moved to the Mescalero Apache Reservation in New Mexico and those remaining in Oklahoma purchased individual homesites from the Comanches and Kiowa-Apaches.¹² The Chiricahuas finally had a permanent home.

When Crook had first recruited Apache scouts, they were from Apache bands hostile to one another.¹³ For as long as the scouts fought their enemies they "were not despised by their own people."¹⁴ Crook's employment of Apache scouts to fight their kinsmen was a controversial issue. The feud between the scouts and renegades was

¹⁰ John G. Bourke, On the Border With Crook (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1891), p. 486.

¹¹ Ball, p. 159.

¹² Ibid., pp. 183-193.

¹³ Crook, p. 165.

¹⁴ Eve Ball, In the Days of Victorio: Recollections of a Warm Springs Apache, narr. James Kaywaykla (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1970), p. 80.

expressed by Ace Daklugie, son of Juh, stating "there was just one good thing about being shipped to Florida and being Prisoners of War twenty-seven years, and that was that the scouts were rounded up and shipped along too." The Scouts and former hostiles carried their contempt for each other to the Mescalero Reservation.¹⁵

The Apache Scouts proved their effectiveness repeatedly. They successfully tracked and fought their hostile kinsmen never allowing the renegades to feel secure in any of their sanctuaries. The two Apache Scouts, Ki-e-ta and Martine, contributed their services in bringing about Geronimo's final capitulation in September 1886. Additional evidence of the Apache Scouts' value to the American war effort was the Scouts' combat record. From 1873 through 1886, the Scouts killed 572 and captured 637 hostiles while regular Army units killed 122 and captured 132.¹⁶ Ten Apache Scouts received America's highest military award, the Medal of Honor, for their invaluable services.¹⁷

The Apache Scouts received praise from various

¹⁵Eve Ball, "The Apache Scouts: A Chiricahua Appraisal," Arizona and the West, Vol. 7, No. 4 (Winter, 1965), 262-63.

¹⁶Joyce E. Mason, "The Use of Indian Scouts In the Apache Wars, 1870-1886" (PhD dissertation, Indiana University, 1970), p. 358.

¹⁷The Medal of Honor of the United States Army (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1948), pp. 218-219.

sources. James H. Cook, a New Mexico rancher, stated the "Scouts whom I have personally known proved extremely valuable. . . ." ¹⁸ Martha Summerhayes, an Army wife, remarked that "as long as they [the Apaches] were serving as scouts, they showed themselves loyal. . . ." ¹⁹ General Crook added that every victory over the renegades should be credited to the Apache Scouts. He stated that "to polish a diamond there is nothing like its own dust." ²⁰ The renegades' hatred of the Scouts was due to their effectiveness. The renegades evaded the American and Mexican soldiers, but not the persistent Apache Scouts. Without the Apache Scouts' valuable service to the United States Army, the war in Apacheria might have continued into the 1890's or the early twentieth century.

¹⁸ James H. Cook, Fifty Years On the Old Frontier: As Cowboy, Hunter, Guide, Scout, and Ranchman (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1957), p. 164.

¹⁹ Martha Summerhayes, Vanished Arizona: Recollections of My Army Life, ed. Milo Milton Quaife (Chicago: The Lakeside Press, 1939), p. 112.

²⁰ Charles F. Lummis, General Crook and the Apache Wars, ed. Turbese Lummis Fiske (Flagstaff, Arizona: Northland Press, 1966), p. 17.

APPENDIX A

APACHE SCOUT MEDAL OF HONOR RECIPIENTS

1871-1886

Alchesay or Achesay. Sergeant, Apache Scouts. Winter of 1872-1873. Gallant conduct during campaigns and engagements with Apaches.

Blanquet. Private, Apache Scouts. Winter of 1872-1873. Gallant conduct during campaigns and engagements with Apaches.

Chiquito. Private, Apache Scouts. Winter of 1872-1873. Gallant conduct during campaigns and engagements with Apaches.

Elsatsoosu. Corporal, Apache Scouts. Winter of 1872-1873. Gallant conduct during campaigns and engagements with Apaches.

Jim. Sergeant, Apache Scouts. Winter of 1872-1873. Gallant conduct during campaigns and engagements with Apaches.

Kelsay. Private, Apache Scouts. Winter of 1872-1873. Gallant conduct during campaigns and engagements with Apaches.

Kosoha. Private, Apache Scouts. Winter of 1872-1873. Gallant conduct during campaigns and engagements with Apaches.

Machol. Private, Apache Scouts. Winter of 1872-1873. Gallant conduct during campaigns and engagements with Apaches.

Nannasaddie. Private, Apache Scouts. Winter of 1872-1873. Gallant conduct during campaigns and engagements with Apaches.

Nantaje. Private, Apache Scouts. Winter of 1872-1873. Gallant conduct during campaigns and engagements with Apaches.

APPENDIX B

NUMBER OF APACHE SCOUTS ENLISTED

<u>Year</u>	<u>Number Enlisted</u>
1871	15
1872	312
1873	252
1874	264
1875	169
1876	197
1877	299
1878	218
1879	177
1880	299
1881	479
1882	339
1883	242
1884	316
1885	745
1886	<u>349</u>
TOTAL	4,672

Joyce E. Mason, "The Use of Indian Scouts In the Apache Wars, 1870-1886." PhD dissertation, Indiana University, 1970, p. 377.

APPENDIX C

ILLUSTRATIONS

<u>Title of Illustration</u>	<u>Thesis Page</u>
Uniform of the United States Army. Fairfax Downey and Jacques N. Jacobsen, Jr., <u>The Red/Bluecoats: The Indian Scouts U. S. Army</u> (Fort Collins, Colorado: The Old Army Press, 1973), p. 191.	128
The Apachean Groups. Thomas E. Mails, <u>The People Called Apache</u> (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1974), p. 15.	129
Location of Chiricahua Bands in the Southwest. Thomas E. Mails, <u>The People Called Apache</u> (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1974), p. 208.	130
Location of Western Apaches. Thomas E. Mails, <u>The People Called Apache</u> (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1974), p. 22.	131
Southwestern New Mexico. Dan L. Thrapp, <u>Victorio and the Mimbres Apaches</u> (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1974), p. 70.	132
Major American and Mexican Settlements. Dan L. Thrapp, <u>Victorio and the Mimbres Apaches</u> (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1974), p. 9.	133
U. S. Army Installations in Arizona, 1849-1886. Ray Brandes, "A Guide to the History of the U. S. Army Installations in Arizona, 1849-1886." <u>Arizona and the West</u> , 1, No. 1 (Spring, 1959), 43.	134
Southern New Mexico and West Texas. Dan L. Thrapp, <u>Victorio and the Mimbres Apaches</u> (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1974), pp. 96-97.	135

APPENDIX C (Continued)

ILLUSTRATIONS

<u>Title of Illustration</u>	<u>Thesis Page</u>
Battle of Tres Castillos. Dan L. Thrapp, <u>Victorio and the Mimbres Apaches</u> (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1974), p. 296.	136
Heliograph System in the Department of Arizona. Nelson A. Miles, <u>Personal Recollections and Observations of General Nelson A. Miles</u> (Chicago: The Werner Company, 1896), p. 484.	137

UNIFORM OF THE U. S. ARMY.
ENLISTED INDIAN SCOUTS.

FATIGUE HAT.

61. Of black felt, brim $3\frac{1}{4}$ inches in width, crown $8\frac{1}{4}$ inches high: brim to be well stiffened.

HAT CORD.

Of white worsted cord, one strand of scarlet, terminating in two tassels $1\frac{1}{2}$ inches in length, same color and material as the cord.

HAT ORNAMENT.

Two arrows crossed, to be made of nickel or some white metal, 3 inches in length, the letters U. S. S. in the upper intersection.

DARK-BLUE SHIRT.


Same as now furnished enlisted men, except that the collar is to be made deeper to hold a neck handkerchief, as follows: Collar 2 inches wide at the back of the neck, $3\frac{1}{4}$ inches in front.

OVERCOAT.

To be made of Irish frieze, or imitation of that material of some dark color, to be cut ulster shape, large and full enough to cover all accouterments; to reach within 10 inches of the ground; to be closed in front with two rows of brass buttons: to be slit well up in rear to admit of the seat in the saddle; to be provided with warm hood of same material as the coat, lined with black Italian cloth, or other suitable material, made to button around the neck, under the collar, and large enough to cover the head; to be worn at night and in inclement weather; and on each hip to have a horizontal slit covered with a flap, this for access to the revolver and ammunition. The coat to be lined throughout.

HELMET.

Same as prescribed for mounted men; cords to be of white mohair with one strand of scarlet; plume to be long enough to reach 6 or 8 inches below the edge of rear visor, of white horse hair with four strands of scarlet; ornament in front to contain crossed arrows, of white metal.




The Apachean groups.





*Approximate location of the Chiricahua
bands within their original Southwest*


ARIZONA

NEW MEXICO












- | | |
|-------------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| 1 — FORT BUCHANAN (1856-1861) | 17 — CAMP DATE CREEK (1867-1874) |
| 2 — CAMP BARRETT (1862) | 18 — CAMP WILLOW GROVE (1867-1869) |
| 3 — CAMP TUBAC (1862-1865) | 19 — CAMP RENO (1867-1870) |
| 4 — FORT CANBY (1855-1864) | 20 — CAMP COLORADO (1868-1871) |
| 5 — CAMP SUPPLY (1863) | 21 — CAMP HUAPAI (1869-1873) |
| 6 — CAMP CLARK (1865-1864) | 22 — CAMP RAWLINS (1870) |
| 7 — CAMP MANSFIELD (1863?) | 23 — CAMP PINAL (1870-1871) |
| 8 — CAMP GOODWIN (1864-1871) | 24 — CAMP PICKET POST (1871-?) |
| 9 — CAMP LINCOLN (1864) | 25 — CAMP BEALE'S SPRINGS (1871-1874) |
| 10 — CAMP MASON (1865-1866) | 26 — CAMP LA PAZ (1874-1875) |
| 11 — CAMP LEWIS (1865?-1870?) | 27 — CAMP SUPPLY (1878) |
| 12 — CAMP WALLEN (1866-1869) | 28 — CAMP RUCKER (1879-1880) |
| 13 — CAMP CAMERON (1869-1867) | 29 — CAMP HIGGS (1870?) |
| 14 — CAMP RIGG (1865?) | 30 — CAMP PRICE (1881) |
| 15 — CAMP EL DORADO (1867) | 31 — CAMP CRAWFORD (1886) |
| 16 — CAMP SKULL VALLEY (1867) | |





Don Bufkin

The Battle of Tres Castillos



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